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Abstract 
The escalation/de-escalation of commitment to capital investment decisions is a 
complex phenomenon that is under-researched not least because of the fragmented 
nature of the extant literature, the absence of comprehensive studies of why managers 
escalate commitment particularly for projects that are perceived to be failing, and the 
overlooking of the capital investment project initiating process in the existing studies. 
These deficiencies in the existing literature seriously limit the understanding of this 
phenomenon and its impact on practice, hence the motivation for the present study.    
 
Drawing on an extensive review of the relevant literature that spans a period of five 
decades and includes a careful scrutiny of theoretical alternatives and more than 130 
empirical works, this research develops an encapsulating approach-avoidance model 
that is applied in a large mixed-methods study of corporate managers in 274 Saudi 
companies. This model not only systematically groups and examines the direct effect 
of a large array of project-specific and non-project-specific variables, but it also 
captures the intervening role of project auditing in the escalation/de-escalation 
decisions.      
 
Primary data were mainly collected by means of a survey using a Likert-scale 
questionnaire that was specifically designed to take into account the purposes and data 
requirements of the present study as embodied in its theoretical model and hypotheses. 
Additional data were collected from conducting face-to-face interviews in three 
companies. To overcome one of the deficiencies of existing studies as mentioned 
above, sufficient data on the capital investment process were sought and obtained 
through the survey and interviews. Besides descriptive statistics, multinomial logistic 
regression and MODPROBE macro tests were applied to examine direct and indirect 
relationships and levels of data fit.  
 
An overall finding of this study is that the (de)-escalation phenomenon is not only 
present in the Saudi corporate environment but it is pervasive throughout the industrial 
spectrum, thus confirming the need for the comprehensive and insightful approach 
adopted by the present research to examine its determinants and their policy 
implications. The detailed statistical analysis provides sufficient evidence to support 
this approach. While it is found that contextual and project determinants have the most 
influence on how Saudi managers commit to a course of action, the (de)-escalation of 
commitment is, contrary to what is portrayed in most existing studies, influenced by a 
combination of rather than by isolated factors. Notwithstanding these results, of 
significant relevance to knowledge in this under researched area are the findings that: 
a) the commitment determinants are underlined by the type of capital investment 
process, and b) that project audit plays a major moderating role in how the 
determinants impact the (de)-escalation of commitment.   
 
Apart from the usual limitations associated with using a survey method, this study 
would have been able to offer more insights had it not been for the sensitivity of the 
topic and the socio-cultural inhibitors that prevented managers from taking part in 
more interviews. Nevertheless, the richness of the data collected and the findings from 
the elaborate analysis undertaken offer not only opportunities for future research but 
also practical guidelines to managers with respect to making capital project decisions.   
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the research and outlines the structure of the 
dissertation. The chapter consists of the following sections: a brief background of the 
research topic (Section 1.2), an explanation of its rationale (Section 1.3), the research 
objectives and questions (Section 1.4), the research methodology (Sections 1.5), the 
research theoretical model (Section 1.6), and dissertation chapter contents (Section 1.7).  
 
1.2 Research Background  
Commitment to a course of action, within the context of capital project management, is a 
double-edged sword. Commitment could be considered as an encouraging tool that 
supports managers to complete difficult tasks. Alternatively, commitment could preclude 
managers from acknowledging and recognizing failing investment projects, which might 
result in the long continuance of projects with negative net present values (Devaney, 
1991). This long commitment to failing projects results from the fact that conditions that 
surround decisions to stop one action in order to undertake another or to abandon a course 
of action are laden with uncertainties and regularly create problems for decision-makers. 
Examples of conditions include a project‟s information ambiguity (Chakravorty, 2009), a 
manager‟s personal responsibility for the failing project (Alvarez et al., 2011), political 
support for projects (Winch, 2013), and sunk costs (Ting, 2011). 
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Given the essentially uncertain nature of these conditions, the decision maker faces the 
problem of “what to do?” (McCaskey, 1979). One kind of decision arising from this 
complicated situation is to de-escalate commitment. The “De-Escalation of Commitment” 
(e.g. Brockner et al., 1979; Tegar, 1980; Nathanson, et al., 1982; McCain, 1986; Staw and 
Ross, 1987a; Simonson and Staw, 1992; Pan and Pan, 2011) implies awareness of the 
means of commitment reductions and guidelines for managers to decrease their 
commitment to a failing course of action. 
 
On the other hand, another possible course of action, discussed in the organisational 
behaviour, strategic management, and social psychology literatures, is the “Escalation of 
Commitment” phenomenon (Bowen, 1987). This is similar to waiting for a bus that will 
never come, or continuing to repair an old car that will never be efficient. Complications 
can further lead to what is called an “Entrapment” situation (Drummond, 1994; 
McElhinney and Procter, 2005; Ku, 2008; Gunia et al., 2009; Yen and Lin, 2012). 
Although there has been some confusion in the literature as to whether escalation of 
commitment and entrapment are synonymous (Drummond, 1994; Gerrit, 1995), there is a 
clear difference between the two because in the entrapment situation the choice element 
disappears as managers find themselves in a deadlocked course of action (Brockner and 
Rubin, 1985; Bowen, 1987; McElhinney and Procter, 2005).   
 
1.3 Research Rationale 
The rationale for this research arises from two related aspects of the capital project 
decision process on the above phenomenon: 
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 The first aspect is the (de)-escalation of commitment itself, where the significance of 
investigating managers‟ escalation decisions stems from the need to examine and 
understand factors as well as causes of managers‟ tendency to add more resources to 
failing projects, which is deemed an irrational and costly behaviour. Therefore, a key 
reason for examining these decisions and understanding the underlying causes is to be 
then able to provide managers with alternatives to avoid such irrational behaviour. 
  
 The second aspect is associated with the initial strategic plan of the capital project. 
While setting the goals and objectives of the strategic plan is a vital element in the 
decision making process, it could be considered as the first building block in deciding 
whether to invest in a capital project, escalate or even de-escalate commitment to an 
on-going project. 
 
These two related aspects are explained in detail in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 below.  
 
1.3.1 The Escalation Dimension 
The academic interest in the issue of escalation of commitment in project management has 
been gaining momentum since the mid-seventies (Staw, 1976; Brockner and Rubin, 1985; 
Staw and Ross, 1987a; Schaubroeck and Davis, 1994; Hantula and Bragger, 1999; Moon, 
et al., 2003; Sivanthan et al., 2008; Korzaan and Morris, 2009; Ting, 2011; Contractor et 
al., 2012; Salter et al., 2013). This is emphasised by the often eye-catching titles given to 
the escalation phenomenon in the existing literature, such as: “Knee deep in the big 
muddy” (Staw, 1976); “Too much invested to quit” (Tegar, 1980); “The dead loss effect” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984); “The sunk cost effect” (Arkes and Blumer, 1985); 
“Entrapment” (Brockner and Rubin, 1985); “Deep waders in muddy waters” (Dodd-
McCue et al., 1987); “Too little too late” (Drummond, 1994); “Throwing good money 
after bad” (e.g. Bondt and Makhija, 1988; Gosh, 1995); “Can‟t stop on a dime” (Goltz, 
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1999) “Your sunk costs, my escalation of commitment” (Gunia et al., 2009) and 
“Cleaning up the big muddy” (Sleesman et al., 2012). 
 
Further, this academic interest was perceived in presenting cases that epitomized real well-
known examples of escalation of commitment in the existing literature in different 
countries. For example, in the UK: installing an e-project (Pan and Pan, 2011), in 
Denmark: installing an IT large Danish project for higher education institutions (Mähring 
et al., 2008), and in the USA: installing a six-sigma programme in an electrical company 
(Chakravorty, 2009) or building a nuclear power plant (Ross and Staw, 1993).  
 
These examples of sensational titles and symbolized cases hint at the escalation of 
commitment phenomenon in terms of: (a) a series of actions linked to an investment to 
attain an established objective; (b) the availability of feedback information, suggesting 
that the chosen investment is not achieving the established objectives; and c) an 
opportunity to commit additional resources to achieve the established objective (Staw, 
1982; Wilson and Zhang, 1997). The financial consequences of project escalation in real 
life cases can be quite spectacular (see Table 1.1).   
Table 1.1: Examples of Escalated Investment Projects* 
Project Location Estimated costs Finished costs Type of escalation 
Concorde UK/France £80 million £700 million Inter-governmental 
Expo‟ 86 Canada $78 million $1.5 billion Political 
Humber Bridge UK £19 million £120 million Economic 
Sydney Opera House Australia $2 million $102 million Technological/political 
Millennium Dome UK £785 million £960 million Political 
Euro Disney France $2.5 million $4.4 billion Economic 
Olympic Village  UK £2.4 billion £9.3 billion Economic/political 
* Source: information was summarized from: Ross and Staw (1986); Wilson and Zhang (1997); Nutt 
(2001); and Hardman (2008). 
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The UK Millennium Dome is a fitting example of the escalating commitment 
phenomenon. The Dome was built in London and intended to be one of the best shows in 
the world in the new Millennium 2000. “The Dome was hyped as futuristic, flashy, and 
high tech, but became a national embarrassment within weeks of opening…the 
Millennium Dome was originally championed by the Conservative Government which lost 
power in 1997. The new Labour Prime Minister, at that time, took over the project calling 
it a triumph of confidence over cynicism, boldness over blandness” (Nutt, 2001: 2). In 
order to complete the project, the government kept spending time, effort, and money. 
“…The government put £785m into the project and had to infuse it with an additional 
£175m to keep it afloat…twelve million visitors were forecast but fewer than 4.5 million, 
many with cut-price tickets, paid to get in” (Nutt, 2001: 2). The Government was left with 
the difficult choice of selling the Dome or adding more resources to the project, knowing 
that the Dome costs about “£1 million monthly to keep standing” (Financial Times, 2001). 
Even worse, “…bidders were planning to bulldoze the building and use its picturesque 
location on the River Thames to build something else” (Nutt, 2001: 2).    
 
A more recent example is building the Olympic Village in Stratford, East London, for the 
2012 Olympic Games. Although all plans and arrangements were approved in addition to 
constructions that were described to be well ahead of schedule (Rajan, 2009), there were a 
few more considerations that caused some writers to evoke the Vancouver games 
(O'Conner, 2009), or some to call it “an economic horror story” (Hardman, 2008: 14). The 
first is considering the funding and budgeting issues where, besides the difficulties of 
raising funds, the project‟s costs more than tripled the original budget by the time the 
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project was completed (Hardman, 2008). The second is considering the economic return 
of this event, which was perceived to be weak (Hardman, 2008). However, a report by a 
government department for the UK trade and investment division stated that hosting the 
2012 London Olympics resulted in a £9.9bn boost in trade and investment in the UK 
economy (BBC news, 2013). 
 
1.3.2 The Strategic Project Management Dimension 
The importance of examining escalation decisions stems from the importance of capital 
investment decision-making in the form of capital budgeting, as the former (i.e. the 
escalation decision) is a logical extension of the latter (i.e. the capital investment 
decision). The strategic dimension refers to the procedures for recognizing, appraising, 
and choosing between projects that are likely to have a great influence on what the 
organisation does, where it does it and how it does it (Adler, 2000). Therefore, capital 
budgeting and strategic management assist managers‟ decisions and activities by directing 
them towards organisational success and growth (Blumentritt, 2006).  
 
Moreover, the strategic decision making and escalation of commitment paradigms are 
seen to be tandem with each other. The former focuses on how decision makers are 
expected to perform, and the latter tries to clarify why they follow particular courses of 
action (Drummond, 1994).  Further, if a strategic investment decision succeeds it will lead 
the company to achieve great advantages and, in case of failure, the company will either 
lose an important opportunity, or significant resources will be wasted (Adler, 2000). For 
example, a case study presented by Collis and Montgomery (1998: 26-27) typifies a 
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paradigm of what they called “managers’ mistake when they define relatedness according 
to product characteristics rather than resources”, which eventually resulted in strategic 
misalignment. In this case, the company faced a remarkable reduction in its product‟s 
sales (industrial thermostats) which then led the marketing team to suggest starting a new 
line of household thermostats. At first look, the strategy seemed sensible as the company 
would continue as a thermostat producer, adding only an additional product line, but a 
more careful examination illustrated the reality that the match between the two businesses 
was not at all close. It turned out to be an unwise decision because, after only three years, 
the company had to reverse that decision. Another example of strategic misalignment and 
escalation implications is found in the McKinsey‟s (2007) global study of „how companies 
spend their money’, based on survey responses received from 2507 executives (26% 
corporate-level executives; 26% division leaders; and 28% frontline managers). In this 
case, senior executives indicated that 17% of the resources invested by their companies 
went toward underperforming investments that needed terminating and that 16% of their 
investments were a mistake. Division leaders and frontline managers also revealed that 
21% of the investments should not have been authorized at all, while another 21% should 
be terminated.       
 
Another important reason for linking escalation of commitment to the project‟s strategic 
investment plan and goals is that any problem with the investment project might lead 
managers to escalate when they have no set budget. This behaviour, as suggested by Heath 
(1995), could be attributed to either one of two causes: 
 A problem with the investment strategic plan. 
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 A problem with applying the investment strategic plan. 
The relationship between strategic goals and how projects are managed seems to be a 
logical one as suggested by Turner et al. (1988) and evidenced by the results reported by 
Glaister et al. (2008) about the existence of a strong relationship between strategic 
planning and performance. Other studies however found no such evidence. For example, 
Falshaw et al. (2006) examined the link between formal strategic planning and companies‟ 
performance in 113 UK firms through the effect of three major variables: firm size, 
environmental turbulence, and type of industry contingency. They found no proof of a 
relationship between strategic planning and financial performance, because according to 
their justification, the factual relationship between the related variables was not the same 
as assumed, and the measurement of planning systems obtained by the formal planning 
process determinants used were not important for explaining performance. Collis and 
Montgomery (1998) argued that the lack of performance success does not depend mainly 
on how sparkling a strategy is, because it does not necessarily lead to success in all types 
of companies. As each company is established differently, it manages its operations from 
a different perspective, and it has various types of funds. They further argued that, the key 
to success is the sense of internally reliable strategy modified to a firm‟s funds and 
opportunities. Otherwise if the company‟s strategy is designed away from such sense, it 
might weaken the company‟s performance, or “at worst, the lack of consistency could be 
the iceberg that sinks the corporate ship” (p. 81).  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded from the above that escalation may possibly start when 
there are some difficulties facing the initiated project. These difficulties may arise as a 
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result of misapplying the investment strategic plan or because the project is not meeting its 
goals, i.e. when there is a problem in the project‟s performance, or even worse, when the 
company adopts a wrong strategic investment plan.  
 
Having clarified the rationale of the current study, the following section presents its aim, 
objectives and research questions.  
 
1.4 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
Drawing on a vast body of relevant literature and mainly guided by the approach-
avoidance theory, the prime aim of this research is to empirically examine the capital 
project (de)-escalation phenomenon in the Saudi corporate environment. The research 
worth and practical viability of this aim have both been established not only through a 
critical review of the literature but also through initial semi-informal discussions with 
project managers. Very early in this research project the researcher decided, on the basis 
of sufficient knowledge already acquired from the literature, to randomly contact by 
telephone practising project managers in ten different companies based in Jeddah City. It 
quickly transpired from the conversations with those managers that the research project 
was topical and practically relevant, which they substantiated with brief narrations of their 
own experience with project escalation cases.   
 
To achieve this overall aim, the research has the following objectives: 
1. Examine the impact of project-specific determinants on managers' decisions to (de)-
escalate commitment. 
2. Examine the psychological dimension in capital project (de)-escalation of commitment 
decisions. 
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3. Examine the extent to which contextual and organisational factors influence capital 
project (de)-escalation of commitment decisions. 
4. Examine the moderating role that operational audit might have on project (de)-
escalation of commitment decisions. 
 
The research seeks to fulfil these objectives by collecting and analysing primary data from 
companies in Saudi Arabia to provide answers to the following questions: 
1. What are the project-specific determinants that influence managers in Saudi 
companies to (de)-escalate commitment in capital project decisions? 
2. To what extent are project managers in Saudi companies affected by non-project-
specific factors when making (de)-escalation of commitment decisions? 
3. Does operational audit have a moderating role in the impact of escalation/de-
escalation determinants on project (de)-escalation of commitment decisions in Saudi 
companies? 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
For the purpose of the current study, and based on an extensive review of the 
escalation/de-escalation of commitment theoretical and empirical literatures, care is taken 
to ensure a wider understanding of factors that influence managers‟ choices and also to 
enhance the validity and reliability of the measured variables. For this purpose, theories 
and empirical studies relevant to the research topic are reviewed and compared to identify 
study variables and derive research hypotheses as well as consider methodological issues 
for the intended study of capital project (de)-escalation of commitment in the Saudi 
corporate context. The research methodology is explained in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
The most prevalent study methods, reported in the (de)-escalation empirical literature, are 
laboratory experiments and single case studies. According to Creswell (2009) the adoption 
of a specific research paradigm is influenced by the research problem, experience of the 
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researcher, and the audience to whom the researcher seeks to report. Given the complexity 
of the research problem and the many variables that need to be examined, the current 
study is both exploratory and explanatory in nature and is based on both the positivism 
philosophical perspective as well as the phenomenological paradigm. It uses a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to answer the research 
questions. Quantitative methods, in terms of survey data collection and appropriate 
statistical analysis, are used to test the research hypotheses, which were developed in 
agreement with the objectives and questions of the current study, while qualitative 
methods are used to augment the analysis and enrich the understanding of the various 
facets of the research topic. 
 
Empirically, as mentioned above, this study is designed to use a multi-method research 
approach (Table 1.2) through both field surveys (quantitative) as well as interviews 
(qualitative) to achieve the objectives of this research. The questionnaire survey method, 
widely used by empirical studies in the social sciences (Creswell and Clark, 2011), is the 
first method chosen for collecting primary data for the present study. Therefore, 
questionnaires were used to collect essential data on the capital investment decision 
making process, problematic project evaluation and (de)-escalation determinants in Saudi 
companies. The data collected this way were used for descriptive as well as inferential 
purposes. 
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                          Table 1.2: Overview of Research Methods 
 
 
Type of Study and Study Stage 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
 Preliminary study Hypotheses testing In-depth case study 
Objectives  Validate research topic 
 Generate direction of 
research and hypotheses 
 Test hypotheses 
 Determine existence of links 
 Generalize results 
  Highlight most 
relevant factors 
Method  Literature study 
 Pilot interviews 
 Survey Questionnaires 
 
 Interviews 
 
The survey questionnaire is self-administered and it was distributed and collected back by 
hand to the targeted companies in the port city of Jeddah, the second largest city in Saudi 
Arabia and its commercial capital. Due to cultural considerations, it is customary and 
compulsory in Saudi Arabia that when the researcher is female, as is the case here, a male 
intermediary needs to be employed by the researcher to administer the questionnaire 
survey on her behalf. The survey questionnaire was purposely developed and designed to 
fit with the current research and was informed by both theoretical and empirical literature. 
The questionnaire consists of five sections; the first section is for gathering general 
information on the respondents (job title, experience, and authority) and the surveyed 
companies (ownership type, size and age of company, main and sub-business). The 
second section focuses on the capital investment process description. The third and fourth 
sections cover the project evaluation and the (de)-escalation decision including the 
decision determinants and the degree of influence on managers' choices. The final section 
asks about respondents‟ name, company name and whether the respondents would be 
willing to take part in interviews. 
 
28 
 
The translated questionnaire of the final English version was distributed to project 
managers in 800 different companies in Jeddah City during the period starting early 
August to late December 2010. A total of 300 questionnaires were received.  However, 26 
of these were excluded as they were unusable/partially completed, yielding a total of 274 
usable questionnaires (35.4% response rate). Questionnaires were piloted prior to the full 
scale survey and issues related to the validity and reliability of the study‟s instruments 
were considered. Descriptive statistics (means and percentages) and advanced statistical 
tests (i.e. Mann-Whitney U test, Chi-Square test, Multinomial Logistic Regression and the 
MODPROBE Macro for the moderation effect) are utilized to analyse the collected data 
using the SPSS statistical package. 
 
The second method used to collect primary data was semi-structured interviews, in order 
to obtain and explore more in-depth information about research issues as a supplement to 
the survey questionnaire (e.g. Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009). The 
interviewees were chosen on their willingness to participate after they completed and 
returned the survey questionnaires. Three participants from three different companies 
agreed to be interviewed; a Chief Executive Officer for a major transportation company, a 
Chief Finance Officer of a multinational food company, and a Project Manager for a 
building contractor company.  
 
1.6 Research Theoretical Model  
The theoretical model of the current research (explained in detail later in Chapter five) is 
initially constructed on the suggested categorization of determinants that was presented in 
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the Ross and Staw‟s (1993) model of escalation. However, the present study enhances 
Ross and Staw‟s (1993) model by adding two essential dimensions based on the gaps 
identified in the literature (see Chapters Three and Four). The first dimension is 
considering Approach-Avoidance assumptions as the theoretical basis for explaining 
managers‟ choices. The second dimension, which was mainly informed by existing 
empirical studies, is extending the number of factors that are included in each set of 
determinants as well as examining the moderating role of operational audit on the impact 
of these determinants. In total 52 variables have been identified and put into two groups of 
determinants (explained in detail in Chapters Five and Six). 
 
Figure 1.1 below shows the study‟s theoretical model, which depicts the direct 
relationship between the two groups of determinants (project-specific and non-project-
specific variables) and managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions. Additionally, the model shows 
the indirect influence of project operational audit as a moderator of the impact of the 
determinants on managers' escalation/de-escalation decisions.  
               
Figure 1.1: The Study’s Theoretical Model 
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1.7 Dissertation Structure and Chapter Content 
The remainder of this dissertation comprises of eight more chapters as follows: 
 Chapter Two covers the characteristics and features of the socio-economic context in 
Saudi Arabia through explaining the effect of traditions, ethics, and beliefs on 
managers' decisions in Saudi companies. 
 
 Chapter Three consists of three sections; the first elaborates further on the definition, 
importance and evolution of both strategic project management (capital investment) 
and the (de)-escalation phenomenon. The second section provides an extensive 
coverage of the theoretical relevant literature, particularly the popular theoretical 
models encountered in the (de)-escalating commitment literature, the factors that fit 
within each theory and their influence on managers' (de)-escalation decisions. The third 
section provides an evaluation for the effectiveness of the suggested theories in 
explaining project (de)-escalation decisions. 
 
 Chapter Four presents a review of empirical studies -both laboratory based and those 
reporting company practices- and gives a detailed assessment of the variables and 
determinants that influence the (de)-escalation phenomenon. The chapter also discusses 
the role of project operational audit as a moderating variable. The overall purpose of 
this chapter is to critically examine the existing empirical literature, identify issues and 
themes, and highlight the need for additional work to inform the present study. 
 
 Chapter Five presents the research theoretical model and hypothesis development 
process, provides justifications and explanations for the research philosophy and 
methodology that is used to achieve the research objectives. Moreover, the chapter 
details the research process with respect to data collection (questionnaires and 
interviews) as well as the descriptive and inferential statistical techniques used to 
analyse the collected data to answer the research questions. 
31 
 
 Chapter Six presents the descriptive results of the questionnaires survey. The data 
analysis in this chapter is mostly in the form of mean scores and percentages and it 
gives an overview of the capital investment process, project evaluation techniques, and 
the significance of (de)-escalation determinants on managers' choices in Saudi 
companies.  
 
 Chapter Seven first explains statistical tests used for testing the research hypotheses 
and presents the results accordingly. The chapter then presents results of both the direct 
and indirect relationships identified in the (de)-escalation phenomenon. Multinomial 
Logistic Regression (MLR) is applied to test the first six research hypotheses, which 
represents the direct relationship between (de)-escalation determinants and managers' 
choices, while the MODPROBE Macro test is applied to the seventh research 
hypothesis, which deals with the moderating (or indirect) effect of project operational 
audit on the (de)-escalation of commitment. 
 
 Chapter Eight complements the previous two chapters with an analysis of interview-
based data collected from three companies. This sheds additional light on the results in 
the previous two chapters and galvanizes the findings further on the (de)-escalation of 
capital project decision making process in Saudi companies. 
 
 Finally, Chapter Nine presents an overall summary of the research, including 
discussion of the research findings, limitations, policy implications, conclusions and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
The next chapter presents an overview of the Saudi business environment in terms of its 
socio-economic dimensions.   
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Chapter Two 
 
The Socio-Economic Context of Saudi Arabia   
 
2.1 Introduction 
The current study is applied in Saudi Arabia, considered to be one of the most important 
countries in the Arabian Gulf region in terms of its geographic location, distinctive 
culture, and economic development. This chapter covers essential aspects of the Saudi 
Arabian business environment as it examines and describes key macro level factors that 
relate to the overall aim and specific objectives of the research study as represented by the 
theoretical model introduced in the previous chapter. 
 
In addition to a brief introduction of Saudi Arabia (Section 2.2), this chapter consists of 
the following sections: economic features (Section 2.3), market structure (Section 2.4), 
managerial profile (Section 2.5), and the chapter‟s summary (Section 2.6).  
 
2.2 A Brief Background  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia covers almost 80% of the Arabian Peninsula; it is spread 
over an area of approximately 1.960.582 square kilometres, which makes it one of the 
biggest countries in the region (Moran et al., 2007; Metz, 1992). The population of Saudi 
Arabia is about 30 million distributed across thirteen regions, which can be grouped in 
relation to their geographic position in five provinces as follows in Figure 2.1 (MOEP, 
2013).   
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Figure 2.1: Population Distribution 
 
Jeddah, which is located in the Kingdom‟s western region where the largest percentage of 
population resides, is known as the commercial capital of Saudi Arabia and, for the 
reasons listed below (JAU, 2011), is an ideal place for this research study of corporate 
capital project decision practices: 
1. It is the second major city in the Kingdom with many key banks and businesses. It is 
also the home to some of the most successful merchants and businessmen in the 
Kingdom.  
 
2. It is the gateway to the holy cities of Makah and Medina and other holy sites and 
Jeddah is therefore the trade and financial hub that results from being this gateway. 
 
3. It is an important port due to its location on the Red Sea coast enabling trade with the 
Middle East, Africa and the rest of the world. 
 
4. It is the country‟s third largest industrial city owing to the existence of a number of 
major factories. Jeddah is also located close to the first and second industrial cities 
(Jubail and Yanbu respectively).  
 
Having clarified the importance and justification of the geographic location for conducting 
the current study, the following sections will give an overview of the features of the Saudi 
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Arabian economy as well as the characteristics of markets and managers in this 
environment.  
 
2.3 Economic Features 
The development of the Saudi Arabian economy could be simultaneously linked, as  Metz 
(1992) suggested, to the combination of three major events that formed the basis of this 
economy: first, the unification and expansion of the Kingdom that led to unifying a 
number of diverse areas of the Arabian peninsula under one ruler (in 1932); second, the 
discovery of oil in the Eastern Province just a few years after the establishment of Saudi 
Arabia (in 1935); and finally the rebuilding of Europe after the Second World War and its 
need for reliable sources of oil that greatly enhanced the position of the newly established 
Saudi Arabian oil industry (in 1945). Since then, Saudi Arabia has been going through a 
series of developments at all levels and sectors (e.g., social, economic, political, 
educational…etc.), perhaps the rate and urgency of progress has been most evident in the 
economy sector (Ramady, 2010; Saudi Aramco, 2006). The following sections highlight 
two aspects of the Saudi economy, which have affected its growth and development; the 
influence of oil, and the diversity of income resources.   
 
2.3.1 Influence of Oil 
The Saudi Arabian economy depends heavily on the oil sector; it is essentially oil-driven, 
and the dominance of oil is the most obvious characteristic of the economic structures in 
terms of the country‟s foreign exchange earnings, government revenues, and the source of 
growth of the national income (El-Mallakh, 1982; Aba Alkhail, 2007). Therefore, the 
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Saudi Arabian economy is influenced by two factors: the degree and growth rate of oil 
revenues and the government budgetary practices, the latter being the central link between 
the oil sector and the rest of the economy on the one hand, and economic growth in case of 
reduced or increased oil revenue on the other (Ramady, 2010).  
 
In addition, the Kingdom, as the world‟s leading producer (11,726 thousand barrels/day) 
and exporter (8,865 thousand barrels/day) of petroleum (EIA, 2012), is an active member 
of the institutions of oil exporting countries such as the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1960 (OPEC monthly bulletin, 2011) and the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) since 1968 (OAPEC 
monthly bulletin, 2011). Being a member of these institutions, has affected the domestic 
economy in terms of determining the level of income and the amount of oil production.  
For example, OPEC‟s aim is to organize and unite the petroleum strategies and to ensure 
the stability of oil markets in order to provide an efficient, economic and regular supply of 
petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for 
those investing in the petroleum industry (OPEC monthly bulletin, 2011).   
 
Today, the Saudi economy is looking towards growth and prosperity; the GDP for the oil 
sector in 2012 was $62.5 billion with a 5.7% growth rate (MOEP, 2013).  The GDP of the 
oil sector in Saudi Arabia went through different cycles (see Table 2.1), which has had a 
strong influence on the Saudi economy. For example, in the 1970/1982 (boom cycle) the 
total public expenditure of the Kingdom increased from $1678 million to $63135 million 
with an average increase of 48% per year, but the decline in oil revenues (starting from 
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1983) influenced the public expenditure of the Kingdom as it fell steadily until reaching 
$36646 million in 1986. This deterioration in public spending did not recover until the 
year 2004 (boom cycle) as it increased to reach $76053 million, and since then, the 
increasing level of public spending is quite high, as it reached in 2011 an amount of 
$224067 million (Al-Eqtisadiah, 2012). 
Table 2.1: Saudi Economy Profile
* 
Year/ Cycle Oil Sector 
revenues’ range 
Influence on the Economy 
1970-1982/ oil 
boom cycle 
1,900-49,602 Rapid economic growth, elevated government expenditure on 
infrastructure, high per capita income, private sector demand. 
1983-1987/ oil 
bust cycle 
38,699-17,975 Imports fell, reduction in investment expenditures by both 
government and private sectors.  
1988-1992/ 
recovery cycle 
12,907-34,344 Reversal of fortunes due to improvement in world oil markets. 
1993-1995/ 
stagnation cycle 
28,260-28,194 Budget cuts, freeze on capital expenditure and slowdown in 
government cash disbursements that caused problems to private 
contractors. 
1996-2002/ 
restructuring 
cycle 
36,262-44,293 Progress in privatization, and capital; market reform to attract 
foreign direct investments.  
2003-2008/ oil 
boom cycle 
61,600-262,232 GDP growth increasingly, economy recovery, and high 
revenues.  
2009-2010/ 
retrenchment 
cycle 
115,845-178,737 Reduction in government revenues and foreign capital, tighter 
credit and investor risk aversion.  
2011-2012/ oil 
boom cycle 
275,829-305,285 Increase in government revenues and expenditures, encourage 
forging and local investment, decrease in domestic debt.  
*Source: information was summarized from Aba Alkhail, 2007; Ramady, 2010, and Al-Turki, 2013. Based 
on SAMA estimates to 2012 in million dollars.  
 
As a result of the fluctuations in oil prices, the Saudi Arabian government took critical 
steps to decrease the dependence on oil as the only source of income, in terms of varying 
the sources of national income through increasing the share of other productive sectors, in 
addition to being a member of several regional and international institutions or 
committees, as will be explained in the next section. 
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2.3.2 Diversification of Income Sources   
The Saudi Arabian government aimed to diversify sources of national income as one of 
the objectives in the first five-year development plan in 1970 to reduce dependence on oil 
through increasing the share of other productive sectors in GDP.  In the ninth five-year 
development plan (2010-2015), seven out of thirteen objectives have focused on the 
advancement of the Saudi economy and these abridged as follows:  
“diversify the economic base horizontally and vertically.., move towards a 
knowledge-based economy.., enhance the role of the private sector and expand 
domains of private investments (domestic and foreign) and public-private 
partnerships.., develop rational utilization of natural resources.., develop 
regulations aimed at raising efficiency and improving performance.., strengthen 
economic integration with (region, Arabian, and Islamic) countries.., and develop 
the sector of Small and Medium Enterprises to increase its contribution to GDP” 
(MOEP, 2013). 
 
The Saudi Arabian government‟s concern to facilitate and encourage the diversification of 
the sources of income was demonstrated by the significant rise in income, in recent years, 
from non-oil sectors in both public and private enterprises (see figure 2.2). The total GDP 
of non-oil sectors has risen from $4,578 in 1972 to $354,614 in 2012, it is expected that 
the non-oil sector will continue to grow strongly in the fiscal year 2013- 2014, indicating 
government-led infrastructure and mining projects. Also, due to the weakening global 
demand, oil revenues were anticipated to decline in 2013, which would result in a slight 
slowdown by 4% in real GDP growth. But this is expected to pick up in 2014, where the 
real GDP growth is expected to be 4.4% as a result of the slight recovery in the oil sector 
(Saudi Gazette, 2013). 
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Figure 2.2: GDP (in current prices) of Private, Government, and Oil Sectors 
                             (SAMA national account statistics in million dollars, 2013) 
 
In order to strengthen the political role the kingdom plays, the Saudi government has 
joined several institutions, which has influenced the gains achieved at the economic level 
in terms of enhancing the regional as well as the foreign trade and investment between the 
Kingdom and members of these institutions. For example, the League of Arab States, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Islamic Development Bank (IDP), the World Trade 
Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the UNESCO, and the G20 (Ramazani, 
1988; IMF, 2001; Martin and Mohaparta, 2003; WTO, 2005; League of Arab States 
historical background, 2000/2006; UN, 2006; Hassan and Lewis, 2007).  
 
Additionally, the accomplishment and success in the diversifying of the national net 
income has depended greatly on the significant role played by the private sector in the 
process of economic development (privatization), as well as replacing foreign labour with 
Saudi nationals (saudization), which will be discussed next. 
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1. Privatization  
The concept of privatization has spread rapidly in both industrial countries and developing 
economies in the last two decades. The Saudi Arabian privatization effort was part of an 
international movement originally led by the United States and the United Kingdom 
between 1979 and 1988, where several government institutions were privatized such as 
British Airways, British Petroleum, and British Telecom in the UK as well as key 
government organisations in the USA (Aluwasheg, 2013).This adoption of privatization in 
many countries made it possible for Saudi Arabia to learn from these experiences and to 
draw important lessons that are relevant to its own economic structure (Ramady, 2010). 
 
Privatization was first introduced in the mid-1980s as a main policy objective by the Saudi 
government and the objectives and policies of privatization were adopted in 1997, yet it 
was not until 2001 (the ninth five-year development plan) that implementation procedures 
were enacted. The Supreme Economic Council was charged with the responsibility of 
supervising the privatization programme and monitoring its implementation, in 
coordination with other government agencies (Akoum, 2009). 
 
In developing countries, privatization could be used as a tool to: (1) improve the level of 
productivity in public organizations, which is normally two to three times lower than 
private firms and in some cases significantly lower; (2) improve service delivery of high-
cost critical sectors that impact the economy as a whole; and (3) reduce the financial 
burden of losses (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). In addition to the fundamental conflict of 
interest created by the fact that the government was judging its own performance 
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(Ramady, 2010), three more reasons could be considered as drivers for privatization: the 
first is, as an oil rich-country, Saudi Arabia has used privatization as a means of 
diversifying its economic base, moving away from the heavy reliance on the oil sector 
revenues (Seznec, 2002). The second is that public enterprises were unable to meet the 
increased domestic demand on services, (Ramady, 2010), and finally, because of the 
forecasted capital expenditures‟ needs of the Kingdom in key areas (Ramady, 2010). 
 
Therefore, privatization is stated as a strategic choice for the Saudi Arabian government, 
which was defined as: “the process of transferring the ownership or management of 
public establishments, projects, and services from the government sector to the private 
sector” (Akoum, 2009: 428). According to the Supreme Economic Council reports (SEC, 
2012), it aimed to achieve the following eight objectives: 
1) Improving the efficiency of the national economy. 
2) Encouraging private sector investment. 
3) Enlarging the ownership of productive assets by Saudi citizens. 
4) Encouraging domestic and foreign capital to invest locally. 
5) Increasing employment opportunities. 
6) Providing services to citizens and investors in a timely and cost-efficient manner. 
7) Rationalizing public expenditure and reducing the burden on the government 
budget. 
8) Increasing government revenues from returns on participation in activities to be 
transferred to the private sector, and from financing compensation obtained. 
 
Up till now, several institutions have been privatized such as: Saudi ports services; 30% of 
Saudi telecoms; and several ancillary services of the national Saudi airline company 
(Hertog, 2010).  Further explanation of the role of the private sector in the Saudi economy 
will be provided in Section 2.4. 
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2. Saudization 
Saudization, i.e. the Saudi Government‟s job localization programme, has been discussed 
for several decades but was not validated until the sixth five-year development plan (1995-
2000), which called for economic diversification and the creation of new jobs for Saudi 
individuals, as is stated in its fourth objective to “replace non-Saudi citizens with the 
appropriate Saudi Arabian workers” (MOEP, 2013). 
 
The saudization policy has been strongly implemented by the government to achieve three 
main goals: 1) reduce and reverse the country‟s over-reliance on an expatriate workforce, 
2) increase employment for Saudi nationals across all sectors of the domestic economy to 
minimize the rate of unemployment in the Kingdom, and 3) recapture and reinvest income 
which would otherwise have flowed overseas as remittances to foreign workers‟ home 
countries (Sadi and Al-Buraey, 2009; Ramady, 2010).  
 
The focus of the saudization programme is particularly on the youth, and the government 
relies on the private sector to participate in this programme. At least 25% of jobs were 
targeted to be replaced by Saudi citizens in the year 2002 in the private sector (Arab 
News, 2001). However, as the percentage of Saudi workers increased, the number of non-
Saudi manpower increased as well (see Table 2.2). Perhaps that is because private 
companies and organizations rely on foreign experts for several reasons, such as: a) 
relatively high cost of Saudi manpower; b) social and cultural perspectives; c) expatriate 
workers are easier to control; and, d) inadequate qualifications of Saudi workers (Ramady, 
2010). For example, a survey study by Sadi and Al-Buraey (2009) showed that 
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saudization is implemented forcibly rather than reasoning and encouragement, and the 
policy was found to be successful in the public sector but relatively unsuccessful in the 
private sector. 
Table 2.2: Labour Force in Private Sector* 
            Labor  
Years  
Saudis Non-Saudis Total 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
2009 681481 9.9% 6214067 90.1% 6895548 
2010 724655 10.4% 6266545 89.6% 6991200 
2011 844476 10.85% 6937020 89.15% 7781496 
2012 1134633 13.4% 7352900 86.6% 8487533 
*Source: SAMA statistics, 2013 
 
Several solutions have been suggested to make saudization an effective policy and 
increase private sector demand and employment of Saudi workers (Looney, 2004; 
Ramady, 2010): 
1. Develop new employment opportunities rather than replacing foreign workers with 
local workers to accumulate a growing national workforce. 
  
2. Enhance the capital of Saudis and the attainment of skills that are valuable to the 
private sector through education and training. 
 
3. Facilitate the adoption of new technologies and the accumulation of capital by raising 
national workers‟ productivity. 
  
4. Pay more attention to the benefits associated with the programme, as with saudization 
remittances to foreign countries would be spent domestically. 
2.4 Market Structure 
The Saudi Arabian market structure consists of several activities and organizations that are 
expressed through different investments. The next two sections will emphasize activities 
and investments in (local and foreign) markets as follows.   
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2.4.1 Local Market Investments 
The Saudi Arabian market, as mentioned earlier, has been gradually led by the private 
sector since mid-November 2002, as the government moved to progressively “disengage” 
from the economy and let the private sector undertake a greater share of the economic 
transformation (to privatization), through the opening up of 20 sub-business sectors to 
private enterprise (Saravia, 2002). This justifies the small percentage of public 
investments in projects, such as: transport and communication (3%); and municipal 
services (4%), compared to the private sector (see Table 2.3), although government 
expenditure has rapidly increased in the past ten years to reach $219,000 million in the 
year 2013 (SAMA, 2013).    
    Table 2.3: Investments in Local Market* 
Investments by sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Private investment 58,872 54,843 56,766 58,627 63,877 
Public investment 22,843 23,355 33,915 44,067 41,397 
Oil-sector investments 14,791 12,363 13,080 14,191 14,469 
Total  96,506 90,561 103,761 116,885 119,743 
     *Source: MOEP statistics 2013 in million dollars 
Consequently, the local market has witnessed a huge leap in the number of private 
companies and in the diversity of both its ownership and sectors to which it belongs. 
There are several types of ownership in the Saudi market.  Perhaps the most common are: 
corporation; general or limited partnership; professional that might take a sole 
proprietorship; and foreign companies (MOCI, 2013). Since family is a crucial base of the 
Saudi society, up to 2000 the trend was to start family companies in terms of General 
partnership, limited partnership, or sole proprietorship, where little attention was paid to 
corporations (such as joint stock). Families opened businesses to allow their members to 
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participate and function as a social welfare safety net, while the family enjoyed a sense of 
corporate identity (Metz, 1992). This is in agreement with the statistics of the Saudi 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2013), where until 2000 there were 5400 Companies 
listed either as General partnership, limited partnership, or sole proprietorship ventures 
and only 20 corporation companies were established and registered in the list of Saudi 
companies.  The overall legal structure of companies operating in the Saudi Arabian local 
market is either owned totally by Saudi citizens (i.e., limited liability), non-Saudis (i.e., 
joint liability), or foreign investors (i.e., joint stock). The number of these companies has 
increased progressively in the last three years to reach a number of 8,783 companies in 
2012 with a cumulative capital of $46,563 million (see Table 2.4).  
Table 2.4: Number and Capital of Legal Structure Companies*  
Type of companies 2010 2011 2012 
Number  Capital  Number  Capital  Number  Capital  
Joint stock companies 361 17,661 403 11,599.2 455 31,373 
Limited liability partnerships 5,713 4,151 6,412 5,766.51 7,712 1,500 
Joint-liability partnership 199 9.1 393 15.31 489 17.4 
Mixed-liability partnerships 94 19.3 152 1.6 127 1.6 
Total  6,367 21,840.4 7,360 17,382.62 8,783 46,563 
* Source: SAMA national account statistics, 2013; MOCI reports and statistics, 2013 in million dollars 
 
At present, there are more than one hundred and forty Saudi companies with shares worth 
almost $1 billion in the Saudi stock market (Tadawul, 2013). Following the announcement 
by the CMA (Capital Market Authority) in 2007, the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) has 
re-organized the constituents of its sectors to fifteen different businesses. These businesses 
(see Table 2.5), in consistence with the JCCI (Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry), were grouped under three main sectors: industrial (481 companies), commercial 
(539 companies) and service (985 companies), knowing that, some of the companies were 
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family owned that converted to corporations, such as companies in the retail and 
agriculture sectors.    
 Table 2.5: Main and Sub-Sectors  
                                                 Sectors (JCCI) 
Sectors (Tadawul)  
Industrial Commercial Services 
Agriculture & Food Industries √   
Banks & Financial Services   √ 
Building & Construction   √ 
Cement √   
Energy & Utilities   √ 
Hotel & Tourism           √ 
Industrial Investment √   
Insurance   √ 
Media & Publishing   √ 
Multi Investment                                                        √   
Petrochemical Industries  √  
Real Estate Development   √ 
Retail  √  
Telecommunication & Information Technology         √ 
Transport   √ 
 
2.4.2 Foreign Market Investments 
On the foreign investment level, the Saudi government, as a member of the WTO (world 
trade organization), has acted to bring into prominence its international image by opening 
up opportunities for foreign investment in two directions: the first is by providing the 
necessary facilities for foreign companies to invest in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(reached $186,850 million in 2011) and the second is by encouraging Saudi companies to 
invest in foreign markets, which reached $29,958 million in 2011 (SAMA, 2013). Hence, 
the Saudi Arabian market for foreign investors is a highly promising one. According to the 
report of the 2nd Annual Saudi Securities Forum which was held in the Riyadh Capital in 
2013, the importance of foreign fund flow to the Kingdom was stressed and the Saudi 
foreign market was characterized by top quality regulations and supervisions. Several 
opportunities are provided for foreign investors in the Kingdom, subject to approval by 
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both the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the SAGIA (the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority). Mead (2000) suggested examples of these opportunities: 
1. Appointing a Saudi agent or distributer for the foreign company. 
2. Opening a branch that is wholly owned by the foreign company, when the foreign 
company is engaged in a business contract with the government, knowing that if the 
foreign company has multiple contracts with the Saudi government, it can obtain a 
representative office license and establish its own liaison office. 
3. Franchising contracts.  
4. Joint ventures, which are set up as limited liability partnerships that require minimum 
amounts of capital investments but cannot offer shares to the public.   
 
Further, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia captures an important global presence in terms of 
its imports and exports. According to the Ministry of Economy and Planning statistics 
(2013), the total amount of exports in 2010 were $240 billion, where oil exports accounted 
for 85% and non-oil exports accounted for 15% of the total exports. Asia represents 55% 
of the Saudi export market, followed by 16% for North America, and 15% for Europe. As 
an import market ($97 billion), Europe represents 36% of Saudi targeted markets, 
followed by 27% for Asia, and 16% for North America. Specifically, the government was 
interested in encouraging the trade in non-oil products (see Table 2.6) where the total 
amount of exports in the Saudi market reached $8650 million and the total amount of 
imports reached $24422 million recently (MOEP, 2013).   
          Table 2.6: Non-oil Exports and Imports 
Exports Percentage Imports Percentage 
Petrochemicals  33% Machinery and electrical 27% 
Plastic  33% Transportation equipment  16% 
Food products  8% Food products 15% 
Re-exported goods   11% Base metals and its products 14% 
Other exports  15% Other imports 28% 
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2.4.3 Problematic Investments 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a development boom that investments in 
many projects are increasing in different key sectors according to local economic 
indicators, for example, SAGIA (Saudi Arabian general investment authority) announced 
that the total amount of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia has reached more than $147 
billion, and in 2011 the value of the approved investment projects exceeded $66 billion 
with an increase of 6% from the year 2010 (SSPC, 2012).  
 
This huge spending was associated with success in many projects and failure in others, in 
both governmental and private sectors. On the one hand, the core element of project 
success is not the amount spent but meeting several requirements of budgets and 
deadlines, which is not limited to one sector but to all businesses in the Saudi market. On 
the other hand, the total estimated size of failed projects in the last three to four years 
exceeded a billion dollars, which induces the emergence of many negative effects on the 
Saudi socio-economic levels that affect the development and delivery of services to Saudi 
citizens (SSPC, 2012). For example, recently, a scientific paper entitled “stalled 
government projects, its causes and ways to reduce it”, presented at the First Construction 
Contracts Forum (2013) in the capital Riyadh revealed that the percentage of stalled 
government projects is 33.47% with annual costs in excess of 40 billion Saudi Riyals, 
which is almost $11 billion (Al-Madina, 2013).     
 
Many reasons were suggested for the large amount of money waste, projects‟ 
deterioration, and failure in an economy that is still making its way to prosperity. For 
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example, Al-Babtain (Al-Madina, 2013) suggested three stages for project failure in the 
Saudi Arabian market: 
 The first stage is the lack of planning and absence of visibility in the design of the 
project in the initial phase such as the lack of preparing project documents, the 
shortages in the study of the nature of the project in terms of location and 
implementation requirements, the lack of clarity of the requirements for those who 
apply for the competition, and the short period of time available to estimate the value of 
the project pricing by competitors. 
 
 The second stage is what he named as “the delivery phase” where the project is to be 
given to a contractor to operate and manage. The main focus is on the financial analysis 
of the bidders (contractors) without considering their technical capabilities, which 
results in that the contractor with the least bid wins managing and operating the project. 
In addition, some contractors who win the bid might be deficient in their financial or 
technical capabilities. 
 
 The final stage is the weakness in the efficient supervision of governmental entities that 
are in charge of the project in the implementation phase. For example, the poor skills of 
some contractors in acquiring high quality material or labour, absence of a project 
manager office on site, the weakness in coordination between beneficiary institutions 
and what is really established, a poor information base, frequent change of decisions 
during the implementation of project, and the expansion of a contract with 
subcontractors without the consent of the owner of the project contribute to badly 
managed projects. 
 
Other reasons for project failure were linked to the nature of the Saudi Arabian market, for 
example Tuncalp (1988) cited four features of the Saudi market: 
1. The Saudi market is a complex one as it consists of several sectors and is distributed in 
different regions.  
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2. Decisions are mainly made by the owners, who base their actions on either experience 
or perceptions. 
 
3. Decisions are made on a rather ad hoc basis, and problems are solved as they approach 
emergency proportions. 
 
4. The deep sense of fatalism and a strong belief in faith diminish the need for long-term 
planning.  
 
Further, in its quest for economic progress, the country faces managerial and social 
challenges, which have caused duality in thinking and practice between the macro and 
micro levels in Saudi organisational settings. On one hand, organisational structures in 
Saudi are influenced by conservative traditions such as Islamic values, particularistic tribal 
family orientations, and inheritance of the autocratic ottoman system. On the other hand, 
at the top level, the government recognizes that in order to compete in the global 
economy, it must modernize its management practices in terms of industrialization, 
western contact, and the use of modern technology, which would strengthen the influence 
of more pragmatic, universalistic values (Assad, 2002).  
 
Cultural values influence the nature of the administrative structure behaviour in 
organizations, therefore current problems in organizations can best be understood in the 
context of on-going encounters between forces of change and forces of stability, which 
could be explained, as Assad (2002) recommended, in terms of: 
1) Many administrative laws and regulations have been established, but sometimes they 
are not applied. For example, employment and promotion systems according to 
qualifications and merit have been designed, but hiring and rewarding are still 
influenced by social ties, personal relations, and family position.  
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2) Saudi cultural values emphasize diligence and competence in work but the shortfall in 
worker performance in large modern organizations in the country is apparently a result 
of the shortfalls in managerial training. Therefore, the government is engaged in an 
intensive effort to maximize managerial effectiveness and there is much concern with 
improving the quality of worker performance in pursuing development programmes. 
 
Additional causes suggested by participants of the Saudi Stumbled Projects Conference 
(2012) that could be summarized in Table 2.7 were as follows:                        
       Table 2.7: Investor and Governmental Roles in Project Failure 
Causes of project failure Investor role Government role 
Lack of identifying the need for the project √  
Poor preparation and planning of project  √  
Poor performance  √  
Delays of needed procedures √ √ 
Ambiguity of roles √ √ 
Lack of coordination between different 
agencies 
 √ 
 
2.5 Managers’ Characteristics 
In Saudi Arabia, project managers are expected to possess several qualifications and skills. 
For example, in different advertisements published either on-line or in local newspapers 
project managers are expected to be fluent in written and spoken English, have a relevant 
degree such as Civil Engineering, have of minimum 5 years job experience, and have 
management skills in terms of developing project plans, setting high standards, 
establishing demanding, but achievable, goals, coordinating projects, inspiring people to 
do the best job possible, completing projects on time and within the budget, managing 
project team activities, monitoring performance, and giving helpful feedback (Al-Riyadh, 
2013; BAYT International, 2013). To put these requirements in perspective, the 
educational and cultural environments are briefly summarised below. 
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2.5.1 Educational Trends 
Education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has gone through several phases of 
development, from what was called “Kuttabs” to teach religion and Arabic language (Al-
Sadan, 2000; Lipsky, 1959) with only a handful of students, to a present total student 
population of more than 6 million covering all phases of formal education as indicated in 
Table 2.8. These are shared between 25 public universities, 22 private colleges and 
universities, public, private, and international schools.  
          Table 2.8: Educational Status and Gender* 
Educational Status Frequency 
Male Female Total 
Primary 1,737,661 1,698,598 3,436,259 
Intermediate 792,603 786,796 1,579,399 
High school 787,838 688,855 1,476,693 
Subtotal  331,810,2 317,424,9 649,235,1 
Technical education 115,948 - 115,948 
Diploma 2,801 1,567 4,368 
Bachelor degree 39,894 61,797 101,691 
Masters 2,497 1,520 4,017 
PhD 344 106 450 
Subtotal  161,484 649,90 226,474 
Total 3,479,586 3,239,239 6,718,825 
           *Source: MOHE, 2013; MOEP, 2013; SAMA, 2013 
 
This is in agreement with the  Government‟s large investment in the educational sector in 
order to, as stated in the ninth five-year development plan, “enhance human development” 
(MOEP, 2013). 
 
However, despite the efforts being carried out in this direction, the education sector still 
faces several challenges. One of the biggest shortcomings that economists pointed out is 
the failure of educational outputs to meet the demands of the modern industry (Vivano, 
2003). For example, At-Twairji and Al-Ghamdi (1997) found out that most Saudi 
managers have built their careers through work experience and they value people with 
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experience the most. Their findings indicated that experience, connection, legitimacy, and 
references were the sources of power for Saudi managers with ranging degrees. Further, 
estimates of unemployed Saudis have reached almost 10.5% in 2009 (MOEP, 2013) and 
the Saudi government has hired more than 6 million foreign workers, which form almost 
half of the Kingdom‟s working age population, to work as physicians, engineers, scientific 
researchers and corporate managers (Vivano, 2003).  
  
This dilemma occurred because, up until now, higher education graduates in the Kingdom 
are mostly qualified to work in the public but not the private sector (Baki, 2004). The 
estimates of the Ministry of Economy and Planning (2013) illustrated that, non-Saudi 
workers comprised 90% of the total workforce in private sectors compared to less than 
10% of Saudis employed in 2009. In order to resolve this dilemma, there is a massive need 
to change the core of education to match up to the requirements of the private sector, 
which will increase both research and development as well as job opportunities provided 
by the private sector and will lead to the hiring of more Saudis in the private market 
(Looney, 2004). 
 
The Saudi Arabian government has focused more on the type and quality of education in 
order to develop the right skills to match the demands of the domestic labour market, and 
to achieve targeted goals such as saudization to promote national economy, by adopting 
several procedures. For example, with regard to the field of management, the Ministry of 
Education introduced Administrative Science in addition to natural and Arabic language 
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sciences as one of the majors that students in the tenth/eleventh grade in public and private 
schools can choose from (MOE, 2013).    
 
Additionally, public colleges, universities, and private higher educational institutions offer 
different degrees in management (MOHE, 2013). Another example, which illustrates the 
Government‟s concern with improving specific leadership skills such as persuasion, 
negotiation, team building or communication, is that the Government has decided to send 
Saudi managers from leading companies for training at business schools abroad.  The aim 
is to develop global leaders through high impact executive education, which refers to 
academic programmes at graduate-level worldwide business schools for executives, 
business leaders, and functional managers (Arab News, 2013). 
 
2.5.2 Cultural Trends 
Culture could be defined as a set of ideas, symbols, actions, morals, and viewpoints that 
are joint and shared by a human group (Banks, 1997), which for the Saudi managers are 
influenced by several aspects. For example, the geographical distribution of regions and 
cities across the Kingdom is such that some cities are located on the shores of the Red Sea 
or the Arabian Gulf while some are close to the desert. Accordingly, there is a disparity in 
the Saudi environment between life in the coastal cities and the desert life which has 
played a major part in forming the Saudi culture,  as those living near the sea have had 
more exposure to other communities and thus have developed a more broad-based outlook 
than those living  more inland (Metz, 1992). In addition, Saudi culture is formed by other 
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factors such as: Islamic beliefs, tradition and modernization, and family values, as 
explained below. 
 
1. Islamic Beliefs 
The influence of Islam in shaping Saudi Arabian culture has overridden the effect of other 
factors. This is obvious from the symbolic monogram on the Saudi flag, its legal system 
rooted in Islamic principles and the general lifestyle of the Saudis (Al-Shahri, 2002). 
Moreover, the Saudi population, despite the geographical distribution, is characterized by 
a high degree of cultural homogeneity reflected in the written and spoken Arabic language 
which is common across Saudi Arabia and in the affinity to Sunni Islam (Metz, 1992). For 
example, when Arabs meet their countryman for the first time they usually attempt to 
establish each other‟s family identity, as Islam is considered an important source for this 
high collectivism orientation (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993).  
 
Saudi Arabia is a Muslim country governed by the principles of Islamic law (Shari‟ah). 
Therefore, many socio-cultural and economic implications have to be acceptable and 
permitted by Islamic law (Choudhury and Al-Sakran, 2001). On the level of institutions, 
several banks, for example, have converted totally or partially to Islamic banking; where 
services are provided free of interest (riba) such as the ones listed by Kettell (2011): Al-
Rajhi Bank (100%), Bank Al-Jazira (100%), Saudi British Bank (34.90%), Banque Saudi 
Fransi (25.27%), and the National Commercial Bank (24.93%).  
 
On the level of individuals‟ behaviour and attitudes within their institutions, there is a 
social distance between superiors and subordinates, which could be attributed to the 
55 
 
Muslim belief about authority in Islamic societies; also, Arab traditions recognize status 
hierarchy. Saudi managers as Muslims are required to co-operate with other Muslims and 
to share one another‟s sorrows and happiness. They are also required to offer non-Muslim 
groups the maximum social and cultural rights that can be accorded them on the basis of 
common humanitarian bonds. Saudi managers are seen as caring and nurturing with less 
ambition for achievement and financial reward (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). 
 
2. Tradition and Modernization  
A closer examination of the Saudi culture shows that it has gone through several rapid 
phases of changes. More than 80 years ago, Saudis were living in an isolated and 
undeveloped atmosphere that changed dramatically after the discovery of oil in 1932 into 
a high technology consumers society, seeking universal education and replacing 
traditional institutions with new ones (Al-Akeel, 1992).  
 
Life in Saudi Arabia would have changed even without the discovery of oil, but certainly 
it would have been at a slower pace. In the past, the foundation of people‟s wealth was 
measured by their degree of faith, communication between each other and generosity. 
Now, it is a different way of life: education, travel, communication and contact with 
foreigners have all made Saudi Arabia a full partner in the modern world (Lunde et al., 
1995). Modernization has affected how Saudis live; it can be seen in the huge shopping 
centres, the modern government buildings and houses, the five and seven stars hotels, 
various luxury restaurants. It even influenced Saudis‟ choice to prefer working in larger 
organizations (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993).  
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For example, prior to the discovery of oil, people in Saudi Arabia valued hard work and 
productive efforts, but this image has changed since the beginning of the oil boom, as the 
increase in the income of the country made the ruler more capable of distributing wealth 
among citizens through scholarships, land grants, interest-free property loans, and free 
public education and health care. Moreover, it facilitated the importing of labour from 
foreign countries to perform menial tasks, which have all resulted in replacing traditional 
values of hard work and productive efforts into schemes of leisure, apathy, and contempt 
for manual work (Assad, 2002).  
 
Despite the tremendous changes in the manifest culture, there is no corresponding change 
in the intrinsic culture, as Saudis have adopted very few additional habits from foreign 
cultures, which have resulted in the idea that Saudi Arabia is a man‟s world and that 
man‟s commitment to work serves as an indicator of his status and of being a responsible 
social actor. Therefore, Saudi managers are highly committed to work as they are very 
loyal to their organizations and would continue working even if they had enough money to 
live comfortably without doing so (Ali and Al-Shakhis, 1989; Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). 
When it comes to values, norms, behaviour, and the attitude of Saudis, usually individuals 
show a moderate attitude towards modernity, as they are neither too conservative nor too 
liberal because they try to preserve some of the traditional values that would strengthen 
and sustain the Saudi society (Al-Akeel, 1992).  
 
Saudis nowadays believe that tradition and modernity can coexist and they are looking 
forward to improving their future by using and applying the new technology but not at the 
57 
 
cost of their beliefs and morals, or even losing what they already have in terms of family 
closeness, the respect for their customs and traditions, the pride in the richness of their 
language, and the sustaining strength of their religion. This has been embodied in the 
belief, for example, that women are capable of playing a more active role in society and in 
the development of their country but within the context of Islam, i.e. without neglecting 
their roles as wives and mothers (Lunde et al., 1995). Several aspects such as education, 
female employment, and the breakdown of the extended family system has improved the 
women‟s role in the family in terms of their self-esteem and it has given them a stronger 
position in the family‟s decision making (Al-Khateeb, 1998). Therefore, since the 1990‟s 
many women have been encouraged to take up jobs traditionally perceived to be men‟s, 
and established respectable positions outside the family (Metz, 1992).  
 
Traditional values such as the importance of personal relationships and the preference for 
individuals from influential tribes have offered resistance to the new trends causing Saudi 
managers to act contrary to legal or rational principles, which has reflected in a “lower 
level of development” rather than choice (Assad, 2002). This conflict between the dual 
forces that pulls managers in opposite directions, tradition and modernity have caused 
managers to suffer from a crisis in direction and identity (Ali, 1990) as the use of more 
traditional organizing practices could be viewed as an informal choice rather than the 
result of the ignorance of bureaucratic principles (Al-Aiban and Pearce 1993).  
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3. Family Values 
Family and work are the most important characteristics in a Saudi manager‟s life, as the 
family takes precedence over the individual, and any member of the society is identified 
by his/her family, which results in taking pride for being a member of an extended family 
and makes the individual‟s duty and obligation as first and foremost to the family (Ali and 
Al-Shakhis, 1989). Family values have contributed to the cultural homogeneity of the 
Kingdom as the Saudis‟ appreciation of values and attitudes exemplified in the family 
which reverts to the Arabian tribal society, particularly, relations within the family itself 
and relationships of the family with the rest of society in terms of neighbours and 
friendships.  
 
Traditionally, the Saudi society is structured on an extended family base; yet, the approach 
towards a nuclear family has become more favourable in the society (Al-Akeel, 1992). 
Marriage and raising children are still very highly valued by both genders in the Saudi 
society; it is believed that motherhood is the most important role in the Saudi woman‟s 
life (Al-Khateeb, 1998). Therefore, Saudi managers rely on family and friendship ties for 
getting things done within their organisation as they live in a society where family and 
friendship remain important and influential factors in the functioning of institutions and 
groups (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). 
 
While the family forms the most important social institution in Saudi Arabia, its structure 
matches the structure of tribal roots in terms of the appearance of the father as the 
authoritarian figure at the top of a hierarchy that is based on age and gender, as he is seen 
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more independent and controlling one's emotions as well as a keenness to support other 
family members and take responsibility for their errors as well (Metz, 1992). Moreover, 
the family‟s image and prestige in the community is usually strengthened if its members 
had work and assumed respected positions, where the image of a father (as protective and 
courageous) is necessary to enhance a manager‟s successful role in the organisation and 
community (Ali and Al-Shakhis, 1989).  
 
Relations in organisations are built within the same cultural and religious values that 
permeate the society as a whole. Saudi managers are more satisfied with directive and 
persuasive superior as they like seeing themselves within the father image as benevolent 
decision makers, where emotional resistance to change such as loyalty to employer is seen 
as a virtue and employees fear to disagree with their boss. Therefore a manager is the one 
who builds a reputation for being honest, wise, generous and committed to his extended 
family (Ali and Al-Shakhis, 1989). Because of this father image, they believe that they 
can make decisions autocratically and paternalistically, and company rules should not be 
broken, therefore, conflicts in organisations are undesirable, but if they are forced to be 
involved, they resolve disagreements by authoritarian behaviour (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 
1993).    
 
Further, Saudi Arabia is a country where there is emphasis on concern for others and a 
friendly relationship among people (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). The social structure, 
social values, and patterns of relationship all centre on the primary group in terms of the 
family, kin, tribe, and friends, where the primary loyalty and responsibility of the 
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individual is directly towards others (Assad, 2002). That is why managers are essentially 
motivated by social needs, especially family affairs, rather than by purely economic 
incentives, which explains Saudi managers tend to have a high uncertainty avoidance 
orientation (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). In other words, the issue is not whether or not 
Saudis can fulfil their economic needs, but, it is whether they can find meanings in work 
that provide them with feelings of pride and would assist family relations and social 
cohesiveness (Ali and Al-Shakhis, 1989). 
 
2.6 Summary  
This chapter has highlighted and emphasized the socio-economic and cultural aspects that 
pertain to the business environment in Saudi Arabia in order to put the study of corporate 
project decision making into its proper context. The educational and social backgrounds 
described in this chapter are taken into account in the design and conduct of this study, 
particularly the definition and operationalization of the research variables and primary 
data collection as will be explained in more detail later in Chapter Five.  
 
The next two chapters will present a critical review of the relevant literature including 
laboratory based experiments and case studies based on real life cases that were 
accomplished within the area of the current research respectively as follows. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Escalation/De-Escalation of Capital Projects Decisions: A 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature on the escalation/de-escalation of commitment in capital project decisions 
consists largely of a plethora of theoretical models and laboratory studies that tried to 
explain and rationalize managers‟ choices. Each theory includes several factors that stem 
from and are consistent with the concepts and principles of the theory being considered. 
There is a noticeable lack of studies based on real life organisations and this is relatively 
due to the complexity and sensitivity of this particular topic, which makes it extremely 
difficult for researchers to gain access to primary data.  
 
This chapter reviews existing theoretical models to explain managers‟ escalation/de-
escalation decisions as follows: capital investment projects management (Section 3.2), the 
definition of both the escalation and de-escalation of commitment (Section 3.3), a review 
of theoretical models to explain the occurrence of the phenomenon (Section 3.4), focusing 
on the four more considered and applicable theories, and discussing the effectiveness of 
the theoretical models to inform the current study (Section 3.5). Section 3.6 concludes this 
chapter. 
 
3.2 Managing Capital Investment Projects 
The importance of applying project management techniques is, as explained by Kerzner 
(2006), dictated by the need to produce several benefits to both the project and the 
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company through: a) measuring plan accomplishment to identify early problems regarding 
project implementation or achieving objectives, b) specifying functional responsibilities, 
and c) minimizing the need for continuous reporting and identify time limits. However, 
there are more at stake in terms of benefits/losses when the project is a capital investment 
one given the amounts of capital and risks involved, hence proper project management is a 
fundamental requirement (Scott-Young and Samson, 2008).  
 
3.2.1 Project Management 
Project management (PM) can be defined as: “the application of knowledge, skills, tools 
and techniques to project activities to meet project requirements” (PMBOK, 2008). It 
differs from other management principles as suggested by Haynes (2009) in two 
significant issues: first, it focuses on an undertaken project with predetermined life 
duration, and second, it works on assigning the necessary resources to needed projects to 
meet objectives throughout the lifecycle of a project. Therefore, the purpose of PM is to 
anticipate as many of threats and obstacles as possible in addition to plan, organise and 
control actions so that projects are completed successfully in spite of all difficulties 
(Dennis, 2007). As PM focuses mainly on the project (Haynes, 2009), it deals with the 
following aspects regarding the project: a) determining the cost and significance of the 
project, b) identifying the type and time of the delivered outcome of the project, and c) 
establishing the roles, responsibilities of those charged with directing and managing the 
project from start to completion (Roberts, 2007). 
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Project management‟s definition, role, and purpose have gone through several critical 
stages of development (i.e., Morris, 1994; Kwak, 2005; Cleland and Gareis, 2006; 
Kerzner, 2006; Dennis, 2007). For example, Kerzner (2006) linked the historical 
development of project management to four aspects: the type of projects, companies‟ sub-
business that implemented PM systems, unstable economy, and the growing time span 
between project initiation and completion. Kerzner (2006) pointed out that up to the 1960s 
aerospace and defence industries in the USA have suffered from cost overruns in excess of 
200%-300%, which induced them to apply PM systems on almost all their projects. From 
the mid-60s up to the 70s and 80s more governmental companies applied PM systems to 
make sure that their cash investment is not wasted, and as companies carried out more 
capital projects in an increasingly unstable economy, even private companies began 
operating PM systems. By the 1990s, PM was seen as an essential need in all private and 
governmental companies as an important tool to achieve business objectives.           
 
Linking the development of PM to the development of both computer and management 
sciences, Dennis (2007) gave a detailed description, as he suggested that the more 
applications computers had the more managers became independent from IT experts and 
PM became a more respected profession (see Table 3.1). Within all the phases of 
development, PM aims to organize and optimize the required resources such as financial 
facilities; equipment; and skills to successfully complete the project (Haynes, 2009). 
Project management systems are constrained, in varying degrees, by time, costs, and 
performance in addition to good customer relationship if the project is accomplished to an 
outside customer, which will influence the progress and outcome of the project (Steffan, 
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2008; Kerzner, 2006). Therefore, the project is considered to be successful, in brief, when 
it is completed within the time; budgeted amount; and performance level (Scott-Young 
and Samson, 2008; Kloppenborg and Opfer, 2002).  
       Table 3.1: Development of PM within Different Time Periods and Features* 
Time period Period features 
Pre-1900 -Wonderful projects and cheap labour. 
-Management organization structures seen in churches and military. 
-No management scientists or project management profession. 
1900-1949 -Emergence of management science. 
-People begin to study work and people at work. 
-Early development of critical path networks. 
1950-1969 -US defence projects exploit critical path network analysis. 
-Mainframe computers can run project management software. 
-Project management becomes a recognized profession. 
-More concern for people at work. 
1970-1979 -Project management has two meanings: 
 1. Industrial project management; 2. IT project management. 
-Creation of professional association and more project management software. 
-Legislation for health and safety and anti-discrimination laws introduced. 
1980-1989 -Desktop computers can run powerful project management software. 
-Wider acceptance of project management as a profession. 
-Computers provide better graphics with colour. 
-Managers less dependent on IT experts. 
-Computers cannot run arrow networks and precedence becomes the norm. 
1990-2000+ -PCs and notebooks can run all applications. 
-Communication by satellite and the internet. 
-More interest in project risk. 
-IT and industrial project management no longer considered differently. 
-Project management is a respected profession, with flourishing associations. 
        *Table adapted from Dennis (2007)  
 
Munns and Bjeirmi (1996) suggested three elements to be considered for project success: 
a) the role of project management must be placed within the context of a wider project 
besides other external criteria and long-term expectations, b) project evaluation should not 
only focus on the implementation processes but also the economic and financial 
performance, and c) initially selecting the right project and screening out potentially 
unsuccessful projects will be more important to ensuring total project success as project 
management would enhance its attainment. These find resonance in Hyvӓri‟s (2006) study 
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in Finland where successful projects were found to depend on several items such as 
leadership skills, the project size, determining the mission of the project in the 
identification phase, and troubleshooting in the controlling phase of the project.  
 
Several elements influence a project‟s success/failure from its initiation through to its 
successful completion or termination if it fails. For example Danielson and Scott (2006) 
suggested that most small companies would reschedule their capital investments waiting 
for internally produced cash. In the USA, the telecommunications business‟ direction and 
level of investment is determined by the capital expenditures, as in 2007 both the wire-line 
and wireless capital expenditures reached $64 billion (Celentano, 2008). Similarly, Nini et 
al. (2009) found that US public companies that faced restrictions on financing their 
investments experienced a 15-20% decline in their investment decisions than those that 
did not face such restrictions. In Germany, Bayer (2008) found evidence that financing 
would have an influence on making investment decisions. Another reason for initiating an 
investment project is to achieve a company‟s strategic goals. For example, Alkaraan and 
Northcott‟s (2007) found that 55.4% of respondents agreed that investment decisions were 
originated from the corporate strategy in their companies. These goals should be set 
rationally with the aim of achieving them, which means that goals should be precise, 
evaluable, approachable, and motivating (Edvardsson and Hansson, 2005). Companies set 
goals either to increase the company‟s revenues (Gebauer et al., 2006), to dominate the 
offered service to customers in the market (Carneiro et al., 2011), to attain a high level of 
customer satisfaction with the aim of outperforming competitors (Wong, 2002), or to 
improve the quality of the presented service (Robinson, 2009).  
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The first problem managers face after initiating and implementing the project is the 
difference between the set budget and the final cost of the completed project. For example, 
in the UK, a survey was conducted by the Tax Payers‟ Alliance (TPA) in 2009 regarding 
the government‟s overspending on capital projects revealed that 32% of projects suffered 
from budget overrun (TPA, 2009). In the USA, a survey in 2005 showed that over 20% of 
big rail and road projects were over budgeted, where one in eight were significantly over 
cost (The Economist, 2005). In Korea, the average final cost at completion has increased 
by 122.4% compared to the original budgeted costs in mega projects, while in medium 
sized projects the average cost increase was 32.5% (Han et al., 2009).  In the USA, 
Flyvberg et al. (2002) found that 90% of 258 major transportation infrastructures were 
overspent. More examples demonstrate the increased monetary amount such as the Denver 
$5 billion airport that was 200% overspent (Szyliowicz and Goetz, 1995), and the 800 
million Danish Kroner Oresund Bridge, which was 68% overspent (Flyvberg et al., 2003).   
  
One of the reasons behind budget overrun, as explained in the literature, might be due to 
time delay because when projects exceed their estimated time, they are either expanded or 
rushed to completion, which causes additional costs to occur (Might and Fischer, 1985; 
Calisir and Gumussoy, 2005; Sambasivan and Soon, 2007). For example, in Turkey, 
Calisir and Gumussoy (2005) found that the average projects that exceeded budgets were 
19% and the schedule overrun was 49% of projects. In Malaysia, Sambasivan and Soon 
(2007) found that the effects of delay in the construction projects were time overrun (82%) 
and cost overrun (78%). In Korea, mega projects suffered from huge overruns as well as 
an average of 3.6 years of delay (Han et al., 2009). In the USA, it is found that 52.7% of 
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corporate software development projects are costing over their estimated schedules and 
budgets (Standish Group International, 1994). In Saudi Arabia, Al-Sultan (1987) found 
that 70% of public projects suffered time overrun, while Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006) found 
that 70% of the construction projects faced time delays. 
 
Once projects exceed their initial budget and time schedule they would be unable to 
achieve their goals. In New Zealand, a survey of 100 organisations across a broad cross 
section of industries showed that 70% of the firms have suffered at least one project 
failure and 50% of these projects failed to consistently achieve their objectives (One 
News, 2010). In a survey of 1,500 change management executives worldwide in IBM 
companies indicated that a 59% of projects missed at least achieving one objective or 
failed entirely (Jørgensen et al., 2008). In the Standish Group report, in 2009, only 32% of 
all projects have succeeded, 44% were facing problems, and 24% have failed (Wright and 
Capps, 2010). Projects, when their costs and time are overrun and when their strategic 
objectives are not met, need to be re-evaluated.  Pike (1996), for example, in a serial of 
studies in the UK found that when the costs of approved projects were over-run; 72% 
(1975), 82% (1980), 85% (1986), and 92% (1992), it was more likely for these projects to 
be evaluated. Since these elements would cause projects to face failure (Eden et al., 2005; 
Standish Group International, 1994). In the UK, a 1994 study of IS development projects 
in the British public sector estimated that 20% of expenditures were wasted, and a further 
30% to 40% did not produce perceivable benefits (Wilcocks, 1994). In 1994, the USA 
General Accounting Office reported that spending of more than $200 billion in the 
previous twelve years had led to a few meaningful returns (Flyvberg et al., 2002).   
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Failure of the project generates several possibilities for managers. For example, Dilts and 
Pence (2006) found that when a project faces major changes in the initial expectations, it 
is certainly to be at risk of being terminated, where project managers would be more 
aware of the influence of project termination than executives. Wright and Capps (2010) 
found that 55.4% of respondents, in the USA, have terminated projects in less than 20% of 
its time and when projects were less than 20% runaway, 71.6% of respondents redirected 
it. Guan et al. (2002) in a survey in China found that termination decisions for on-going 
projects were rarely made in time and were generally based on two issues: a) the 
experience of project managers as well as their top management, and b) a comparison of 
the project‟s performance in opposition to the target group of a number of signs. Corbett et 
al.‟s (2007) found that, in the USA, managers‟ inability to terminate projects in a timely 
approach have resulted in wasted resources that might have been reallocated to other 
promising projects. Further, three types of termination scripts were implemented: a) 45% 
made rapid decisions to exterminate a project without considering the possibility of 
learning opportunities, b) 72% used an indicative of a concerted effort to acquire sufficient 
information to know when to terminate or to continue a project, and c) 81% had the 
tendency to let projects continue when the chances for commercial success were limited.  
 
Another possibility is to continue funding the failing project, i.e., escalation of 
commitment (Staw and Ross, 1987b; Keil et al., 2000; Delios, 2004; Chakravorty 2009; 
Korzaan and Morris, 2009). For example, Keil et al. (2000) indicated that 30-40% of 
problematic IT projects showed some degree of escalation, where Delios et al. (2004) 
found that managers in Japan have continued 75% of poorly performing projects that had 
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not made a profit in the earlier five years of operations in joint ventures. Chakravorty 
(2009) in the USA found in a case study that more monetary resources were added to the 
failing project for four years before terminating it. In the USA, as well, Korzaan and 
Morris (2009) found that both personality characteristics of the decision maker as well as 
the locus of internal control have influenced managers‟ intention to escalate a failing 
project.    
 
The position of managers who deal with failing projects might not be influenced by 
project failure. Lui and Chan (2008) found, for example, that top management noticed that 
replacing project managers or team members of a failing project would be of no help as it 
would result in losing the considerable knowledge they have gained from dealing with the 
project, instead, they decided to limit the tasks of the project manager to one particular 
area. Contrary, managers‟ positions would face critical consequence. For example, Dilts 
and Pence (2006) have found that project managers‟ occupation could be critically 
derailed if they have managed a failing project, where executives might feel less 
threatened. Collins (2001) found in a survey in the USA that 11 out of 48 project 
managers were replaced during the lifetime of the failed projects. In the USA and 
Australia, 92.5% of respondents have agreed to some extent that they have left their jobs 
as project managers when they managed failing projects or performed poorly (Parker and 
Skitmore, 2005). Wright and Capps (2010) found in a survey in the USA that 68.1% of 
respondents agreed to replace the project manager, while 31.9% considered educating the 
project manager, and 63.8% were willing to improve the project manager.   
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Therefore, managing a project successfully depends on different inter-dependent phases of 
the project that are linked together in a logical manner, whereas each of the phases could 
be considered as a key step towards a successful outcome (Young, 2006). These phases 
will be explained below within the context of capital investment projects. 
 
3.2.2 Capital Investment Projects  
The need for understanding how to manage capital projects has grown rapidly as more 
surveys reveal the amount of problematic capital projects that companies face. For 
example, a survey by the McKinsey Quarterly group (2007) that examined four types of 
successful capital investment projects in different companies (acquisitions, maintenance, 
projects aimed at stimulating growth in existing companies, and efforts aimed at 
innovation) showed that seniors believed that 17% of the capital projects should be 
terminated, and 16% should not be financed at all. It is, therefore, essential that project 
managers understand how capital investment decisions are made if they are aiming to 
improve their companies‟ performance (Farragher et al., 1999).  
 
A capital investment project could be defined as a long-term investment project that 
requires relatively large sums to obtain, develop, improve, and/or maintain a capital asset 
(Business Dictionary, 2011). Examples of capital projects are: companies‟ acquisitions 
and mergers, new facilities investment projects, new product or major product line 
development, new technology employment, installation of new manufacturing and 
business processes, employment of advanced manufacturing and business technologies, 
and significant changes in production capacities (Alkaraan and Northcott, 2007; 
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Emmanuel et al., 2010). Capital projects are distinguished from other types of project 
because they are based on projections of future cash flows and they do not fit into the 
daily operating requirements of the company (Fabozzi et al,. 2008). They are surrounded 
by both quantifiable factors such as risk, and qualitative factors such as uncertainties that 
influence decision-makers‟ confidence in project estimates, whereas modifying levels of 
risk and uncertainty can influence the decision-makers‟ choice of forms, methods, and 
procedures for making the investment decision (Alessandri et al., 2004). These projects 
once made, they are difficult to reverse, which result in a considerable amount of 
monetary resources being at risk (Emmanuel et al., 2010).  Therefore, considering whether 
or not to invest in newer or additional versions of capital projects at any point in time is a 
significant managerial decision (Gilbert, 2003).   
 
In this regard, much attention has been given in the management accounting literature to 
address how capital investment decisions should be and are made, which they refer to as 
capital budgeting (e.g. Myers, 1974; Neale and Pike, 1992; Kester et al., 1999; Lazaridis, 
2004; Prather et al., 2009; Bennouna et al., 2010). Neale and Pike (1992: 254) have 
defined capital budgeting as the: “whole process of creating, appraising and implementing 
capital projects”. Where several forms of the capital investment decision making were 
suggested in the literature, regardless of differences in the content of the stages, they 
mostly agreed that the formal investment decision begins with generating the investment 
idea and ends with evaluating, monitoring, and measuring the outcome of the decision 
(Mukherjee and Henderson, 1987; Pike, 1996; Mukherjee and Hingorani, 1999; Klammer 
et al., 2002; Burns and Walker, 2009; Hall and Millard, 2010).    
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Of particular, usefulness is the extensive reviews undertaken by Mukherjee and 
Henderson (1987) and Burns and Walker (2009), of the surveys published on capital 
investment decisions process covering the period 1959-2007. The resulting four-stage 
framework from these reviews is adapted for the present study as presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Capital Investment Decision Process 
 
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the four stages are the identification stage, the development 
stage, the selection and implementation stage, and the evaluation stage, where each 
comprises of several sub-stages.  
 Identification 
stage 
•Source and reasons of idea origination.                               
•Process, submiossion of origination and time pattern of origination.  
Development 
stage  
•Extent of roject screening and secreenting process. 
•Forecasting and estimates and personal responsibilitty for the project. 
Selection & 
implementat-
ion stage  
•Strategic importance of the project, size of project, personal resposibility for analysis, 
determining project appraisal techniques and risk assessment. 
•Capital rationing, appropriate cost of capital, project approval and project 
implementation.   
 
Evaluation 
stage 
•Clarity of roles in project evaluation, use of project audit, quality of project audit 
process and assessment of audit reports. 
•Response of project manager to audit reports, effective use of team-based performance 
measures and incentives.  
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3.3 The Escalation/De-Escalation Phenomenon 
Several definitions were given in the literature for the escalation/de-escalation 
phenomenon. Since the focal area of this research is to understand managers‟ (de)-
escalation decisions (see Table 3.2), it is important to critically review definitions for the 
escalation/de-escalation phenomenon in the context that is consistent with the aim and 
objectives of the current research as follows.  
          Table 3.2: Escalation/De-Escalation Decisions 
                                                                     
Decision 
Project progress 
Successful   Failure   
Correct  Continue  De-escalate  
Incorrect   Quit  Escalate  
 
 
3.3.1 The Concept of Commitment Escalation 
The escalation of commitment, which is a central concept in this research study is 
generally understood as a subsequent decision of an initial investment decision related to a 
project that is no longer meeting its strategic plan and goals (e.g. Staw, 1981; Garland and 
Conlon, 1998; Citera et al., 2000). For instance, feedback information indicates that the 
investment project has a negative net present value (NPV) or an internal rate of return 
(IRR) below the minimum desired rate of return (hurdle rate), hence the project manager 
would face the choice between continuing to incur losses or immediately withdrawing 
from that investment project. 
 
Therefore, as suggested by the existing literature (see for example, Bazerman and Neale, 
1992; Harrison and Harrell, 1995; Cheng et al., 2003), there are three key aspects to this 
concept: 
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1. Escalation of commitment is a decision subsequent to an initial investment decision. 
2. The evaluation of the profitability and failure/success of the current investment 
project. 
3. The decision maker has the choice of either to continue with or to withdraw from the 
investment project. 
 
In more detail, the first aspect highlights the fact that the decision to escalate is a 
subsequent to an initial strategic investment decision. Escalation of commitment is not the 
starting point of an investment; it is the decision that follows the initial investment 
decision with the exception of investments that have a specific nature and are surrounded 
by special circumstances, in which committing more resources to those investments would 
be considered to reflect the “wasteful” face of commitment (e.g. Staw, 1981; Harrison and 
Harrell, 1995; Garland and Conlon, 1998; Wilson and Zhang, 1997; Citera et al, 2000).  
 
This special nature and circumstances were described in the literature through several 
terms such as: “uneconomic projects” (Cheng et al., 2003); “projects that logically should 
be discontinued” (Harrell and Harrison, 1994); “failing course of action” (Schmidt and 
Calantone, 2002); “economic conditions suggest that cancelling the project would be the 
best alternative” (Staw and Ross, 1978); or, “a project beyond an economically defensible 
point” (Staw, 1981). The fact that an escalation decision is a subsequent to an initial 
investment decision was the motive for most escalation authors who examined the effect 
of personal responsibility on escalation decisions; specifically, it was the reason that 
escalation has become widely discussed in the psychology and social psychology 
literature (e.g., Staw, 1976; Brockner et al., 1979; Bobocel and Meyer, 1994; Kirby and 
Davis, 1998).  
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Escalation authors who examined the effect of personal or initial responsibility on 
escalation decisions based their assumption on the link between the decision maker who 
initiated the investment project and his/her decision to escalate.  For example, Staw (1981: 
579) explained managers‟ decision to escalate through their need to justify a previous 
behaviour as: “individuals may go beyond the passive distortion of adverse consequences 
in an effort to rationalize a behavioural error. By committing new and additional 
resources, an individual who has suffered a setback could attempt to turn the situation 
around or to demonstrate the ultimate rationality of his/her original course of action.”  
 
The second aspect is linked to evaluating the profitability and success of the problematic 
investment project. Escalation authors have pursued two lines to explain the degree of 
project success/failure. The first line focused on the available feedback information, which 
indicated that the future investment has a negative net present value (NPV). The current 
literature in the field of capital budgeting and financial management suggests that 
accepting and continuing a capital investment project is conditional on the positive NPV 
of the project, or an IRR that is higher than the minimum desired rate of return (hurdle 
rate) (Horengren et al., 2002; Brearly and Myers, 1996).  
 
According to this rule, any project with a negative NPV will be rejected and any 
processing project with a negative NPV or an IRR less than the hurdle rate will be 
terminated (e.g. Cheng et al., 2003; Statman and Caldwell, 1987). The importance of 
including this rule is to clarify the situation to be examined so there will be no risk of 
providing misleading results. Such a rule was presented explicitly in a limited number of 
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studies in the existing literature either in the definition of a losing project, such as the one 
presented by Devaney (1991), who defined the losing project as a project that has negative 
net present value (NPV) when he explained the two edges of commitment.  
 
Alternatively, this rule was presented explicitly through the scenarios that were provided 
in the experimental tasks. For example, Harrell and Harrison (1994) provided subjects 
with a scenario where the NPV was less than the salvage value of the project in order to 
explain the high degree of project failure. Moreover, Harrell and Harrison (p. 572) have 
expected that: “since the project’s current salvage value exceeded the net present value of 
its cash flow, the normatively correct decision as taught in the participants’ economics 
and managerial accounting courses was to discontinue the project.”  
 
The second line that escalation authors have pursued is linking the evaluation of the 
profitability and success/failure of the problematic investment project to the ability of the 
project to achieve the established goals. For example, Ross and Staw (1986: 274) have 
stated that the project is failing and there is no hope for the project to achieve the 
established goals: “escalation situation is a situation where things have not only gone 
wrong, but where potential actions aimed at curing the problem can actually deepen or 
compound one’s loss. ” Therefore, escalation would represent completely an irrational 
behaviour that can be highlighted as the persistence of a previously prescribed course of 
action past the point where a rational analysis would suggest it was profitable (Bazerman 
and Neale, 1992).  
 
77 
 
The third aspect of the escalation phenomenon concentrates on the matter of choice where 
the decision maker can either continue or withdraw from the escalation conflict. Yet, some 
escalation authors have confused the definition of escalation of commitment with the idea 
of managers being locked or trapped in a course of action. Drummond (1994: 591), for 
example, defines escalation as a situation that: “refers to predicaments where individuals 
and organizations become trapped in losing courses of action as a result of earlier 
decisions.” 
 
In order to explain the difference between managers being trapped or locked and the 
process of escalating commitment, it is essential as a starting point to go back to the 
dictionary (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995) and pick up the basic meaning of the 
four concepts: escalating; trapped; locked; and, entrapment. Escalating (p. 459) according 
to the dictionary means: “increasing or developing by stages”, being trapped (p. 1484), on 
the other hand, means: “stop and retain in”, being locked (p. 800) similarly, means: 
“become rigidly fixed or immovable.” Finally, entrapment (p. 451) refers to: “the act or an 
instance of entrapping; the process of being entrapped.”  
 
Escalation of commitment is a situation “where there is an opportunity to withdraw or 
persist” (Staw and Ross, 1987b: 40). Therefore, escalation depends mainly on the choice 
that managers have in several stages of the failing investment lifetime. Oppositely, the 
choice element in being trapped or locked is missing; in fact, being trapped is an advanced 
stage of the escalation of commitment.  
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Additionally, entrapment “is a particular type of conflict escalation, based on the 
individuals’ need to feel that their past commitment to a chosen course of action was not 
made in vain” (Brockner and Rubin, 1985: 6), is always viewed as a “bad” situation, 
“whereby individuals escalate their commitment to a previously chosen, though failing 
course of action” (Brockner and Rubin, 1985: 5) and "in contrast to escalation research, 
subjects in entrapment situations typically incur small continuous losses as they seek or 
wait to achieve a goal” (Bowen, 1987: 53).   
 
3.3.2 The Concept of Commitment De-Escalation  
De-escalation of commitment, in the context of this research, is a concept that can be 
considered as a subsequent decision of escalation, which is related to terminating or 
redirecting a problematic project that is not meeting its strategic plan and goals anymore 
and is made through several stages (e.g. Ryan, 1995; Montealegre and Keil, 2000; 
Mähring et al., 2008; Chong and Suryawati, 2010). 
 
This concept considers the following two aspects: 
1. De-escalation of commitment is a consequence decision of escalation that goes beyond 
the idea of just abandoning or terminating a project. 
2. De-escalation of commitment decision is a not a sudden or a one-step choice that is 
made without planning, but a decision that is based on several stages. 
 
The first aspect is considering de-escalation as a decision that pursues escalation of 
commitment. Therefore, it is not only a terminating or an abandoning decision. In order to 
clear this misunderstandings it is important, borrowing from project management 
literature (Hormozi et al., 2000), to bring to light the relationship of three elements to the 
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type of the decision to be made: a) when the decision will be made, b) how much cost was 
allocated, and c) whether the decision will be made because the project is considered as a 
successful or failing venture. With regard to the time and the amount of costs allocated, 
the decision to withdraw from a project might take place in the early stages of its life 
cycle, sometimes just before few or no costs have been allocated because of, for example, 
shortage of financial supply, changes in consumer tendency, negative relationship between 
costs and expected benefit, or firm merging (Capples, 2003; Kerzner, 2006). In this view, 
since there is no evidence of any escalation to occur in terms of exceeding the estimated 
time and costs, therefore, the choice to withdraw cannot be considered as a de-escalation 
decision; it is only a terminating, abandoning, or cancelling a project.   
 
Molden and Hui (2011) suggested the regulatory-focus approach to explain de-escalation 
of commitment; they found evidence in two laboratory studies in the USA that 
motivations of promotion-focused in terms of focusing on gains of the project, broadening 
the consideration of alternatives, and foregoing previous choices for new opportunities 
could reduce managers‟ escalation of commitment tendencies. Moser et al. (2013) 
suggested “pre-decisional accountability with unknown opinion of the audience” as a de-
escalation strategy, as they found empirical evidence in a laboratory study in Germany 
that when subjects were accountable for their initial choices they were less likely to persist 
with a failing project. 
 
With regard to why the decision is made (i.e., because the project is considered as a 
successful or failing venture), de-escalation of commitment is not made if the project has 
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succeeded and accomplished its goals, whereas the decision to be made eventually will be 
to terminate, stop or close a successful project that has reached completion (Hormozi et 
al., 2000). Whereas, de-escalation of commitment is linked only to failing or problematic 
projects that have suffered from escalation outcomes. It is a consequence decision that 
takes place after the decision maker has been locked in a cycle of several escalation 
decisions (Ryan, 1995; Gosh, 1997; Montealegre and Keil, 2000).  
 
In agreement with the interpretation above, almost all de-escalation authors have defined 
or explained managers‟ tendency to abandon or stop a failing project. For example, 
McCain's (1986) results demonstrated that managers have the tendency to de-escalate after 
being locked in a cycle of escalation decisions to the failing project. Ryan (1995) named 
decision makers as “non-escalators” where he defined escalation of commitment as 
decision makers‟ trend to carry on their investing of resources in courses of action that 
were problematic and where the final results of continuing the investment were doubtful. 
Gosh (1995) and Cheng, et al. (2003), defined de-escalation of commitment strategies as 
managers‟ tendency to decrease escalation of commitment to both sunk costs and the 
probability of escalation of commitment respectively.  
 
De-escalation of commitment is not limited to terminating or abandoning a failing project; 
it might include re-directing the project to turn the situation around and recoup escalation 
consequences (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). This view was found lately in case studies 
but not in laboratory settings studies where the pursued approach was to design scenarios 
that limited respondents' answers to either escalate or de-escalate commitment in terms of 
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continuing or stopping the funds to failing projects. For example, Simonson and Staw 
(1992: 422) examined subjects' tendency to de-escalate commitment, in a laboratory 
setting, where the second part of the presented scenario contained the following phrase: 
“your recommendation to allocate the $3 million…….as you will note…. the results have 
been rather disappointing.” Their results gave more support to de-escalation of 
commitment as subjects decided not to allocate the extra $3 million to the failing project. 
However, they called for more field research to investigate de-escalation of commitment 
strategies.     
 
In a case study, Montealegre and Keil (2000) examined the Computerized Baggage 
System Project at Denver International Airport (DIA) in Denver City (USA), where the 
project was assumed to be operating by October 1993. They found that when the baggage 
system failed in terms of a 16-month delay and an amount of $2 million exceeding the 
budget, managers of the project, after several discussions, de-escalated commitment 
through redirecting the project and restructuring the baggage system by dividing the 
implementation responsibility of the original contract to two parties: the United Airlines 
and the City of Denver. 
 
The second aspect of the de-escalation phenomenon is related to the fact that de-escalation 
is not a sudden or a one-step choice that is made without planning. Instead it is a decision 
that is developed through several stages. This aspect was more explicit in the literature 
that was based on case studies (Ross and Staw, 1993; Montealegre and Keil, 2000; 
Mähring et al., 2008; Flynn et al., 2009; Arbuthnott and Dolter, 2013). For example, Ross 
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and Staw (1993) recommended an exit strategy to de-escalate commitment in their case 
study that depended on four propositions: 
1. Reducing social and psychological determinants through replacing top management 
who initiated the escalated project. 
2. Minimizing organisational determinants through separating the project from the 
company‟s central goals.  
3. Reducing project determinants by assuring the organisation‟s persistence in the 
business after withdrawal through financial deals and new loans. 
4. Minimizing external political pressure by announcing the worries of persisting in a 
failing project. 
 
Montealegre and Keil (2000: 430-431) suggested four proceeding stages for de-escalation 
decisions that are teemed with several factors as follows: 
1. Problem recognition stage: involves questioning the project‟s capability to be 
operating at the pre-scheduled time and within the initiated budget.  
2. Re-examination of prior course of action: includes reconsidering the problematic 
project.  
3. Search for alternative course of action: by clearly identifying and legally accepting 
the alternative.    
4. Implementing an exit strategy: through influencing other groups or parties who had 
a significant authority and control on the projects‟ progress to discontinue the 
project. 
 
As most of the empirical literature is laboratory based, which has different settings from 
case studies (Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009), this aspect was not clearly 
evident in the choices presented to subjects of their experiments. Instead, the de-escalation 
choice was, on one hand, presented on a scale to measure the strength of the decision 
(Garland et al., 1990; Cheng et al., 2003; Greitemeyer et al., 2009). For example, Cheng, 
83 
 
et al. (2003: 77), examined “subjects’ tendency to continue or terminate the project; their 
response was measured on a 10-point scale; a response of 1-5 indicated project 
termination while 6 to 10 indicated continuation of the current investment project.” 
Similarly, Greitemeyer et al. (2009), asked subjects to allocate from zero to 10 million 
Euros to the failing project to measure the amount of (de)-escalation of commitment.   
 
Alternatively, subjects were asked to make one choice either to persist in or discontinue 
the failing project (Boehne and Paese, 2000; Karlsson et al., 2002). Boehne and Paese 
(2000: 184), for example, handled subjects a scenario regarding an opening of a tennis 
club project. It was explained in the scenario that the project might require exceeding the 
initiated budget ($10 millions) to be completed, afterwards “subjects were asked two 
questions: 1) completing the project, and 2) not completing the project.”   
 
3.4 Theoretical Models to Explain the (De)-Escalation Phenomenon 
Since the mid-1970s, a large number of theories have been proposed to explain the (de)-
escalation phenomenon. However, summarizing and integrating this growing literature is 
difficult because theoretical explanatory models presented were largely fragmented and 
detached (Staw and Ross, 1987b; Wilson and Zhang, 1997; Karlsson et al., 2005; 
Sleesman et al., 2012). Wilson and Zhang (1997) pointed out that none of the theories they 
reviewed had fully explained the (de)-escalation of commitment phenomenon, though 
each of the theories reviewed possessed an explanatory power. Furthermore, they called 
for more research that would focus on the effect of the investment decision making 
process away from laboratory conditions (Wilson and Zhang, 1997).  
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Escalation/de-escalation of commitment models and theories could be grouped into 
several categories according to several perspectives. First, according to their source of 
origin, theories were either developed to only fit the (de)-escalation phenomenon such as 
Ross and Staw‟s model (in different studies of Ross and Staw, 1986; 1987a; 1987b; 1991; 
1993), new project development effect (Oorschot et al., 2011), outside-board members 
effect (Woods et al., 2012), and an analytic model (Winch, 2013). Alternatively, they were 
adopted from other disciplines to explain the phenomenon such as attribution theory 
(Gross, 1991), agency theory (Harrison, and Harrell, 1993), decision dilemma theory 
(Bowen, 1987), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Whyte, 1986; Garland and Newport, 1991), reactance theory (Staw and 
Ross, 1978; Bateman, 1986), self-justification theory (Staw, 1976; Rubin et al., 1980, 
1980), self-presentation theory (Brockner, 1992), self-efficacy theory (Whyte et al., 1997), 
and behavioural forecasting (Ku, 2008).  
 
Second, according to the rationality that triggered their explanation, most authors who 
applied these theories have explained escalation in psychological terms (e.g. Staw, 1976; 
Tegar, 1980; Brockner and Rubin, 1985; Staw and Ross, 1987a; Schulz and Cheng, 2002; 
Gunia et al., 2009). The assumption underlying these studies was that when individuals 
commit new or additional resources, they might try to rationalize a behavioural error by 
going past a passive distortion of adverse consequences. Further, an individual who has 
suffered a setback could try to turn the situation around or to demonstrate the ultimate 
rationality of his/her original decision (Staw, 1981). On the other hand, little effort was 
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given to explain this phenomenon in economic terms (e.g. Tang, 1988; Whyte, 1993; 
Harrison et al., 1999; Sabherwal et al., 2003; Chong and Suryawati, 2010).  
 
Finally, with regard to factors that affected the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon, 
some theories have focused only on factors that are under the decision makers‟ control 
such as managers‟ attitudes and personalities, (i.e., attribution theory; reactance theory; 
self-justification theory; and self-efficacy theory). Others have, in addition to managers‟ 
attitudes and behaviour, have taken into account the effect of factors that are beyond the 
decision makers‟ control such as the expected utility of the project and other economic 
considerations, (i.e., the decision dilemma theory; expectancy theory; prospect theory; and 
Ross and Staw‟s model, 1993), or considered the separation between ownership and 
management, accordingly, they were based on the conflict that rises between owners‟ and 
managers‟ own interests (agency theory).   
 
Since the current research focuses mainly on the de-(escalation) scheme, the aim of the 
next sections is to review key theories that are of direct relevance to explaining (de)-
escalation of commitment (see Table 3.3), which are self-justification theory, agency 
theory, prospect theory and approach-avoidance theory (Keil et al, 2000; Pan et al, 2009), 
whereas a brief review of those theories will be presented in the following sections, 
considering their relationship to managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions.  
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Table 3.3: A Summary of Theories of Project (De)-Escalation*                                 
Theory Underlying concept of theory How theory rationalizes escalation 
Self-Justification 
theory 
People have the need to justify 
their actions and decisions, 
especially the wrong ones. 
In order to justify themselves psychologically or 
socially, managers tend to allocate more 
resources to a failing endeavour.  
Agency theory  Looks at the conflict of interests 
between the principal and the 
agent that appears within 
incomplete and asymmetric 
information 
When there is a conflict between agents' and 
principals' self-interests, agents are more likely 
to act towards their own self-interest and escalate 
commitment.  
Prospect theory Describes decisions between 
alternatives that involve risk. 
When managers face failing projects they tend to 
be risk seeking and allocate more funds to the 
failing project. 
Approach- 
Avoidance 
theory  
A situation in which an 
individual faces a single event 
that has both fascinating and 
averting elements. 
Managers have the tendency to escalate when 
escalation factors that affect their decision are 
more attractive than de-escalation factors. 
* Table modified from Pan et al. (2009: 78) 
 
 
3.4.1 Self-Justification Theory 
The theory of self-justification is derived mainly by the cognitive dissonance model where 
people might go against their better judgment and make the choice that would never make 
them feel regretful of their decisions i.e., they have a need to justify their actions and 
decisions, especially the wrong ones (Festinger, 1957). It is based on the idea that when an 
individual comes across cognitive dissonance, or a situation in which his/her behaviour is 
psychologically inconsistent with what he/she believes, that individual will be more likely 
to justify the behaviour declining any negative feedback associated with it (Aronson et al., 
2006). 
 
Behaviour justification might be, as suggested by Holland et al. (2002), internally or 
externally. Internal self-justification refers to a change in the way people value their 
actions, as it may be an attitude change, underestimation or rejection of the negative 
detriments. Conversely, external self-justification aims to diminish one's responsibility for 
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a behaviour and is usually elicited by moral dissonance; it refers to the use of external 
excuses to justifying one's actions, whereas, the excuses can be a realignment of personal 
responsibility, short of personal control or social pressures.  
 
Both, internal and external self-justification grasped the attention of a large number of 
escalation/de-escalation authors since the mid-seventies until recently (see Table 3.4), it 
could be argued that it was the most applied theory in laboratory studies to explain why 
managers allocate more resources to a failing endeavour (Staw, 1976; Brockner et al., 
1981; Whyte, 1991; Simonson and Staw, 1992; Drummond, 1997; Keil et al, 2000; Greer 
and Stephens, 2001; Schulz and Cheng, 2002; Gomez and Sanchez, 2013). Regarding 
external self-justification, several authors have explained managers‟ (de)-escalation 
decisions through the desire of managers to justify other parties that were beyond their 
own control in terms of social or political pressures (Brockner et al., 1981; Ross and Staw, 
1986; Beauvois et al., 1993; Drummond, 1994; Keil et al., 2000; Pan et al., 2009). For 
example, in a case study in the UK, Pan et al. (2009) found that the managers‟ external 
self-justification in terms of their identification with customers was one of the reasons for 
escalation of commitment.    
 
Regarding internal self-justification, the existing literature explained managers‟ (de)-
escalation decisions as a result of justifying their earlier choice either through being 
involved or personally responsible for those decisions (Staw, 1976; Caldwell and O'Reilly, 
1982; Brown and Solomon, 1993; Drummond, 1998; Keil et al., 2000; Wong, 2005; 
Slaughter and Greguras, 2008; Alvarez et al., 2011; Contractor et al., 2012). For example, 
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Schulz and Cheng (2002) found that subjects in the high personal responsibility condition 
were more likely to escalate commitment than those in the low personal responsibility 
condition, which enhanced the assumption of the effect of personal responsibility as a key 
factor that is driven by self-justification theory to explain subject's escalation attitudes.  
Table 3.4: Authors and Variables of Self-Justification Theory 
Authors  Year  Variables  
Staw  1976 Personal responsibility 
Staw & Ross  1978 Prior experience 
Brockner et al.  1979 Resource allocation process and prior limit setting 
Staw & Fox  1977 Initial responsibility and efficacy of resources 
Conlon & Wolf  1980 Visibility 
Leatherwood & Conlon  1987 Initial responsibility and diffusion of blame 
Barton et al. 1989 Initial responsibility, positive and negative information 
Whyte 1991 Individual and group prior responsibility 
Simonson & Staw  1992 Personal responsibility, less threatening outcome, minimum goal 
setting, and accountability for decision process 
Keil et al. 1995 Nationality and availability of alternative investment 
Harrison & Harrell  1995 Initial responsibility, and NPV; IRR explicit information 
Boulding et al.  1997 Ambiguous environment, future opportunity costs, and 
pre-commitment to a self-specified stopping rule 
Drummond 1997 Desire for self-justification, paucity of information, and 
expectations are not met 
Rao & Monk 1999 External justification, and inner motivation 
Sabherwal et al.  2003 Personal responsibility, job insecurity, and competitors satisfactory 
experience 
Sivanathan et al. 2007 Self-esteem, and self-affirm 
Slaughter & Greguras  2008 Evaluation bias,  and personal responsibility 
Harvey & Victoravich  2009 Level of completion, and presence of an alternative project 
Gunia et al. 2009 Psychological connection  
Gomez & Sanchez  2013 Nationality, past investment decision 
Salter et al.  2013 Nationality, self-justification 
 
Simonson and Staw (1992) investigated strategies to reduce escalation of commitment as 
they focused on moderating the effect of internal self-justification in terms of cutting 
down the effect of personal responsibility as well as making negative outcomes less 
threatening and giving more power to other factors such as setting minimum target levels 
and evaluating decision makers on the basis of their decision process rather than the 
decision outcome. They found that, when the effect of self-justification was moderated 
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and more weight was given to other variables, subjects were less likely to escalate and 
preferred to withdraw from a failing project.  
 
3.4.2 Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory was built by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979 as a psychological practical 
substitute to the expected utility theory. It describes how people might evaluate possible 
losses and gains in order to make a decision that involves choosing between risky 
alternatives. The theory presumes that managers identify and distinguish between negative 
and positive outcomes in relation to a particular recommended goal and that the 
satisfaction of the choice could be subject to whether the framing or evaluating of the 
negative outcomes are considered as expenditures or losses that will not be remunerated 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 1984).   
 
Prospect theory was broadly applied to explain escalation of commitment (e.g. Thaler, 
1980; Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Northcraft and Neale, 1986; Garland, 1990; Garland and 
Newport, 1991; Whyte, 1993; Ryan, 1995; Ruchala, 1999; Keil et al, 2000; Gomez and 
Sanchez, 2013; Salter et al., 2013). However, most research on escalation within the 
prospect theory approach has considered one or two of the theory's implications (see Table 
3.5): 
 Framing effects 
 Risk attitudes  
 Sunk costs 
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Thaler (1980) recommended prospect theory to provide a reliable ground to explain sunk 
cost effects in escalation situations through two features of the theory; the value function 
and the certainty effect (see Figure 3.2). The value function stands for the relation between 
the independently identified gains and losses and the individual's own value of such gains 
and losses.  
 
Figure 3.2: Prospect Theory Value Function  
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)  
 
 
When the decision maker initiates an investment, he/she would be at point (a). After a 
considerable failure has occurred, the decision maker will be at point (b), where additional 
losses do not cause great reduction of value; yet, equivalent gains do cause great growth of 
value. Accordingly, when the decision maker is at point (b), where sunk costs already 
exist, he/she might risk minor losses with the intention of obtaining probable great gains. 
The second feature of the prospect theory that explains sunk costs is the certainty effect, 
which might appear in two directions either by considering that totally certain gains are 
very much overvalued or by taking into consideration that certain losses are significantly 
undervalued (Thaler, 1980; Arkes and Blumer, 1985).   
 
a 
b 
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Following this line, several researchers have examined the sunk costs effect through 
prospect theory. For example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) conducted ten experiments where 
their scenarios ranged from topics related to events that subjects might face in their 
everyday life choices such as purchasing a holiday ski trip or buying a ready-made dinner, 
to topics that are related to decisions that face a president of an airline company or the 
owner of a printing company. In their ten experiments they found strong effects for sunk 
costs on subjects' final decisions to pursue with an action that is assumed to be failing and 
not creating any rewards in return.  
  Table 3.5: Authors and Variables of Prospect Theory 
Author Year  Variables  
Northcraft & Neale  1986 Sunk costs, Explicit opportunity costs, and Enhance the salience of 
opportunity costs  
Bondt & Makhija 1988 Sunk costs, and Degree of completion 
Garland & Newport  1991 Sunk costs 
Whyte 1993 Group decision making, and Sunk costs 
Schaubroeck & Davis  1994 Personal responsibility, and Risk seeking vs. avoidance 
Keil et al.  1995 Sunk costs, and Alternative investment 
Keil  1995 Emotional attachment 
Rutledge  1995 Group initial responsibility, and Negative information frame 
Ryan 1995 Investor‟s belief 
Sharp & Salter  1997 Negative domain 
Ruchala 1999 Time spent, and Risk seeking (not meeting budget goals) 
Keil et al.  2000 Nationality, Risk propensity, and Sunk costs 
Sabherwal et al.  2003 Initial support for project, and Positive frame 
Biyalogorsky et al.  2006 decision maker‟s involvement, and Biased belief 
Zhiyuan & Qing  2008 Sunk costs, Framing, Decision making process. 
Schulz-Hardt et al. 2009 Preference of initial responsibility 
Gomez & Sanchez  2013 Nationality, Decision frame  
Salter et al. 2013 Nationality, Risk framing, Risk avoidance 
 
Framing effects, which is another feature of the prospect theory that was widely examined 
in the (de)-escalation of commitment literature (e.g., Barton et al., 1989; Whyte, 1993; 
Drummond, 1994; Sharp and Salter, 1997; Biyalogorsky et al., 2006). For example, 
Whyte (1993) examined the framing effects on groups' decisions to escalate. He proposed 
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that in the negative frame, where losses have occurred, managers would be risk seeking 
when they have to choose between assured losses and the probability of larger losses 
joined with an opportunity to prevent otherwise assured losses. He found that when 
subjects were asked to act as groups and choose between different alternatives in the 
negative frame, they were more likely to escalate than when they were asked to make the 
decision individually.     
 
3.4.3 Agency Theory 
The concept of agency theory could be defined as an agreement where a person or more 
(the principals) employ another person (the agent) to perform particular duties on their 
behalf, which requires authorizing some managerial power to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). A commonly illustrated agency model is when owners or shareholders 
of an organization, performing as the principals, employ a chief executive officer, 
performing as the agent, to accomplish and manage the firm or when the senior 
management of an organisation, the principal, employs a qualified junior manager, as the 
agent, to deal with definite actions of the organisation (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1989). 
 
The agency conflict deals with the complexities that appear under situations of incomplete 
and asymmetric information when the principal and the agent might not have the same 
interests. As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) the following consequences occur: 
 Agents would accomplish their duties in agreement with their own self-interest. 
 Goal conflict would occur between the principals and the agent. 
 Agent's decisions and actions consequences could be evaluated simply. 
 Agent's attitude towards risk would be a risk adverse attitude more than principals.  
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In order to explain the escalation behaviour through the agency theory, escalation authors 
(e.g., Harrell and Harrison, 1994; Harrison and Harrell, 1993; 1995; Kirby and Davis, 
1998; Rutledge and Karim, 1999; Keil et al., 2000; Salter et al., 2013) have taken into 
account how incentives and information asymmetry influence the principal-agent 
relationships. For example, Harrison and Harrell (1993) suggested two different situations 
might arise in organisations that are linked to the information provided of the failing 
project: 
 Public information: the information available to the principal supported him to follow 
actions made by the agent, within a state of information where asymmetry exists. The 
agent with an incentive to shirk in not expected to act according to his own interest as 
he would discontinue the failing project. 
 
 Private information: the information was available only for the agent. The principal is 
not able to follow the actions made by the agent, within a state of information where 
asymmetry exists. The prospective of goal differences between the principal and agent 
occurs, where the agent with incentives to shirk is expected to make decisions that 
meet his own self-interest at the cost of the principal's interest.      
 
Several authors have attempted to explain escalation behaviour through the propositions 
of the agency theory (see Table 3.6). Harrison and Harrell in several studies (1993; 1994; 
1995) have followed such a line. For example, they found strong support for their 
assumption that project managers who established an investment project and consequently 
went through situations of adverse selection (privately held information and an incentive 
to shirk) would be more likely to continue their initiated projects when surrounded by 
failure (Harrison and Harrell, 1993). Kirby and Davis (1998) noticed a major agency 
theory propositions influence in several features of their experiment: a) when agents' 
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actions are monitored they would act in favour of the principal‟s self-interest, b) when 
agents are monitored their attitude towards risk will be less risk seeking and therefore they 
are less likely to escalate their commitment to failing projects, and c) when agents are 
accountable for their decisions this would enhance organisation control. Rutledge and 
Karim (1999) examined adverse selection effects as well as the level of moral reasoning 
on managers' escalation tendencies. They found that when subjects face high levels of 
adverse selection and low levels of moral reasoning they will be more likely to escalate 
than subjects with high moral reasoning or subjects who faced low levels of adverse 
selection. 
   Table 3.6: Authors and Variables of Agency Theory 
Author Year  Variables    
Harrison & Harrell 1993 Existence of adverse selection, and Personal responsibility 
Harrell & Harrison  1994 Existence of adverse selection 
Sharp & Salter 1997 Nationality (north America) 
Kirby & Davis  1998 Monitoring managers‟ decisions, and Accountability  
Harrison et al.  1999 Existence of adverse selection, and Nationality (Americans) 
Rutledge & Karim  1999 Existence of adverse selection, and Moral reasoning 
Keil et al. 2000 Project size, Goal congruency, and Information asymmetry 
Salter et al.  2004 Nationality (American), and Existence of adverse selection 
Salter et al.  2013 Nationality, potential long-term payoff 
 
 
3.4.4 Approach-Avoidance Theory 
The approach-avoidance theory displays a situation where a person has to deal with an 
issue that has both positive and negative characteristics. The theory is related to situations 
that have multiple features, which cause the decision maker to struggle as he/she has to 
decide whether to approach or to withdraw from such situations, when he/she has to make 
his/her decision after comparing and evaluating both the positive and negative aspects of 
the situation to choose which forces are stronger -the positive or negative- to effect his/her 
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decision (Pan et al, 2009). The mechanism of the theory was described in Gray and Braver 
(2002) study, as they linked individuals' behaviour to their emotions, which as they 
recommended are strongly related to achieving the goal of a specific event (Figure. 3.3). 
They pointed out that events that generate an emotion could be real and continuing, 
predictable, recalled from memory, or a fancy. In Figure 3.3, these events are indicated 
jointly according to the situation.  
 
              Figure 3.3: Schematic Outline of Emotion-Related Processing Stages 
(Gray and Braver, 2002: 298) 
 
When an event evokes a warning, the follow-on condition would be disappointing and 
triggers withdrawal. On the other hand, if the event is more likely to be encouraging, the 
follow-on condition would be satisfying and approach is motivated. Moreover, they 
suggested that emotions go through several stages before being translated into behaviour.    
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The approach-avoidance theory was applied by few studies to explain both escalation and 
de-escalation of commitment domains (see Table 3.7).  
    Table 3.7: Authors and Variables of Approach-Avoidance Theory 
Author Year  Variables  
Rubin & Brockner 1975 Goal attainment, Reward with attaining goal, and Cost of giving up an 
investment 
Keil et al. 2000 Project completion 
Pan et al. 2006 Considered a failure, Sunk costs, Responsibility, Close to completion, 
Opportunity cost, and Loss of faith in project leadership 
Pan et al. 2009 Reward for success, Proximity to goal, Ambiguity, Sunk costs, 
Information asymmetry, and Opportunity cost 
 
Rubin and Brockner (1975) were the first to suggest that (de)-escalation of commitment 
could be considered as an illustration of this theory. They examined the effect of the 
passage of time either as an investment or an expense on entrapment. They built their 
assumption on predictions of the approach-avoidance theory where an individual is more 
likely to abandon a waiting situation from the beginning when the desire to avoid is higher 
than the desire to approach. They found that entrapment is more likely to take place when 
the choice to remain in a waiting situation has been reached. Within the passage of time 
effect, the desire to approach increases more speedily than the desire to avoid (Rubin and 
Brockner, 1975). They concluded that within the approach-avoidance theory, escalation of 
commitment could be structured as a performance that takes place when major features 
that persuade perseverance appear to overshadow features that persuade withdrawal from 
such a conflict (Brockner and Rubin 1985). 
 
Keil et al (2000) expanded the earlier work done by Rubin and Brockner, as they 
suggested three factors that might overshadow the cost of perverseness in an escalation 
situation within the approach-avoidance theory. Those factors were: (1) the size of the 
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reward for goal attainment, (2) the cost of withdrawal, or (3) the proximity to the goal.  
Further, they examined the effect of goal completion as a construct that is derived from 
approach avoidance theory on managers' escalation and de-escalation decisions. Their 
results gave strong evidence that goal completion has a great effect on managers' 
escalation/de-escalation decisions.  
 
(De)-escalation authors were interested in examining the effect of goal completion on 
escalation of commitment (see for example: Conlon and Garland, 1993; Garland and 
Conlon, 1998; and, Boehne and Paese, 2000). For example, Garland and Conlon (1998) 
found that project completion has great power to explain escalation more than sunk costs. 
They also found that when a project was nearly completed, subjects ignored other 
variables such as opportunity costs or expected revenues as they concentrate on 
completing the project.   
 
Pan et al (2009) examined constructs from four theories: self-justification, agency theory, 
prospect theory, and approach-avoidance theory on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation 
decisions in an IS project in British Utilities (BU), which was a huge utility supplier, 
established in the UK. The project was launched to determine the problem of long queues 
at a call centre. They found that the approach-avoidance theory presented a good 
explanation for managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions. They further found that 
ambiguity, which was known as a variable that generates escalation, contributed to de-
escalation decisions as well. 
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3.5 Evaluation of the Use of Theoretical Models in Empirical Studies   
As mentioned in Section 3.4 above, the four main theoretical models that populate the 
literature and have been frequently applied to explain the escalation/de-escalation 
phenomenon are self-justification theory, agency theory, prospect theory, and approach-
avoidance theory. These four theories were introduced to explain the escalation/de-
escalation of commitment phenomenon at different points in time: in the mid-seventies 
(self-justification, approach-avoidance theory), early-eighties (prospect theory) and early-
nineties (agency theory), noting that the self-justification theory has been most prominent 
in laboratory based studies. 
 
Having described each theory (see Sections 3.3.1-3.3.4), and in order to determine the 
most appropriate theory for the current study, a comparison between the four theoretical 
models will be presented, with regard to how they have been used to explain (de)-
escalation decisions, in terms of their operationalisation mechanism and variables 
coverage in the following two sections. 
3.5.1. Operationalisation Mechanism  
Except for the approach avoidance theory, there are two main shortcomings regarding how 
the theories have been operationalised. The first shortcoming relates to their capability to 
explain escalation/de-escalation trends. For instance Keil et al. (2000) have tried to 
empirically test, through a select set of variables, to what degree each theory (self-
justification, agency, prospect, and approach-avoidance theory) could explain managers' 
escalation/de-escalation of commitment decisions. They found that prospect theory and 
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self-justification theory might explain escalation tendencies but both theories failed to 
explain managers‟ de-escalation of commitment, which perhaps encouraged de-escalation 
of commitment authors to look for different theoretical models to explain managers‟ de-
escalation trends (i.e., Chulkov, 2009; Flynn et al., 2009; Pan and Pan, 2011). In two 
sequential case studies in the UK, Pan et al. (2006; 2009) found that the approach-
avoidance theory explained managers‟ (de)-escalation trends in terms of costs of 
withdrawal (approach escalation) and persistence (avoid escalation), where sunk costs 
effect and proximity to the goal were considered as withdrawal costs, while ambiguity and 
the availability of an alternative investment were grouped under the costs of persistence.       
 
The second shortcoming concerns the source that provokes the mechanism of each of the 
four theories when rationalizing managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions. Self-justification 
theory (see Section 3.4.1) rationalizes managers‟ choice by relying on their personal 
responsibility of their original decision as they try to justify their earlier decision by 
investing additional resources, (Fox and Staw, 1979; Bobocel and Meyer, 1994; Gomez 
and Sanchez, 2013). Prospect theory (see Section 3.4.2) relies on managers‟ attitudes in 
the way they frame the outcome of a decision, as they become more risk seekers in the 
losses domain and risk averse in the domain of gains (Northcraft and Neale, 1986; Whyte, 
1993; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2009; Gomez and Sanchez, 2013). Agency theory (see Section 
3.4.3) relies on the divergence of goals between a firm‟s owner (principal) and its 
managers (agents), which becomes more significant when there is asymmetry of 
information and the agent can obtain a personal gain (Harrison and Harrell, 1993; Salter et 
al., 2013).    
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With regard to the approach avoidance theory, since the mid-eighties (e.g. Northcraft and 
Wolf, 1984; Bowen, 1987; Harrison and Harrell, 1995) research has been calling for 
enhancing the role of factors that are more related to the project such as the investment 
decision process (Simonson and Staw, 1992;  Wilson and Zhang, 1997; Greitemeyer et al., 
2009), investment opportunity (McCain, 1986; Montealegre and Keil, 2000; Fox et al., 
2009; Salter et al., 2013), investment appraisal methods (Cheng et al., 2003; Denison, 
2009; Karami and Farsani, 2011), revenue estimates (Bateman, 1986, Winch, 2013), and 
monitoring and control techniques (Hollenbeck et al., 1989; Schulz and Cheng, 2002; 
Chong and Suryawati, 2010; McNamara., 2002). This trend is consistent with the 
explanatory mechanism of the approach-avoidance theory in interpreting managers‟ (de)-
escalation decisions, whereas the theory (see Section 3.4.4) rationalizes managers‟ choices 
by relying on the substance of attributes that might persuade perseverance/withdrawal 
from a conflict situation (Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Pan et al., 2009; 2006) away from 
managers‟ responsibility feelings (self-justification theory); framing attitudes (prospect 
theory) and satisfaction of achieving personal gains (agency theory). 
 
3.5.2 Variables Coverage  
There are two main shortcomings with regard to variables coverage. The first is caused by 
the limited number of variables that have been linked to each theoretical model. This is 
mainly due to the nature of laboratory studies, which dictates the controlling of variables 
and their interactions, and the limited scope of studies based on real life cases (see Table 
3.7). This was clearly noticed in the effect of initial responsibility (self-justification 
theory), information framing or risk attitudes (prospect theory), principal-agent conflict 
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(agency theory), and goal attainment (approach-avoidance theory) (e.g. Ryan, 1995; Kirby 
and Davis, 1998; Ruchala, 1999; Greer and Stephens, 2001; Schulz and Cheng, 2002; 
Salter et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2006).  
   
The second shortcoming is that the role that variables play in the (de)-escalation changes 
over time. As explained earlier in Section 3.3 the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon 
represents a series of decisions that either increases or decreases over time, which is more 
obvious in researches that are based on investigating a case study (e.g. Ross and Staw, 
1993; and Montealegre and Keil, 2000). Therefore, the element of time is crucial for 
theoretical models when providing an explanation for managers‟ choices. However, this 
element was absent in case studies that relied on theories such as self-justification or 
prospect theories (e.g., Bondt and Makhija, 1988; Keil, 1995; Ryan, 1995; Kisfalvi, 2000). 
For example, Ryan (1995: 240) in five case studies in Australia based on the prospect 
theory, found that managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions might change only if their beliefs 
regarding the investment have changed over time: “non-escalating investors did report 
dramatic changes in their mental representations of the investment situation….they no 
longer believed that the company would grow into a large revenue company.” Keil (1995: 
349) in a case study in the USA based on self-justification theory found that the project 
was terminated because “financial support was withdrawn and all further development 
and support for the project was terminated.” However, self-justification theory could not 
explain the de-escalation of the project as no evidence could be found whether the 
influence of personal responsibility had changed over time to cause shutting down the 
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project. That is why Keil then asked for a more complete theoretical model that could 
explain the (de)-escalation of commitment.     
 
On the other hand, the time element, as was observed by Brockner and Rubin (1975) 
seems to be well accommodated by the approach-avoidance theory for both tendencies to 
approach and avoid a decision. This is not limited to a specific variable, as any factor 
could be considered as a driving or restraining force of escalation. For example, in Pan et 
al.‟s (2009) study, ambiguity in the early stages of commitment to the project, in terms of 
receiving mixed signals regarding the usefulness of the project was considered as an 
escalation approach tendency, while receiving mixed signals regarding the usefulness of 
the project afterwards in advanced levels of commitment was considered an avoidance 
tendency.  
 
3.6 Implications for the Present Study 
On the basis of the foregoing review of existing theories, it can be argued that the 
approach-avoidance theory is the most appropriate theory that is capable of properly 
rationalising the (de)-escalation of commitment. This theory seems to provide a more 
complete explanation for decisions in these conflict situations because, as Pan et al. (2006: 
1141) clarified, “it captures the essence of complex situations that tend to create conflict 
in the mind of the decision maker who faces a project with ambiguous future… and…it 
acts as a foundation to bring several different escalation theories into one over-arching 
model”.  
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Nevertheless, despite the established superiority of the approach-avoidance theory, careful 
scrutiny of the literature (e.g. Keil et al., 2000; Pan et al., 2009) reveals that it has not been 
used to its full potential:   
1. There are only four studies that examined the propositions of the theory. 
2. Only three of the four studies examined the theory with real-life case studies and one 
examined it through a laboratory setting. 
3. Only a limited number of variables were examined, while many more relevant 
variables have been overlooked thus resulting in superficial explanations.    
 
Having made an informed choice about the suitability of the approach-avoidance theory 
for the purposes of the current study, the above shortcomings dealt with, as will be 
explained in Chapter Five, through a systematic integration of relevant variables that are 
considered as driving or restraining forces of the escalation phenomenon.  
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review the literature related to theoretical models that were 
suggested in the literature to explain managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions and the 
linked factors or variables within each theory. The chapter covered three main areas: 
addressing the importance of managing capital projects, review the various definitions and 
aspects of the escalation/de-escalation of commitment that authors have suggested, and 
reviewing alternative models and theories applied in the relevant literature.  
 
After an extensive review of the definitions, models of the existing literature, it is 
concluded that in order to properly study the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon, a 
theoretical refocus is essential, starting with a definitional correction. Hence the proposed 
104 
 
working definition of de-escalation of commitment is “a subsequent decision of 
escalation, which is related to terminating or redirecting a problematic project that is not 
any more meeting its strategic plan and goals and is made through several stages”. 
Moreover, it is concluded from the detailed review of the literature that the approach-
avoidance theory is, subject to adjustments, the most appropriate of the theoretical models 
available that fulfils the comprehensive nature of the present study. These conclusions are 
emphasized further through the review of the empirical literature, which is presented in 
the next chapter.   
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Chapter Four 
 
A Review of the Empirical Literature: Laboratory 
Experiments, Case Studies and Surveys   
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, relevant theoretical literature in the escalation/de-escalation field 
was reviewed, where the, approach-avoidance theory was found to be the most appropriate 
model for the purposes of the present study. This chapter complements the previous 
chapter by extending the literature review to empirical studies whether based on 
laboratory experiments or real life cases, in order to learn from their methodological 
choices, key findings and limitations to then inform the direction, focus and design of 
current study.   
   
The chapter consists of: a review of the empirical studies of capital investment decisions 
process (Section 4.2), a brief historical introduction of studies of the (de)escalation 
phenomenon (Section 4.3), a review of studies that examined empirical variables 
separately whether they have a direct or indirect influence on (de)-escalation decisions 
(Section 4.4), and a review of studies that examined variables within groups (Section 4.5) 
whether they were controlled (laboratory based) or uncontrolled (real life cases). The 
limitations of existing studies are presented in Section 4.6, followed by an overall chapter 
summary and conclusion in Section 4.7. 
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4.2 A Review of Capital Investment Decisions Process 
A capital investment decision could follow either a formal or an informal process. 
Informality generally refers to prescriptive and structured written approach for the 
investment decision (Pike, 1996; Klammer et al., 2002; Alkaraan and Northcott, 2007). It 
also refers to the reliance on behavioural tendencies and entrepreneurial inclinations -in 
lieu of or in addition to budgeting processes- such as gut-feeling, experience, and 
judgment when undertaking investment initiative (Ekanem, 2005). A typical example in 
this regard is the desire of a manager to be in more control of the investment decision 
process (Prather et al., 2009), thus superimposing their personal preferences over formal 
procedures, if the latter exist.  
 
Several types of companies follow an informal investment decision making process, such 
as small firms or those operating in the service sector (e.g., Ekanem, 2005; Danielson and 
Scott, 2006; Prather et al., 2009). For example, Danielson and Scott (2006) found that 
more than 60% of 792 small firms in the USA did not have a formal planning system for 
their capital investment decisions. This was because of the age of the firm and the owner 
(the younger they are the more likely they are to have written plans) and because of the 
educational background of the owner; the more highly educated, the more likely they are 
to have a written plan.     
 
Formality involves the existence of a structure for the decision process. The early 
emergence of formal capital investment structures was through the standardized 
documentation of procedures (Northcott, 1995) which was followed by presenting a 
107 
 
specific order of steps to be tracked when making capital investment decisions (Burns and 
Walker, 2009). In the USA the use of standard forms had been consistently high and it 
grew from 84% to 97% over the period 1959 to 1970 (Klammer, 1972). Similarly, in the 
UK, Pike (1988) observed that the use of capital investment manuals in large firms had 
increased by 19% over a decade or so. The formal capital investment decision process (see 
Chapter Three) starts with the identification of an investment opportunity and ends up 
with applying project audit and evaluation techniques to the chosen and implemented 
investment (Mukherjee and Henderson, 1987; Burns and Walker, 2009; Hall and Millard, 
2010). These steps are expounded upon below.  
                                             
4.2.1 Identification of the Investment Project  
The identification stage, despite its vital role in the investment process, has unfortunately 
attracted very few studies in the literature, none of which examined it in any reasonable 
depth (Burns and Walker, 2009). The little evidence that exists on company practice is 
very disparate, ranging from a 2% of firms in Istvan‟s (1961) study that made particular 
efforts to encourage ideas for capital expenditures, to between  82% in 1959 and 94% in 
1972 in Klammer‟s (1972) study.  
 
Two items in the identification stage, to the knowledge of the researcher, were empirically 
examined in the existing literature. The first is the “time pattern of origination”. Istvan‟s 
study (1961) reported the importance of the time pattern of origination as there were three 
timing patterns for submitting the investment idea; only 14% periodically, 37% 
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continuously submitted ideas that previously were included in the overall capital budget, 
and 49% submitted investment ideas at any time. 
 
The second item is the “source of idea origination”, where it was found that ideas and 
investment proposals were originated from bottom-up instead of top-down (Istvan, 1961; 
Mao, 1970; Petty et al., 1975; Stanley and Stanley, 1984; Farragher, 1986) Such as is the 
case in Mao‟s (1970) study of financial executives; they did not originate ideas because 
packed plans and ideas were forwarded to them for evaluation from different departments 
to financial managers. A similar pattern was relayed by other authors; for example Petty et 
al. (1975) noticed that new ideas and plans commonly flowed from lower managerial 
levels; Stanley and Stanley (1984) found that more than 80% of the responding firms‟ 
investment plans come from bottom-up; and Farragher‟s (1986) study where 58% of the 
responding firms searched for investment ideas from their employees, while retail firms 
were the highest at 94%. 
 
4.2.2 Development of the Investment Project  
Investment ideas are screened before completed proposals are developed (Mukherjee and 
Henderson, 1987). The purpose of investment screening is to investigate whether the 
investment proposal is to be accepted or rejected. Overall, good progress has been made in 
the empirical literature regarding the development stage, particularly in the cash flow 
estimation, forecasting, and origination of biases on those processes (Petty et al., 1975; 
Ryan and Ryan, 2002; Alkaraan and Northcott, 2007; Burns and Walker, 2009).   
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The first item in the development of the investment project is “the extent of project 
screening”, which was examined through two approaches:  a) the managerial or divisional 
level of the organization; and b) the size of the screened project or organization. Within 
the first approach, Istvan (1961) found that only 7% of projects were screened by the 
decision maker, 55% were screened by a non-specialist before forwarding to a decision 
maker, 27% were reviewed by a specialist or team, and 11% were reviewed by a specialist 
or team and then forwarded to the decision maker. Petty et al. (1975) found some 
dominance of the division and plant levels over the central office level in the screening 
process. More recently, more than 60% of the UK companies in Alkaraan and Northcotts‟ 
(2007) study agreed/strongly agreed that lower level managers are involved in the 
strategic investment decisions. 
 
Within the second approach, Ryan and Ryan (2002), for example, linked the size of the 
capital budget to the regularity usage of a particular assessment method where they found 
that 65% of respondents with capital budgets that ranged between $100 and $499.9 
million used the net present value method. Gilbert (2003) linked the applied assessment 
method to the proportion of projects within the size of the organization; he found that 72% 
proportions of projects have applied the payback period technique in large firms in South 
Africa.              
 
The second item is “screening process”, Pike‟s (1996) four sequential studies in the UK 
showed that the percentage of companies that used formal evaluation procedure have 
increased; 93% in 1975, 95% in 1980, 100% in both 1986 and 1992 respectively. 
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Alkaraan and Northcott (2007) found that 89.2% of responding companies have formal 
procedures to evaluate strategic investment decisions. Klammer et al. (2002), in a 
comparison study between companies in the UK and USA, found that 90.6% of USA 
firms apply standard forms compared to 86.4% of UK firms.  
 
The third item is “forecasting and estimates”, which several studies (e.g. Istvan, 1961; 
Pruitt and Gitman, 1987; Pohlman et al., 1988; Ryan and Ryan, 2002; Bennouna et al., 
2010; Klammer et al., 2002) have provided empirical evidence  about in a number of 
different firms. Pruitt and Gitman (1987), from the decision makers‟ point of view, 
reported that 59.2% of respondents in large USA companies agreed that decision makers 
who evaluate forecasts consider them to be optimistic in estimates and adjust forecasts to 
correct them, while 67.8% agreed that decision makers tend to have more experience than 
forecasters who provide them with estimates. Pohlman et al. (1988), with regard to the 
availability of a standard procedure to generate cash flow estimates, reported that 85.3% 
of respondents in large USA firms agreed that their companies provided a standard 
procedure for cash flow estimates and 65.5% agreed that their companies require the 
usage of such procedures when forecasting cash flows.           
 
The fourth item is “personal responsibility for the project”. For instance, 22.3% of the 
respondents in Pruitt and Gitman‟s (1987) USA study stated that their companies had 
assigned the responsibility for project proposal preparation and project acceptance to the 
same individuals or group. In the UK, Alkaraan and Northcott (2007) have found that 
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40.9% of respondents have agreed/strongly agreed that top management judge the 
evaluation of strategic investments. 
                
4.2.3 Selection and Implementation of the Investment Project 
The first two items in the selection and implementation stage are the “strategic 
importance of the project” and the “size of the project”, which were investigated by a 
number of studies in terms of the expected age of the investment and the type of 
investment. For example, Farragher et al. (1999) found that 60% of companies in their 
study in the USA required a formal link between strategy and forecasts. In the UK, Pike 
(1996) found that 68% of respondents applied pre-decision controls on capital budgets that 
look beyond two years. In the USA, Pohlman et al. (1988) recorded six types of 
investment project categories: a general type (59%), facilities expansion (30.6%), 
acquisition of on-going concern (28.4%), new equipment (24.6%), facilities 
modernization (19.8), and replacement of equipment (10%). In a comparative study 
between the USA and Canada, Payne et al. (1999) found that, regarding the evaluation 
method of capital budgeting, projects were classified as follows: all replacement projects 
(41.5% Canada, 26.7% USA). 
 
The third item is the “personal responsibility for analysis”. In the UK, 26% of Pike‟s 
(1996) respondents agreed that there was at least one full-time person engaged in the 
capital budgeting. In China, Wei and Christodoulou (1997) found that 50% of respondents 
considered themselves responsible for making the foreign direct investment decision. 
Farragher et al. (1999) found that 55% of USA responding companies required an 
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independent management group to review investment analysis. Mukherjee and Hingorani 
(1999) found that 40.6% of USA respondents agreed that each division in the organization 
submits all positive-NPV proposals. In a comparative study, Carr (2006) found that 
respondents agreed that managers should do the job alone in a different range as follows: 
Japan (69%); Germany (87%), UK (78%); USA (83%); and Russia (53%). In the UK, a 
study by Alkaraan and Northcott (2007) showed that 40.9% of respondents 
agreed/strongly agreed that the evaluation of strategic investments was left to the 
judgment of top management. 
 
The fourth item is “determining project appraisal techniques”, which Pike (1988) found 
that 71% of companies in the UK regularly reviewed hurdle rates. In the USA, Pohlman et 
al. (1988) found that 78% of respondents agreed that their companies had standard forms 
to collect cash flow data and other financial information. In the USA and Canada 
respectively, Payne et al. (1999) found that only 7.8% and 6.2% of respondents do not use 
discounted cash flows. In the USA, Farragher et al. (1999) found that 88% of respondents 
prepared their cash flow forecasts using company-wide procedures. In a comparative 
study of six countries, Kester et al. (1999) found that, regarding the use of high discount 
rates when evaluating risky investments, respondents‟ replies varied as follows: Australia 
(37.5%); Hong Kong (19.1%); Indonesia (28.6%); Malaysia (23.5%); Philippines 
(51.6%); and, Singapore (37.8%). In South Africa, Gilbert (2003) found that regarding the 
applied appraisal techniques, 35% of respondents used two combined techniques, and 
55% used a combination of discounted cash flows (DCF) and non-DCF techniques. 
Bennouna et al. (2010) found that 63.4% of respondents used multiple discount rates to 
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investment appraisal in Canada. In the UK, Alkaraan and Northcott (2007) found that 53% 
of respondents agreed that financial evaluation techniques are regularly used in the early 
analysis of investments, 53% strongly agreed that financial evaluation techniques are often 
used in the final choice of strategic investment, and 50.6% agreed that a strategic 
investment proposal will be rejected if its expected financial return did not meet the 
minimum requirements of return on investment.  
 
Further, In the UK, Pike (1996) found that only 4% of respondents used the payback 
method as a single technique. However, this percentage reached 36% when the payback 
technique was combined with other methods such as IRR, and NPV. Farragher et al. 
(1999) in the UK found that 80% of respondents applied IRR, 78% the NPV, 52% the 
payback, and 34% only used the ROI. When applied appraisal techniques were linked to 
the type of investment, Klammer et al. (2002) found that 58.3% of USA and 50.8% of UK 
respondents applied DCF methods when investing in replacement projects, while 9.4% of 
USA and 30.5% of UK respondents considered the PB method when investing in Hi-Tech 
investments.  
 
Carr (2006) found that 40% of UK, 50% of Germany, 14% of USA, and 69% of 
respondents in Japan applied PB method. Sangster (1993) found that in Scotland, with 
regard to considering a single method: PB (14%); IRR (4.5%); NPV (3%) and, ARR (2%). 
Danielson and Scott (2006) linked the appraisal technique to the cash flow projection 
made, as they found that 23% of USA respondents applied PB, while 15% considered 
ARR. Ryan and Ryan (2002) in the USA, most responding companies have preferred the 
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usage of DCF techniques over Non-DCF methods when evaluating investments; 49.8% 
considered NPV, 44.6% applied IRR, 19.4% used PB, and only 5.3% considered ARR. In 
South Africa, Gilbert (2003) found that 67% of companies applied PB, 68% considered 
ROI, 51% ARR, 61% NPV, and 62% IRR. In Cyprus Lazaridis (2004) found that 11.4% 
of respondents applied NPV, 8.7% IRR, 36.7% PB, and 17.7% ROI.  
                                        
The importance of the fifth item “risk assessment” has been highlighted in the literature 
either by stressing the availability of risk assessment or by emphasizing risk assessment 
techniques applied in respondents companies. Farragher et al. (1999) found that 55% of 
USA respondents required a quantitative risk assessment to their capital investments. 
Kester et al. (1999) found that with regard to applying sensitivity analysis: 100% in 
Australia as well as in Hong Kong, 88% in Indonesia, 83% in Malaysia, 94% in 
Philippines, and 79% in Singapore. Payne et al. (1999) found that 60% of Canadian 
respondents applied sensitivity analysis compared to 52.2% of respondents in the USA. 
Klammer et al. (2002) found that USA respondents who considered sensitivity analysis 
were 69.3% compared to 84.8% of UK respondents. Bennouna et al. (2010) found that 
92.8% of Canadian respondents considered sensitivity analysis. In Cyprus, Lazalidis 
(2004) 31.7% of respondents apply total statistical risk analysis to their capital 
investments.  
 
The sixth item is “capital rationing process”, which Mukherjee and Hingorani‟s (1999) 
study highlighted the reasons for in US companies. Their results indicated that capital 
rationing was practised for several reasons: a) when senior managers cannot trust project 
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forecasts and when the project‟s downside risk is large (53%), b) to preserve borrowing 
capacity to finance potentially high-NPV projects in the near future (50%), c) to 
discourage biased cash flow forecasts (46%), and d) firms are more likely to reject a 
positive NPV project when it is non-routine/unique in nature (42%). Kester et al. (1999) 
found that capital rationing was common in more than half of the their sampled companies 
in Indonesia and the Philippines practised, while most of the respondents from Australia, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore  indicated  did no ration capital.  
 
The seventh item is “knowledge of the appropriate cost of capital”, which was highlighted 
in different countries by a number of studies. For example, Klammer et al. (1991) found 
that 72% of USA respondents agreed that dollars available for capital expenditures were 
predetermined and 71% had formal calculation of the cost of capital. Kester et al. (1999) 
found that 72.7% of Australian respondents based their capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) on the companies‟ estimated beta, 53.8% of respondents from Hong Kong 
dividend yield plus growth rate, and 58.6% of Philippines as well as 53.4% of Indonesian 
respondents used the cost of debt in addition to risk premium to determine the cost of 
capital. In the USA, Ryan and Ryan (2002) found that 83.2% of respondents chose the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and 7.4% chose the cost of debt to be 
considered to be the discount rate in their companies. In Cyprus, Laziradis (2004) looked 
at factors that determined the cost of capital for investors‟ financing and found that 30.9% 
of respondents agreed on the cost of borrowing, 26.2% considered past experience, and 
20.2% took into account the cost of equity capital.  Recently, Bennouna et al. (2010) have 
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reported that 76.1% of respondents in Canada use WACC, 9.89% apply the cost of debt, 
and only 1.4% uses the cost of equity to calculate the discount rate.              
      
The eighth item is “approval of project”. In Cyprus, Laziradis‟s (2004) reported that 81% 
of respondents used capital budgeting techniques to evaluate investment projects for 
approval. Alkaraan and Northcott (2007) found that 75.9% of investigated companies in 
the UK agreed/strongly agreed that the investment project would not be approved if the 
expected financial return did not meet the minimum requirements of return on investment.  
Finally, regarding the “implementation of the investment project”, Bryde (2003) found that 
58.6% of responding companies in the UK considered project selection to be a 
documented project management procedure and 79% considered project start up to be one 
of these procedures. Nutt (2007) found that 90% of respondents in the USA believed that 
implementation of a project led the analysis to evaluate an investment while 65% believed 
that project implementation followed the analysis for evaluation.   
    
4.2.4 Evaluation of the Investment Project 
The steps in the project (post-implementation) evaluation stage could be categorized into 
two groups; the first is linked to individuals involved in the evaluation and 
implementation of the capital investment project, and the second group is related to the 
commencement of project audit to evaluate the performance of the capital investment 
project. Within the first set, the “clarity of roles in project evaluation”, the “effective use 
of team-based performance measures”, and the “effective use of performance incentives” 
could be included. As for the second set, the “use of project audit”, the “quality of project 
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audit process”, the “assessment of audit reports”, and the “response of project manager to 
audit report” could be included.  
 
Existing studies show that companies assess capital projects after implementation either 
through post-audit or any type of evaluation techniques. For example, Gordon and Myers 
(1991) in the USA found that almost 76% of respondents conducted post-audits of capital 
projects in their companies, while 47% had regular post audit. Pike (1996) found that 92% 
of UK respondents have evaluated approved projects when the cost over-run, while 72% 
required post-completion audits on most major projects. In the USA, Farragher et al. 
(1999) found that 88% of respondents have conducted post-audits on a regular basis. In 
Italy, Azzone and Maccarrone (2001) found that 70% of companies applied post-audit to 
their investment projects.    
 
Klammer et al. (2002) found that respondents in the USA (90.6%) and the UK (79.7%) 
have agreed that different capital projects; construction, installation, or buying new capital 
projects were monitored, while major capital projects were post audited in the USA 
(74.8%) and (79.7%) in the UK. Bryde (2003) in UK found that 82.8% of organizations 
monitored and controlled a project as part of their project management activity. Bennouna 
et al. (2010) found that 84.5% of companies have conducted post audits for major capital 
investment projects in Canada. Hall and Millard (2010), in South Africa, found that 7.2% 
of respondents considered project review as a most difficult stage in the capital budgeting 
process. 
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Further, Myers et al. (1991) in the USA linked the usage of sophisticated techniques in 
post-audits to the improvement of firm performance. Their results indicated that of 232 
firms, 65 were classified as using sophisticated post-audit techniques such as discounted 
cash flow techniques, which required regular periodic reviews of assets and had 
documented review procedures. Their findings, as well, supported the argument that 
amongst firms that were recognized to face poor performing assets, the usage of 
sophisticated post-audit procedures influenced the firm performance positively.  
 
The literature has identified different bodies that often play a clear “role in project 
evaluation”. For example in the USA Gordon and Myers (1991) distinguished between 
three groups of evaluated assets linked to different managers‟ level: operating assets are 
evaluated by lower level managers, administrative assets are within the responsibility of 
middle managers, and strategic assets are evaluated by senior managers. Other studies 
have found that responding companies in different locations usually assign one member of 
the staff to be fully responsible for the investment project, such as Kalmmer et al. (1991) 
in the USA (55%), Pike (1996) in the UK (23%), Farragher et al. (1999) in the USA 
(88%), Klammer et al. (2002) in both the USA (35.4%) and the UK (11.9%), Carr (2006) 
in Japan (32%), Germany (36%), UK (48%), USA (54%), and Russia (69%), and 
Bennouna et al. (2010) in Canada (52%). Further, it is found that investment projects are 
often reviewed or evaluated by a group of managers, such as Farragher et al. (1999) results 
in the USA (55%) or by the top management such as Alkaraan and Northcott (2007) 
results in the UK (40.9%). 
 
119 
 
The second and third items; “effective use of team-based performance measures” and 
“performance incentives” were examined either independently or jointly. Independently, 
Pike (1996) found that 84% of observed UK companies monitor project performance once 
operated. Bryde (2003) found that 72.4% of UK firms review performance. Carr (2006) 
found that responding companies in different countries apply performance orientation; in 
Japan (4.2%), in Germany (4.3%), in the UK (4.1%), in the USA (4.5%) and in Russia 
(3.3%). Regarding performance incentives, Carr (2006) found that individuals in different 
countries received a credit for accomplishing the job; in Japan (43%), in Germany (62%), 
in the UK (70%), in the USA (72%), and in Russia (86%). 
 
Both items were found to be considered jointly, for example, Scott and Tiessen (1999) 
found that 64.5% of respondents used non-financial performance measures compared to 
45.5% that used financial measures, where a combination of both types of measures was 
used more often (40.7%) than just one type of a measure alone (28.6%). This arrangement 
of performance measurement was strongly associated with the proportion of the time 
members have spent in intra-and-inter-departmental teams. Bouwens and Lent (2006) 
found a significant positive correlation between the total effect of incentive contracts and 
its associated variables, available cash bonus, and performance measure properties, as the 
available cash bonus and performance measure properties were associated with the 
selection effect of incentive contracts in Dutch firms.  
 
Further, Wulf (2007) found that performance of division managers has increased in terms 
of the division sales growth and the firm sales growth in the USA, when the division 
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manager‟s bonuses were linked to division performance measures over which the manager 
has greater control relative to firm performance measures. In addition, by focusing on the 
annual salary and bonus paid to division managers as performance incentives, she found 
that salary plus bonuses of division managers with officer status were more sensitive to 
firm sales growth. Also, she found that there was no difference in performance incentives 
between division managers that are close in proximity to the CEO and those that are 
further down the hierarchy.  
 
The fourth item is “quality of the audit”, which Ireland (2003), for example, had noticed 
that high quality auditors were more likely to attract high quality clients and large auditors 
in the UK had the motivation to provide a higher audit quality because they had more 
wealth and a reputation to protect. Lin et al. (2003), in China, found that a qualified 
auditor opinion had a negative impact on users‟ assessment of the credibility of financial 
data, as it might lead users to consider the financial statement as relatively less credible. 
Francis (2011) recently suggested several factors that might influence the improvement of 
the audit quality: 1) individuals who implement audit tests should be competent and 
independent, 2) the testing procedures used should be capable of producing reliable and 
relevant evidence, 3) the capability of the engagement team personnel to make good 
decisions regarding the specific tests to be implemented 4) the evidence from these tests 
could be appropriately evaluated in leading to the audit report, 5) the testing procedures 
used on audit engagements, and incentives that affect the behaviour of engagement team 
personnel which are developed by the accounting firm that auditors work in, 6) auditors 
and accounting firms should be punished by institutions for misconduct and low-quality 
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audit, and, 7) the economic consequences of audit outcomes as audit outcomes influence 
clients and users of audited accounting information.  
 
Regarding the fifth item, “assessment of project reports”, Innes and Lyon‟s (1994) in the 
UK found that 70% of managers rely on the financial audit report only, 72% rely on 
favourable management audit report, and 54% rely on adverse management report. In 
China, Lin et al. (2003) found that although the qualification of audit reports would not 
have a significant impact on the decisions made by investors or creditors, it might 
influence their assessment of the credibility of financial statements. Ireland (2003) found 
that company‟s management regularly made the choice to select the auditors instead of the 
shareholders in the UK. Therefore, auditors had not been randomly assigned to companies 
but chosen by them, which might result in a self-selection bias. He analysed both public 
and private companies to examine whether company status would influence audit report 
outcomes, he found that public companies were significantly less likely to receive non 
going-concern related audit modification than private companies, and subsidiary 
companies were found to be significantly less likely to receive non going-concern related 
audit modifications than independent companies. Further, he found that in subsidiary 
companies, large auditors were negatively associated with non-going-concern related 
modifications, while large auditors were positively associated with going-concern related 
modifications in independent companies.  
 
A final topic related to project audit and evaluation of capital investment is project audit 
steps. It is found that different steps were suggested from different firms, although they all 
122 
 
fall into three basic steps: 1) planning the audit, 2) performing auditing tests, and, 3) 
reporting the findings.  For example, the institute of internal auditors (IIA, 2011) in the 
USA and Canada has suggested six steps for applying a continuous auditing: 1) establish 
priority areas, 2) identify monitoring and continuous audit rules, 3) determine the process' 
frequency, 4) configure continuous audit parameters, 5) follow up, and 6) communicate 
results. Putra (2009) identified six steps for auditing: 1) audit planning, 2) gathering 
related information, 3) assessing risk, 4) designing the audit response, 5) perform further 
audit procedures, and, 6) evaluate audit findings. Azzone and Maccarrone (2001) 
suggested four steps for post-audit: 1) identifying the cycle of activities carried out, 2) 
knowing the kind of data analysed, 3) recognizing the source of information and the 
gathering tools, and 4) classifying the structure, the content and the diffusion of reports. 
 
4.3 Brief Historical Development of Studies of De-(Escalation) of Commitment 
In the escalation/de-escalation literature, the development of studying empirical variables 
does not differ from the theoretical studies development (as explained in section 3.4 in 
chapter three) in terms of being largely fragmented and detached, because these variables 
were mostly drawn from different theories, and were selected to examine the credibility of 
suggested theoretical models. Therefore, they ranged across several disciplines such as 
psychology, social, finance, and culture (Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Arkes and Blumer, 
1985; Simonson and Staw, 1992; Keil et al., 2000; Wong, 2005; Pan et al., 2009; Winch, 
2013) through the last five decades (Table, 4.1).  
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The chronology of empirical studies shows that in the 1970s researchers became aware of 
the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon, where it became a research topic that people 
investigated in laboratory settings to simulate the existence of the problem. In this period, 
it is noticed that a limited number of variables were tested in a direct simple form. In the 
1980s, the interest in this phenomenon has intensified where the effort was more than 
doubled, publication wise. Besides the more attention the escalation/de-escalation 
phenomenon obtained in examining its existence in real life cases, authors based their 
studies whether in laboratory settings or real cases on examining more variables with 
more complicated settings. In laboratory experiments, the trend was to examine indirect 
relationships through a moderator/mediator, while in case studies, the trend was to classify 
and categorize several variables into groups of determinants.    
 
The bulk of studies, both laboratory base and real life cases have been published from the 
1990s onwards. This coincides with the significant changes in the business landscape that 
impacted on capital investment decisions e.g. increased competition and implying new 
technologies. Therefore, it could be stated that the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon 
after it got the attention of authors through laboratory experiments, which then paved the 
way for studies based on real life cases.     
 Table 4.1: Escalation/De-Escalation Studies in the Last Five Decades 
Type of studies 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s  Total  Percentage  Cumulative %  
Empirical         
       Laboratory  6 15 37 35 12 105 78% 59.28 
       Case studies - 2 11 10 3 26 19% 14.44 
       Other  - - 1 3 - 4 3% 2.28 
             Sub-total  6 17 49 48 16 135 100% 76% 
Theoretical  - 12 18 10 3 43 24% 24% 
                   Total  6 29 67 58 19 178 100% 100% 
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4.4 Studies that Examined Empirical Variables Separately  
Studies under this category were mostly conducted through laboratory settings, focused on 
examining variables that were under the authors‟ control to explain the occurrence and 
persistence of managers' choices to face problematic projects either directly or indirectly 
(Section 4.4.1). Escalation/de-escalation authors have been interested in examining the 
direct effect since the mid-seventies, whereas the indirect influence has received early 
attention since the 1980s to the current, which is based on examining the 
moderating/mediating effect of selected variables on the escalation/de-escalation 
decisions. Additionally, few studies were interested in examining the existence of the 
phenomenon through variables that researchers did not have any control over through 
either applying the case study approach, which started in the mid-eighties or through other 
methods such as telephone interviews in the late-nineties (Section 4.4.2). Both sections 
will be reviewed as follows.             
4.4.1 Controlled Empirical Variables   
As mentioned earlier, the essential feature that escalation/de-escalation authors who 
examined controlled empirical variables separately shared is that their studies were 
conducted in laboratory settings, (e.g., Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Leatherwood and 
Conlon, 1987; Keil et al., 1995), which allowed these authors to control the influence of 
several variables on the occurrence and persistence of the escalation/de-escalation 
phenomenon (97 study out of 136). Additionally, few attempts were made to explain this 
phenomenon through field surveys or interviews (Garland et al., 1990; Wong et al., 2006; 
O‟Neil, 2009; Lee et al., 2012). This explanation was either examined directly (Boulding 
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et al., 1997; Rao and Monk, 1999) or indirectly (Rutledge, 1995; Brody and Kaplan, 
1996).  
 
1. Direct Influence Variables 
According to this category, the decision to escalate/de-escalate occurred as a result of the 
consistency and interaction of several forces that influenced the incidence and persistence 
of the phenomenon (see Table 4.2)
1
, which can be expressed through two main categories:  
the characters of the decision maker and aspects or consequences of the decision.  
 
Regarding the first category, it is noticed that the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon 
was explained from four different dimensions that were introduced in the literature. Initial 
or personal responsibility was the first dimension that received strong attention (e.g. Staw, 
1976; Barton et al., 1989; Jeffery, 1992; Slaughter and Greguras, 2008). Within this 
dimension, it is assumed that when managers receive negative feedback regarding a 
project they were initially responsible for, they are more motivated to justify their earlier 
decision in terms of escalating their commitment to that project (Schultz and Cheng, 2002; 
Biyalogorsky et al., 2006), which was explained in the previous chapter through the self-
justification theory. The second dimension was the level that the decision was made on 
i.e., whether the decision was made on an individual or group level (e.g. Bazerman et al., 
1984; Whyte, 1993; Zhiyuan and Qing, 2008). It is was assumed that when the decision 
was made by a group of managers their tendencies to escalate would be less than if the 
decision was made by an individual, as group decision-making would result in the 
                                                          
1  For a detailed display of studies of this category see Table 1 in Appendix C 
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diffusion of responsibility among members for any negative outcomes, which leads to less 
self-justificatory influence as the blame would be shared and therefore results in the 
reduction of the escalation of commitment (Whyte, 1991; Citera et al., 2000).  
 
The third dimension is managers' nationality (Keil et al., 1995; Harrison et al., 1999; 
Salter et al., 2004), where from the mid-1990s several authors were interested in 
understanding whether the escalation/de-escalation decision would differ if managers from 
different cultures would make these choices. In addition to the USA, where the 
phenomenon was first academically highlighted, other authors studied managers' 
behaviour in these circumstances in the UK (Ku, 2008), in Finland (Keil et al., 1995), Asia 
and North America (Sharp and Salter, 1997), China (Garland and Conlon, 1998; Harrison 
et al., 1999), and Mexico (Greer and Stephens, 2001; Salter et al., 2004). In addition, other 
variables that were related to managers' nationality, but received less attention such as 
self-values (Sivanathan et al., 2008) in the USA, unpleasant emotions (Wong et al., 2006) 
in Hong Kong, and  internal locus of control (Singer and Singer, 1986) in New Zealand.  
 
The fourth dimension that escalation/de-escalation authors explained and was related to 
the decision maker's characteristics is managers' concern about their own self-interest as 
they favour achieving their own personal gains (Harrison and Harrel, 1993; Sharp and 
Salter, 1997; Rutledge and Karim, 1999). If the project's manager had private information, 
his/her actions were not completely monitored, and information asymmetry prevailed, 
these circumstances together would allow for the existence of goal conflict between the 
company's owners and project's manager, which would lead the project manager to save 
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his/her own reputation or future career opportunities and act in his/her own interest even if 
these acts might cause the escalation of a problematic project (Harrison and Harrel, 1993).   
 Table 4.2: A Chronology of Controlled, Separate and Direct Variables 
Time 
Period 
Number and Place 
of Studies 
Theoretical Approach Variables Examined 
1970s 6 studies, USA 
 
Approach-Avoidance 
Self-Justification 
External-Justification   
Decrement, Salience, Queue positions, Personal 
responsibility, Initial responsibility, Efficacy of resources, 
Time, Prior experience, Prior limit setting, Process of 
resource Allocation, Job insecurity.  
1980s 13 studies, USA  External-Justification 
Self-Justification 
Modeling Effects 
Sunk Costs, Attribution 
Reactance, Self-
Identity 
Goal-Attainment  
Social anxiety, Gender, Decision type, Importance of 
rewards, Personal responsibility, Choice, A third party to 
blame, Persistence of setback, Decision context, Initial 
responsibility, An escalation model, Alternative 
investment, Financial information, Probability of future 
success, Attribution of decision performance, Locus of 
control, Goal origin, Information frame.  
1990s 33 studies, USA, 
Canada, France, 
Finland, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Asia, 
China.   
Sunk costs, Prospect,  
Self-Justification 
Reinforcement 
cognitive dissonance 
Project completion 
Agency, Mental 
budgeting, Self-Image 
Capital Budgeting 
Self-Efficacy 
Goal-Substitution 
Behaviour Momentum 
External-Justification 
Decision Dilemma 
Sunk costs, Initial responsibility, Ambiguity, Time, Threat, 
Goal setting, Self-diagnostic, Decision outcome and 
process, Accountability, Experience, Different 
relationships, External justification, Information frame, 
Project completion, Information disclosure, Decision 
context, Personal gains, Alternative risk, Prior 
commitment, Reinvestment risk, Nationality, Alternative 
investment, Opportunity cost, Internal rate of return, Net 
present value, Mental budget, Expected benefits, 
Education level, Motivation, Anonymity, Equivocality, A 
standard which information may be judged against, Budget 
goals, Incentives, Moral reasoning. 
2000s 22 studies, USA, 
Mexico, Australia, 
Singapore, Hong 
Kong, UK, China.    
Group Decision 
Making, Goal 
Completion, Self-
Justification, 
Escalation, Cognitive 
Dissonance, Agency, 
Prospect, Equivocally, 
Cognitive bias, Self-
Affirming, Learning, 
Self-Efficacy, External-
Justification, Status 
Queue Bias.    
Personal responsibility, Decision context, Sunk costs, 
Sales price, Project completion, Nationality, Time, 
Information source, Product innovativeness, Information 
source credibility, Stage of new product development, 
Initial responsibility, Information asymmetry, Prospective 
additional investment, Prospective multi stage budget, 
Hurdle rates, Information frame, Personal gains, Personal 
involvement, Information time, Momentary, Illusion of 
control, Self-esteem, Self-values, Task relevance 
affirmation, Post regret, Self-efficacy, Risk, Alternative 
investment, Decision difficulty, Decision procedures.      
2010s 9 studies, USA 
Australia, Iran, 
Taiwan, Mexico, 
Germany, Canada, 
China, Malaysia 
Hong Kong, India, 
Pakistan, 
Singapore. 
Agency, Cognitive 
Dissonance, Prior 
Involvement, Real 
Options, Self-
Regulation, Terror 
Management, De-
Escalation, Culture, 
Self-Justification, 
Prospect.  
Monitoring control, Information disclosure, Project 
performance, Certification, Auditor involvement, Client 
pressure, Real option, Net present value, Personal 
responsibility, Activated motivations, Mortality salience, 
Accountability, Choice, Personal gains, Long term 
orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism, Culture, 
Decision context, Information frame.  
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Regarding decision circumstance, sunk costs were the most studied force to explain 
managers' choices in conflict situations (Arkes and Blummer, 1985; Garland and Newport, 
1991; Heath, 1995; Heng et al., 2003). Authors who examined this factor relied on the 
assumption that project managers would often consider past expenditures when making 
current decisions (Staw and Hoang, 1995). This consideration becomes more significant 
when an investment fails, as the impact of the sunk costs would be taken into account so 
the project manager would add more resources (escalate commitment) to avoid wastage of 
invested resources (Arkes and Blummer, 1985; Zhiyuan and Qing, 2008).   
 
The second force that could be linked to the decision circumstance, which grasped the 
attention of escalation/de-escalation empirical authors, was the consequences or framing 
of the condition (Staw, 1976; Brockner et al., 1981; Garland, 1990; Chow et al., 1997; 
Biyalogorsky et al., 2006). From studies conducted earlier (Staw, 1976), this factor was 
believed to influence the manner in which managers would make their escalation/de-
escalation decisions, where managers when faced with negative conditions would be more 
risk-seeking and therefore escalate problematic projects than when faced with positive 
consequences (Whyte, 1997; Chow et al., 1997).   
 
2. Indirect Influence Variables 
Within the indirect relationship, the decision to escalate/de-escalate occurs, in addition to 
the interaction of several factors, as a result of the indirect influence of variables that 
moderates/mediates this relationship
2
 (Conlon and Wolf, 1980; Brody and Kaplan, 1996; 
                                                          
2  For a detailed display of studies of this category see Table 2 in Appendix C 
129 
 
Wong, 2005; Denison, 2009). By the time a mediator represents the mechanism whereby 
the principal independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable the 
moderator divides the principal independent variable into subgroups, which would 
establish the areas of greatest effectiveness with regard to a given dependent variable 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
 
Both moderators and mediators share one similarity as they represent functions of a third 
variable, yet several differences are noticed between moderators and mediators that can, as 
suggested by Wu and Zumbo (2008: 383) be displayed in Table 4.3 below.  
Table 4.3: Distinction between Moderators and Mediators 
Concept Moderator Mediator 
Nature of variable Is a trait that is a relatively stable 
characteristic, innate attribute, 
enduring process, or disposition.  
Is a state that is a temporary 
condition of mentality or mood.  
Function in a causal 
relationship 
A third variable that modifies a 
casual effect 
A third variable that links a cause 
and an effect 
Type of question For whom and when cause and effect 
occurs 
How and why cause leads to effect 
Role in a causal 
relationship 
Single role: auxiliary independent 
variable for y 
Dual roles; dependent variable for x, 
independent variable for y  
Sequence of operation Precedes both independent and 
dependent variable 
Follow independent variable and 
precedes dependent variable 
Relationship with 
independent variable 
Un correlated with independent 
variable 
Correlated with independent 
variable 
Design control Typically observed Manipulated or observed 
 
 
A mediator is usually predicted by the independent variable that aims to explain why and 
how the effect between the explanatory variable(s) and the dependent variable would 
occur (see Figure 4.1). The mediator effect exists if the following conditions are met: a) 
variations in the explanatory variable(s) predict variations in the mediator variable b) 
variations in the mediator variable predict variations in the dependent variable, and c) 
when the relationships in a) and b) are controlled in the model, the direct relationship 
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between the independent variable(s) and the outcome variable becomes nonsignificant 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986; Bennett, 2000).                            
                      
Figure 4.1: Mediator Effect Model 
 
 
In this regard, from the year 2000 upwards (see Table 4.3); more attention was given to 
the mediating effect. Several examples were presented in the escalation/de-escalation 
empirical literature to demonstrate this influence (e.g., Moon et al., 2003; Cuellar et al., 
2006; O'Neill, 2009). Mediating variables in the escalation/de-escalation literature, were 
related to the focal independent variable, for example, in both studies by Keil et al. (2000) 
in the USA and Wong (2005) in Hong Kong the suggested mediator variable was risk 
perception, which is correlated to risk propensity (the independent variable). Cuellar et al. 
(2006) examined whether the relevance of the message given by the auditor (the 
mediator), which is linked to the auditor‟s credibility (focal independent variable) in the 
USA. Schulz-Hardt et al. (2009) examined the mediating influence of responsible 
preference where the focal independent variable was that of personal responsibility in 
Germany.      
  
Conditions of the mediation effect, in terms of the mediator's relationship with the 
independent and the dependent variables, were each separately met in these studies. For 
Mediator 
variable  
 
Independent 
variable(s) 
Dependent 
variable 
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example, in the study by Moon et al. (2003), all three mediating conditions were 
established (p.72): a) the mediator (decision confidence) was retreated on the independent 
variable (decision process) and the mediator "groups whose members made prior 
individual decisions were less confident in their decisions", b) the dependent variable 
(incremental amount) was retreated on the independent variable "groups whose members 
made prior individual decisions allocated more", and c) the dependent variable was 
retreated on both the independent variable and the mediator "the path between decision 
process and commitment was significantly lower in the mediated condition than in the 
non-mediated condition".    
 
Otherwise, a moderator is a separate independent variable that influences the direction 
and/or strength of the relationship between the independent variable(s) and the dependent 
variable (see Figure 4.2), i.e., the moderator interacts with the independent variable(s) so 
that the relationship between the independent variable(s) with the dependent variable is 
stronger or weaker at different levels of the moderator variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986; 
Bennett, 2000). Therefore the relationship between the independent variable(s) and the 
outcome variable depends on the value or level of the moderator variable (Cohen and 
Cohen, 1983).                            
                            
Figure 4.2: Moderator Effect Model 
 Moderator 
variable 
Independent 
variable(s) 
Dependent 
variable 
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In this regard, escalation/de-escalation authors who were interested in examining the 
moderator effect have selected variables to act as moderators (see Table 4.3) that were not 
only independent, but were not derived from the focal independent variable (e.g., Conlon 
and Wolf, 1980; Brody and Kaplan, 1996; He and Mittal, 2007). For example, Rutledge 
(1995) in the USA examined the moderating influence of the manner in which the 
information was framed and the focal independent variable was group decision-making. 
Heng et al. (2003) studied the moderating effect of the level of sunk costs and independent 
variables were individuals and approach. It is noticed that because the influence could be 
measured through the value or levels of the moderator, escalation/de-escalation authors 
who examined this influence have provided several levels of the moderator, for example, 
high and low degrees of project risk (He and Mittal, 2007), high and low degrees of sunk 
costs (Heng et al., 2003), and months of experience as internal audits (Brody and Kaplan, 
1996).   
 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), testing the moderation effect could be achieved 
through several methods. The simplest one is where the moderator and the independent 
variable would interact to cause the dependent variable. Therefore, it is worth mentioning 
that although the studies that examined the moderation effect might seem few (only seven 
out of eighteen) in the escalation/de-escalation literature for the time it arose in the early 
80s (see Table 4.4). It could be argued that all empirical studies that were established in a 
laboratory context from the mid-70s up to now have to a certain extent examined the 
moderation effect.  
 
133 
 
Table 4.4: A Chronology of Controlled, Separate and Indirect Variables  
Time 
Period 
Number 
and Place 
of Studies 
Theoretical Approach Variables Examined Moderator/Mediator 
1980s 1 study, 
USA  
External-Justification 
Self-Justification 
  
Involvement, cause of 
setback.  
Strategy. 
1990s 2 studies, 
USA.   
Prospect, Personal- 
Involvement 
 
Group initial responsibility, 
Personal responsibility.  
Information framing, 
Level of internal audit 
experience   
2000s 13 studies, 
USA, 
Finland, 
Netherlands, 
Singapore, 
Hong Kong, 
China, 
Germany.    
Risk, Self-
Justification, Group 
Decision Making,   
Mental 
Representation, 
Cognitive Dissonance, 
Sitkin-Pablo model of 
risk taking, External-
Justification, 
Heuristic-Analytic, 
Project Completion, 
Real Options, 
prospect, Social 
Information 
processing, 
Appraisal theories of 
Emotion.    
Nationality, Sunk costs, Risk 
propensity, Approach, 
Individual, Previous 
performance, Project 
completion, Decision 
process, Assigned purpose, 
self-monitoring, 
Justification, Consultation of 
a third-party, Assigned 
purpose of consultation, 
Personal responsibility, Risk 
propensity, Outcome 
expectancy, Auditor 
credibility, Gender, Age, 
Need for information, 
Rational thinking style, 
Capital budgeting, Time, 
Anger and Quilt feeling, 
Alternative project, 
Assessment of preferences, 
Decision evaluation, 
Attributes, Participation. 
Risk perception, Sunk 
costs, Decision 
confidence, Knowledge 
score, Relevance of 
message, Project risk, 
Strength of prior 
beliefs, Cognitive 
possibility of project 
abandonment 
possibility, 
Psychological safety, 
Anticipatory emotions, 
Responsible 
participants' 
preferences, Vicarious 
self-justification. 
2010s 4 studies, 
USA, India. 
Risk Perception, Goal 
Completion, New 
Product Development, 
Goal Setting theory  
Fear, Anger, Free draws, 
Sunk costs, Personal 
responsibility, Goal 
difficulty, Goal specificity, 
Project completion. 
Risk perception, Goal 
proximity, Reward for 
success, Commitment 
to a budget and 
schedule goal 
 
 
For example, in Staw's (1976) initial work, high and low personal responsibility were 
interacted with positive and negative decision consequences, Singer and Singer (1986) 
have interacted initial responsibility (high/low) with locus of control (internal/external), 
Harrison and Harrell (1995) manipulated the  presence and absence of  initial 
responsibility with the capital budgeting techniques (internal rate of return/net present 
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value), and Schultz and Cheng (2002) interacted high and low initial responsibility with 
present and absent information asymmetry to measure the influence of interactions, of 
each study on its own, on the escalation/de-escalation decisions.   
 
This rule could be applied to all laboratory-based studies. However, there are two reasons 
for not considering those studies as examples for the moderation effect: 
1. None of those studies have distinguished between the moderator and the focal 
independent variable as both were treated as independent variables that had the same 
influencing interacting chance to cause the existence of the escalation/de-escalation 
phenomenon. For example, in an early study by Rubin and Brockner (1975: p. 1058), 
they stated "three treatment variables were incorporated into a completely between-
subjects 2x2x2 factorial design: decrement.., salience.., and queue position". An 
additional example that illustrates the absence of determining the moderator variable, 
is in a study by Jani (2008; p.728), who stated "the experimental design was 2x2x2x4 
mixed factorial design with between-subjects manipulations of project risk factors.., 
and initial task-specific self-efficacy". 
2. The moderation assumption was never introduced in those studies neither when 
developing their hypotheses nor when displaying their results. For example, Chow et 
al. (1997) when examining the influence of personal responsibility, information frame, 
and nationality on managers' decisions in China, developed three hypotheses where 
none referred to a moderator influence (p. 350-351) "h1; individuals who had prior 
responsibility... are more likely to invest additional resources.., h2; individuals who 
are presented with negatively framed information... are more likely to invest 
additional resources.., and h3; Chinese nationals are more likely to invest additional 
resources...", their results indicated (p.357-358): " weak statistical support for the 
importance of initial responsibility and framing…Chinese subjects were more risk-
preferred". Fox et al. (2009) examined the influence of the availability of alternatives 
and difficulty of decisions on managers' choices in the USA, as they hypothesized that 
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(p. 434): "people will more frequently opt for persisting with the same failing project 
when (a) equally attractive options are available; (b) the number of the equally 
attractive options increases and (c) the available options consist of unique negative 
attribute". Their results indicated that when managers had the choice to either continue 
the original failing project or equally choose between equally attractive investments 
(potentially more profitable than the original project), they were more likely to 
reinvest in the original project. 
 
4.4.2 Uncontrolled Empirical Variables 
The starting point for studies under this category was laboratory-based research, which 
took place during the first 10 years to uncover and discover as many relevant factors that 
influence the existence of the (de)-escalation phenomenon before any attempt to 
investigate real life cases (see Table 4.1). In fact, the bulk of examining real life cases (24 
studies out of 26) was in the period from the 1990s up to now (after 20 years of laboratory 
based studies) for the (de)-escalation concept and ideas to mature and shape-up, to capture 
variables in real life situations (e.g., Bondt and Makhija, 1988; Ryan, 1995; Drummond, 
1998; McElhinney and Proctor, 2005; Mährang and Keil, 2008; Pan et al., 2009).  
 
The majority of real life research concentrated on exploring factors and forces of the (de)-
escalation phenomenon in case studies (see Table 4.5)
3
 particularly operating in the 
service sub-sector field whereas only one study was found that investigated a Nuclear 
Power Plant in the USA (Bondt and Makhija, 1988).  The service companies investigated 
have varied to include several businesses, for example, information technology projects' 
decisions (Drummond, 1998 in the UK; Montealegre and Keil, 2000 in the USA), 
                                                          
3  For a detailed display of studies of this category see Table 3 in Appendix C 
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decisions linked to athletics and games (Staw and Hoang, 1995; Bourgie, 2001 both in the 
USA), and information systems projects' decisions (Pan et al., 2009) in the UK. 
Table 4.5: A Chronology of Uncontrolled and Separate Variables 
Time 
Period 
Number 
and Place 
of Studies 
Theoretical 
Approach 
Variables Examined 
1980s 1 study, 
USA  
Prospect theory  
  
Sunk costs, Average return, Project completion, negative 
information 
1990s 7 studies, 
USA, UK.   
Multi theoretical 
approach, 
Single-option 
paradigm, Sunk 
costs, Prospect, 
Decision 
dilemma, 
Escalation, The 
mum and deaf 
effect. 
Personal responsibility, Lack of goal congruency, Negative 
framing, Information asymmetry, Anger, frustration feelings, 
Face saving, Non-achievable goal, Risk involved, Justification, 
Face saving, Sunk costs, Investors' beliefs about the course of 
action, Investors not to be embarrassed, Expectations are not 
met, Paucity of information, Socially motivated, Technical 
difficulties, Less tolerance for failure, Awareness of problems, 
Publicly stated limits, Clear success and failure criteria, 
Outcome oriented evaluations, Regular evaluations of projects, 
Separation of responsibility for approving and evaluating 
projects,   
2000s 11 studies, 
USA, UK, 
Canada, 
Denmark, 
Europe.    
Theory-building 
approach, Multi 
theoretical 
model, Self- 
External- 
justification, 
Sunk costs, 
Intervention- 
Avoidance, 
Lewin's Change 
theory, 
Approach-
Avoidance,   
Montealegre & 
Keil's De-
Escalation 
Model, 
Narrative,  
Visual mapping,  
Psychological 
factors 
Problem recognition, Re-examining prior course of action, 
Alternatives, Implement an exit strategy, Psychological self-
justification, Social self-justification, Sunk costs, Goal 
incongruence, Completion effect, Information asymmetry, 
Managers being successful, achieving, clever, Being respected, 
Age, Salary, Individual, club performance, managing style, 
Monitoring, Change in decision responsibility, and control 
variables (borrower relationship characteristics, prior size of 
loan, previous performance of a branch, and branch size), 
Internal resistance, Powerful product champions, Limited 
knowledge of capital costs or ongoing revenue costs, Lack of 
knowledge of the level of risk, No stated project objectives, 
Worry of punishment, Managers loss of control, Monitoring, 
Restructuring, Reward for success, Cost of withdrawal, Cost of 
persistence, Ambiguity,  Noticeable role for communicators 
during the project, Goal conflict, Management incapable to 
determine problems, Ambiguous, Asymmetry, Implementation 
mind-set, Locus of control, Preference for consistency, Time 
urgency.  
2010s 
 
 
1 study, 
UK. 
Leadership, 
Politics and 
Interpersonal. 
Provision of psychological safety, Personal appeal 
Consultation, Agile mobilization, Re-establish legitimacy and 
stakeholder commitment, Continues empowerment. 
 
 
Besides, few survey attempts were made from the late 1990s by escalation/de-escalation 
authors, which were built on laboratory studies that have helped getting the empirical 
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work started by identifying key variables and factors that were later examined in real 
cases. These attempts aimed, building on knowledge, to investigate the (de)-escalation 
phenomenon through a wider-range and generalize obtained results. Only three surveys 
were found, to the knowledge of the researcher, in addition to one study that was based on 
financial data observation all in the USA as follows: interviewing information system 
auditors by phone (Keil and Robey, 1999), sending a cross-sectional mailed survey to 
members of the information systems audit and control association (Keil et al., 2000), 
observing companies' loan and financial data (McNamara et al., 2002), and an online 
survey for information system projects' stakeholders, developers, leaders and users 
(Korzaan and Morris, 2009). 
 
Overall, several variables were found in all real life studies, whether cases or surveys, that 
could be categorized into two sets of factors: the first set included empirical variables that 
either confirmed or differed from what was accomplished within laboratory setting 
studies, and the second set of factors included empirical variables that were not examined 
earlier through laboratory contexts but were considered to have a significant influence on 
managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate commitment in real life cases. For example, 
within the first set, variables such as personal responsibility, sunk costs, degree of project 
completion, information frame, self-justification, face saving, and the availability of 
alternatives have confirmed what empirical laboratory-based studies have achieved (Staw 
and Hoang, 1995; Montealegre and Keil, 2000; Wong et al., 2006; Pan et al., 2009). While 
variables such as the manner in which the decision was made (groups or individuals), 
managers' nationality, and managers' aim for personal gains were not found to widely 
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influence managers' escalation/de-escalation decisions in laboratory-based studies (Keil 
and Robey, 1999; Kisfalvi, 2000; Pan et al., 2006). 
 
Within the second set, it is found that variables such as the average return on investment 
(Bondt and Makheja, 1988), lack of goal congruency (Keil, 1995), investors' beliefs of the 
course of action (Ryan, 1995), technical difficulties (Drummind, 1998), implementing an 
exit strategy (Montealegre and Keil, 2000), change in decision responsibility (McNamara 
et al., 2002), cost of withdrawal/resistance (Pan et al., 2009), and preference for 
consistency, time and urgency (Korzaan and Morris, 2009) were found to influence the 
(de)-escalation phenomenon in real life cases, particularly, in agreement with the specific 
characteristics of each case but their influence was never discovered in laboratory-based 
studies.  
 
4.5 Studies that Examined Empirical Variables within Groups  
Authors within this category based their studies on classifying empirical variables under 
several different groups, where each group includes a set of variables that had or shared 
similar characteristics (Table 4.9). Knowing that, this approach started to take place in the 
(de)-escalation empirical literature in the late 1980s up to the current, as it resulted from 
examining projects within a case study approach (Section 4.3.2) and extended to be 
applied in laboratory contexts, which will be discussed first in the following subsection. 
 
4.5.1 Controlled Empirical Variables 
Studying empirical variables as groups under this category did not differ from examining 
them separately (see Section 4.3.1). The first step was developing a hypothetical 
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explanation for the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon (Sivanathan et al., 2007; Berg et 
al., 2009), which is followed by examining variables under the researcher control that 
would enhance this explanation through restricting any other forces that were not subject 
to the study and manipulating the degrees of influence of the variables that were under the 
study (Schultz and Cheng, 2002; Biyalogorsky et al., 2006).  
 
Only one study was found, to the knowledge of the researcher, which examined empirical 
variables as groups in a laboratory context that was accomplished in the USA. Perhaps the 
reason for the limited studies in this category goes back to the difficulties in managing 
large numbers of variables in a laboratory context (Sabherwal et al., 2003). In the study by 
Sabherwal et al. (2003) the level of commitment to a course of action was suggested to be 
influenced by four groups of factors: project; psychological; structural; and, social. 
Further, by limiting each group to only two variables, they manipulated each variable to 
two levels of influence (see Table 4.6) to measure such effects. 
 
               Table 4.6: Variables as Groups in the Study of Sabherwal et al. (2003) 
Group of Variables Variables Degrees of manipulation 
Project  Project payoff Large  Small  
Cost of payoff Large  Small  
Psychological  Initial commitment Present  Absent  
Decision frame Positive  Negative  
Social  Competitor experience Present  Absent  
Job security High  Low  
Structural  CEO support High  Moderate 
Side bets Involved Not involved 
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4.5.2 Uncontrolled Empirical Variables 
The empirical literature, as mentioned earlier, has classified variables that shared similar 
characteristics into several different groups (see Table 4.7)
4
.  
 
Table 4.7: A Chronology of Detailed Uncontrolled within Group Variables   
Time 
Period 
Determinants and forces of (de)escalation of commitment 
Project  Psychological  Social  Structural  
1980s Objectively 
beneficial project, 
doubtful costs and 
benefits. 
Information 
processing errors 
and personal 
responsibility.  
Need for external 
justification, political 
importance, and 
modelling. 
Project side-bets, inner 
and outside relationships. 
1990s Ambiguity of 
economic data, 
sequencing of 
project's costs and 
benefits, project 
categorization as a 
long investment, 
salvage value, 
closing costs, and 
overall size of 
project. Paucity of 
alternatives. Costs 
of withdrawal and 
salvage value. 
Project payoff, 
payoff structure, 
infeasibility of 
alternatives.   
Personal 
reinforcement 
history and errors in 
information 
processing. 
Reinforcement traps, 
information 
processing errors, 
value attached to 
turnarounds, sunk 
costs, and framing. 
External justification, 
management 
identified with 
project, norms of 
consistency and 
modelling. Committee 
embarrassment, 
political pressures, 
and the desire to 
maintain appearance. 
Fear of confrontation. 
Public identification 
with project, 
responsibility for 
failure, modelling, 
and political rivalry. 
Director became a 
scapegoat, political 
pressures, and 
preserving the image. 
Organisational: technical 
side-bets, political 
support, and 
institutionalization. 
Contextual: the project 
became larger than the 
company, and external 
political parties. The 
committee was tied to 
their inheritance. Timing 
of information. Political 
support and resource 
constrains. Committee 
was tied to its 
inheritance.  
 
2000s Unclear definition 
and incorrect 
sequence of 
programme, 
Illusion of control. 
Selective perception   
2010s Low salvage value, 
Expedition goal 
had a large payoff, 
Mismanaged 
information. 
Prior history of 
success, 
Reinforcement traps, 
Personal 
responsibility 
Competitive rivalry, 
Revelation of errors 
and failure. 
Organisational 
(institutionalization, 
Pursuit of enterprise 
growth) 
 
                                                          
4  For a more detailed display of all variables of this category see Table 4 in Appendix C 
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Project determinants referred to those that are precisely linked to the project such as the 
costs and financial benefits, psychological determinants referred to those that are related to 
the decision maker him/her-self such as reinforcement‟s traps, social determinants referred 
to those that are linked to the decision maker‟s society such as external justification, and 
structural determinants represented variables that beyond managers‟ control yet they are 
not social or linked to the project such as organisational or political influences (e.g., Ross 
and Staw, 1986; 1993; Drummond, 1994; 1995; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; O'Neil, 
2009).  
 
The leading authors who started this trend were Ross and Staw (1986) who investigated 
the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon within a real life case study in Canada and 
consequently suggested grouping variables that influenced the occurrence as well the 
persistence of this phenomenon into four categories: project, psychological, social, and 
structural determinants. Moreover, they followed their attempt with three sequential 
theoretical studies in the years (1987a; 1987b; 1991) in order to develop a prototype for 
the phenomenon that would provide guidance on which forces would have the strongest 
influence in such situations over time (see Figure 4.3).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Stages of the Escalation Prototype in Ross and Staw’s Study (1987: 67)  
     Phase 1                                          Phase 2                                                 Phase 3                                         Phase 4 
    Promise of future outcome (+)      Receipt of questionable outcome (0)   Receipt of negative outcome (-)   Receipt of highly negative outcome (- -)        
 
   
               Project determinants (+)                           Project determinants (0)                   Project determinants (-)                              Project determinants (+) 
                                                                    Psychological determinants (+)      Psychological determinants (+)                 Psychological determinants (0) 
                                                                                                                                               Social determinants (+)                               Social determinants (+)  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Structural determinants (+) 
                                                            
Perceived Utility of Current Project/Withdrawal                  Commitment to Current Course of Action 
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Their suggested model (1987, 65-66) included four phases that were classified according 
to the receipt of information, which started with the promise of positive outcomes but over 
time turned to negative consequences, and factors influencing managers‟ decisions at each 
phase as follows: a) the first phase where the project would be expected to gain positive 
future outcomes, as it was influenced positively by project determinants; b) in the second 
phase, were doubts surrounding  the positive outcomes, as the project determinants were 
suggested to be less attractive, yet psychological determinants were expected to positively 
influence management decisions; c) in the third phase, were the project starts to receive 
negative information whereas psychological and social determinants are positively 
expected to influence managements' decision while the influence of project determinates 
would be negative; d) finally in phase four, where management would receive highly 
negative information, psychological pressures on commitment would be eliminated, while 
project, social, and structural factors would be positively influencing the decision to 
commit additional resources.  
 
According to their classification (Table 4.8), project determinants such as the salvage 
value closing costs or whether the investment is characterized as short or long term are 
factors that share one element which is the objective features of the failing project. While 
psychological determinants are forces that stem from the decision makers themselves in 
terms of reinforcement traps, self-justification or information biasing. Social determinants, 
on the other hand, are factors that stem from other parties such as competition pressures or 
they could be linked to the image of decision makers in the society such as acting as a 
hero.  Finally, structural determinants are those forces that stem from the features of the 
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managers' organisation such as goals of the firm or any interaction patterns in relation 
such as created economic side-bets.  
Table 4.8: Suggested Factors and Determinants in Staw and Ross’s 1987 study 
Determinants Factors 
Project determinants Investment character of project, temporary cause of setback, efficacious 
resources, size of payoff, cost of payoff, infeasibility of alternatives, closing 
costs, salvage value, and long-term payoff structure.  
Psychological 
determinants 
Irregular pattern of decline, prior expenditures irrevocable, tendency for 
perseverance, public, freely chosen, repeated and important, turnaround 
scripts, framing, commons structuring of outcomes, ego importance of failure, 
personal responsibility for failure, and reinforcement traps. 
Social determinants Competition or political rivalry, responsibility for failure, job insecurity, 
public identification with the project, norms of consistency or hero effect, and 
modelling. 
Structural 
determinants 
Institutionalization, project tied to organisational goals or values, political 
support, administrative inertia, and economic or technical side-bets. 
 
 
In order to gain more support, Ross and Staw (1993) investigated an organisational 
decision of commitment in a real life case (Nuclear Power Plant) in the USA through their 
1987 prototype model of escalation. They categorized 17 variables into four groups: 
project, psychological, social, organisational, and contextual determinants. Their results 
gave more strength to their model in terms of both the cycle of the escalation/de-escalation 
decision and the determinants that influence this decision.  
 
In their 1993 study, the organisational escalation/de-escalation of commitment decision 
went through four phases before management decided to quit and terminate the failing 
project. The first phase: when the project was initiated and implemented, project 
determinants were favourable (positive). In the second phase: future outcomes begun to be 
questionable, project determinants were less positive while psychological and social 
determinants were more effective than organisational or contextual determinants, the 
decision was made to continue adding resources to the project (escalate commitment). In 
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the third phase: future outcomes were negative, project determinants turned distinctly 
negative, and psychological, social, organisational, and contextual determinants were 
positively influencing the decision to continue the project. Finally, in the fourth stage: the 
project was receiving highly negative outcomes, psychological and social determinants 
influences were removed, while project, organisational and contextual determinants were 
positively influencing managers' decisions which led to closing the project.    
 
The previous work of Ross and Staw has inspired several authors that investigated real life 
cases (e.g., Drummond, 1994; Keil, 1995; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Drummond and 
Hodgson, 1996; Kisfalvi, 2000; Alvarez et al., 2011) as they grouped studies variables in 
several determinants (Table 4.9)
5
.  
   Table 4.9: A Chronology of Uncontrolled within Groups Variables 
 
                                                          
5  For detailed display of studies of this category see Table 5 in Appendix C. 
Time 
Period 
Number and 
Place of 
Studies 
Theoretical 
Approach 
Variables Examined 
1980s 1 study, 
Canada  
Ross & Staw‟s 
model of escalation 
Project, Psychological, Social, and Structural 
determinants. 
1990s 5 studies, 
USA, UK.   
Organization theory, 
Ross & Staw‟s 
model of escalation, 
Bowen's two factor 
model, Escalation 
Theory. 
Psychological, Project, Social, Organisational, 
Contextual, Structural, and Political 
determinants, Information effects.  
2000s 2 studies, 
USA. 
Self-justification. 
Prospect theory, 
Escalation theory. 
Project, Psychological, Social, Organisational, 
and Structural factors. 
2010s 1 study, 
Mount 
Everest. 
Escalation theory. Project, Psychological, Social, and 
Organisational determinants. 
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4.6 Limitations of Previous Empirical Research 
A noticeable restriction, from the previous review, is the issue of generalizing the 
achieved results of empirical studies in the escalation/de-escalation field, as they were 
mostly obtained either within laboratory-settings or through single case studies. Most of 
these studies were conducted in industrialized developed countries, mainly in the USA, 
UK, Canada, and Australia, but to the knowledge of the researcher, no such studies exist 
about developing countries. The present study overcomes these shortcomings through a 
rigorous research design that includes an encapsulating survey questionnaire that was 
methodically administered to large sample of companies to capture first-hand corporate 
(de)-escalation experience (see Chapter Five). More limitations were found in the existing 
empirical literature that, in agreement with the structure of this chapter, could be 
categorized into two groups: the first is related to studies that examined controlled 
variables and the second is linked to studies that examined uncontrolled variables as 
follows. 
 
4.6.1 Limitations of Studies with Controlled Variables 
Variables that influenced the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon, whether directly or 
indirectly, within controlled settings i.e. in laboratory contexts, shared the following 
limitations: 
 
The first shortfall is linked to subjects who participated in those experiments, which the 
generated results were obtained from. Although escalation/de-escalation authors have 
targeted managers such as MBA students (Leatherwood and Conlon, 1983), executive 
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MBA students (Sharp and Salter, 1997), auditors (Jeffery, 1992), or geologists (Garland et 
al., 1990) the majority of participants were undergraduate students who were asked to act 
as managers. A few of these students were familiar with the decision making process in 
the real world (Rao and Monk, 1999), few have studied an introductory course in 
management (Citera et al., 2000), while a few came from psychological (Brecher and 
Hantula, 2005) or informational system backgrounds (Greer and Stephens, 2001).  
 
Therefore, counting on and obtaining results through participants with these 
characteristics might cause the ignorance of important features that practitioner managers 
when facing conflict situations in the real world might experience particularly as project 
managers. This explains the difference between the explanation provided by managers in 
real life case studies and the one provided by subjects in laboratory contexts for the 
escalation/de-escalation phenomenon. For example, by the time the decision of escalation 
was found to be largely explained through managers' initial or personal responsibility 
(e.g., Staw, 1976; Barton et al., 1989; Jeffery, 1992; Schultz and Cheng, 2002; 
Biyalogorsky et al., 2006; Slaughter and Greguras, 2008) in laboratory settings, in real life 
cases not only this explanation did not exist to the same extent, but the decision of 
escalation/de-escalation commitment was explained more through other forces such as 
political support for the failing project or organisational side-bets (e.g., Ross and Staw,  
1993; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Montealegre and Keil, 2000). 
 
The second shortfall is related to the tested variables. The majority of escalation/de-
escalation studies did not clearly distinguish between the moderating variables and the 
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main independent variables. As was discussed previously in Section 4.4.1, the 
manipulation of examined variables in most controlled studies was unrealistic in terms of 
presenting two levels or degrees of manipulation. For example, very high/low levels of 
sunk costs (Zhiyuan and Qing, 2008), present/absent levels of self-affirm (Sivanathan et 
al., 2007), or positive/negative degrees of information framing (Salter et al., 2004).  
However, few attempts were made to examine more than two levels of variables such as 
several levels of project completion (Conlon and Garland, 1993), individual vs. groups vs. 
groups with shared information levels (Citera et al., 2000), or three levels of new product 
development (Schimidt and Calantone, 2002), which to an extent matches what was found 
in real case studies.  For example Ross and Staw (1993) in their study of the Nuclear 
power Plant case in the USA, found that project determinants had three different degrees 
of influence on four levels of managers' decision: positive (+) in phase one, extra positive 
(+ +) in phase three, and extremely positive (+ + +) in phase four. 
 
Finally the scenarios presented in experiments were created to reflect a replicated decision 
making setting through narrowing and restricting the escalation/de-escalation forces to 
particular variables that would be examined. This restriction was not limited to external 
forces such as the competitive market, but included the removal of variables that were 
considered in the literature to be significant to managers' choices in these conflict 
situations. For example, the scenario provided in Greer and Stephans' (2001: 69) study to 
both Mexican and USA participants did not include any indication of the amount of 
expected return except for the phrase: "the project outcome will have an enormous impact 
on your reputation". Therefore, the scenarios presented did not ever match real life 
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environments where decisions regarding projects are influenced by external dynamics in 
addition to internal factors. 
 
4.6.2 Limitations of Studies with Uncontrolled Variables  
Variables that influenced the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon through uncontrolled 
settings i.e. methods that were beyond the researcher‟s manipulation shared the following 
limitations:  
 
The first shortfall can be linked to the number of studies that examined uncontrolled 
variables; out of 135 empirical studies only 26 real life cases were examined and another 
four studies only employed methods, which ranged from telephone interviews, cross-
sectional postal surveys, observed data, and online surveys (see Tables 3 and 4 in 
Appendix C). Each examined case was unique, for example, factors that influenced the 
decision to continue constructing a Nuclear Power Plant in the USA (Ross and Staw 1993) 
were different from factors that would influence hosting a worldwide affair such as 
Expo86 in Canada (Ross and Staw, 1986), where both would differ from implementing an 
informational technology programme in the UK (Drummond, 1998) or an informational 
technology programme in an educational institution in Denmark (Mährang et al., 2008). 
Therefore, generalizing the results obtained is limited to each case particularly or at best, 
might extend to include similar cases.  
 
Although the studies reported company practice, they only considered a limited number of 
variables. This limitation was not unique to case studies; it also applies to the few survey-
based studies. For example, Keil and Robey (1999) questioned seven variables through 
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their telephone interviews to 75 informational system auditors in the USA.  Keil et al. 
(2000), on the other hand, attempted a multi-theoretical approach by selecting six 
variables from four different theories in their cross-sectional survey of auditors of 
information system projects in the USA. However, in addition to the long list of 
limitations they mentioned themselves, their study cannot be considered properly multi-
theoretical, nor is the cross-sectional method they used appropriate for a multi-theoretical 
study. Other examples of studies with limited variable sets are those by McNamara et al. 
(2002) who looked at only three variables, and Korzan and Morris (2009) only considered 
four variables in their online survey of 232 information system project managers.  
 
Finally, the third restriction is related to the respondents‟ type in surveys. Because of easy 
access and being agreed to participate in studies (e.g., Keil et al., 2000), respondents in 
two out of three surveys were information systems auditors, while the third were 
information systems‟ stakeholders, developers, leaders and users. This resulted in that an 
important respondents‟ segment represented in people who have direct authority and 
relationship with the failing project such as the department or project managers were 
excluded. Therefore, results will not represent managers‟ view and will not provide an 
accurate explanation for the existence of the phenomenon. 
 
4.7 Theoretical and Methodological Implications for the Present Study 
It is clearly evident from the foregoing detailed review of empirical literature that the 
complexity, pervasiveness and universality of the project escalation decision problem 
cannot be comprehended through speculative reasoning alone, regardless which 
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theoretical lens they are seen through. Empirical validation is needed to establish 
theoretical legitimacy of the study of the escalation problem but this cannot be 
demonstrably and unambiguously achieved through the restrictive manipulation of 
selected variables in an imaginary setting such as a laboratory experiment. A laboratory-
based approach is therefore ruled out for the present study. Nevertheless, despite their 
shortcomings, laboratory experiments have been useful in the continuing search for 
appropriate theoretical models and the relentless research effort to make sense of a multi-
faceted problem despite the perennial lack of access to company data that frustrates 
researchers. This academic tenacity can be seen as the catalyst for the few studies based 
on real life companies that have steadily emerged in the shadow of the large number of 
laboratory-based experiments in the last five decades.  
 
Although few in number, the studies reviewed above have tried in a very limited way to 
examine single company project (de)-escalation practice and provide, in most cases, some 
empirical validity to one of the plethora of theoretical propositions that abound in the 
literature. It is clearly evident from the above analysis that no single study provided a 
comprehensive framework to guide a serious research project but, when viewed 
collectively, they formed a body of evidence that pointed to the superiority of the 
approach-avoidance model, hence the adoption of this model in the present study.  
 
It is worth adding here that one exception is the study of Keil et al. (2000) whose eye-
catching title gives the reader the initial impression that it is, unlike its predecessors, an 
encapsulating multi-theoretical study. Undoubtedly there has been a growing interest in 
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the multi-theory approach, or theoretical triangulation, to remedy the shortcomings of one 
theory with another theory in the investigation of a research question, and enhance 
confidence in the ensuing findings and interpretation of results (e.g., Christopher, 2010; 
Hoque et al., 2013). However, the desirability of theoretical triangulation is one thing, and 
properly operationalising it is another and, by their own admission, Keil et al. (2000) have 
not succeeded in doing so. Some of the many limitations they list have been summarised 
in Section 4.6 above, namely their cherry-picking of constructs from the four theories they 
claimed to combine and their total reliance on project auditors as their source of primary 
data. Even if their questionably selective approach can be passed as mildly multi-
theoretical, their use of a single data source that relies on a cross-sectional survey is also 
questionable. Proponents of theoretical triangulation (e.g., Christopher, 2010; Hoque et 
al., 2013) clearly advocate the use of (multiple) case studies and preferably 
methodological triangulation. As the overall aim of the multi-theoretical approach is the 
in-depth probing of the „how‟ and „why‟ questions particularly for contemporary 
phenomena within a real-life context, a multiple-case study approach (e.g., Yin, 2003) is 
more suitable as research data can be treated cumulatively. Alternatively, the adoption of a 
multi-theoretical approach warrants the use of data triangulation, or pluralism in data 
sources and data collection techniques (Hoque et al., 2013), to capture multi-level 
complexities of a phenomenon such as the escalation of commitment in capital project 
decisions. Therefore, Keil et al.‟s (2000) purported multi-theoretical approach is too 
flawed and cannot be relied upon for the purposes of the present study.   
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4.8 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter presented a detailed review of the empirical literature on the capital 
investment decision making process and the escalation/de-escalation problem in order to 
highlight conceptual and methodological issues to help guide the current study.  Most of 
the existing literature is in the form of often ill-conceived laboratory based on experiments 
conducted mainly in the USA and UK. Although these experiments have tried to extend 
the understanding of the problem by „operationalising‟ existing theoretical constructs 
through simulation, their practical relevance is questionable because the numerous 
limitations of such experimental determination, e.g. the professional level of subjects who 
participated in those experiments, the mechanisms of variable manipulation used, and the 
degree in which the simulated scenarios matched reality.  
 
On the other hand, studies based on real life companies, while more useful than 
laboratory-based ones, are too few in number and are limited to a small aspect of the 
problem, therefore far from being able to offer enough evidence to generalize, statistically 
or analytically, the reported practice.  Moreover, they are generally limited in scope given 
the uniqueness of each case presented, the small number of variables examined and, when 
an attempt was made to conduct a large scale study; it was done with a largely flawed 
theoretical triangulation approach. A key conclusion from reviewing empirical studies in 
relatively sufficient detail is that they are quite disparate in approach and results for them 
to form a cohesive body of knowledge on a problem of tremendous complexity and 
practical implications for capital project investment and management. 
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Overall, in addition to extensive review of theoretical perspectives presented in the 
previous chapter, it has been learnt from the analysis of the (semi)empirical literature in 
this chapter that a serious study of the escalation of commitment phenomenon needs to be 
conceptually sound, methodologically robust, and applied to a sufficiently large sample of 
managers directly involved in capital investment projects and the subsequent (de)-
escalation decision. This is no easy task on a sensitive and data deficient research topic 
but, in the light of the cumulative knowledge gleaned from the extant literature, it is the 
most promising approach to produce results that are knowledge worthy and practically 
impactful. To this end, the careful research design of the present study is explained in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the main objective of the current study is to examine the 
escalation/de-escalation of capital projects in the Saudi corporate culture. Since the 
methodology adopted by any study must be appropriate for the objectives of that study, 
the aim of this chapter is to describe the research design and methods as well as to explain 
the reason for applying the chosen method. 
 
This chapter presents the research theoretical model and hypothesis development in detail 
(Section 5.2), followed by the research paradigm and philosophy (Section 5.3), research 
approach (Section 5.4) and data collection methods (Section 5.5).  The remaining five 
sections present information on the research population and sample for both the survey 
questionnaire and interviews (Section 5.6), questionnaire design (Section 5.7), 
questionnaire content and sources (Section 5.8), validity and reliability issues (Section 
5.9) and data analysis techniques (Section 5.10).  Section 5.11 concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2 Research Theoretical Model and Hypothesis Development 
The research theoretical model that was introduced in Chapter One and its constituent 
components were clarified further through the information presented in Chapters 2-4. A 
more detailed explanation of how the approach-avoidance theory is applied in a systematic 
and integrative way in this study is given below. 
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5.2.1 Research Theoretical Model 
Figure 5.1 below depicts the research theoretical model, taking into account the model‟s 
project-specific and non-project-specific variables, in addition to the direct/indirect 
relationships therein in relation to the (de)-escalation of commitment and its outcomes. H1 
to H7 refer to the research hypotheses (see Section 5.2.2). 
 
Figure 5.1:  Research Theoretical Model 
 
The natural progression and the parallel development of methods in the literature in the 
preceding chapters made clear that the (de)-escalation phenomenon is complex in its 
nature and implications and any simple study approach would not do it justice.  
 
Therefore, in order to comprehend all facets of this complexity, the development of the 
current research model adopts a sophisticated approach that combines the influence of two 
groups of decision determinants: project-specific (financial, strategic, informational) and 
non-project-specific (psychological, contextual, organisational). This influence is studied 
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at two levels: the direct effect of determinants on managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions and 
then the moderating effect of project operational audit on managers‟ choices.  
 
5.2.2 Hypothesis Development 
The hypotheses are summarised in Table 5.1 in relation to the study‟s research objectives 
and questions and explained in detail from here onwards.  
 
Table 5.1: Research Objectives, Questions and Hypotheses 
Objectives Questions Hypotheses 
1. Examine the impact of 
project-specific 
determinants on managers' 
decisions to (de)escalate 
commitment. 
1. What are the project-
specific determinants that 
influence managers in 
Saudi companies to 
(de)escalate commitment 
in capital project 
decisions? 
H1: Financial determinants influence managers' 
decisions to (de)escalate commitment to a 
failing course of action.   
H2: Strategic determinants influence managers' 
decisions to (de)escalate commitment to a 
failing course of action.   
H3: Informational determinants influence 
managers' decisions to (de)escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action. 
2. Examine the psychological 
dimension in capital project 
(de)escalation of 
commitment decisions. 
2. To what extent are project 
managers in Saudi 
companies affected by 
non-project-specific 
factors when making 
(de)escalation of 
commitment decisions? 
H4: Psychological determinants influence 
managers' decisions to (de)escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action. 
3. Examine the extent to 
which contextual and 
organisational factors 
influence capital project 
(de)escalation of 
commitment decisions. 
H5: Contextual determinants influence 
managers' decisions to (de)escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
H6: Organisational determinants influence 
managers' decisions to (de)escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action. 
4. Examine the moderating 
role that operational audit 
might have on project 
(de)escalation of 
commitment decisions. 
 
3. Does operational audit 
have a moderating role in 
the impact of 
escalation/de-escalation 
determinants on project 
(de)escalation of 
commitment decisions in 
Saudi companies? 
H7: Operational auditing plays a moderating 
role with respect to the determinants 
involved in the (de)escalate decisions. 
 
 
Guided by the study‟s theoretical model and the in-depth review of both the theoretical 
and empirical literature in the previous chapters, the development of the study‟s research 
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hypotheses is henceforth laid out for all the decision determinants at both the direct and 
moderated levels of analysis. In line with the chosen multifaceted research approach, a 
near enumerative account of relevant studies is given to elucidate the relevance and 
practical significance of the project decision determinants and contextualise each research 
hypothesis. 
 
5.2.2.1 Project-Specific Determinants 
Project-specific determinants are those that are found straightforwardly related to the 
project itself and they have a noticeable influence on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation 
decisions (Ross and Staw, 1986; 1993; Drummond, 1994; 1995; Newman and Sabherwal, 
1996). They are linked to the project‟s financial features, strategic aligning, and 
information related (Ross and Staw, 1993). In this section each of the project-specific 
determinants will be treated as an approach or avoidance attribute of escalation as 
suggested by the results of the relevant literature review in order to generate plausible 
research hypotheses.   
 
1. Financial Determinants  
Financial determinants are related to the system of in and out cash flows (Adair, 2005). 
They either represent the amount of monetary resources invested in the failing project i.e., 
sunk costs (Arkes and Blummer, 1985; Garland and Newport, 1991; Devine and O‟Clock, 
1995; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Boehne and Paese, 2000; Pan et al., 2006) or they 
refer to the expected costs and revenues of the failing project (Brockner et al., 1981; 
Drummond, 1994; Gosh, 1997; Tan and Yates, 2002; Pan et al., 2006).  
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Since Arkes and Blummer (1985) introduced the philosophy of sunk costs effect in a 
series of ten different laboratory experiments on managers‟ escalation decisions, sunk 
costs have been one of the financial determinants closely examined in the empirical 
literature, as it is considered, just like initial responsibility, an important force behind 
managers‟ choices to escalate commitment. As cited by Arkes and Blummer (1985: 124) 
in the words of a USA senator “to terminate a project in which $1.1 billion has been 
invested represents an unconscionable mishandling of taxpayers’ dollars”.           
 
Sunk costs are seen as a factor that increases managers‟ allocation decisions to failing 
projects (e.g., Arkes and Blummer, 1985; Brockner et al., 1986; Garland et al., 1990; 
Garland and Newport, 1991; Keil, 1995; Newman et al., 1996; Drummond, 1998; Keil et 
al., 2000; Kisfalvi, 2000). For example, whether participants of Keil (1995) study were 
given the choice of an alternative course of action, an upward sloping sunk costs effect on 
commitment was observed. Most empirical studies that examined the sunk cost effect 
linked it to the assumptions of prospect theory in laboratory conditions, which allowed 
them to frame and manipulate this influence such as the framing of sunk costs to: absolute 
(dollars)/relative (budgeted) in Garland and Newport‟s (1991) study, or manipulating four 
levels of sunk costs (15%; 40%; 65%; and, 90%) in the study by Keil et al. (1995).  
  
However, manipulating, framing, and relating the effect of sunk costs with other 
financial/non-financial factors have either limited the strong influence of this variable or 
increased managers‟ ability to make de-escalation decisions (see Tables 1 and 2 in 
Appendix C). For example, the influence of sunk costs was limited when examined jointly 
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with implicit/explicit opportunity costs (Northcraft and Neale, 1986) or within the degree 
of project completion (Conlon and Garland, 1993; 1998; Boehne and Paese, 2000). 
Managers were driven to make de-escalation decisions when sunk costs, for example, 
were examined in relation with the information regarding residual return of the project 
(Tan and Yates, 1995), within the availability of shoulder blaming or assurance affording 
and in low degrees of sunk costs (Heng et al., 2003), or if sunk costs were compared to 
and exceeded the budgeted amount for a project (Heath, 1995).  
 
In addition to sunk costs, a number of other financial determinants attracted several 
escalation/de-escalation authors (e.g. Staw, 1976; Brockner et al., 1979; Bateman, 1986; 
Ross and Staw, 1993; Boulding et al., 1997; Mcelhinney and Proctor, 2005). For example, 
the costs and revenues of the failing project (Brockner et al., 1981; Ross and Staw, 1993; 
Drummond, 1994; Boulding et al., 1997), the estimated costs and revenues of a future 
investment (Heath, 1995; Tan and Yates, 1995; Gosh, 1997), opportunity costs attracted 
several authors (Northcraft and Neale, 1986; Devine and O‟Clock, 1995), the salvage and 
closing costs of the project (Ross and Staw, 1986; 1993; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996), 
if the stated budget limits for the project were publicly stated (Keil and Robey, 1999), the 
costs of persisting (Leatherwood and Conlon, 1983; Drummond, 1994; Pan et al., 2006; 
Pan et al., 2009) and costs of withdrawal from a failing course of action (Drummond, 
1995; Pan et al., 2006; Pan et al., 2009).  These financial determinants were examined 
from different viewpoints, for example, their degree of importance (Brockner et al., 1981), 
whether they were doubtful (Ross and Staw, 1986); poor/slack (Newman and Sabherwal, 
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1996; Boulding et al., 1997); or whether they were explicit/implicit (Tan and Yates, 
1995). 
 
Escalation/de-escalation authors have focused on financial factors (see Table 5.2) in trying 
to explain managers' choices (Staw, 1976; Brockner et al, 1981; Arkes and Blumer, 1985; 
Bateman, 1986; Northcraft and Neale, 1986; Garland and Newport, 1991; Drummond, 
1994; Boehne and Paese, 2000; Tan and Yates, 2002; Pan et al, 2006). Financial 
determinants were presented in experimental scenarios to give participants of laboratory 
experiments the financial performance of the failing/alternative projects (e.g. Staw and 
Ross, 1978; Caldwell and O'Reilly, 1981; Kite et al., 1997; Chow et al, 1999; Ruchala, 
1999; Cheng et al., 2003; Berg et al., 2009).  
           Table 5.2: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Financial Determinants 
Approach attributes Avoid attributes 
Negative financial information Positive financial information  
Sunk costs Decrease the ambiguity of financial information 
 Opportunity costs 
 Low closing costs 
 High salvage value 
 Stated limits for the budget was publicly stated 
 Residual return  
 Limited budget 
 Future return 
 Low degree of sunk costs and conditions of 
shoulder blaming or providing assurance 
 
 
For example, subjects were assigned to long/short-term groups of investors and were 
provided with financial information regarding an alternative investment that would cut 
75% of production costs in Kite et al. (1997) study; the results indicated that 62% of long-
term participants switched directly to the alternative compared to 50% of short-term 
investors. In Cheng et al. (2003) study, subjects were assigned to organisational/self-set 
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hurdle rates conditions and were provided with negative information regarding the failing 
project in the form of declined net cash flows and positive information regarding an 
alternative project in the form of promising IRR. The results showed that self-set hurdle 
rate participants have reduced their escalation of commitment to the failing project more 
than organisational-set participants.  
 
The importance of financial determinants emerged from their influence on managers‟ 
escalation/de-escalation decisions in laboratory settings. For example, when financial 
information regarding the failing project was presented in positive circumstances, 
managers allocated fewer resources than when it was presented in negative circumstances 
(Staw, 1976). The sequence of revenues and costs of a project might have acted against 
withdrawal from it, because the cost estimates for the project rose almost exponentially 
(Ross and Staw, 1993). Escalation tendencies were reduced when participants in a 
laboratory experiment were provided with information on future benefits from the 
additional investments (Gosh, 1997). Similarly, more than 75% of the participants in 
Zikmund-Fisher‟s (2004) study left earlier when provided with high returns, whereas 
when provided with low returns the estimated cumulative quit rate was 69% and almost at 
the end of the experiment. Devine and O‟Clock (1995) reported that when provided with 
historical costs in the negative domain, 43.1% of the subjects in their experiment chose to 
sell the project, compared to 64.4% who chose instead to sell the alternative project. On 
the other hand Devine and O‟Clock (1995) observed that when confronted with 
opportunity costs 43.8% of the study subjects chose to sell the project, compared to 52.2% 
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who decided to sell when explicit information was presented regarding an alternative 
opportunity.  
  
Further, after being committed to an initial launch, 6 of the 28 participants in Boulding et 
al. (1997) study chosen to pull out of the product, when the degree of information 
ambiguity was decreased, 21% chosen to withdraw the product regardless of the financial 
information that indicated it was the best course of action. Participants in Goltz (1999) 
study allocated more resources to the investment opportunity that provided more frequent 
positive revenues, and participants who received large irregular positive revenues for their 
allocations at the start invested more than those who received small irregular positive 
revenues. The size of project payoff affected participants‟ first as well as third stages of 
commitment to the project in Sabherwal et al. (2003) study. 
 
Financial determinants influenced managers‟ choices in case and field studies. For 
example, because the failing project was initially categorized as a long term investment, 
the initial losses were accepted, the price of subsequent returns and the payback period 
was thought to be taken ten years from the date of completion, and the salvage value was 
never very high, managers have persisted in the project (Ross and Staw, 1993). The 
opportunity cost of investing in another project was an approach for the de-escalation 
decision (Pan et al., 2006; 2009). Drummond (1995; 1998) found in two different case 
studies that what made managers consider discontinuing the investment in the first case 
was that the costs of withdrawal were low and salvage value was high, while the potential 
payoff in the second case made decision makers continue with the project. Escalation of 
163 
 
commitment was influenced by the large payoff, long-term pay off structure, and the high 
closing costs, while, low salvage value and low closing costs influenced the decision to 
de-escalate commitment in Newman et al‟s. (1996) case study. De-escalation of 
commitment was associated with more public stated limits in Keil and Robey (1999) field 
survey.  
 
Therefore, based on the foregoing evidence from the literature, the link between managers' 
escalation/de-escalation decisions and financial determinants can be hypothesized as 
follows: 
H1: Financial determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.  
 
2. Strategic Determinants 
Strategic determinants are those related to strategic investment decision-making, which is 
relevant to the procedure of recognizing, appraising, and deciding on a project that is 
expected to have a large influence on the organisation's economic benefit (Adler, 2000). 
Strategic determinants emerge from and are about elements related to strategic 
management issues where top management takes responsibility of three stages (David, 
2007): formulation, implementation, and evaluation.  
 
In the escalation/de-escalation literature, strategic formulation has been represented 
through categorizing the investment project‟s life cycle (Kite et al., 1997), resource 
constrains (Newman et al., 1996; Drummond, 1998), and the availability of an alternative 
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investment opportunity (Drummond, 1994; Lipshitz, 1995; Keil et al., 1995; Newman et 
al., 1996; Mähring and Keil, 2008; Harvey and Victoravich, 2009; Fox et al., 2009).    
 
Strategic implementation has been discussed through a project‟s degree of completion 
(Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Conlon and Garland, 1993; Keil et al., 2000; Moon et al., 
2003; He and Mittal, 2007; Pan et al., 2006; 2009) and a project‟s degree of risk 
(Boulding et al., 1997; Wong, 2005; He and Mittal, 2007; Jani, 2008). Finally, strategic 
evaluation has been expressed in terms of continuous monitoring (Keil and Robey, 1999; 
McNamara et al., 2002) and the availability of a progress report (Gosh, 1997).  
 
The significance of strategic determinants emerged from their influence on managers‟ 
escalation/de-escalation decisions (see Table 5.3) as illustrated by the following 
chronology of previous studies.  
        Table 5.3: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Strategic Determinants 
Approach attributes Avoid attributes 
Ownership (resource constrains) Financial (resource constrains) 
High degree of project completion Low degree of project completion 
Short term investments Long term investments 
Initially responsible for risky projects  High degree of risk 
 Increased monitoring and regular evaluation 
 Preparation of progress report 
 Availability of an alternative investment opportunity 
 
 
Regarding managers‟ escalation decisions, several strategic elements were considered, for 
example the degree of project completion, which is associated with time passage and the 
closure to goal attaining (Rubin and Brockner, 1975), where the importance of the need 
for information decreases whereas the strength of the need for completion increases (He 
and Mittal, 2007). This was noticed in laboratory based studies regardless of the existence 
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of other variables such as personal responsibility (Conlon and Garland, 1993) or whether 
the decision was made by a group of participants instead of individuals (Moon et al., 
2003). The degree of project completion was, also, considered as an escalation force in 
real cases such as in Pan et al. (2006; 2009) case studies and in Keil et al. (2000) cross 
sectional survey, as they found that 75.4% of participants with complete conformity 
believed that the completion effect influenced escalation, that was encouraged when, in 
addition to the degree of goal completion, mangers ignored the extent of difficulties they 
believed were gone with the old director (Drummond, 1994). 
 
Other strategic determinants were considered as escalation forces such as the project’s life 
cycle (i.e. strategic formulation) especially short-time investments (Kite et al., 1997). 
Project risk was considered an escalation of commitment attribute, as it predicts 
managers‟ choices through three risk-related variables: risk propensity, risk perception, 
and outcome expectancy (Wong, 2005). The more risky the project became the more 
managers were risk seeking and either favoured to launch the project (Boulding et al., 
1997) or to continue adding resources (Schaubroeck and Davis, 1994; Jani, 2008).  
 
The alternative investment opportunity was considered an escalation force if alternatives 
were paucity and the consequences of each alternative were unclear (Drummond, 1994), if 
the decision maker‟s major decisions were made without systematic comparison among 
alternatives (Lipshitz, 1995), if alternatives were infeasible (Newman et al., 1996), if 
alternative courses of action were described as equally or more problematic than the 
escalated project (Mähring and Keil, 2008; Fox et al., 2009).   
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With Regard to managers‟ de-escalation decisions, several strategic elements were 
considered, for example, resource constraints which were directly linked to the supplier‟s 
financial difficulties (Newman et al., 1996), the preparation of a progress report (Gosh, 
1997), more outcome-oriented evaluations and more regular evaluation of projects (Keil 
and Robey, 1999), the increased monitoring (McNamara et al., 2002), the availability of a 
feasible alternative investment opportunity that the decision maker was offered to pursue 
(Keil et al., 1995; Harvey and Victoravich, 2009). 
 
On the basis of the above literature evidence, the link between managers' escalation/de-
escalation decisions and strategic determinants can be hypothesized as follows: 
H2: Strategic determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
 
3. Informational Determinants 
Informational determinants are related to “any representation, such as characters or 
analogue quantities, to which meaning might be assigned” (Walter, 2004: 123). 
Constantly some sort of information were presented in all escalation/de-escalation 
empirical studies when examining this phenomenon either through experimental settings 
(e.g. Boulding et al., 1997; Rutledge and Karim, 1999; He and Mittal, 2007) or case 
studies (e.g. Drummond, 1994; 1997; Mähring et al., 2008). Informational determinants in 
the escalation/de-escalation literature were either presented through digits and numbers of 
the failing project or through a description of specific condition related to the failing 
project.     
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Regarding the first group of informational determinants, an amount of exact numbers, 
several digits were presented in quantitative forms such as sunk costs (Keil et al., 1995; 
Whyte et al., 1997), future investment (Heath, 1995; Whyte et al., 1997), expected return 
on investment (Ryan, 1995; Whyte et al., 1997), project's share of the annual market, and 
the risk-return trade-off (Shaubroeck and Davis, 1995). In addition to these, there is also 
the degree of project completion (Boehne and Pease, 2000), future returns on investment 
(Tan and Yates, 1995), opportunity costs (Boulding et al., 1997; Garland and Conlon, 
1998), probability of total loss and potential net return on additional investment (Whyte et 
al., 1997),  project IRR and NPV (Ruchala, 1999), the net remaining of an investment 
(after profits or losses) following each round (Kirby and Davis, 1998), and the need to add 
more funds to the estimated budget and the expected delay in launching the project (Pan et 
al., 2006).  
 
The second group of informational determinants is related to a description of a specific 
condition such as: whether the information was private/public (Harrison and Harrell, 
1993; 1995; Harrell and Harrison, 1994; Rutledge and Karim, 1999), the degree of 
information ambiguity (Boulding et al., 1997; Gosh, 1997), whether the information was 
framed negatively/positively (Whyte, 1993; Drummond, 1994; Chow et al., 1999), 
managers‟ poor performance (Bobocel and Meyer, 1994; Devaun et al., 1997), problems 
facing the implementation of the project (Ruchala, 1999), a competitor has developed the 
same project but with superior features (Tan and Yates, 2002), and the low quality of the 
product where the users were complaining from its low efficacy triggering a need to 
change the design in order to benefit from the product (Pan et al., 2006).         
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Both groups of informational determinants, whether in digits or a description, have 
persuaded managers to escalate/de-escalate commitment to a failing course of action (see 
Table 5.4). For example, information ambiguity was considered an escalation of 
commitment prompt (Boulding et al., 1997; Gosh, 1997; Hantula and Bragger, 1999; 
Brecher and Hantula, 2005; Mähring and Keil, 2008). An ambiguous atmosphere 
regarding a project is explained in terms of the lack of information and the absence of 
clarity (Mähring and Keil, 2008).The influence of the ambiguity factor is more highlighted 
when joined with information bias because managers would focus on positive information 
and interpret negative information in a positive way which made them more and longer 
committed to the project (Boulding et al., 1997) or if managers experienced a high 
ambiguous environment prior to consistent losses, they would escalate commitment to 
their investments and persist with these allocations (Hantula and Bragger, 1999), or even 
worse, they would invest amounts well over the anticipated budget during the failure 
period (Brecher and Hantula, 2005).  
       Table 5.4: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Informational Determinants 
Approach attributes Avoid attributes 
Information ambiguity More clear information  
Information biased Public information with less personal gains  
Private information and personal gains High information source credibility 
Low information source credibility  Time (early) 
Time of information (late)  
 
 
Another escalation force is the bias (error processing) of the information (Staw and Ross, 
1978; Caldwell and O‟Reilly, 1981; Ross and Staw, 1993; Drummond, 1995; Newman et 
al., 1996; Schmidt and Calantone, 2002; Biyalogorsky et al., 2006; Keil, 2008; Pan et al., 
2009). Managers emphasize the positive aspects of their decision and minimize the 
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negative aspects because they are more defensive in their choice of information to be 
committed to the project (Caldwell and O‟Reilly, 1981). They process the information in 
their favour if they experienced a previous failure and faced an exogenous setback (Staw 
and Ross, 1978), if they were personally responsible for project failure either through 
choice or assignment (Caldwell and O‟Reilly, 1981; Schmidt and Calantone, 2002), if 
managers were experts and they wanted to protect their image (Ross and Staw, 1993) or if 
they were involved in the project failure (Biyalogorsky et al., 2006). 
 
The publicity of the information provided was considered an escalation/de-escalation of 
commitment force (Harrison and Harrell, 1993; Harrell and Harrison, 1994; Sharp and 
Salter, 1997; Harrison et al., 1999; Rutledge and Karim, 1999; Salter et al., 2004). If 
managers received private information they would be more likely to escalate commitment 
than if the information was privately provided (Sharp and Salter, 1997; Rutledge and 
Karim, 1999). This was more evident when managers in addition to the availability of 
private information had the potential for personal gains (Harrison et al, 1999), had low 
moral reasoning (Rutledge and Karim, 1999), or had their own beliefs based on their own 
culture (Salter et al., 2004). 
  
Managers‟ de-escalation of commitment decision was influenced by informational 
determinants such as the timing of the clear and negative feedback, as the sooner negative 
back is received, the greater the likelihood of withdrawal (Drummond, 1995), or the 
credibility of information source, which not only directly influenced managerss decisions 
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affect but it also affected how managers viewed the relevance of the message to their 
decision (Cuellar et al., 2006).  
 
Therefore, based on the literature evidence above, the link between managers' 
escalation/de-escalation decisions and informational determinants can be hypothesized as 
follows: 
H3: Informational determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
 
5.2.2.2 Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
Non-project-specific determinants are those that are not straightforwardly related to the 
project, yet they have a noticeable influence on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation 
decisions (Ross and Staw, 1993; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Greer and Stephens, 
2001; Cheng et al., 2003; Wong et al., 2008). They are linked to psychological 
characteristics of the decision-maker, organisational surroundings and contextual 
characters in terms of social, cultural, and political influences. In this section each of the 
non-project-specific determinants will be treated as an approach/avoidance attribute of 
escalation and key findings from the relevant literature are summarised to pave the way 
for hypothesis generation.  
 
1. Psychological Determinants 
Psychology could be defined as the regular scientific analysis of the mind, behaviour, and 
mental processes, in order to understand human minds and behaviour whether in 
individuals, groups or societies (Albon, 2007). In the escalation/de-escalation field, 
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psychological determinants refer to those variables that are linked to the decision maker‟s 
reactions, characters, or feelings and emotions (Staw and Ross, 1987b; O'Neil, 2009) as 
they add more explanation to managers' behaviour particularly when this behaviour is 
noticed as irrational.   
 
Factors that are related to the decision maker‟s reactions might encourage errors in the 
estimation of costs or revenues, which influence the way that managers would collect or 
clarify gathered information or proceed in behaviour. In a case of individuals who might 
experience losses that caused them to be defensive, they would be more likely to limit 
their information search and identify information in a certain way (Staw et al., 1981). 
Similarly, when the information presented questions the profitability of a course of action, 
it would be disbelieved if it was not in agreement with their image about that course of 
action (Caldwell and O'Reilly, 1982; Bazerman et al, 1982; Ross and Staw, 1993; Greer 
and Stephens, 2001). Within this perception, several variables were examined such as 
initial responsibility (Staw, 1976; McCain, 1986; Kirby and Davis, 1998; Slaughter and 
Greguras, 2008), prior experience (Staw and Ross, 1978; Goltz, 1992), degree of 
involvement (Conlon and Wolf, 1980; Biyalogorsky et al., 2006), diffusion of blame 
(Leatherwood and Conlon, 1983; 1987), mental budget establishment (Heath, 1995),  
justification (Bobocel and Meyer, 1994; Drummond, 1997; Kadous and Sedor, 2004), and 
evaluation bias (Slaughter and Greguras, 2008).   
 
The second set of variables are related to the character of the decision maker, which might 
further attach managers to a course of action, whereas when individuals obtain a return 
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occasionally or when they trust their efforts, they might persevere in a course of action, 
despite the fact that there is no hope of attaining their goals (Platt, 1973; Bandura and 
Cervone, 1986; Staw and Ross, 1987a; Whyte et al, 1997). Variables related to the 
character of the decision maker were examined such as reinforcement traps (Ross and 
Staw, 1993; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996), identification with performance (Brockner et 
al., 1986; Drummond, 1994), incentive to shirk (Whyte et al., 1997; Harrison et al., 1999; 
Salter et al., 2004), preference for consistency (Korzaan and Morris, 2009), rational 
thinking (Wong et al., 2008), risk perception (Wong, 2005), and self-efficacy (Whyte et 
al., 1997; Jani, 2008).  
 
The third set of psychological determinants are related to the feelings and emotions of the 
decision maker that will influence his/her bond to a course of action, it is noticed that the 
more managers have negative feelings about a project the more they might be attached to 
the project, which would result in resisting and continuing a failing course of action. 
Within this context, variables such as the degree of desire to revenge (Drummond, 1994), 
job insecurity (Fox and Staw, 1979; Drummond, 1994), feelings of anger and frustration 
(Lipshitz, 1995), being less tolerant of failure (Keil and Robey, 1999), regret (Ku, 2008), 
self-esteem (Sinanthan et al., 2008), guilt feelings (O‟Neill, 2009) and being worried 
about punishment (Pan et al., 2006) were examined.    
 
Because the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon was mostly discussed in the 
organisational behaviour, strategic management, social psychology, and behavioural 
accounting literatures, (e. g. Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Bobocel and Meyer, 1994; Boehne, 
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and Paese, 2000; Greer and Stephens, 2001; Cheng et al., 2003) there was more interest in 
psychological factors. In fact these factors attracted the most attention of escalation/de-
escalation authors considering that most of the previous literature comprised one or two 
psychological factors and it is very uncommon to find any study devoid of those factors, 
which is consistent with both the definition of psychology as it aims to understand 
behaviour as well as the rationale behind managers‟ behaviour. As escalation authors 
became more dependent on psychological determinants to explain managers' tendency to 
continue funding a failing project (Schulz and Cheng, 2002; Whyte et al, 1997; Bobocel 
and Meyer, 1994), de-escalation authors were less interested in these determinants (Pan et 
al, 2006; Gosh, 1997). They intended to examine whether the existence of factors linked 
to the project would weaken the influence of the psychological determinants on managers‟ 
choices and consequently reduce what was thought to be irrational behaviour (McCain, 
1986; Simonson and Staw, 1992; Drummond, 1995; Schultz-Hardt et al., 2009). For 
example, Drummond (1995) showed that managers would prefer to de-escalate 
commitment if the influence of psychological determinants was weakened. 
 
In agreement with the current study‟s theoretical research model, each of the 
psychological determinants that were examined previously can be treated as an 
approach/avoidance attribute of escalation of commitment (see Table 5.5). Regarding 
escalation of commitment approach attributes, both self-justification and personal 
responsibility have been widely investigated and confirmed (e.g. Staw, 1976; Caldwell 
and O'Reilly, 1981;  Keil, 1995; Sabherwal et al., 2003; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2009) with 
few notable exceptions (e.g. Singer and Singer, 1986; Drummond, 1995; O‟Neill, 2009) to 
174 
 
effect the managers‟ allocation decisions. Studies who confirmed this influence have 
found empirical evidence that managers who were responsible for initiating a decision 
reinvested a higher amount of money to the initially funded decision than those who were 
not responsible for the initial decision (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2009). This influence has 
existed even when managers were surrounded with negative circumstances (Rutledge, 
1995), or the decision was made by a group of managers (Bazerman et al., 1984; Moon et 
al., 2003; Zhiyuan and Qing 2008).  
         Table 5.5: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Psychological Determinants 
Approach attributes Avoid attributes 
Individual initial responsibility Separate responsibility of approving from 
responsibility of evaluating 
Self-justification The existence of a third party to blame 
Group decision making Feelings of quilt 
High degree of self-efficacy Opportunity to verify wounded ego 
Feelings of anger High degree of self esteem 
High degree of job insecurity Less degree of tolerance of failure 
Tolerance of failure Setting a mental budget 
Potential for personal gains More aware of problems 
Need for achievement  
Ignoring project‟s difficulties  
Believing that project would turn around  
 
 
The strong influence of personal responsibility on managers‟ escalation decisions was 
weakened when managers were more influenced by political forces, as seen in Drummond 
(1995) case study, where psychological demands for continuance were low; as at no point 
did the manager appear to be influenced by feelings of responsibility for project failure. In 
agreement, when the responsibility of initiating and approving a project was separated 
from the responsibility of evaluating a project, managers would be less likely influenced 
by personal responsibility and they would make de-escalation decisions (Keil and Robey, 
1999). 
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The argument about the influence of personal responsibility and self-justification on 
escalation/de-escalation decisions encouraged more researchers to examine other 
psychological factors (e.g. Leatherwood and Conlon, 1983; Whyte, 1993; Rutledge, 1995; 
Keil and Robey, 1999; Seibert and Goltz, 2001; Moon et al., 2003; O‟Neill, 2009). 
Managers were adding more resources to failing projects when they believed they had 
self-efficacy (Whyte, 1997), when they believed that the failing project could not be 
turned around despite the disappointing results that were intensely frustrating (Kisfalvi, 
2000), when managers experience a condition of high job insecurity and high policy 
resistance (Fox and Staw, 1979; Sabherwal et al., 2003), or when managers have a 
potential for personal gain, which had a positive relationship with the continuation of a 
troubled project, where the more individuals felt the need for achievement in terms of 
implementation mind-set, internal locus of control and preference for consistency, the 
more they would continue a troubled project (Korzaan and Morris, 2009). Personal gains, 
additionally, were noticed in terms of the motivation to maintain an internal image of 
competence (Rao and Monk, 1999) and in the existence of private information (Harrison 
et al., 1999). 
 
Managers‟ de-escalation decisions were influenced by psychological determinants in 
terms of feelings and emotions they experienced in previous similar situations such as 
when managers had frequently expressed guilt feelings (O‟Neill, 2009), when they 
experienced regret emotions in one escalation situation, which would tend to reduce future 
escalation (Ku, 2008), or as explained in Zikmund-Fisher‟s (2004) study, who reported 
that nearly one third of participants chose not to return to the experiment at all, another 
176 
 
42% quit after making only one more unsuccessful attempt, 65% quit because they 
believed that they had little or no chance of winning, 32% quit because they were losing 
too much money, and 32% quit because it was too frustrating to lose time after time.  
 
More de-escalation forces were noticed such as the incidence of a third party as a cause of 
the negative consequences that which offered means in which blame could be diffused by 
the decision maker (Leatherwood and Conlon, 1983), when managers set a mental budget, 
even with the existence of sunk costs effect, they (80%) stopped reinvesting in a failing 
project (Heath, 1995), or when managers were more aware of problems and they believed 
that the project is a failure and cannot be turned around (Keil and Robey, 1999).  
 
Further, the clear association between managers‟ tolerance of failure and de-escalation 
decisions that was established in studies influenced their choices, such as, the research by 
Keil (1995), Keil and Robey (1999) and Yik and Kwong (2006). The less tolerance for 
failure that individuals have, the less likely they would be attached to the same selected 
investment decision when it appears to be failing (Yik and Kwong, 2006). Likewise, the 
association between managers‟ high/low self-esteem and their choices, affected managers‟ 
de-escalation decisions (Sivanathan et al., 2007; 2008). The more managers were given 
the opportunity to verify their wounded ego the less they were motivated to justify past 
actions and, accordingly, were less likely to escalate bad decisions, further, managers who 
were allowed to bring to mind their high self-esteem, who were allowed to reflect on an 
important personal value, and received feedback affirming an important ability not 
directly related to the decision they had made were more likely to decrease escalation, 
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finally, managers with high self-esteem who received feedback affirming an important 
ability that was directly related to their decision increased escalation of commitment to 
their decision.  
    
Therefore, based on literature evidence above, the link between managers' escalation/de-
escalation decisions and psychological determinants can be hypothesized as follows: 
H4: Psychological determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
 
2. Contextual Determinants 
While psychological determinants deal with factors related to managers‟ attempt to have a 
good self-image, other factors such as social, cultural, and political determinants are 
related to managers‟ attempt to be perceived as having a good self-image by others such as 
their society and their organization (Ross and Staw, 1993).  They are seen as factors that 
are beyond managers‟ control and, as such, they are either labelled as contextual or 
structural determinants (Ross and Staw, 1986; 1993; Drummond, 1994; 1995; Newman 
and Sabherwal, 1996). In the current research, factors that are related to political 
interference, cultural values, and social traditions will be grouped under contextual 
determinants and each will be treated as an approach or avoidance attribute of escalation. 
 
Social traditions, according to the existing literature, are seen as factors that influence 
managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions within two sets of variables. The first are 
linked to how the decision maker would like to be seen in his/her society, and the second 
set of factors are related to managers‟ need to justify their actions to other parties in their 
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organizations as well as the whole society (Staw and Ross, 1980; 1987a; Brockner et al., 
1981; Drummond, 1994; Ryan, 1995).  
 
The first set of factors share the idea that decision makers attempt to be known as tough 
and strong managers and also as heroes or leaders. And because heroes and leaders are 
known to face problematic and failing circumstances through staying and holding strong 
until they achieve success, they would persist and keep adding more resources to a failing 
course of action as an indication of leadership, whereas, on the other hand, withdrawing 
from a difficult situation is seen as an indication of weakness (Staw and Ross, 1980; 
1987a). For example, managers‟ need to be seen as heroes (Lipshitz, 1995), or champions 
(Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; McElhinney and Proctor, 2005), which makes them 
anxious about their reputation (Harrison and Harrell, 1993), or avoid being embarrassed 
(Ryan, 1995). Additionally, managers might act in a way to enhance their personal image 
of respectability (Drummond and Hodgson, 1996), (Kisfalvi, 2000), to protect their 
credibility (Cuellar et al., 2006), and to save face (Brockner et al., 1981; Drummond, 
1994, Lipshitz, 1995; Staw and Hoang, 1995).  
 
The second set of factors is related to the idea that when managers might continue a 
project even if is a failing endeavour in order to give the impression of a strong decision 
maker and consistency (Staw and Ross, 1980; 1987a) because management is identified 
with a project (Ross and Staw, 1993; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996),  their actions are 
visible to other parties in the organization (Conlon and Wolf, 1980; Kirby and Davis, 
1998), the publicity of the goal they are seeking to attain (Hollenbeck et al., 1989), and the 
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stated limits for the project are publicly announced (Keil and Robey, 1999). More forces 
could influence their decision such as management could either be externally or socially 
justifying their actions (Ross and Staw, 1986; Bobocel and Meyer, 1994; Keil et al., 
2000), the threat of external justification is minimized (Simonson and Staw, 1992), and 
managers could be socially motivated to make a choice (Drummond, 1998; Rao and 
Monk, 1999) because of the existence of successful models of persistence (Ross and Staw, 
1993; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996).   
 
The influence of social determinants on managers‟ escalation decisions (Table 5.6) could 
be stronger and more obvious when managers' social needs are satisfactorily met and 
fulfilled (Staw and Ross, 1980). For example, project management would be gradually 
more committed to the project if they became personally identified with it (Ross and Staw, 
1993), if publicly identified with their earlier decision (Lipshitz, 1995), if they were 
responsible for the project as they held tightly to it as if it was their own child (Keil, 
1995), and if they were publicly identified with either the project or company‟s customers 
(Pan et al., 2006; 2009).  
 
Fulfilling social needs would make managers continue funding a failing endeavour if 
managers needed to persist and be consistent in the oath of their personal word of honour 
to others (Lipshitz, 1995), if managers had the desire to maintain appearance (Drummond, 
1994), if their need to maintain an external image of competence (Rao and Monk, 1999), 
and if the desire to maintain a consistent leadership was repeated in all project‟s 
pronouncements (Ross and Staw, 1993). More forces that explained managers‟ 
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consistency is their worry to be considered a failure by others (Pan et al., 2006), or their 
fear of confrontation, which would be overridden by a far worse fear of the potential 
consequences of continuance (Drummond, 1995) they attempt to defend their personal 
reinforcement history (history of success) because it might have been difficult for him to 
imagine a course of action not eventually being successful (Ross and Staw, 1993), or they 
were motivated by ego-defensiveness to save their reputation from being bad managers 
because they were seeking to prove that the second decision was correct (Drummond, 
1997), and they believe that the troubled project will turn around (Ross and Staw, 1993) in 
order to save face (Keil, 1995), to be a role model (Pan et al., 2006), and to be a seen as a 
strong champion who continued funding a failing endeavour (Pan et al., 2009).  
          
More social trends that influenced managers‟ escalation decisions such as external 
justification (Keil et al., 2000; Gunia et al., 2009), where managers justify other 
institutions (Lipshitz, 1995) that they had no information about their opinions (Rao and 
Monk, 1999) as a part of managers‟ responsibility to external constituents such as 
shareholders (Pan et al., 2006) to assure those constituents that the investment project was 
a wise one (Ross and Staw, 1993). The existence of norms of modelling, equally, were 
considered as escalation of commitment attributes (Ross and Staw, 1993) whereas 
managers as a result of modelling do not hesitate to invest substantial sums in the failing 
venture, and kept doing so despite substantial losses as they believed that these 
investments would work out as similar ones had before (Kisfalvi, 2000). 
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Less social factors, compared to escalation forces, were considered as de-escalation 
attributes, such as the lack of managers‟ public identification with the project, the 
existence of successful models of persistence (Newman et al., 1996), managers being 
rewarded for the decision process rather than decision outcome, and managers were 
socially motivated to discontinue the project through minimizing the threat of external 
justification (Simonson and Staw, 1992) by providing assurance and shoulder blame 
(Heng et al., 2003).    
 
Culture is a communicated scheme of techniques that verifies what we focus on, how we 
take action, and what we respect and value (Trompenaars, 1994) It could be seen through 
fundamental beliefs and ideas that explain how individuals should recognize, reason and 
think about problems (Schein, 1992). The importance of cultural determinants rises from 
the fact that individuals have an approximately different capability to notify elements in 
the route of their own ideas and favourites (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
 
In the escalation/de-escalation literature, cultural determinants were linked to the personal 
characteristics of the decision maker in terms of his/her gender (Brockner et al, 1981; 
Bateman, 1986; Harrison and Harrell, 1993; Harrison et al., 1999; Cuellar et al., 2006), 
his/her level of education or training (Conlon and Garland, 1993; Harrison and Harrell, 
1995; Tan and Yates, 1995; Goltz, 1999), his/her work experience (Jeffery, 1992; 
Harrison and Harrell, 1993), age of the decision maker (Bourgie, 2001; Cuellar et al., 
2006), and his/her nationality (Chow et al., 1997; Harrison et al., 1999; Keil et al., 2000; 
Greer and Stephens, 2001; Salter et al., 2004). 
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With respect to the influence of those factors on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation 
decisions (see Table 5.6), Geiger et al. (1998) have recommended that cultural factors 
should be considered to influence escalation decisions. They have suggested four cultural 
elements based on Hofstede's (1980) study of cultural values: masculinity, individualism, 
power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. They further called for more literature to 
investigate cross-cultural effects in terms of different nationalities. However, nationality 
was figured as the most important factor that attracted escalation/de-escalation authors 
(e.g., Keil et al., 1995; Sharp and Salter, 1997; Harrison et al., 1999; Keil et al., 2000; 
Greer and Stephens, 2001; Salter et al., 2004; Liu and Liu, 2008), while gender as well as 
educational background attracted less attention (e.g., Garland and Conlon, 1998; Cuellar et 
al., 2006).  
 
Examining gender effects in the escalation/de-escalation literature gave adverse results, 
for example, there was no difference found between male and female subjects' allocating 
decisions (e.g., Brockner et al., 1981; Harrison and Harrell, 1993). On the contrary, under 
failing conditions female subjects allocated more resources when someone else took the 
blame than male subjects (Bateman, 1986), or they were more likely to delay a failing 
project than men (Cuellar et al. (2006).   
 
Other cultural determinants such as educational background was confirmed to influence 
managers' allocating decisions, for example, in laboratory experiments, under the 
influence of  high degree of project completion, 88.24% Chinese graduate students 
compared to 59.67% MBA students agreed to allocate an additional $1 million to the 
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failing project (Conlon and Garland, 1998). Further, subjects that held professional 
degrees such as Masters of Business Administration and had work experience were more 
interested in information regarding IRR, NPV than initial responsibility when making 
allocation decisions (Harrison and Harrell, 1995).  
 
With regard to the influence of different nationalities on managers‟ choices, the results 
attained depended on the factors that were examined jointly with the influence of the 
nationality item. For example, when examined jointly with high sunk costs effect; 
American subjects had more tendencies to escalate their commitment than Finnish 
subjects (Keil et al., 1995). Likewise, American participants were more likely to escalate 
commitment than Mexican participants when the effect of nationality was manipulated 
with the influence of adverse selection conditions i.e., the presence of information 
asymmetry and managers‟ incentive to shirk (Salter et al., 2004). On the other hand, more 
Chinese participants had chosen to escalate compared to American participants when the 
effect of nationality was manipulated with the influence of adverse selection conditions 
(Harrison et al., 1999). Similarly, Mexican subjects were more likely to escalate 
commitment and were more confident of their decision than USA subjects when 
nationality was examined jointly with managers‟ desire of self-justification (Greer and 
Stephens, 2001).  
 
Political factors are the seeking of interest in the allocation of limited resources 
(Drummond and Hodgson, 1996). In the escalation/de-escalation empirical literature these 
determinants comprised both internal as well as external forces. On the internal level 
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political determinants included chief executive of the project (Drummond, 1994), and 
chairman of the board (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996). While on the external level, were 
the political character of the city council (Drummond and Hodgson, 1996), city personnel 
officer (Drummond, 1994), political parties and federal government (Ross and Staw, 
1993), relationships with other countries‟ governments and local institutions (Ross and 
Staw, 1986).    
 
Although political determinants did not grab a large attention of the literature, however, 
those determinants have influenced managers‟ choice to either continue or withdraw from 
a failing project (Table 5.6). Managers‟ escalation decisions were influenced by political 
factors such as managers‟ worry to preserve the image of the city council (Drummond and 
Hodgson, 1996); managers gained the political support from external committees for the 
failing venture (Ross and Staw, 1993), and the support and commitment of the top 
management (Drummond, 1994; 1998; Pan et al., 2006). This political support was as 
Ross and Staw (1993) have reported in a case study that when the directors recommended 
cancelling the project because it exceeded the allocated budget, the project continued 
because of political pressures surrounding the project.  
  
De-escalation of commitment, on the other hand, occurred because of the lack of political 
support to the failing project, as explained, in a case study by Newman and Sabherwal 
(1996: 38), by a manager “we really needed somebody to stand behind us and say never 
mind, these are just temporary difficulties”. Therefore, managers aim to negotiate the 
failing project and available legitimating alternatives to be applied with the internal and 
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external constituencies to get the political support for the de-escalation decision 
(Montealegre and Keil, 2000).  
           Table 5.6: Approach-avoidance Attributes for Contextual Determinants 
Approach attributes Avoid attributes 
Management identified with project Lack of public identification 
Consistent and strong leadership Providing assurance 
Maintain appearance Existence of shoulder blame 
Norms of modelling Norms of modelling 
Social justification Lack of political support 
Manager‟s reinforcement history  
Ego-defensiveness  
Save reputation  
Relations with other countries  
Relations with outside committees.   
Federal government prompt  
Executive chair interest  
Preserve the image of the council  
 
Therefore, based on literature evidence above, the link between managers' escalation/de-
escalation decisions and contextual determinants can be hypothesized as follows: 
H5: Contextual determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
 
3. Organisational Determinants 
Organisational determinants, which several studies have named structural determinants, 
are linked to factors that transfer suitable values for the organization's employees to guide 
them in what they should say and do, which therefore would help holding the organization 
together (Robbins, 1996). In the escalation/de-escalation empirical literature they contain 
factors that are related to organisational culture and policy (Ross and Staw, 1993; Keil, 
1995; Cheng et al., 2003). Few organisational determinants were examined through case 
studies such as organisational policy (Keil, 1995; Cheng et al., 2003), saving the 
company‟s reputation (Drummond and Hodgson, 1996), the significant linkage of the 
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project to the company‟s existence (Ross and Staw, 1993; Drummond and Hodgson, 1996; 
Kisfalvi, 2000), and the amount invested in technical side-bets (Ross and Staw, 1993; 
Sabherwal et al., 2003). 
 
Most escalation/de-escalation authors found that managers might escalate commitment 
when their organisational culture persuades them to do so and they can only de-escalate 
when they get the support to withdraw from a failing course of action (see Table 5.7). 
Managers‟ escalation decisions, with regard to organisational determinants, were made 
because of the total size of the failing project; a large percentage of the company‟s assets 
were tied to the project and abandoning the project might cause the company‟s bankruptcy 
(Ross and Staw, 1993), i.e., the company‟s future potential as a business was tied up with 
this project (Kisfalvi, 2000), and the decision to go into the project‟s construction engaged 
more of just an investment; it involved other technical side-bets such as hiring planners 
and expertise for the project (Ross and Staw, 1993). Further, managers preferred 
escalation if the company had plenty of cash, if managers believed in the future of their 
company (Keil, 1995), if managers owed their authority stand to the existence of the 
department, and if they believed that protecting the organization‟s reputation as an 
important strategic asset (Drummond and Hodgson (1996). 
       Table 5.7: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Organisational Determinants 
Approach attributes Avoid attributes 
Saving company‟s reputation Shortage of cash 
Linkage of project to company‟s existence Self-setting limits 
High investment in technical side-bets  
Organisational culture (cash availability)  
Setting organisational limits  
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Managers would favour to de-escalate commitment, with regard to organisational factors, 
because the company‟s fortune began to take a downgrade turn (Keil, 1995), or because of 
the direct manager‟s involvement in the setting of hurdle rates by their organizations 
(Cheng et al., 2003).  
 
Therefore, based on literature evidence above, the link between managers' escalation/de-
escalation decisions and organisational determinants can be hypothesized as follows: 
H6: Organisational determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
 
5.2.2.3 The Moderating Role of Project Audit 
Generally, audit could be defined as the gathering and assessment of facts about 
information to decide and report on the degree of connection between the information and 
the established criteria (Arens et al, 2006). It could be also defined as “checking somebody 
else's accounting and reporting thereon” (Kumar and Sharma, 2006: 3). Determining 
errors, mistakes and frauds is one of the important characteristics and objectives of audit 
(Kumar and Sharma, 2006). Three types of project audit were suggested by Arens et al. 
(2006) as follows: 
 Operational audit. 
 Compliance audit. 
 Financial statement audit. 
 
Both compliance and financial statement audits deal with the project at the end of its 
lifecycle, where the results and outcomes of the project are identified, therefore, the 
chance to influence factors that might be linked to the success of the project is not 
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available any more. For the aim of continuous monitoring, it is an advantage for all 
projects to be exposed to proper objective evaluation of their operation early in their life 
cycle when corrective actions could be efficiently attained (Parsons, 2006). In agreement 
with the aim and objectives of this research, the main focus would be on project 
operational audit, which is sometimes called performance or continuous audit. 
 
Operational project audit deals with assessing the effectiveness and the efficiency of any 
part of the firm's operating actions and techniques (Arens et al, 2006), as it provides an 
independent evaluation of accomplishment, with the intention of knowing how well the 
project started and whether its aims are being attained, in addition to recognizing 
opportunities for development. The auditor, within this scope, acts in an advisory role as 
he/she suggests the results of the audit at the endings to guide the decision maker 
(Nalewaik, 2006). Once the findings of the auditing report and conclusions are discussed 
and worked out, several results might arise such as providing a tight and strong project 
and internal controls in addition to noticing reduction in errors, mistakes and overcharges 
(Nalewaik, 2006).         
 
Project audit, as explained in Chapter three, is always considered as an important element 
in capital projects decision process given that it plays an important role in improving 
internal control, which accordingly reduces management mistakes and assists managers to 
make better decisions in order to reach their goals (Mukherjee and Henderson, 1987; Kim, 
2006; Burns and Walker, 2009). However, this important element was neglected and 
ignored in the escalation/de-escalation literature. Despite a thorough search of the 
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literature, there is no study to the knowledge of the researcher, that examined the influence 
of project audit on managers‟ choices, even though few escalation/de-escalation authors 
have referred to the role of project audit indirectly through several terms, such as the 
availability of a progress report (Gosh, 1997), the regular evaluations of projects (Keil and 
Robey, 1999), the presence of project monitoring (McNamara et al., 2002; Pan et al., 
2006), and the availability of locus of control (Korzaan and Morris, 2009).   
 
Further, as noticed earlier in Chapter Four, the moderation effect in the escalation/de-
escalation empirical literature endured from several shortcomings. The first was linked to 
the incapability of distinguishing between the moderator and the focal or additional 
independent variables (Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Jani, 2008), the second pointed to the 
absence of introducing the moderation assumption in those studies neither in their 
hypotheses nor in their results (Chow et al., 1997; Fox et al., 2009) and finally the limited 
number of studies (seven studies only) that examined the moderation influence (Rutledge, 
1995; Brody and Kaplan, 1996; He and Mittal, 2007).  
   
Therefore, to overcome these shortcomings this research looks at the effect of the 
operational project audit on managers' escalation/de-escalation decisions through 
assuming that when managers face a conflict situation where they have to decide on 
whether to continue or withdraw from a problematic project, they have to make their 
decision within the guidance of project auditing outcomes.            
The outcome of the decision to proceed, which is influenced in the first place by 
escalation/de-escalation determinants (Figure 5.1) will be moderated by the effect of 
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operational project audit, based on the previous arguments made in the context of 
hypotheses H1-H6 and the summary of relevant literature above, it is assumed that 
operational project audit plays a moderating role on the relationship that exists between 
each of the investigated escalation/de-escalation determinants and managers‟ choices. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H7: Operational auditing plays a moderating role with respect to the determinants 
involved in the escalation/de-escalation decisions. 
 
5.3 Research Paradigm and Philosophy 
Research philosophy can be defined as the progress of the research background, research 
knowledge, and research nature (Saunders et al., 2009). It is the “philosophical framework 
that guides how scientific research should be conducted” (Collis and Hussey, 2009: 55). It 
is the starting point when the researcher is not clear about the significance of what action 
he/she is taking in terms of the research objectives, the embedded merit, the right/wrong 
and true/false assumptions, and whether it is sensible or not (Pring, 2000). There are three 
important reasons that Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) suggested for the usefulness of 
understanding the philosophical issues for the researcher: a) clarifying the research design, 
b) recognising the appropriate design, and c) identifying and creating the design that might 
be separated from their earlier experience as well as suggesting ideas of how to adapt the 
research designs to different conditions. 
 
The research paradigm is about how to carry out a research, i.e., the philosophy that 
underlies the research (Gliner and Morgan, 2000). Research philosophy depends on 
epistemological and ontological assumptions, which will influence how the research 
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should be conducted and the methodology for data collection (Ryan et al., 2002; Creswell 
and Clark, 2011). Each theoretical perception represents a definite way of understanding 
the ontology; “what is”, as well as a specific way of understanding the epistemology; 
“what it means to know”, whereas both issues tend to merge together to address the 
structure of meaningful reality, i.e., it is difficult to keep ontology and epistemology apart 
conceptually (Crotty, 2012). 
 
Epistemology deals with the theory of the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and 
general basis (Hamlyn, 1995). It involves what knowledge is and considers what counts as 
good knowledge (Greener, 2011). Epistemology is linked to providing a philosophical 
grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that 
they are adequate and legitimate (Maynard, 1994). The study of nature and validity of 
human knowledge depends on stressing the difference between knowledge and belief, 
either by emphasizing the role of human reason in knowing, or highlighting the 
importance of sensory perception (Wellington, 2012). Ontology deals with the theory of 
“what is” i.e., the characteristic of reality (Wellington, 2012). It is specifically the study of 
being (Greener, 2011), because it is linked to the nature of existence, and the structure of 
reality (Crotty, 2012). It is essential for the researcher to recognize the philosophical 
perception or paradigms of the research to understand the different combinations and 
arrangements of research methods (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). In reality, there are two 
extreme paradigms, which are positivism and phenomenology.    
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Positivism, which is also known as the quantitative approach, relies merely on facts and 
solid knowledge, on experiences which can be observed by the senses (Tacq, 2011). It is 
regularly equated with the “scientific” approach because it is based on the idea that true 
knowledge is derived from the sense-perception of an objective, detached, value-free 
knower (Wellington, 2012). It is as Tacq (2011) explains: 1) what is real is positive, what 
is not real is negative, 2) what is meaningful and useful is positive, what is useless and 
senseless is negative, and 3) what is sure and can be determined exactly is positive, what 
is unsure and cannot be determined exactly is negative.  
 
The positivism paradigm has been widely applied in management and business research, 
because of the philosophical perspective of the natural science (Saunders et al., 2009) 
where the aim is to seek generalization through “hard” quantitative data. The positivist 
researcher believes in objective knowledge of an external reality that is rational and 
independent of the observer, which makes positivism an objective, value-free, 
generalizable, and replicable type of knowledge (Wellington, 2012).    
 
The phenomenology (qualitative) paradigm, which could be considered as an opposite to 
positivism (Tacq, 2011), assumes that there are “things themselves” to occur in our 
experience, that is, objects to which our understandings link, and lie at the heart of 
phenomenology (Crotty, 2012). It promotes studying of direct experience taken at face 
value; therefore, behaviour is determined by the fact of experience rather than by external 
objective and physically described reality (Remenyi et al., 1998). With this paradigm, 
researchers‟ activity is influenced by their own beliefs and interests (Collis and Hussey, 
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2003). Therefore, researchers should concentrate on understanding and explaining what 
people think and feel and the ways they communicate together i.e., people‟s different 
experiences rather than searching for casual relationships through external factors 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
  
It is important for the researcher to clarify the paradigm he/she has chosen for the 
conducted research, as it influences and restricts the methodology selection, yet, neither of 
the two presented paradigms could be considered to be better than the other. Therefore, 
they should be considered as being on a continuum (Collis and Hussey, 2003), and 
researchers should not fall into the trap of thinking that one research approach is better 
than the other, as they are better at doing different things (Saunders et al., 2009). In this 
respect, Table 5.8 shows a summary of the distinguishing features of both positivism and 
phenomenological paradigms below. 
Table 5.8: Implications of Positivism and Phenomenological Paradigms* 
Implications Positivism Phenomenology 
Observer Independent A part of what is being observed 
Human interest Irrelevant The main drivers 
Explanations Must demonstrate causality Increase general understanding of the 
situation 
Research progress Through hypothesis and 
deductions 
Rich data is gathered from induced ideas 
Concepts Measured through operationalized Stakeholder perspectives must be 
incorporated 
Units of analyse Reduced to simplest terms May be complex 
Sampling requires Large numbers randomly selected Small number of cases selected for specific 
reason 
Generalization Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction 
*Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) 
 
Accordingly, this research is based on a positivistic philosophical perspective as 
evidenced by the following: 
194 
 
 A review of the approach-avoidance theory, suggested determinants and escalation/de-
escalation literature has been conducted.  
 
 The research hypotheses, informed by the extensive literature review, have been 
formulated (see section 5.2 above).  
 
 The population and sample frame have been determined. It has been decided that the 
study will be on Saudi companies located in the port city of Jeddah.  
 
 The research instrument and the operationalization of the study variables have been 
developed and a pilot study has been used to test and refine these research tools. 
 
 A large scale questionnaire survey, of the Likert-scale type, has been administered to 
the target companies, resulting in a relatively large response rate, and a large date set 
for a quantitative analysis in line with the positivistic approach. 
 
 The most appropriate statistical tools to be used for data analysis have been determined. 
In particularly, the survey data collected will be analysed using multinomial logistic 
regression, and moderation multinomial logistic regression will be applied to the 
indirect effect (or interaction effect).  
 
 Interviews have been conducted to  expound on questionnaires‟ survey information  
and get an in-depth understanding of the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon in 
selected cases of corporate practice in Saudi companies  
 
5.4 Research Approach 
There are two research approaches according to the literature (Creswell, 2003; Sekaran, 
2003; Greener, 2011): the deductive approach (theory testing) and the inductive approach 
(theory building). 
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According to the deductive approach, the theory testing starts from the general to reach the 
particular (De Vaus, 2014), with researchers following this approach to reach at their 
logical conclusions by applying reasons to a given set of ideas or theories (Sekaran, 2003). 
The theory is usually tested through the use of quantitative data (Greener, 2011), in other 
words:  
Theory           Observations/Findings 
(Bryman, 2012) 
 
Deductive arguments are accurate, given that the premises can be shown to be true, 
because the conclusion is actually included in the premises, which makes the researcher to 
be aware of what type his/her argument (logical, empirical, or choice) is, and whether 
there are  sufficient grounds to support it (Greener, 2011). Therefore, the deductive 
research is in line with the positivism paradigm and quantitative research strategies 
(Saunders et al., 2009), whereas, the research begins with an idea or theory that is used to 
work towards a logical conclusion (Williams and May, 1996). The researcher is expected 
to start with a theory to develop hypotheses, which is followed by data collection to draw 
the findings in terms of confirming or rejecting the hypothesis and finally revision of 
theory (Creswell, 2003). 
 
While, in an inductive approach, theory is the outcome of research, i.e., the process of 
induction involves drawing generalizable inferences from specific observations (Williams 
and May, 1996). The inductive approach process starts from observations, collecting data, 
analysing data to make sense of it and finally formulating a theory, in other words: 
Observations/Findings             Theory 
(Bryman, 2012) 
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Inductive argument depends on evaluating actions cautiously as well as considering the 
logic of what the researcher is claiming. Greener (2011) suggest three issues that the 
induction argument depends on: a) whether the observations were accurate, regular and 
inclusive, b) whether the casual links between two events appear to be influential and 
strong, and c) whether the situation the argument is applied to is similar or the same as the 
perspective in which it was created.   
 
Based on the argument above, the current research is designed on the deductive approach 
since hypothesis development is based on the literature of escalation/de-escalation as well 
as approach-avoidance theory. Quantitative data and statistical packages are used for 
hypothesis testing. In addition, interviews were conducted with three Saudi companies to 
gain a better and deeper understanding about the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon. 
 
5.5 Data Collection Methods 
There are two main sources of data that can be used in a research; primary and secondary 
data (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Greener, 2011). If researchers collected data themselves, 
through conducting interviews, experimental data, or by using a survey to meet the 
research objectives then they are using original data that is known as primary data. But if 
researchers conducted a review of others‟ work, or were looking at resources that someone 
else has collected, either in books, journals, published statistics, annual reports, films, and 
government surveys then they are using secondary data. 
 
There is no one data collection method that can be appropriate for all types of research, 
but every research requires one or more suitable strategies or data collection methods 
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(Remenyi et al., 1998; Wellington, 2012). These methods are determined according to the 
research philosophy or paradigm, and research approach in the aim of achieving research 
objectives (Saunders et al., 2009). In addition, they are determined according to several 
limitations such as time, cost, and the availability of people and facilities (Sekaran, 2003).  
  
Each data collection method has its own advantages and disadvantages, it is argued that a 
mixture of research methods would provide more awareness of the topic being considered 
and it would strengthen the credibility of the research conclusions (Douglas, 1976). The 
perception of applying a multi-method approach in collecting data is known as 
triangulation which is “the use of two or more methods of data collection in the study of 
some aspects of human behaviour” (Cohen and Manion, 1994: 254). In this respect, the 
philosophical paradigm that is behind  triangulation is what Schatzman and Strauss (1973) 
referred to as the “methodological pragmatism”, which they indicated as the status when 
the researcher considers any method of inquiry as a designed scheme of plans and 
procedures in order to get answers to certain questions about issues that he/she is 
interested in. This combination between quantitative and qualitative approaches will result 
in providing more understanding and insights into the context or settings as well as to 
confirm the findings with each other (Creswell and Clark, 2011). For example, in-depth 
interviews were recommended as a good method of obtaining qualitative insights that can 
verify data derived from a questionnaire survey (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). 
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As stated in Chapter One, the aim of this research is to investigate the (de)escalation 
phenomenon through the approach-avoidance theory in the Saudi corporate culture. Since 
this study is exploratory in nature, it is essential to use a combination of different 
quantitative and qualitative methods in order to answer the research questions. Therefore, 
a mixed-method research approach is adopted; an overview of each stage is shown in 
Table 5.9. The intention of the first stage of the research method is to validate the matters 
proposed in previous research and to uncover any issues that are missing. The outcome of 
this is the validation of the research topic and the formulation of the research hypotheses. 
In stage two, survey questionnaires were distributed, in order to collect necessary primary 
data to be used in testing the research hypotheses and answering the research questions. In 
stage three, interviews were conducted, to provide a more in-depth understanding of 
factors that either contribute to or inhibit the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon. 
       Table 5.9: Overview of Research Methods 
Stages Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Type of study Preliminary study Hypotheses testing In-depth study 
Objectives Validate research topic. 
Generate direction of 
research and hypotheses. 
Test hypotheses 
 Determine existence 
of links. 
 Generalize results. 
Highlight most 
relevant factors 
Method  Literature study 
 Pilot interviews. 
 Survey 
Questionnaires. 
 
 Interviews 
 
Most of the escalation/de-escalation research known to the researcher, including recent 
studies, has relied on laboratory experiments (e.g., He and Mittal, 2007; Wong et al, 2008, 
Denison, 2009; Berg et al, 2009). In order to give a better understanding of this complex 
practical phenomenon in real companies, primary data were sought and collected by using 
two methods: a detailed questionnaire survey of a large sample of companies in Saudi 
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Arabia (quantitative), and conducting interviews (qualitative) with a subset of the 
responding companies. 
 
5.5.1 Interviews 
Interviews allow the researcher to investigate what cannot be observed, such as the 
interviewees‟ thoughts, values, perceptions and feelings, therefore, it is believed that 
interviews allow the researcher to reach areas that other methods could not reach 
(Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007). Greener (2011) suggested several reasons for 
conducting interviews: a) provide significant background on present situations that are 
linked to previous events, b) give chances for overlooked or excluded people to be heard, 
and c) improve other methods‟ results to help fill in the gaps. Further, supplementing other 
methods could be met through either exploring a research issue by complementing in-
depth interviews with questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2009), or validating results of 
conducted questionnaires (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
There are several types of interviews such as structured, semi-structured, or unstructured 
(Wellington, 2012). Each has its own characteristics (see Table 5.10) that makes it 
appropriate for the purpose and type of the research conducted. Structured interviews are 
used within a positivistic paradigm and are more useful in a descriptive study, while semi-
structured and unstructured interviews are more associated with a phenomenal approach 
and are more used in explanatory and exploratory studies (Collis and Hussey, 2009; 
Saunders et al., 2009).    
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Table 5.10: Characteristics of Interview Types
*
 
Characteristics Structured Semi-structured Unstructured 
Control  Most control by interviewer More control by 
interviewer 
Some control on both 
sides 
Flexibility  Less flexible Flexible  Very flexible 
Guidance  Guided by researcher‟s pre-
determined agenda 
Not completely pre-
determined 
Guided by the 
interviewee 
Direction More predictable Less predictable  Direction unpredictable 
Analysis May provide easier 
framework for analysis 
Relatively easy to analyse May be difficult to 
analyse 
*Source: Wellington (2012) 
 
As this study is both explanatory and exploratory, semi structured interviews were used as 
a supplement to the main primary data collection method which is survey questionnaires. 
These interviews were conducted with some of the survey respondents, to obtain and 
explore more in-depth information about the research issues, with specific emphasis on 
the escalation/de-escalation determinants in the Saudi context.    
 
5.5.2 Survey Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are the most applied method when collecting data for social research 
(Oppenheim, 1992; Sekaran, 2003; Collis and Hussey, 2009; Saunders, et al., 2009; 
Greener, 2011).They are a type of survey that involve asking participants to respond to a 
variety of questions, often in a self-completion form (Greener, 2011). They seek to build 
up facts that could be subsequently quantified (Pring, 2000). The main advantages of self-
completion questionnaires are that they may ensure a high response rate, given the 
benefits of a degree of personal contact, targeting the most appropriate sample very 
precisely, and overcoming the sample bias problem if any (Oppenheim, 1992; Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). 
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Survey questionnaires are widely used because they are relatively simple to put together 
and their costs are reasonable as they often do not involve researchers having to find time 
to gather data personally (Greener, 2011). They offer considerable administrational 
advantages, they represent an equal incentive to large numbers of respondents at the same 
time and they provide the researcher with a relatively easy data gathering (Walker, 1985). 
They could be used in different ways across social science disciplines, because they 
produce data that can be used to test hypotheses (positivism) as well as gathering 
qualitative (phenomenological) response (Greener, 2011). They aim to give a wider 
picture or an overview, since they can give answers to the questions: What? Where? 
When? How? Yet, it is not so easy to find out why? Casual relationships can rarely if ever 
be proved by a survey method since the emphasis is on fact-finding (Bell, 1993).  
 
The type of survey questionnaire to be used partially depends on the methods of its 
distribution, with short questionnaires usually distributed electronically, and longer 
questionnaires sent by traditional mail (Pring, 2000). As explained in detail in Section 5.8 
below, neither email nor traditional mail could be relied on to distribute the survey 
questionnaire. Therefore, the only feasible way to undertake the survey in this place was 
to deliver the questionnaires by hand. Among the advantages of self-administered 
questionnaires are the anonymity and flexibility they give the respondents, which should 
motivate them to give complete and truthful answers within a specified short time frame 
(Sekaran, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
202 
 
5.6 Research Population, Sample and Target Responses  
The research population is the universe of elements or units from which the sample is to 
be chosen; therefore a sample represents a subgroup of the population (Sekaran, 2003; 
Weathington et al., 2012). There are several methods suggested to select a sample, the 
most common being simple random sampling, which is based on the idea that each unit in 
the population has an equal chance of being selected. The second method for selecting a 
sample is stratified random sampling, which is another variation of a simple random 
sampling but more complicated as the population is first divided into groups that share the 
same characteristics following which each category or group is randomly sampled 
(Greener, 2011; Weathington et al., 2012).  
 
According to Bryman (2012), the decision about a sample size represents an arrangement 
between restrictions (time, cost), and the need for precision, where the larger the sample 
size the greater the precision, because when sample size increases sampling errors 
decrease. In the current research, this means the whole population (2002 companies in 
total) which is defined as Saudi companies operating in the three main business sectors 
(industrial, commercial and services), regardless of whether they are small, medium or 
large companies. All 2002 companies were listed in the statistical reports of the Jeddah 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry
6
.  
 
The sampling method was stratified random sampling, where companies were first 
grouped into industrial, commercial and service companies, and then they were randomly 
                                                          
6
 Each Chamber of Commerce and Industry holds a list of all Saudi companies that operate in the region in 
relation. 
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selected to ensure that a sample of each group is included in the research, which resulted 
in a reasonable representation of the population (Weathington et al., 2012). For the 
interviews, there was a question in the questionnaire (in Section Five) asking respondents 
if they would like to participate in the interviews. The number of interviewees depended 
on the answers to this question. Further, the targeted respondents are all senior company 
staff, including company managers, financial managers, project managers, and division 
managers. The rationale for choosing these respondents is that they are in a good position 
to complete the questionnaire and should have the necessary knowledge to provide 
accurate and useful data regarding the determinants that influence escalation/de-escalation 
decision in their companies.   
 
5.7 Conducting the Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior managers in three companies, 
using Arabic and/or English depending on the language choice of the interviewee. The 
choice of interviewees was based on their consent to be interviewed, as in section five of 
the questionnaire respondents were asked optionally, because of the sensitivity of the 
topic, to declare whether they accepted to be interviewed and were able to share their 
experience in dealing with project (de)-escalation cases.  
 
The interviewees agreed to participate with the guarantee of full confidentiality and to 
receive a copy of the results of the research. However, to guarantee the success of the 
interviews, the process of conducting the interviews was as follows: 
 Once approval for the interview was received the respective company was contacted to 
arrange the date and time for the interview. 
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 Prior to visiting each company, the questionnaire they completed and returned was 
studied in detail and a copy was made to take to the interview.  
 Each interview was started in each company by the researcher who introduced herself 
and thanked the interviewee for completing and returning the questionnaire and 
granting the interview opportunity.  
 
 Providing information about the nature of the research study, its objectives, and 
expected benefits, noting that the interviewees had already completed and returned the 
survey questionnaire, this was a short reminder to properly focus the interview right 
from the outset. A copy of the questionnaire they completed and returned was given to 
them before the start of the interview to help launch the discussions.  
 
 The interviewees were asked first to talk about their experience and were left to explain 
how they initiated a specific project that then became problematic and explain in as 
much detail as possible how they made their escalation/de-escalation decisions. 
 
 With the permission of the interviewees, the interviews were tape-recorded and notes 
were also taken during the course of the interview. All interviewees were open-minded 
about answering questions related to the cases they had first-hand experience with.   
 
 At the end of the interview, the interviewee was asked if they had any questions or 
wished to add any comments. The interviews were concluded by thanking the 
interviewee and appreciation was expressed for giving their time, effort and 
cooperation. 
 
 After finishing the interview and leaving the company premises, the interviewer went 
over the information again while it was still fresh in the mind to make sure the notes 
taken were thorough enough and remove any ambiguities to avoid misinterpreting the 
information at a later date. 
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5.8 Questionnaire Design, Translation, Piloting and Administration 
5.8.1 Questionnaire Design  
The design and construction of the survey questionnaire for the current study received a 
considerable amount of attention, as several requirements were taken into account when 
building up the stages of the questionnaire, taking into account best practice advice from 
several authors (see Table 5.11).  
Table 5.11: Questionnaire Features 
Feature Requirement 
Cover later As the response rate can be influenced by the messages in the cover letter, the cover letter 
was written to briefly explain the importance and purpose expected benefits of the research 
project and invite the target respondents to take part in the survey. 
Wording  Simple, direct and familiar language was used, avoiding insensitive or double negative 
questions.  
Coordination Three matters were considered in the coordination of questions and questionnaire: 
- Clear instructions about each section in the questionnaire were provided. 
- Questions that are similar in content were grouped in the same sections. 
- Questions started to be from general to more specific, moving through questions in a 
logical sequence, without making major shifts or gaps for the respondents. 
Types and 
format 
The type and format of the questions were considered to be as follows: 
- Closed questions were used, which most of included the option “other (please specify)”.  
- A five-point scale was used in all questions except those regarding general information 
about the respondents and general information about the companies, as a five-point scale 
is perfectly adequate, while an increase to seven or nine points on a rating scale will not 
influence the improvement of the ratings‟ reliability.  
Layout and 
Appearance  
The appearance and layout give an initial impression about the seriousness and importance 
of the questionnaire, therefore, it was considered that the questionnaires should be consistent 
in style, and the length of each question was kept as short as possible in a way that did not 
affect its content and meaning. 
Source: information was summarized from: Oppenheim (1992), Dillman (2000), Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2002), Hairet al. (2003), Sekaran (2003), Cooper and Schindler (2006), Collis and Hussey (2009), Saunders 
et al. (2009), Gideon (2012) De Vaus (2014). 
 
The survey questionnaire was designed to achieve several objectives:  
 The research topic itself is a data deficient topic, as most of the existing studies are 
laboratory based (see Chapter Four) and even when they tried to simulate they did not 
necessarily reflect practical real life decisions. Hence, designing the survey 
questionnaire aimed to go far beyond the existing literature and capture the effects of 
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the whole phenomenon of escalation/de-escalation of commitment entirely from real 
life companies.  
 
 Although a small number of studies examined the escalation/de-escalation of 
commitment phenomenon in real life single case studies, their individual results are 
too limited to be offer ground for generalisation. Hence the motivation and the need 
for a large scale survey study which, according to the researcher, is the first of its kind.  
 
 The escalation/de-escalation topic is a sensitive area of investigation as it deals with 
failing projects that managers might be responsible for or they have faced during their 
career, which could cause managers to be embarrassed, particularly in a socio-cultural 
environment where admission of failure is a sensitive issue. Therefore, survey 
questionnaires were deemed the most appropriate primary data collection instrument 
to use with project managers in Saudi companies as the anonymity they offer would 
make managers more comfortable to fully participate in the study. This was eventually 
confirmed by the relatively high response rate of the questionnaire survey and the very 
low take up of interview requests (see Sections 5.7 and 5.8.2). 
 
 All existing non-laboratory based-studies have been carried out in Western countries. 
Therefore, the design of the study‟s questionnaire is, according to the researcher‟s best 
knowledge, the first to deal with the escalation/de-escalation of commitment 
phenomenon in a developing country.  
 
 
Several issues measures were considered taken when the survey questionnaire was being 
designed, in particular: a) linking the questionnaire to the research theoretical model, b) 
going back and forth to making make sure that all empirical critical variables that were 
examined in the escalation/de-escalation literature were captured and contextualised to 
suit the Saudi culture business environment and the study‟s theoretical model, and c) 
looking at various research projects in other subject areas that were achieved in Saudi 
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Arabia that used using survey questionnaires in order to pick up any useful tips that would 
assist the researcher to determine the features that should be paid attention to when 
targeting Saudi respondents on design, content, consistency and balance features. 
The construction of questionnaire was gradual, taking into account the design and 
refinement of the study‟s theoretical model, objectives and questions and the careful 
scrutiny of the academic and business literatures. After ten detailed revisions, a finalised 
version of the question was printed and used in a pilot phase before full distribution on the 
3
rd
 of August 2010.  The thorough revisions and redrafting of the questionnaire were made 
to ensure that: 
 The questionnaire fully encompasses the research theoretical model and the empirical 
variables to be examined; therefore, the survey questionnaire was designed to obtain 
information including capital investment decision making, project evaluation, and 
determinants of managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions of Saudi companies. 
 
 Internal consistency and balance were achieved in the questions by removing any 
unnecessary repetition, adding or rewriting questions to avoid respondents‟ boredom 
or fatigue and to make sure that the questions were free of any potential ambiguity or 
bias especially for such sensitive topic. 
 
 Most care was taken to minimize the limitations of the questionnaires and to increase 
the response rate, therefore at the end of the first draft the questionnaire was translated 
to Arabic to look for whether the questions would be translate easily and pick the 
points that needed to change to suit the Saudi culture to avoid a badly designed 
questionnaire that would cause a low rate response. 
 
 Revisions were made to decide on the type of questions to be included, i.e., yes or no; 
multi questions, or Likert scale questions. The decision was made to use 5-point Likert 
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scale for the core questions because of: the nature of the sensitivity and complexity of 
the topic, limitations of Likert scales as attitudinal scales, and the uniqueness of the 
Saudi context. Most care was taken to make sure that questions were constructed free 
from ambiguity and bias for every single item.   
 
5.8.2 Content and Sources of the Survey Questionnaire 
Table 5.13 summarizes the content of the questionnaire, variables measured and sources 
of each construct (for the full list of the 52 variables that make the two groups of 
determinants see Chapter 7 and Appendix A). First, the mapping of the survey questions 
to the research objectives and research questions is summarized in Table 5.12 as follows.  
 
Table 5.12: Mapping of Research Objectives, Questions and Survey Questions   
Research Objective Research Question Relevant questions in the 
questionnaire 
Objective One:  
Examine the impact of project-
specific determinants on 
managers' decisions to 
(de)escalate commitment. 
Question One:  
What are the project-specific 
determinants that influence 
managers in Saudi companies to 
(de)escalate commitment in 
capital project decisions? 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 35, 
36, 37. 
Objective Two:  
Examine the psychological 
dimension in capital project 
(de)escalation of commitment 
decisions. 
Question Two: 
To what extent are project 
managers in Saudi companies 
affected by non-project-specific 
factors when making 
(de)escalation of commitment 
decisions? 
12, 13, 18, 31, 32. 
Objective Three: 
Examine the extent to which 
contextual and organisational 
factors influence capital project 
(de)escalation of commitment 
decisions. 
 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 23, 24, 26, 
30, 33, 34. 
Objective Four:  
Examine the moderating role 
that operational audit might have 
on project (de)escalation of 
commitment decisions. 
 
Question Three: 
Does operational audit have a 
moderating role in the impact of 
escalation/de-escalation 
determinants on project 
(de)escalation of commitment 
decisions in Saudi companies? 
3, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 38. 
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Table 5.13: Content and Sources of the Survey Questionnaire 
Section QN. NI. Scale & Type 
 
Anchors Question 
objective 
Source 
One:  
General 
information  
1 1 Open-ended Choose the most 
appropriate answer 
Know/ascertain 
the qualification 
and experience of 
respondents 
Drury et al. (1993); Longden et 
al. (2001) 2 2 
3 1 Multiple choice 
4 1 Identify the 
company‟s 
business and 
performance  
Innes et al. (2000); White and 
Fortune (2002); Gerdin (2005)  
 
5 1 
6 1 Open-ended 
7 1 Multiple choice 
8 1 Open-ended 
9 1 Multiple choice 
 
Two: 
Description 
of the capital 
investment 
process  
10 1 Multiple choice Choose the most 
appropriate answer 
Identify and 
measure the 
company‟s 
formal or 
informal capital 
investment 
decision making 
process.   
Farragher (1986); Innes and Lyon 
(1994); Pike (1996); Kester et al. 
(1999); Ryan and Ryan (2002); 
Bryde (2003); Laziradis (2004); 
Ekanem (2005);  Alkaraan and 
Northcott (2006); Bouwens and 
Lent (2006); Carr (2006); Putra 
(2009) Bennouna et al. (2010)  
11 5 1-5 Likert Not important at all-
Very important 12 5 
13 10 
14 7 Multiple choice Choose the most 
appropriate answer 
15 8 1-5 Likert Not important at all-
Very important 16 11 
17 1 Multiple choice 
 
 
 
Choose the most 
appropriate answer 18 1 
19 4 
20 1 
21 3 
 
Three: 
Project 
evaluation 
and the de-
escalation 
decision 
22 1 Multiple choice Choose the most 
appropriate answer 
Identify and 
measure project 
evaluation 
techniques.  
Wilcocks (1994); Delios et al. 
(2004); Boukendour (2005); 
Edvardsson and Hansson (2005); 
Dilts and Pence (2006); 
Sambasivan and Soon (2007); 
Bayer (2008); Han et al. (2009); 
Wright and Capps (2011)  
23 6 
24 1 
25 1 
26 5 1-5 Likert Not important at all-
Very important 
27 1 Multiple choice Choose the most 
appropriate answer 
28 2 Open-ended Indicate  the 
appropriate answer 29 7 
30 4 Multiple choice 
 
Choose the most 
appropriate answer 
Four: 
Determinants 
of the de-
escalation 
decisions 
31 13 1-5 Likert Totally disagree-
Totally agree 
Identify and 
measure de-
escalation 
determinants that 
influence 
managers‟ 
decisions. 
Devine and O Clock (1995); 
Harrison et al. (1999); Cheng et 
al. (2003); Zikmund-Fisher 
(2004); He and Mittal (2007); 
Sivanathan et al. (2007); Liu and 
Liu (2008); Slaughter and 
Greguras (2008); Berg et al. 
(2009); Fox et al. (2009); Pan et 
al. (2009)  
32 15 
33 5 
34 11 
35 8 
36 6 
37 9 1-5 Likert Not important at all-
Very important  
QN: question number, NI: number of items in each question 
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5.8.3 Questionnaire Pre-Testing and Translation 
As the questionnaire was to be distributed in Saudi Arabia, where the official language is 
Arabic, it needed translating from the original in English. The translation process, which 
followed the back translation method (Malhotra and Birks, 2007), went through several 
stages as follows:  
 The final English draft of the questionnaire and the cover letter were translated by the 
researcher into Arabic (the researcher is a native bilingual Arabic speaker and 
experience university teacher).  
 
 The Arabic version was given to two academics (bilingual speaker) in the English 
Department at the King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah to check the translation for 
any ambiguities, poorly worded questions or unfamiliar terms. 
 
 The Arabic version was re-translated to English and given back to one academic in the 
Linguistics Department at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, whose original 
language is Arabic, to correct any errors, confusion and misinterpretation of meanings. 
 
Copies of both the English and Arabic versions were also given to three Saudi academics 
in the Accounting Department at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, who hold a Ph.D. 
degree and have experience doing research on Saudi companies, to check both form and 
content of the questionnaire As a result of the feedback received, a few modifications were 
made to produce an improved draft of the questionnaire.  
 
Copies of the revised questionnaire were piloted in two stages. First both the Arabic and 
English versions were given to three bilingual local project managers from three different 
companies (large car dealership, medium petrochemical firm, large food manufacturer) to 
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get their professional opinion as practicing managers on the suitability of the questionnaire 
for the planned large scale survey. Al three gave very positive feedback about the 
questionnaire and did not suggest any changes. An opportunity arose to get additional 
feedback from managers who were enrolled on a post graduate management accounting 
course at King Abdul-Aziz University. At their request they were given copies of the 
revised Arabic version of the questionnaire. After careful scrutiny of the questionnaire, but 
without filling it in, they stated, like the three managers from the first pilot phase, that 
there was no need to make any changes to the questionnaire. However, some commented 
that the questions about “disclosing the monetary amount or percentage of problematic 
projects” might not receive fair answers due to their sensitivity. 
 
5.8.4 Administration of Survey Questionnaires  
Once the final version of the questionnaire was ready, the process of delivering the 
questionnaire package to the 800 companies in the study sample began. The questionnaire 
package consists of the Arabic version and the covering letter (see Appendix B). The 
covering letter attached to the questionnaire had the logos of both King Abdul-Aziz 
University and the University of Huddersfield (where the researcher is registered as a PhD 
student). The covering letter briefly explained the study objectives, the importance of the 
respondent‟s participation in the study and assurance of confidentiality for the respondent, 
and included the researcher‟s and the supervisor‟s contact details.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter One (Section 1.5) and in Section 5.5.2 above, the questionnaire 
package was delivered by hand by the appointed male representative. The delivery by 
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hand or what is known in the literature on survey methods as the drop-off/pick-up 
(DOPU) method is superior to the alternatives of email and postal delivery even in 
countries such as the USA where these alternatives are feasible and reliable (Steele et al., 
2001; Allred and Ross-Davis, 2010). What makes the DOPU delivery method superior, as 
demonstrated by the studies of Steele et al. (2001) and Allred and Ross-Davis (2010), is 
the increased notable benefits on both quantity and quality levels; on the quantity level it 
positively increases the response rate, which reduces the non-response bias, while on the 
quality level the researcher is able to determine whether the person meets the eligibility 
requirements to answer the survey, which increases the quality of data obtained.  
 
For the present large scale survey, the DOPU delivery of the questionnaire was facilitated 
by the appointed male intermediary who was hired for the following reasons: 
 Because the researcher is female, this makes it impossible for her to administer the 
questionnaire in person due to social restrictions in Saudi Arabia. This is the usual 
practice for conducting this type of research project in Saudi Arabia when the main 
researcher is a female. 
 
 Because the questionnaire design for this study is fairly complex and long, thus ruling 
out distributing it by email to the target respondents.  
 
 It is not feasible to send the questionnaire by traditional mail because it is a well-known 
fact to researchers in Saudi Arabia that companies not only they do not return email 
questionnaires they also do not return postal questionnaires.  
  
The appointed male representative was given the list of target companies to deliver the 
questionnaires. A total of 800 questionnaires were distributed to companies in Jeddah City 
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during the period August-December 2010. The questionnaires were distributed in two 
waves of 400 copies each, during the August-October period (the first wave) and the 
October-December period (the second wave). On arrival at each company, the 
representative introduced himself, explained the purpose of his visit, and asked to be taken 
to the designated target respondent (see Section 5.6). Once with the target respondent, he 
gave him the questionnaire package and explained the overall purpose of the research 
project, the expected benefits and encouraged them to contact the researcher at any time if 
they had any queries, by using the researcher‟s contact details provided on the cover letter. 
In addition, he negotiated the time period for completing and returning the questionnaire, 
which on average took between one to two weeks. A total of 300 questionnaires were 
received back, providing a response rate of 35.4% (a full consideration of the response 
rate and non-response bias is provided in the next chapter).  
 
5.9 Validity and Reliability  
In any research, it is critical to measure the validity and reliability of concepts; these 
issues become vital in positivistic research (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Whereas it is 
important to evaluate the goodness of the measures developed to make sure that the 
developed instrument measures exactly the concept that was set out to measure not 
something else (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). Although reliability and validity seem very 
similar terms regarding their indication of accuracy and precisely, they have quite 
different meanings, especially when linked to evaluating developed measures of concepts 
(Bryman, 2012). Validity refers to the degree to which a test actually measures what it is 
supposed to measure, whereas reliability is linked to the idea of consistency, which is 
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concerned with whether a test gives consistent results across a range of settings, and is 
used by a range of researchers (Willington, 2012). The following sections will shed light 
on these terms and the extent in which they are applicable in the current research.  
 
5.9.1 Validity  
Validity refers to the degree to which a measure really measures the concept that was 
designed to measure (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). The question of validity draws attention 
to whether the researcher is measuring the right concept or not (Cooper and Emory, 1995).  
Therefore, the concept of validity is concerned with the accurateness of the research 
findings, and their representativeness of the real situation (Collis and Hussey, 2009), 
which can be established through a comprehensive list of validity types such as face, 
content, and criterion-concurrent validity (Bryman, 2012).  
 
1. Face Validity 
Face validity is the mere appearance that a measure is valid, as it is the degree to which a 
measurement seems to measure what it is supposed to (Kaplan and Saccuzo, 1993). Face 
validity is an intuitive process, it can be achieved by asking expertise in the field to judge 
whether the measure seems to obtain the concept that is the focus of attention (Bryman, 
2012). In the current research, face validity is obtained through the questionnaire 
development process of managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions: first by linking the 
questionnaire to the literature, second by receiving feedback from academics and 
managers, and third by piloting the questionnaire to project managers who were studying a 
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management accounting course as a part of their master programme in King Abdel Aziz 
university in Jeddah.  
   
2. Content Validity 
Content validity refers to the degree to which the instrument gives an adequate 
representation of the conceptual domain that is designed to cover is measured (Sekaran, 
2003). It can be achieved by a careful definition of the research topic and the items 
included in the measurement scale (Emory and Cooper, 1991), whereas content validity is 
the only type of validity for which the evidence is subjective and logical rather than 
statistical (Kaplan and Saccuzo, 1993). In the current research, experts in the project 
management field in both questionnaires and interviews through a critical and overall 
review of the literature ensured the content validity of the instrument. 
 
3. Criterion Validity 
Criterion validity can be achieved when the researcher retains a criterion on which cases 
are known to differ and that is relevant to the concept in question (Bryman, 2012). In the 
current research content validity was established as the criterion measure is managers‟ 
decisions to continue, discontinue, or redirect the problematic project which all scales of 
variables were linked to. 
        
5.9.2 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure of a concept, i.e., the extent to which the 
instrument is without bias and consistent over time and across the different items in the 
instrument (Bryman, 2012; Sekaran, 2003; Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). It refers to 
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consistency; therefore it is a matter of stability that is concerned with the questionnaire 
robustness and whether or not it produces consistent results at different times and in 
different occasions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
In order to consider and assess the reliability concept, three prominent factors were 
suggested; including test re-test, internal consistency, and parallel (alternative) form. The 
most widely used is the form of internal consistency, which can be measured through the 
Cronbach Alpha test (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2009; Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2010; Bryman, 2012). The test calculates the average of all possible split-half 
reliability coefficients, and the computed value would range from zero (no internal 
reliability) to one (perfect internal reliability), where the value .80 to indicate an accepted 
level of internal reliability (Bryman, 2012).  
 
In the current study, the internal consistency of the scales is measured through the 
application of Cronbach Alpha test for each construct of the study to consider whether or 
not the items built in the scale tended to measure the same concept (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Table 5.14 below shows the Cronbach alpha results of all variables (questions) that 
were measured with scaled items have passed the test (ranged from 0.855 to 0.989) and 
the obtained values exceeded the minimum value required to assess the reliability.    
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                    Table 5.14: Results of Reliability Test 
Variables  Questions No. of 
items 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Project identification stage 11 5 .955 
Project development stage 12 5 .958 
Project selection and implementation stage 13 10 .855 
Project evaluation stage 15 8 .984 
Project auditing 16 11 .988 
Investment motivation factors 16 5 .937 
Psychological determinants 31 13 .983 
Contextual determinants 32 15 .986 
Organisational determinants 33 5 .946 
Financial determinants 34 11 .989 
Strategic determinants 35 8 .984 
Informational determinants 36 6 .970 
Determinants  37 9 .961 
 
5.10 Data Analysis Tools Used 
Because the current study focuses on previous research conducted in the same area, the 
hypotheses suggested in Section 5.2 are tested using simple and multivariate data analysis. 
The software used for conducting the quantitative analysis was SPSS version 19. Before 
the regression analyses were performed the data extracted from the survey were tested to 
investigate several issues including the non-response bias, which was tested (see Section 
6.2) through examining the difference between means (Mann-Whitney U test) and the 
relatedness of general aspects (Chi-square test). The reliability of some of the study 
variables that were presented on a scale such as capital investment decision process and 
de-escalation determinants were examined through the Cronbach alpha test (see Table 
5.14). In addition, the assumptions required for multinomial logistic regression tests were 
examined and met (see Chapter Seven, Section 7.2). Once these tests were applied and 
results were thoroughly achieved, the full statistical analysis of the data was undertaken 
using the relevant techniques described below. 
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5.10.1 Descriptive Statistical Techniques Used 
The aim of the descriptive statistics in terms of frequencies, means, and standard deviation 
is to describe the Saudi managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions and determinants that 
influence these decisions in addition to Saudi managers‟ capital investment decision 
making process through the observed data that was collected within the distribution of 
survey questionnaires to companies in Jeddah City in Saudi Arabia.  
 
5.10.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) for Measuring Direct Effects 
Hypotheses H1-H6 shown in Section 5.2 predict the expected direct effect between 
independent variables (escalation/de-escalation determinants) and the dependent variable 
(managers‟ decisions to continue, withdraw, or re-direct a failing project), and explain the 
behaviour of the dependent variable on the basis of these independent variables. These 
hypotheses are tested using Multinomial Logistic Regression. The test was employed 
because the dependent variable is not continuous (i.e. it is dichotomous). 
 
5.10.3 MODPROBE Macro for Measuring the Moderated Effect 
According to Wu and Zumbo (2008) the moderation effect is a special case of an 
interaction effect (indirect effect), which suggests the range that the independent variable 
most strongly (or weakly) causes the dependent variable, basically, the moderator 
modifies the strength or direction of a causal relationship. Based on this definition 
hypothesis H7 (see Section 5.2.2.3) was formulated. The hypothesis focuses on the 
possible impact of interaction effect of project auditing on the relationship between 
escalation/de-escalation determinants and managers‟ decisions. In order to examine this 
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hypothesis the MODPROBE Macro test that was developed by Hayes and Matthes (2009) 
is applied.  
 
5.11 Summary  
This chapter focused on explaining and discussing the research model and methodology of 
the current study. The research model and hypotheses were built and developed to be in 
agreement with the research objectives, considering the direct and the indirect influence of 
escalation/de-escalation determinants on managers‟ choices in Saudi companies and 
according to several significant gaps and justifications that were identified through the 
literature review that was carried out in Chapters Three and Four.  
 
Further, a mixture of paradigms and a mixed-methods approach was adopted to achieve 
the research objectives. The data were collected for this purpose using a questionnaire 
survey and analysed by different statistical methods, namely: Descriptive Statistics, 
Multinomial Logistic Regression, and MODPROBE Macro test provide reasonable and 
acceptable results. The quantitative data are supplemented by data from interviews and 
relevant tests were applied to establish validity and reliability issues.  
 
The detailed analysis of all the data collected will be presented in next three chapters as 
follows: Descriptive statistical analysis (Chapter Six), inferential statistics (Chapter 
Seven), and description and analysis of conducted interviews (Chapter Eight). 
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Chapter Six  
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Project (De)-Escalation 
Decisions in Saudi Companies 
  
6.1 Introduction 
Application of the correct statistical techniques is a necessity in any research project in 
order to obtain meaningful results in accordance with the research objectives and 
questions. All the statistical analysis for the present study covering all research questions 
are presented in this chapter and the next. Immediately below in Section 6.2 the current 
study‟s response rate is presented and discussed, followed by a full analysis of non-
response bias. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 comprise of information about the respondents and 
their companies. Sections 6.5-6.7 present the descriptive statistics for the capital 
investment and escalation decisions as well as the determinants of the (de)-escalation of 
commitment. Section 6.8 concludes this chapter. 
 
6.2 Analysis of the Study’s Response Rate and Non-response Bias 
6.2.1 Comparative Analysis of the Response Rate  
As stated in Chapter Five, out of the 800 copies of the survey questionnaires that were 
distributed to the targeted companies in Jeddah City, a total of 300 were completed and 
returned in two waves. Careful scrutiny revealed that 26 of those were missing answers to 
critical questions in the survey. In agreement with established quantitative research 
guidance (e.g. Sekaran, 2003), these 26 questionnaires were removed and not considered 
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for further analysis, leaving 274 usable questionnaires thus yielding a 35.4% usable 
response rate (see Table 6.1). 
          Table 6.1: Frequency and Percentage of Response to Survey 
 First wave Second 
wave 
Total 
Number of Distributed questionnaires         400 400      800 
No response  208* 292 500* 
Received        192 108      300 
Unusable (partially completed)          12 14        26 
Total usable          180 94      274 
  *This figure includes the 10 that initially were approached for views about the viability of 
the research topic (see Chapter One, Section 1.4). 
 
 
The response rate was calculated by the following equation: 
 
Response rate %   = 
 
Number of usable questionnaires 
x 100  
 
Total number of sample - ineligible copies 
 
Response rate %   =         274 / (800-26)  x 100 =  35.4% 
 
 
Saunders et al. (2009) pointed out that the response rate of self-administered 
questionnaires is between 30 and 50%. However, such ball park figures are not specific 
enough to be used as a firm benchmark. There are many factors that affect response rates, 
including population type and sample size, sensitivity of the research topic, the design of 
the data collection instrument and mode of administration, and cultural considerations 
(Dillman, 2000; Shih and Fan, 2008; Rao, 2009; Gideon, 2012; De Vaus, 2014). Hence 
the variable response rates reported in survey based research, such as those of the studies 
of capital investment practice in Croatia: 25% (Lidija and Silvije, 2007) and India: 30% 
(Verma et al., 2009), management accounting practice in the Arabian Gulf countries: 19% 
(Joshi et al., 2011), success vs. project failure in Saudi Arabia: 17% (Alfaadel et al., 
2012).  
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The current study‟s response rate could be considered within the usual range of values for 
this type of survey carried out in large populations for respondents that have no individual 
purpose to take part in the survey (Kapetanopoulou and Tagaras, 2010), not to mention the 
socio-cultural and sensitivity of the topic. For a more specific comparison, the study of 
direct relevance in terms of research topic is that by Keil et al. (2000) who used a large 
sample to generate response. However, not only they achieved a much lower rate, but 
according to their own many stated limitations and those highlighted in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.7), they did so by examining a very small set of variables for one type of project only 
(i.e. software projects) and relying on the process of answers from people who were not 
directly responsible for project escalation decisions. Therefore, taking into account the 
socio-cultural context of the present study, the sensitivity of the topic, and the 
comprehensive content and length of the survey questionnaire, the response rate of nearly 
36% can be considered relatively very high.  
 
In addition to non-response bias tests, among the techniques usually used to gauge the 
strength of a survey is by looking at the margin of error (or sampling error). Assuming a 
confidence level of 95%, the margin of error for a sample size of 800 companies should be 
between 3%-4% (Gideon, 2012), or to be more precise 3.46% (calculated with critical 
value of Zα/2 = 1.96, E = Zα/2/(2√n). Given the population of 2002 companies sampled 
from (see Chapter 5, Section 5.6), the margin of error is actually smaller at only 2.685% 
for the present study, meaning that the chosen sample size is higher than the number 
required for it to be representative of the population of companies and the greater the 
accuracy of the survey conducted.  
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Besides the margin of error there are, as explained by Gideon (2012), other very important 
factors - or non-sampling errors such as coverage and measurement errors - that affect the 
robustness of a survey. The measures taken in the present study to minimise the effect of 
non-sampling errors on the response rate include the right design of the research 
instrument, the careful selection of target respondents (i.e., project, financial managers) 
and the implementation of the drop-off pick-up later (or DOPU) method in distributing the 
survey questionnaires (see Chapter Five, Section 5.8.4). This obviously necessitated 
taking risks and incurring costs that were avoided by those who opted for laboratory-based 
studies (see Chapter Four). For instance, despite the sensitivity of the topic and the socio-
cultural considerations that could have derailed any attempt at collecting primary data, it 
was decided that the risk of developing and administering a comprehensive questionnaire 
was worth taking for a serious research project of this nature. As pointed out by Dillman 
(2000) and De Vaus (2014), a necessarily long questionnaire needs to be used with 
specialised topics (in this case escalation commitment) and specialised respondents (in 
this case managers directly involved in the escalation decisions), as using short 
questionnaires trivialises the research and brings low response. Moreover, using the 
DOPU method to administer the questionnaire to 800 companies located in various parts 
of Jeddah city, consumed significant resources, particularly travel time and money (with 
an average of four car journeys made to-and-from each company, petrol cost, and fees 
paid to the male intermediary employed in the DOPU process).  In the light of the above, 
it can be said that the relatively high response rate achieved is a good return on the 
investment made in constructing and conducting the study‟s survey. 
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6.2.2 Analysis of the Non-Response Bias 
 
Rogelberg and Loung (1998) suggested four reasons for target respondents not to take part 
in a survey: (a) they were never given the survey, (b) they were not capable of completing 
the questionnaire, (c) they lost or failed to remember the survey out of carelessness, or (d) 
they had made up their mind not to respond to the survey. Non-response in the current 
self-administered survey is attributed as follows: 
1. A total of 175 refused to participate in the survey altogether, giving no reason for 
their refusal. 
 
2. A total of 125 did not participate because their company‟s policy does not allow them 
to answer any questionnaires. 
 
3. A total of 200 did not have the time to respond or to complete all questions. 
 
Due to the large number of non-respondents, the ability to generalize the findings of this 
study might be affected. Hence, there was a need to test for non-response bias, which 
requires comparing the responses from the first mailings of the survey questionnaires to 
those from the subsequent reminders in order to determine any significant differences 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). If there were no substantive differences in the answers 
between those two groups (early and late respondents), it could be argued that the non-
responding sample would also not differ. This is based on the assumption that non-
respondents tend to have answers most similar to those of late respondents (Panacek, 
2008), and is in agreement with what Rogelberg and Luong (1998) have suggested that 
late respondents would have been non-respondents if the survey‟s deadline was observed. 
 
In this study, the first 400 copies that were handed out produced a total of 192 replies, 180 
of which were usable. Another 108 replies were received, where only 94 responses were 
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accepted as usable after another 400 copies were handed out. To test for non-bias 
response, the following procedure was used: (a) determining whether there are any 
significant differences between the means of key variables (Section 6.2.1), and (b) testing 
the degree of relatedness for the general aspects of the responding companies (Section 
6.2.2). Both tests have been applied as explained below. 
 
6.2.2.1 The Difference between Means 
To determine whether there were any significant differences between the means of the key 
variables, the Mann-Whitney U test was applied, where the key variables are the project-
specific (financial, strategic, and informational) and non-project-specific (psychological, 
contextual, and organisational) determinants. This is a non-parametric test that is applied 
to find out whether two independent samples have been drawn from populations with the 
same distribution, without assuming whether the population samples have roughly the 
shape of a normal distribution. If the samples are from the same population, it is 
reasonable to assume that the means of the ranks assigned to the values of the two samples 
are more or less the same (Linsely and Lawrence, 2007).  
 
Before carrying out the Mann-Whitney U two-tailed test, the following points were noted: 
a) the first group of responses  consists of the usable 180 received from the first survey 
wave, while the second group of responses consists of the 94 usable responses received 
from the second wave; b) the Mann-Whitney U test is usually applied to large samples 
(Nagarajan and Keich, 2009), and c) the targeted statistic is the p value, which the test 
mainly computes  at the level of significance ɑ = 0.05 (Nagarajan and Keich, 2009). The 
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following hypotheses were generated under the assumption that the (Asymptotic 
Significance) p > 0.05:  
The null hypothesis: Answers from the first group of respondents are similar to answers 
from the second group of respondents. 
 
The alternative hypothesis: Answers from the first group of respondents differ from 
answers from the second group of respondents. 
 
 
Given that p > 0.05 for all key variables (see Table 6.2), this indicates that there is no 
significant difference between the answers of the first and the second group of 
respondents, and, therefore, the null hypothesis stated above is accepted. 
 
Table 6.2: Results of Mann-Whitney U Test for Key Variables 
Question Group N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
ranks 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2 tailed) 
Project-Specific Determinants 
Mean of financial  determinants First  180 136.19 24513.50 8223.500 .702 
Second  94 140.02 13161.50 
Total  274   
Mean of strategic determinants  First  180 134.86 24274.00 7984.000 .438 
Second  94 142.56 13401.00 
Total  274   
Mean of informational 
determinants  
First  180 141.01 25381.00 7829.000 .304 
Second  94 130.79 12294.00 
Total  274   
Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
Mean of psychological 
determinants  
First 180 140.84 25351.50 7858.500 .333 
Second 94 131.10 12323.50 
Total  274   
Mean of contextual 
determinants 
First  180 138.25 24885.00 8325.000 .828 
Second  94 136.06 12790.00 
Total  274   
Mean of organisational 
determinants 
First  180 135.00 24300.00 8010.000 .462 
Second  94 142.29 13375.00 
Total  274   
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6.2.2.2 The Relatedness of General Aspects  
In order to examine the degree of relatedness for the general aspects of the responding 
companies, the Chi-Square (χ²) test for relatedness is applied. The test measures whether 
the variance of two categorical variables differs significantly; it is sometimes called the 
Pearson‟s Chi-Square test (Field, 2009). The test is based on comparing the frequencies 
observed in certain categories to the frequencies expected to be had in those categories by 
chance. 
 
In this study, the main characters of the responding companies are: ownership type, 
number of employees, company capital, and company main business. In order to apply the 
χ² test for relatedness, regarding the group of respondents‟ assumption, the following two 
hypotheses were generated under the assumption that the (Asymptotic Significant) p > 
0.05 is at the level of significance: 
The null hypothesis: Frequency of the first group of respondents does not differ 
significantly from the frequency of the second group of 
respondents. 
 
The alternative hypothesis: Frequency of the first group respondents differ significantly 
from the frequency of the second group of respondents. 
 
Given that the “p” value is more than 0.05 (see Table 6.3) for all mentioned variables, then 
the null hypothesis is accepted and it is concluded that there is no significant difference 
between the frequency of the first and the second group of respondents.  
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Table 6.3:  Results of χ² Tests for Relatedness/Independence 
Variable Pearson      
Chi-Square 
χ² 
df⃰ Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)⃰ 
Notes 
Ownership type 11.345 6 .078  4 cells (28.6%) have an expected count of 
less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
.68. 
Number of employees 145.681 123 .080  241 cells (97.2%) have an expected count 
of less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .32. 
Company‟s main 
business 
.293 2 .864  0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of 
less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
23.67 
Company capital 
 
72.035 65 .257 123 cells (93.2%) have an expected count 
of less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .32. 
⃰df: degree of freedom, Asymp.Sig. (2-sided): asymptotic significance (p) 
                 
According to the results of both the Mann-Whitney U test and the Chi-Square (χ²) test for 
relatedness, there is no-response bias and, therefore, the outcomes of the questionnaire 
survey can be generalized. 
 
6.3 General Information about the Respondents 
The first and the fifth sections of the survey questionnaire were designed to gather general 
information about the respondents. The first section was devoted to gathering general 
information regarding the respondents‟ total years of work in their current companies, 
years of work as project managers, job titles, years and positions in their companies, and 
main decision authorities related to their positions. 
 
Responses to questions have considerably varied, where some of the questions were 100% 
answered, other questions received only 4% answers (see Table 6.4). The fifth section, 
which is related to providing demographic information such as age, gender and 
educational level, was designated „optional‟ as it asked questions of a more personal 
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nature and it was therefore no surprise that it received only 1% response. However, when 
distributing and collecting the questionnaires, it was noticed that all the completed 
questionnaires were from male respondents.  
          Table 6.4: General Profile of the Respondents 
Years of work in current company Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Less than 5 years  46 16.8 16.8 
5-10 years 163 59.5 76.3 
11-15 years 56 20.4 96.7 
16-20 years 8 2.9 99.6 
21-25 years 1 0.4 100.0 
Total 274 100.0  
Years of work as project managers  Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Less than 5 years 1 .4 9.1 
5-10 years 8 2.9 81.8 
11-15 years 2 .7 100.0 
Total  11 4.0  
Job Title  Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Project manager 107 39.1 39.1 
Division manager 90 32.8 71.9 
Financial manager 56 20.4 92.3 
Company manager  5 1.8 94.1 
Other job titles 16 5.8 100.0 
Total                                                                                                                              274 100.0
Years of work in current job  Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
less than 5 years 203 74.1 74.1 
5-10 years 65 23.7 97.8 
11-15 years 5 1.8 99.6 
16-20 years 1 0.4 100.0 
Total                                                                                                                              274 100.0
Years of work in previous jobs  Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
less than 5 years 6 2.2 46.2 
5-10 years 3 1.1 69.2 
11-15 years 4 1.5 100.0 
Total 13 4.8  
Decision Making Authority Frequency Percentage 
Conduct audit on active projects 236 86.1 
Starting new projects 154 56.2 
Make decisions about failing projects 105 38.3 
Other decision making 6 2.2 
 
The majority of the respondents (59.5%) have worked in their current companies for 5-10 
years and spent between one to 19 years in their current jobs as project managers (39.1%), 
division managers (32.8%) or financial managers (20.4%). Respondents (5.8%) have 
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worked in other jobs such as assistants or representatives for project managers, financial 
managers, company managers, and division managers. Further, respondents‟ decision 
making authority included three main decisions: conducting audits on active projects 
(86.1%), starting new projects (56.2%), and making decisions about failing projects 
(38.3%). Other decision making authorities (2.2%) included assisting either project 
managers, financial managers, company managers, or division managers in the decision 
making process.   
 
Given the nature of the information required by this research, these results were expected 
to be obtained because, as was explained in the preceding chapter, respondents who were 
involved in or know more about project management in their companies (e.g. project 
managers) were targeted to participate in the survey to make sure meaningful data on a 
complex phenomenon would be collected. Around three quarters of the respondents have 
been in their current jobs for less than 5 years, which is consistent with both the local 
government‟s saudization policy -that is implemented forcibly in both public and private 
sectors- and the oil booming period of 2004-2009 (i.e. the economic recovery) that 
resulted in the increase of investment in capital projects, and the demand for managers to 
run the projects.  
 
It could be concluded that most of respondents had access to managing projects within the 
position they hold in their companies and the decision making authority they maintained, 
to qualify them to answer this research questionnaire with reasonable knowledge about 
problematic projects in their companies.  
231 
 
 
6.4 General Information about the Responding Companies 
In addition to general questions about the respondents, the first section of the 
questionnaire was designed to also gather general information about the responding 
companies, in terms of their size, ownership type, number of years in operation, their main 
as well as the industrial sub sectors, and how long they have been operating in the most 
profitable sub sector. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 summarize these characteristics, where the 
response rate ranged from 97% to 100%.  
 
The Saudi Arabian economy has moved towards the large corporation type (MOCI, 2013),  
but the number of Sole Proprietorship companies (38.7%) is still relatively high compared 
to corporation companies (28.5%) or General Partnership companies (14.6%). This is 
because, as was explained in Chapter Two, the Saudi companies‟ ownership type is still 
more influenced by family values.  
 
The age distribution of companies shows that more than 95% of companies have been 
operating in the Saudi market for over 5 years.  The size of most of responding companies 
ranged from medium to large whereas their (84.2%) declared capital was up to 100 million 
Riyals ($26.67 million), and up to 10000 employees (89.8%), which made them more 
suitable to respond to the survey questionnaire. The participating companies‟ main 
business was consistent with the distribution of the Saudi markets in the Jeddah chamber 
of commerce and industry (see Chapter Two), where 38.7% of the responding companies 
operated in the services sector, 36.1% operated in the industrial sector and 25.2% worked 
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in the commercial sector. These results concord with the information provided in Chapter 
Two about the socio-economic context of the Saudi business enterprise. 
         Table 6.5: General Characteristics of the Responding Companies 
Company’s Ownership Type  Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Sole Proprietorship 106 38.7 38.7 
Corporation 78 28.5 67.2 
General Partnership 40 14.6 81.8 
Limited Partnership 30 10.9 92.7 
Holding Company 15 5.5 98.2 
Semi Government 2 0.7 98.9 
Other 2 0.7 100.0 
Total   273 99.6  
Company Age  Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Less than 5 Years    3 1.1 1.1 
5-10 Years 23 8.4 9.5 
11-15 Years 78 28.5 38.1 
16-20 Years 97 35.4 73.6 
20-25 Years 38 13.9 87.5 
More than 25 Years 34 12.4 100.0 
Total   273 99.6  
Company’s Declared Capital Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Less than 20 Millions 148 54.0 55.6 
21-40 Millions 28 10.2 66.2 
41-60 Millions 20 7.3 73.7 
61-80 Millions 11 4.0 77.8 
81-100 Millions 17 6.2 84.2 
More than 100 Millions 42 15.3 100.0 
Total   266 97.0  
Company Market Share Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Less than 20 Millions 14 5.1 18.7 
21-40 Millions 12 4.4 34.7 
41-60 Millions 6 2.2 42.7 
61-80 Millions 10 3.6 56.0 
81-100 Millions 7 2.6 65.3 
More than 100 Millions 26 9.5 100.0 
Total   75 27.4  
Number of Employees Frequency Percentage Cumulative % 
Less than 100 58 21.2 21.8 
101-1000 154 56.2 79.7 
1001-5000 21 7.7 87.6 
5001-10000 6 2.2 89.8 
10001-20000 25 9.1 99.2 
More than 20001 2 .7 100.0 
Total   266 97.0  
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Several efforts were made by the Saudi government to encourage a diversified economy 
(Choudhury and Al-Sakran, 2001), which can be seen through the wide range of sub-
businesses that responding companies operated either as the only activity (15.3% in the 
agriculture and food industries) or as part of several activities (10.2% in the building and 
construction sub-sector). They have been operating up to 25 years with the highest annual 
sales turn over sub-business (89.4%), while one third of them have been operating for 16-
20 years with the highest annual sales turn over sub business. 
Table 6.6: Responding Companies’ Main and Sub Business 
Company's Main Business  Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Services  106 38.7 36.1 
Industrial  99 36.1 61.3 
Commercial 69 25.2 100.0 
Total  274 100.0  
Company’s Sub Business As the only activity As part of several activities 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Agriculture & Food Industries 42 15.3 13 4.7 
Transport 41 15.0 9 3.3 
Petrochemical Industries 21 7.7 19 6.9 
Industrial & Investment 17 6.2 22 8.0 
Building & Construction 15 5.5 28 10.2 
Retail 15 5.5 2 0.7 
Hotel & Tourism 10 3.6 5 1.8 
Tele & Information Technology 9 3.3 22 8.0 
Multi Investment 9 3.3 9 3.3 
Media & Publishing 8 2.9 4 1.4 
Cement 6 2.2 24 8.7 
Energy & Utilities 5 1.8 2 0.7 
Real Estate Development 2 .7 11 4.0 
Banks & Financial Services 2 0.7 4 1.5 
Insurance 1 0.4 11 4.0 
Company Operating in Highest 
Sub business Years  
Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Less than 5 years    5 1.8 1.8 
5-10 years 23 8.4 10.3 
11-15 years 85 31.0 41.4 
16-20 years 92 33.6 75.1 
20-25 years 39 14.2 89.4 
More than 25 years 29 10.6 100.0 
 Total   273 99.6  
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6.5 Description of Capital Investment Process in the Responding Companies 
To get a better understanding of the capital investment process (consistent with the 
literature review provided in Chapters Three and Four) in the responding companies, the 
respondents were asked to answer questions 10 to 21 in section two in the questionnaire. 
Question 10 addresses whether the capital investment process followed was formal or 
informal; questions 11-16 cover the formal steps in capital investment; and questions 17-
21 any informal approach that the responding companies might have. These questions 
were fully answered by the respondents as summarised in Tables from 6.7 to 6.14. 
 
Almost all participating companies follow a formal process when making their capital 
investment decisions(see Table 6.7) This finding agrees with that of existing studies on the 
structure of capital investment decisions in other countries (e.g. Klammer, 1972; Pike, 
1988; Farragher et al., 1999; Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006).  
           
Table 6.7: Capital Investment Decisions Structure 
Capital Investment Decisions Structure Frequency Percentage M 
(S.D) 
Formal capital investment decision process     272 99.3 1.0073 
(.08528) Informal capital investment decision process 2 .7 
Total                                                                                         274 100.0
 
 
The various aspects of the formalisation are presented next, detailing the steps followed 
when making a formal capital investment decision (Tables 6.8-6.12), and those steps 
followed when making an informal capital investment decision (Table 6.13).  
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6.5.1 Identification and Development of the Investment Project  
Both the identification and the development of the investment project are reported as 
essential stages in the decision-making process as the respondents consider most of the 
question items they were presented with to be “important” as indicated by the mean score. 
This is consistent, as evidenced by the review of literature in Chapter Four, with the 
results studies in other countries (e.g. Istvan, 1961; Klammer, 1972; Petty et al., 1975; 
Ryan and Ryan, 2002; Alkaraan and Northcott, 2007).  
 
Table 6.8: Project Identification and Development Stages 
Project Identification Stage Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Time pattern of origination 6 
(2.2) 
24 
(8.8) 
28 
(10.2) 
139 
(50.7) 
75 
(27.4) 
3.930 
(.963) 
Process and submission of origination 7 
(2.6) 
39 
(14.2) 
69 
(25.2) 
122 
(44.5) 
35 
(12.8) 
3.511 
(.975) 
Reasons for idea origination 5 
(1.8) 
43 
(15.7) 
96 
(35.0) 
110 
(40.1) 
18 
(6.6) 
3.341 
(.886) 
Source of idea origination 9 
(3.3) 
129 
(47.1) 
78 
(28.5) 
51 
(18.6) 
5 
(1.8) 
2.683 
(.877) 
Due diligence (other steps) 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.4) 
5.000 
Project Development Stage 1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Forecasting and estimates 5 
(1.8) 
23 
(8.4) 
46 
(16.8) 
125 
(45.6) 
73 
(26.6) 
3.875 
(.963) 
Screening process 2 
(.7) 
26 
(9.5) 
52 
(19.0) 
136 
(49.6) 
56 
(20.4) 
3.801 
(.899) 
Extent of project screening 4 
(1.5) 
31 
(11.3) 
29 
(10.6) 
178 
(65.0) 
30 
(10.9) 
3.731 
(.857) 
Personal responsibility for the project 10 
(3.6) 
79 
(28.8) 
64 
(23.4) 
79 
(28.8) 
40 
(14.6) 
3.220 
(1.127) 
Future projections (other steps) 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.4) 
5.000 
*1=not important at all, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, 5=very important 
 
In the project identification stage, the “time pattern of origination” was the most important 
item (M = 3.930) and the “source of origination” was the least important item (M = 
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2.683). While in the project development stage, the “forecasting and estimates” was the 
most important item (M = 3.875) and the “personal responsibility for the project” was the 
least important but not insignificant item (M =3.220). Two items were added by two 
respondents (operating in the service sector) as decisive criteria, these are the project 
identification “due diligence” at the identification stage, and “future projections” during 
project development. As these items were not specifically identified through the extensive 
review of the literature prior to questionnaire construction, future similar research should 
look at these in more detail. 
 
6.5.2 Selection and Implementation of the Investment Project 
Results here suggest a range of crucial items that responding companies consider within 
the project selection and implementation stage in addition to capital appraisal techniques 
used (Tables 6.9 and 6.10). All of the items in the selection and implementation stages 
were ranked “very important”  with a mean score higher than 4 (Table 6.9), besides four 
out of five capital appraisal techniques were implemented in more than 50% of the 
responding companies (Table 6.10). These results are in agreement with those of 
highlighted in Chapter Four (e.g. Pohlman et al., 1988; Pike, 1996; Mukherjee and 
Hingorani, 1999; Carr, 2006; Alkaraan and Northcott 2007).  
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Table 6.9: Project Selection and Implementation Stage 
Project Selection & Implementation Stage Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Project implementation 0 3 
(1.1) 
6 
(2.2) 
32 
(11.7) 
231 
(84.3) 
4.805 
(.517) 
Project approval 0 8 
(2.9) 
15 
(5.5) 
51 
(18.6) 
198 
(72.3) 
4.614 
(.725) 
Knowledge of the appropriate cost of capital 1 
(.4) 
11 
(4.0) 
21 
(7.7) 
72 
(26.3) 
167 
(60.9) 
4.444 
(.831) 
Capital rationing process 1 
(.4) 
13 
(4.7) 
24 
(8.8) 
70 
(25.5) 
164 
(59.9) 
4.408 
(.866) 
Risk assessment 0 18 
(6.6) 
23 
(8.4) 
92 
(33.6) 
139 
(50.7) 
4.294 
(.881) 
Determining project appraisal techniques 2 
(.7) 
20 
(7.3) 
17 
(6.2) 
94 
(34.3) 
139 
(50.7) 
4.279 
(.926) 
Size of the project 1 
(.4) 
23 
(8.4) 
12 
(4.4) 
121 
(44.2) 
115 
(42.0) 
4.198 
(.895) 
Strategic importance of the project 2 
(.7) 
17 
(6.2) 
18 
(6.6) 
144 
(52.6) 
91 
(33.2) 
4.121 
(.839) 
Personal responsibility for analysis 3 
(1.1) 
24 
(8.8) 
22 
(8.0) 
112 
(40.9) 
111 
(40.5) 
4.117 
(.964) 
*1=not important at all, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, 5=very important 
                             
 
More than one of five capital appraisal techniques is used to evaluate investment 
opportunities. The most used technique is the NPV (93.8%) and the least used is the ROI 
technique (36.1%).  It is worth noting here that both the NPV and the IRR are considered 
as fairly advanced capital investment appraisal techniques that require a good grasp of the 
concepts of the time value of money, discounting, cost of capital, cash flow forecasting, 
inflation, the cost of capital, and preferably sensitivity analysis, before one can use with a 
sufficient degree of confidence.  
 
As this study deals with corporate level capital investment decisions that mostly involve 
expensive long term projects, it can be safely concluded here that project managers in 
these companies are properly qualified in this respect. This gives credence to the formal 
approach to capital project management reported by all respondents and is in line with the 
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information on managers‟ educational trends that was presented in Section 2.5.1 in 
Chapter Two.    
              Table 6.10: Capital Investment Appraisal Techniques 
Capital Investment Appraisal 
Techniques 
Frequency  Percentage  
NPV (net present value) 257 93.8 
IRR (internal rate of return) 214 78.1 
PB (Payback) Method 164 59.9 
ARR (accounting rate of return) 138 50.4 
ROI (return on investment) 99 36.1 
Number of Appraisal Techniques Used  
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative%  
Five techniques 30 10.9 10.9 
Four techniques 58 21.2 32.1 
Three techniques 122 44.5 76.6 
Two techniques 56 20.4 97.0 
One technique 5 1.9 98.9 
Zero techniques 3 1.1 100.0 
Total  274 100.0  
 
 
6.5.3 Evaluation and Auditing of the Investment Project 
The results  here (Table 6.11) suggest that both the project evaluation and auditing are 
essential stages in the decision-making process as respondents considered most of the 
items included to be “important” with a mean score higher than 3. This is consistent with 
other empirical study outcomes (e.g. Gordon and Myers, 1991; Kalmmer et al., 1991; 
Pike, 1996; Farragher et al., 1999; Azzone and Maccarrone, 2001; Klammer et al., 2002; 
Carr, 2006; Bennouna et al., 2010; IIA, 2011).  
 
Auditing the investment project is an important stage in the evaluation of the capital 
investment project, where the “response of the project manager to audit report” was 
considered the most important item (M = 4.055) while the “clarity of roles in project 
evaluation” was considered the least important item (M = 3.625) of the evaluation of the 
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investment project. Further, “consider risks involved of conducting audit” was the most 
important step (M = 4.121) while “write up and submit the audit report” was, in ranking 
terms, the least important step (M = 3.591) of the project audit process.   
Table 6.11: Project Evaluation and Audit Stages 
Project Evaluation Stage Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
The response of the project manager to audit 
report  
0 18 
(6.6) 
37 
(13.5) 
129 
(47.1) 
88 
(32.1) 
4.055 
(.850) 
The assessment of audit reports 1 
(.4) 
27 
(9.9) 
29 
(10.6) 
133 
(48.5) 
82 
(29.9) 
3.985 
(.917) 
The effective use of team-based performance 
measures  
3 
(1.1) 
23 
(8.4) 
38 
(13.9) 
123 
(44.9) 
85 
(31.0) 
3.970 
(.944) 
The quality of the project audit process 2 
(.7) 
29 
(10.6) 
41 
(15.0) 
135 
(49.3) 
65 
(23.7) 
3.852 
(.929) 
The effective use of performance incentives  3 
(1.1) 
25 
(9.1) 
45 
(16.4) 
143 
(52.2) 
56 
(20.4) 
3.823 
(.900) 
The use of project audit  8 
(2.9) 
29 
(10.6) 
41 
(15.0) 
157 
(57.3) 
37 
(13.5) 
3.683 
(.938) 
The clarity of roles in project evaluation 3 
(1.1) 
36 
(13.1) 
38 
(13.9) 
178 
(65.0) 
17 
(6.2) 
3.625 
(.832) 
Project Audit Steps 1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Step five: consider risks involved of conducting 
audit  
1 
(.4) 
22 
(8.0) 
32 
(11.7) 
105 
(38.3) 
112 
(40.9) 
4.121 
(.935) 
Step eight: interpret information 2 
(.7) 
25 
(9.1) 
23 
(8.4) 
125 
(45.6) 
97 
(35.4) 
4.066 
(.934) 
Step four: emphasize essential factors 1 
(.4) 
19 
(6.9) 
34 
(12.4) 
132 
(48.2) 
86 
(31.4) 
4.040 
(.868) 
Step six: outline audit profile  2 
(.7) 
33 
(12.0) 
34 
(12.4) 
97 
(35.4) 
106 
(38.7) 
4.000 
(1.034) 
Step seven: gather more detailed information   1 
(.4) 
29 
(10.6) 
33 
(12.0) 
116 
(42.3) 
93 
(33.9) 
3.996 
(.962) 
Step nine: evaluate information 1 
(.4) 
26 
(9.5) 
34 
(12.4) 
140 
(51.1) 
71 
(25.9) 
3.933 
(.894) 
Step ten: record findings and recommendations 3 
(1.1) 
21 
(7.7) 
34 
(12.4) 
151 
(55.1) 
63 
(23.0) 
3.919 
(.872) 
Step three: collect basic information  2 
(.7) 
31 
(11.3) 
44 
(16.1) 
138 
(50.4) 
57 
(20.8) 
3.797 
(.925) 
Step two: prepare an audit plan  3 
(1.1) 
33 
(12.0) 
43 
(15.7) 
152 
(55.5) 
41 
(15.0) 
3.716 
(.903) 
Step one: agree to start the audit 3 
(1.1) 
27 
(9.9) 
33 
(12.0) 
192 
(70.1) 
17 
(6.2) 
3.709 
(.773) 
Step eleven: write up and submit the audit 
report 
4 
(1.5) 
31 
(11.3) 
77 
(28.1) 
120 
(43.8) 
40 
(14.6) 
3.591 
(.924) 
*1=not important at all, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, 5=very important 
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6.5.4 Informal Steps in Capital Investment Decision 
Only two out of 274 companies followed an informal process (see Table 6.12) when 
making their capital investment decisions. They both operate in the transportation sub-
business and their main business is services, which is in agreement with the sector of 
investigated companies that applied informal capital investment process in the literature 
(e.g. Ekanem, 2005; Prather et al., 2009).  
 
Table 6.12: Steps in the Informal Capital Investment Process 
The Main Reason for Approving the Project Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative % 
Strategic importance of investment opportunity  1 .4 50.0 
The annual capital budgeting round 1 .4 100.0 
The Person Responsible for the Project Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative %  
Company manager 1 .4 50.0 
Project manager 1 .4 100.0 
Type of Follow-Up Procedure to the Project Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative %  
Continuous monitoring of the project 2 .7 100.0 
Project audit play a role in the decision   2 .7 100.0 
Post completion evaluation 1 .4 100.0 
Evaluation of project teams 1 .4 100.0 
Items considered in the project audit Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative %  
Monitor profitability 2 .7 100.0 
Monitor revenue 1 .4 100.0 
 
Applying an informal process does not mean the absence of a structure for the decision 
making process (as explained in Chapter Four). One of the two firms considers the project 
to be the strategic importance of the investment opportunity as a main reason for 
approving the capital project. Additionally, both companies believe that project audit 
plays a role in the capital investment decision, they apply continuous monitoring, and they 
consider monitoring profitability as one of the key items in their project audit.  
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6.6 Project Evaluation and (De)-Escalation Decisions  
The third section of the survey questionnaire (Questions 22-30) was designed to gather 
detailed information about the management of failing projects. Respondents were asked to 
provide information regarding the final cost of the completed project, failure criteria 
applied, type as well as the timing of the most recent failing project, investment 
motivation factors, the prospects of the project, cost of a failed project, additional costs, 
and the type of impact the failing project had on the person responsible. Most of the 
questions were answered fully (see Tables 6.14, and 6.18), while one question received 
very few responses (“monetary amount” item in Table 6.13), confirming feedback 
received from the pilot study (see Chapter Five), as less than 6% answered it. 
 
The results of determining the monetary aspects of the project show that the majority 
(61.7%) of failing projects‟ final costs differed from the set budget, and 12% of final costs 
significantly exceeded the original budget. Regarding the monetary amount and 
percentage of final cost of failing project, the utmost majority of respondents prefer not to 
disclose this information, and the few who did stated amounts of the final cost of the 
failing project ranging from 2 to 60 million Saudi Riyals (approximately $.534 to $16 
million) and the difference of the final cost from the original budget ranging from 7% to 
45%. These results are similar to those reported by some previous studies (e.g. Szyliowicz 
and Goetz, 1995; Han et al., 2009). 
 
Besides the original cost of the project, the most important costs are contractual penalties 
incurred to compensate customers and suppliers, followed by insurance cost, government 
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penalties and redundancy payments, indicating that projects are often not completed on 
time or at all successful and that contingency finance needs to be regularly factored into 
project budgets to account for cost changing factors such as delays and overruns. The 
lowest ranked other costs are joint-venture costs (less than 9% of the responding 
companies) noting that 39% of the companies are sole partnership companies, i.e. 
companies unlikely to be involved in joint ventures (see Table 6.4).  
 
   Table 6.13: Monetary Aspects of the Project 
The closure of final cost to set budget Frequency  Percentage  M 
(S.D) 
Did differ from the set budget 169 61.7 1.857 
(.603) Did not significantly differ from the set budget 72 26.3 
Significantly exceeded the set budget 33 12.0 
Total                                                                                                        274               100.0 
Monetary amount of failing project Frequency  Percentage  M 
(S.D) 
Project final cost 9 3.3 1.400 
(.507) Difference from original budget in percentage 6 2.2 
Total                                                                                                            15                   5.5 
Additional cost for the failing project Frequency  Percentage  
Contractual penalties with customers 180 65.7 
Contractual penalties with suppliers  164 59.9 
Insurance costs  154 56.2 
Government penalties  96 35.0 
Redundancy payments  91 33.2 
Joint-venture cost  23 8.4 
Opportunity loss (other additional costs) 1* .4 
  *The sum given by the respondent is SAR 1 million, or approx. $0.267 
The results of examining the criteria of failure applied for judging projects (see Table 
6.14) show that the vast majority of the responding companies consider the project as a 
failure if its cost exceeded the set budget, while more than 50% believe that when a 
project exceeded its anticipated completion time it was a failure. These results are 
consistent with those reported in the literature (e.g. Al-Sultan, 1987; Pike, 1996; Assaf and 
Al-Hejji, 2006; Sambasivan and Soon, 2007; Wright and Capps, 2011).  
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Table 6.14: Failure Criteria Applied to Projects 
Failure Criteria Applied to Projects Frequency  Percentage  
Exceeded set budget 257 93.8 
Did not meet initial strategic objectives 221 80.7 
Should not have been accepted in the first place  195 71.2 
Exceeded anticipated completion time 159 58.0 
New regulations 73 26.6 
  
 
For the type of failing project, as shown in Table 6.15, the most frequent type is 
“renewing old capital asset” and the least frequent is “buying new capital assets”. Failing 
projects also seem to be a recurring event that is on the increase, given the frequency and 
percentage aspects indicated by the respondents. 
 
   Table 6.15: Type and Time of Most Recent Failing Project 
Type of most recent failing project Frequency Percentage M 
(S.D) 
Renewing old capital assets 131 47.8 2.675 
1.089 Expanding capacity 102 37.2 
Opening a new company branch 30 10.9 
Buying new capital assets 11 4.0 
Total                                                                                        274               100.0 
Time of the Most Recent Failing 
Project 
Frequency Percentage M 
(S.D) 
Last Year 110 40.1 2.058 
1.134 Two Years Ago 79 28.8 
Three Years Ago 59 21.5 
Four Years Ago 13 4.7 
Five Years Ago 11 4.0 
Other  2 .7 
Total                                                                                       274               100.0 
 
It is interesting to note that what seems to drive the initial investment in projects that later 
turned out not to be successful is the availability of finance (i.e. as confirmed in capital 
expenditure budgets) as most respondents rank this highest motivating factor for 
approving projects (M = 4.394 in Table 6.16). Other factors, although still important, 
come next in the pecking order. In the light of the information given in Chapter two about 
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the business environment in Saudi Arabia and the Government plans for accelerating 
economic growth, project managers seem to be more preoccupied with finding worthwhile 
capital projects than with how the finance them as capital expenditure budgets are taken 
from granted. These results concord with those of some previous studies (e.g., Edvardsson 
and Hansson, 2005; Dilts and Pence, 2006; Alkaraan and Northcott, 2007; Bayer, 2008; 
Celentano, 2008; Nini et al., 2009; Carneiro et al., 2011).  It is worth noting here that one 
respondent stated “expansion of business” as a very important investment motivation 
factor but, as more 100 companies have identified expansion projects as the second 
highest type of failing project (Table 6.15), its sole mention here by the one respondent 
was more likely to give an example of strategic priority which is the second highest 
ranking among the items listed in Table 6.16. 
 
Table 6.16: Investment Motivation Factors 
Investment Motivation Factors Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Capital expenditure budget 3 
(1.1) 
5 
(1.8) 
25 
(9.1) 
89 
(32.5) 
152 
(55.5) 
4.394 
(.815) 
Company strategic goals 4 
(1.5) 
49 
(17.9) 
61 
(22.3) 
120 
(43.8) 
40 
(14.6) 
3.521 
(.995) 
Social impact of project 18 
(6.6) 
55 
(20.1) 
62 
(22.6) 
66 
(24.1) 
73 
(26.6) 
3.441 
(1.257) 
Expansion of business (other motivation 
factors) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(.4) 
5.000 
*1=not important at all, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, 5=very important 
 
The results of examining prospects of the failing project (Table 6.17) show that the 
majority of managers make the decision to de-escalate the failing project either by 
terminating (46.4%) or redirecting (29.6%) projects. Nevertheless, 24.1% of the managers 
neither terminated, nor redirected perceived failing projects, but instead escalated  them by 
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committing more resources, a rather intriguing behaviour that the escalation literature has 
documented and tried to explain (e.g. Staw and Ross, 1987; Keil et al., 2000; Delios, 
2004; Chakravorty 2009; Korzaan and Morris, 2009). The escalation of commitment is 
covered in more detail in the remainder of this chapter and through the inferential 
statistical analysis and case studies presented in the next two chapters.  
Table 6.17: Prospects of the Failing Project 
What Happened to the Failing Project Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative %  
Project was terminated 127 46.4 46.4 
Project was redirected 81 29.6 76 
More resources were added to project  66 24.1 100 
Total                                                                               274                100.0 
 
 
Regarding the results of investigating the impact of the failing project on the person who 
was responsible for the project (Table 6.18), more than half of the respondents  are found 
to no longer be involved with project management, and even losing their jobs altogether 
(in 36 of the cases). While not having succeeded with a capital project investment was 
claimed to have no impact on the person involved in the failure in 83 of the responding 
companies, the fact senior management in 190 of the 274 responding companies reacted to 
failure with decisive action (i.e. removing/sacking the person responsible for the failure), 
further confirms the importance of capital investments to the country‟s economic growth 
plans and reinforces the formal approach taken to oversee the investments. Some 
similarity to these results can be traced in the literature to the fairly recent works of 
Collins (2001), Parker and Skitmore (2005), Dilts and Pence (2006), Lui and Chan (2008) 
and Wright and Capps (2011).  
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An issue of controllability seems to also emerge from the answers received as those 
respondents who claimed no personal impact from failing projects, clarified their answers 
by adding that “the decision is beyond the project manager’s authority”, or “it is not the 
decision maker’s fault to approve such a project”. It may therefore be deduced from this 
that senior management, through the formal procedures in place, recognize and take into 
account non-controllable factors when evaluating cases of project failure and take 
remedial action accordingly. 
      Table 6.18: Impact of Failing Project on Responsible Person 
Impact of Failing Project on Responsible Person Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative %  
No longer involved with project management 154 56.2 56.2 
No impact at all 83 30.3 86.5 
Lost his job and left the company 36 13.1 99.6 
Other impact 1 .4 100.0 
Total                274                100.0 
 
Overall, the results above give a fairly clear picture of how failing projects are dealt with 
and evaluated in responding companies, especially where the monetary factor plays a key 
role throughout. In almost all cases the final cost differed from the set budget, which is the 
prime investment motivator and, by the same token, the most important failure factor. A 
large number of the failing projects were terminated, knowing that the additional costs for 
the failing project were contractual penalties with customers. Finally, the majority of 
responsible managers for the failing project were no longer involved with project 
management.    
 
6.7 Determinants of the (De)-Escalation of Commitment Decisions 
The fourth section of the survey questionnaire (Questions 31-37) was designed to gather 
detailed information about the (de)-escalation of commitment decisions in the responding 
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companies by indicating the project-specific (financial, strategic, informational) and non-
project-specific (psychological, contextual, organisational) factors that influence these 
decisions. It is worthwhile to mention right from the outset that the study findings 
summarised through the ensuing descriptive statistics can only be meaningfully compared 
to some of the results of studies reviewed in Chapter Four. The reason for selective yet 
focused comparison is twofold. First, excluded from the comparison are the laboratory-
based studies because there is no real ground for like with like comparison given that they 
do not reflect company practice. Second, a whole sale comparison of the results of the 
present study to those of the non-laboratory-based studies is also not possible because of 
the many limitations of the latter as explained in Chapter Four.   
 
Answers to the preceding questions ranged from 0.4% to 100%, with most of the 
questions receiving a 100% response. 
 
6.7.1 Project-Specific Determinants 
Data presented in Tables 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21 shows the extent to which project-specific 
determinants in terms of financial, strategic and informational respectively influence 
managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions as follows. 
 
1. Financial Determinants  
The results of the current study show that all ten financial items (Table 6.19) influenced 
managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions. Seven out of ten financial items affected managers‟ 
de-escalation of commitment decisions, while the other three influenced managers‟ 
decisions to commit more resources to the failing project (escalation of commitment).  
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Table 6.19: Financial Determinants 
Financial Determinants Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
The withdrawal costs at a later date are 
much higher  
5 
(1.8) 
24 
(8.8) 
34 
(12.4) 
113 
(41.2) 
98 
(35.8) 
4.003 
(.999) 
The availability of a more financially 
attractive investment opportunity 
4 
(1.5) 
28 
(10.2) 
32 
(11.7) 
118 
(43.1) 
92 
(33.6) 
3.970 
(.997) 
The financial information clearly reflected 
the success and failure of the project 
9 
(3.3) 
29 
(10.6) 
32 
(11.7) 
114 
(41.6) 
90 
(32.8) 
3.901 
(1.076) 
The availability of project‟s costs 3 
(1.1) 
31 
(11.3) 
28 
(10.2) 
166 
(60.6) 
46 
(16.8) 
3.806 
(.886) 
The availability of the project estimated 
revenues 
4 
(1.5) 
30 
(10.9) 
15 
(5.5) 
193 
(70.4) 
32 
(11.7) 
3.799 
(.838) 
The availability of a limit for extending 
the estimated budget 
7 
(2.6) 
29 
(10.6) 
34 
(12.4) 
150 
(54.7) 
54 
(19.7) 
3.784 
(.965) 
The limit for extending the estimated 
budget was publicly announced 
15 
(5.5) 
76 
(27.7) 
77 
(28.1) 
75 
(27.4) 
31 
(11.3) 
3.113 
(1.101) 
The salvage value of the project is ignored 97 
(35.4) 
99 
(36.1) 
31 
(11.3) 
40 
(14.6) 
7 
(2.6) 
2.127 
(1.126) 
The extra funds required could not be 
raised in time to save the project 
80 
(29.2) 
133 
(48.5) 
27 
(9.9) 
26 
(9.5) 
8 
(2.9) 
2.083 
(1.014) 
The decision maker realized sunk costs 91 
(33.2) 
118 
(43.1) 
37 
(13.5) 
23 
(8.4) 
5 
(1.8) 
2.025 
(.984) 
*1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=unsure, 4=agree, 5=totally agree 
 
Regarding de-escalation of commitment, respondents ranked the “the withdrawal costs at 
a later date are much higher” item to have the highest degree of influence (M = 4.003), 
while the “limit for extending the estimated budget was publicly announced” item to have 
the least degree of effect (M = 3.113) on their decisions. Respondents, with relation to 
escalation of commitment, ranked the “salvage value of the project is ignored” item to 
have the least degree of influence (M = 2.127) and the “decision maker realized sunk 
costs” item to have the highest degree of effect (M = 2.025) on managers‟ decisions. 
 
These results are, as supported by the literature review in Chapter Four, to some extent in 
agreement with the findings of some previous case studies (e.g. Ross and Staw, 1993; 
Drummond, 1998; Keil et al., 2000; Pan et al., 2009).  Therefore, these determinants can 
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be described and classified according to their effect on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation 
decisions in Saudi companies, which is in agreement with results of previous studies, and 
within the approach-avoidance theory as follows: 
 Approach attributes: decision maker realized sunk costs, the salvage value of project is 
ignored, and extra funds required could not be raised in time to save the project. 
 
 Avoid attributes: the availability of the project estimated revenues, the availability of 
project‟s costs, the availability of a limit for extending the estimated budget, the 
availability of a more financially attractive investment opportunity, the financial 
information clearly reflected the success and failure of the project, and the withdrawal 
costs at a later date are much higher. 
 
2. Strategic Determinants 
All seven strategic items listed in the questionnaire have been recognised by the 
respondents as factors that have influenced their (de)-escalation decisions (Table 6.20), 
with three items associated with de-escalation of commitment and the other four with the 
escalation of commitment. 
Table 6.20: Strategic Determinants 
Strategic Determinants Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
The efficacy of resources utilization 1 
(.4) 
15 
(5.5) 
17 
(6.2) 
165 
(60.2) 
76 
(27.7) 
4.094 
(.764) 
The systematic continuous monitor of 
managers‟ actions 
4 
(1.5) 
22 
(8.0) 
26 
(9.5) 
147 
(53.6) 
75 
(27.4) 
3.974 
(.907) 
The flexibility to restructure the project 14 
(5.1) 
42 
(15.3) 
20 
(7.3) 
130 
(47.4) 
68 
(24.8) 
3.715 
(1.148) 
The low frequency of project progress 
reporting 
76 
(27.7) 
113 
(41.2) 
21 
(7.7) 
43 
(15.7) 
21 
(7.7) 
2.343 
(1.248) 
The low level of project risk 70 
(25.5) 
131 
(47.8) 
27 
(9.9) 
37 
(13.5) 
9 
(3.3) 
2.211 
(1.071) 
The low degree of project completion 75 
(27.4) 
141 
(51.5) 
19 
(6.9) 
33 
(12.0) 
6 
(2.2) 
2.102 
(1.007) 
The availability of a less strategically 
attractive investment opportunity   
76 
(27.7) 
161 
(58.8) 
16 
(5.8) 
16 
(5.8) 
5 
(1.8) 
1.952 
(.856) 
*1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=unsure, 4=agree, 5=totally agree 
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In relation to the de-escalation of commitment, respondents ranked the “efficacy of 
resources utilization” item to have the highest degree of influence (M = 4.094), while the 
“flexibility to restructure the project” item to have the relatively least effect on their 
decisions (M = 3.715). On the other hand, the respondents ranked “low frequency of 
project progress reporting” to have the least degree of influence (M = 2.343) and the 
“availability of a less strategically attractive investment opportunity” as the item with the 
highest impact on escalation decisions (M = 1.952). These findings bear resemblance to 
those reported by some of the existing studies (e.g., Drummond, 1998; Pan et al., 2006).   
 
Therefore, strategic determinants can be described according to their effect on managers‟ 
escalation de-escalation decisions and could be classified according to the approach-
avoidance theory in Saudi companies as follows: 
 Approach attributes: the availability of a less strategically attractive investment 
opportunity, the low degree of project completion, the low frequency of project 
progress reporting, and the low level of project risk. 
 
 Avoid attributes: the efficacy of resources utilization, the systematic continuous 
monitor of managers‟ actions, and the flexibility to restructure the project. 
 
3. Informational Determinants 
Descriptive analysis results show (see Table 6.21) that all five informational items 
influenced managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions. Three informational items affected 
managers‟ de-escalation of commitment decisions and two items influenced managers‟ 
escalation of commitment decisions.  
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Table 6.21: Informational Determinants 
Informational Determinants Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
The credibility of the information source 4 
(1.5) 
16 
(5.8) 
24 
(8.8) 
143 
(52.2) 
87 
(31.8) 
4.069 
(.876) 
The timing of the information is helpful for 
the decision maker 
2 
(.7) 
17 
(6.2) 
28 
(10.2) 
141 
(51.5) 
86 
(31.4) 
4.065 
(.853) 
The information is publicly available 17 
(6.2) 
36 
(13.1) 
33 
(12.0) 
116 
(42.3) 
72 
(26.3) 
3.693 
(1.173) 
The information is biased 63 
(23.0) 
122 
(44.5) 
22 
(8.0) 
49 
(17.9) 
18 
(6.6) 
2.405 
(1.207) 
The information about the failing project is 
ambiguous 
116 
(42.3) 
125 
(45.6) 
15 
(5.5) 
15 
(5.5) 
3 
(1.1) 
1.773 
(.864) 
*1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=unsure, 4=agree, 5=totally agree 
 
 
In relation to de-escalation of commitment, respondents ranked the “credibility of the 
information source” item to have the highest degree of influence (M = 4.069), while the 
“information is publicly available” item to have the least degree of effect (M = 3.693) on 
their decisions. Respondents, with regard to escalation of commitment, ranked the 
“information is biased” item to have the least degree of influence (M = 2.405) and the 
“information about the failing project is ambiguous” item to have the highest degree of 
effect (M = 1.773) on managers‟ decisions. 
 
These results are consistent conditionally with the outcomes of some previous studies 
summarised in Chapter Four (e.g. Keil, 1995; Keil et al., 2000; Pan et al., 2006). 
Therefore, informational determinants can be described and classified according to their 
effect on managers‟ escalation de-escalation decisions in Saudi companies, which is 
consistent with the empirical literature, within the approach-avoidance theory as follows: 
 Approach attributes: the information about the failing project is ambiguous and the 
information is biased. 
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 Avoid attributes: the credibility of the information source, the information is publicly 
available, and the timing of the information is helpful for the decision maker. 
 
6.7.2 Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
Data presented in Tables 6.22, 6.23 and 6.24 show the extent to which non-project-
specific determinants in terms of psychological, contextual, and organisational 
respectively influence managers‟ escalation de-escalation decisions as follows. 
 
1. Psychological Determinants 
The respondents have identified all the 12 psychological items listed in the questionnaire 
as factors that have influenced project (de)-escalation decisions in their companies (Table 
6.22. Seven of the listed items affected de-escalation of commitment decisions while the 
other five influenced escalation of commitment decisions.  
 
Regarding de-escalation of commitment, the respondents ranked the “project initiated by a 
group” item to have the highest degree of influence (M = 3.733), while the “manager’s 
experience of guilt and regret about the project’s failure” item to have the least degree of 
effect (M = 3.302) on their decisions. Respondents, considering escalation of commitment, 
ranked the “manager has personal gains” item to have the least degree of influence (M = 
2.613) and the “manager’s experience job insecurity” item to have the highest degree of 
effect (M = 2.292) on managers‟ decisions. Moreover, the item “relationships” was 
included as another psychological determinant that strongly influences a company‟s de-
escalation decision. 
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Table 6.22: Psychological Determinants 
Psychological Determinants Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Project initiated by a group 11 
(4.0) 
46 
(16.8) 
17 
(6.2) 
131 
(47.8) 
69 
(25.2) 
3.733 
(1.131) 
Manager has less tolerance for failure 11 
(4.0) 
56 
(20.4) 
8 
(2.9) 
122 
(44.5) 
77 
(28.1) 
3.722 
(1.190) 
Manager given the opportunity to state his low 
self esteem 
16 
(5.8) 
51 
(18.6) 
10 
(3.6) 
115 
(42.0) 
82 
(29.9) 
3.715 
(1.237) 
Manager was already committed to a mental 
budget 
15 
(5.5) 
52 
(19.0) 
15 
(5.5) 
130 
(47.4) 
62 
(22.6) 
3.627 
(1.182) 
Manager believes that the project is a failure and 
cannot be turned around 
14 
(5.1) 
46 
(16.8) 
15 
(5.5) 
165 
(60.2) 
34 
(12.4) 
3.580 
(1.066) 
Manager was allowed to bring to mind his high 
level of self esteem 
17 
(6.2) 
63 
(23.0) 
17 
(6.2) 
119 
(43.4) 
58 
(21.2) 
3.503 
(1.229) 
Manager experience of guilt and regret about the 
project‟s failure 
20 
(7.3) 
75 
(27.4) 
19 
(6.9) 
122 
(44.5) 
38 
(13.9) 
3.302 
(1.216) 
Manager has personal gains 42 
(15.3) 
131 
(47.8) 
14 
(5.1) 
65 
(23.7) 
22 
(8.0) 
2.613 
(1.226) 
Manager was initially responsible for initiating 
the project 
16 
(5.8) 
166 
(60.6) 
15 
(5.5) 
63 
(23.0) 
14 
(5.1) 
2.609 
(1.060) 
The desire to justify a previous decision 3 
(1.1) 
205 
(74.8) 
6 
(2.2) 
50 
(18.2) 
10 
(3.6) 
2.485 
(.926) 
Manager desire for self-efficiency 80 
(29.2) 
107 
(39.1) 
16 
(5.8) 
57 
(20.8) 
14 
(5.1) 
2.335 
(1.239) 
Manager experience job insecurity 83 
(30.3) 
111 
(40.5) 
13 
(4.7) 
51 
(18.6) 
16 
(5.8) 
2.292 
(1.241) 
Relationships (other psychological 
determinants) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(.4) 
5.000 
*1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=unsure, 4=agree, 5=totally agree 
 
These results are consistent to some extent with the evidence found in the empirical 
literature as indicated in Chapter Four (e.g., Lipshitz, 1995; Ryan, 1995; Drummond, 
1997; Pan et al., 2006). Therefore, psychological determinants can be described and 
classified according to their effect on managers‟ escalation de-escalation decisions in 
Saudi companies, which is consistent with the empirical literature, within the approach-
avoidance theory as follows: 
 Approach attributes: the desire to justify a previous decision, the manager was initially 
responsible for initiating the project, the manager experienced job insecurity, the 
manager‟s desire for self-efficiency, and the manager has personal interests. 
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 Avoid attributes: manager‟s experience of guilt and regret about the project‟s failure, 
the manager was allowed to bring to mind his high level of self-esteem, the project was 
initiated by a group, the manager was given the opportunity to state his low self-
esteem, the manager has less tolerance for failure, the manager was already committed 
to a mental budget, the manager believes that the project is a failure and cannot be 
turned around. 
 
 
2. Contextual Determinants 
The descriptive analysis of responses shows that all 14 contextual items influence 
managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions (Table 6.23). Half of the contextual items seem to 
affect managers‟ de-escalation of commitment decisions and the other half influence 
escalation of commitment decisions.  
 
Regarding de-escalation of commitment, the respondents ranked the “political 
interference to discontinue the project” item to have the highest degree of influence (M = 
3.813), while the “manager is rewarded for decision process rather than decision 
outcome” item to have the least degree of effect (M = 3.540) on their decisions. 
Considering the escalation of commitment, the respondents ranked the “effort the manager 
has put in the project is noticeable” item to have the least degree of influence (M = 2.540) 
and the “manager is respected for his previous history of managing projects” item to have 
the highest degree of effect (M = 2.208) on managers‟ decisions. 
 
These results are consistent to some extent with those found in  the empirical literature as 
summarised in Chapter Four (e.g. Ross and Staw, 1993; Drummond, 1994; Lipshitz, 1995; 
Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Kisfalvi, 2000; McElhinney and Proctor, 2005; Pan et al., 
2006 Pan et al., 2009).  
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Table 6.23: Contextual Determinants 
Contextual Determinants Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Political interference to discontinue the project 12 
(4.4) 
36 
(13.1) 
13 
(4.7) 
143 
(52.5) 
70 
(25.5) 
3.813 
(1.091) 
Manager educational background 10 
(3.6) 
46 
(16.8) 
19 
(6.9) 
111 
(40.5) 
88 
(32.1) 
3.806 
(1.165) 
Manager continuing a failing project would 
degrade his masculinity 
16 
(5.8) 
48 
(17.5) 
14 
(5.1) 
111 
(40.5) 
85 
(31.0) 
3.733 
(1.233) 
Manager is politically supported to discontinue the 
project 
19 
(6.9) 
50 
(18.2) 
11 
(4.0) 
108 
(39.4) 
86 
(31.4) 
3.700 
(1.274) 
Project and its goals were publicly announced 9 
(3.3) 
36 
(13.1) 
5 
(1.8) 
208 
(75.9) 
16 
(5.8) 
3.678 
(.893) 
Manager is socially motivated to discontinue the 
project 
11 
(4.0) 
64 
(23.4) 
15 
(5.5) 
102 
(37.2) 
82 
(29.9) 
3.656 
(1.239) 
Manager is rewarded for decision process rather 
than decision outcome 
20 
(7.3) 
53 
(19.3) 
18 
(6.6) 
125 
(45.6) 
58 
(21.2) 
3.540 
(1.229) 
Effort the manager has put in the project is 
noticeable 
46 
(16.8) 
129 
(47.1) 
20 
(7.3) 
63 
(23.0) 
16 
(5.8) 
2.540 
(1.183) 
Existence norms of modelling 41 
(15.0) 
153 
(55.8) 
15 
(5.5) 
53 
(19.3) 
12 
(4.4) 
2.423 
(1.094) 
Manager is saving his reputation 77 
(28.1) 
114 
(41.6) 
10 
(3.6) 
53 
(19.3) 
20 
(7.3) 
2.361 
(1.274) 
Project is a key project in the manager‟s portfolio 40 
(14.6) 
165 
(60.2) 
11 
(4.0) 
47 
(17.2) 
11 
(4.0) 
2.357 
(1.053) 
Manager is externally justifying others 55 
(20.1) 
139 
(50.7) 
17 
(6.2) 
40 
(14.6) 
23 
(8.4) 
2.405 
(1.201) 
Manager cultural background 73 
(26.6) 
130 
(47.4) 
8 
(2.9) 
48 
(17.5) 
15 
(5.5) 
2.277 
(1.190) 
Manager is respected for his previous history of 
managing projects 
84 
(30.7) 
120 
(43.8) 
11 
(4.0) 
47 
(17.2) 
12 
(4.4) 
2.208 
(1.178) 
*1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=unsure, 4=agree, 5=totally agree 
 
Therefore, contextual determinants can be described and classified according to their 
effect on managers‟ escalation de-escalation decisions in Saudi companies, which is 
consistent with the empirical literature, within the approach-avoidance theory as follows: 
 Approach attributes: project is a key project in the manager‟s portfolio, effort the 
manager has put in the project is noticeable, manager is saving his reputation, manager 
is respected for his previous history of managing projects, manager cultural 
background, manager is externally justifying others, and existence norms of modelling. 
  
 Avoid attributes: project and its goals were publicly announced, manager is rewarded 
for decision process rather than decision outcome, manager is socially motivated to 
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discontinue the project, manager is politically supported to discontinue the project, 
manager educational background, manager continuing a failing project would degrade 
his masculinity, and political interference to discontinue the project.  
 
 
3. Organisational Determinants 
The descriptive analysis of the responses received shows that all four organisational items 
seem to influence managers‟ (de)escalation decisions (Table 6.24). Two of these 
determinants have been associated with de-escalation of commitment decisions and the 
other two items with escalation of commitment decisions.  
Table 6.24: Organisational Determinants 
Organisational Determinants Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
The project was technically irretrievable   6 
(2.2) 
40 
(14.6) 
39 
(14.2) 
162 
(59.1) 
27 
(9.9) 
3.598 
(.929) 
Low investment in other technical side-bets 
of project   
7 
(2.6) 
46 
(16.8) 
64 
(23.4) 
115 
(42.0) 
42 
(15.3) 
3.507 
(1.024) 
The linkage of project to organisation‟s 
strategic existence is significant  
39 
(14.2) 
134 
(48.9) 
48 
(17.5) 
48 
(17.5) 
5 
(1.8) 
2.438 
(.997) 
Saving the organisation reputation   124 
(45.3) 
99 
(36.1) 
27 
(9.9) 
20 
(7.3) 
4 
(1.5) 
1.835 
(.975) 
*1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=unsure, 4=agree, 5=totally agree        
 
Regarding de-escalation of commitment, the respondents ranked the “project was 
technically irretrievable” item to have the highest degree of influence (M = 3.598), while 
the “low investment in other technical side-bets of project” item to have the least degree of 
effect (M = 3.507) on their decisions. Respondents, considering escalation of commitment, 
ranked the “linkage of project to organization’s strategic existence is significant” item to 
have the least degree of influence (M = 2.438) and the “saving the organization 
reputation” item to have the highest degree of effect (M = 1.835) on managers‟ decisions.  
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These results are to some extent, consistent with those summarised in the review of 
empirical literature in Chapter Four (e.g. Ross and Staw, 1993; Drummond, 1998). 
Therefore, organisational determinants can be described and classified according to their 
effect on managers‟ escalation de-escalation decisions in Saudi companies, which is 
consistent with the empirical literature, within the approach-avoidance theory as follows: 
 Approach attributes: saving the organisation reputation and the linkage of project to 
organisation‟s strategic existence is significant.  
 
 Avoid attributes: the project was technically irretrievable and low investment in other 
technical side-bets of project.  
 
6.7.3 The Perceived Role of Project Audit 
Descriptive analysis results show that applying project audit has, on the one hand, limited 
the influence of two of the non-specific determinants on project‟s (de)escalation decisions 
in respondents companies (Table 6.25). On the other hand, it increased the influence of 
project-specific determinants. 
 Table 6.25: Applying Operational Project Audit 
De-escalation Determinants Used level in Frequency, and (Percentage) n=274* 
1 2 3  4  5 M 
(S.D) 
Financial determinants 0 1 
(.4) 
112 
(40.9) 
0 161 
(58.8) 
4.580 
(.516) 
Informational determinants 0 0 1 
(.4) 
153 
(55.8) 
120 
(43.8) 
4.434 
(.503) 
Organisational determinants 1 
(.4) 
2 
(.7) 
27 
(9.9) 
183 
(66.8) 
61 
(22.3) 
4.098  
(.612) 
Strategic determinants 1 
(.4) 
2 
(.7) 
36 
(13.1) 
166 
(60.6) 
69 
(25.2) 
4.094 
(.661) 
Contextual determinants in terms of political effects 25 
(9.1) 
64 
(23.4) 
76 
(27.7) 
89 
(32.5) 
20 
(7.3) 
3.054  
(1.103) 
Psychological determinants 33 
(12.0) 
85 
(31.0) 
70 
(25.5) 
79 
(28.8) 
7 
(2.6) 
2.788  
(1.068) 
Contextual determinants in terms of social effects 41 
(15.0) 
89 
(32.5) 
68 
(24.8) 
69 
(25.2) 
7 
(2.6) 
2.678  
(1.085) 
Contextual determinants in terms of cultural effects 41 
(15.0) 
93 
(33.9) 
90 
(32.8) 
45 
(16.4) 
5 
(1.8) 
2.562  
(.993) 
*1=not important at all, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, 5=very important 
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Within the implementing process of operational project audit, the majority of respondents 
considered “financial determinants” a very important (M = 4.580) avoiding attribute for 
escalation decisions, while the item “contextual determinants in terms of political effects” 
was viewed the least important avoiding attribute for escalation decisions (M = 3.054). 
Alternatively, “psychological determinants” were considered the least important/very 
important (M = 2.788) approach attribute for escalation and “contextual determinants in 
terms of cultural effects” were viewed the most important/very important (M = 2.562) 
approach attribute for escalation of commitment decisions.  
 
Therefore, within the application of project audit, (de)escalation of commitment 
determinants can be classified, according to their effect on managers‟ decisions in Saudi 
companies and within the approach-avoidance theory, as follows: 
 Approach attributes: psychological determinants, contextual determinants in terms of 
social and cultural effects. 
 
 Avoid attributes: financial determinants, informational determinants, organisational 
determinants, strategic determinants, and contextual determinants in terms of political 
influences.    
6.8 Summary and Conclusion 
The aim in this chapter was to provide descriptive statistics based on original data 
collected with survey questionnaires to companies in Jeddah City in Saudi Arabia. The 
results of both the Mann-Whitney U test and the Chi-Square tests for relatedness have 
ruled out the presence of non-response bias, thus making it possible to generalise results 
from this large scale study which, to the researcher‟s best knowledge, is the first of its 
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kind on the complex phenomenon of the commitment of escalation in capital project 
decisions. 
 
A key generalizable finding, at least to the population of companies sampled from for the 
large questionnaire survey undertaken, is the widespread use of formal processes of capital 
project investment that take care of all stages of a project‟s life from its inception to post-
completion audit. Central to these formal processes is the use of established techniques of 
capital appraisal, particularly the DCF techniques of NPV and IRR. The demand for and 
noticeable intensity of this formal approach are underscored by investment programmes 
dictated by the country‟s economic growth plans and carried through companies in the 
various industrial sectors represented by the 274 companies that have taken part in the 
present study. However, despite the systematic approach to all aspects of capital project 
investments, it has neither stopped investments from exceeding original budgets and 
eventually failing, nor prevented managers faced with the prospect of a failing project 
from pouring more resources into the project and thus escalating their commitment to it. 
This raises the question asked to how rational the reported (de)-escalation decisions are, 
knowing that sunk costs only appear to be a major determinant of escalation (66 
companies) but are the least of concerns for the managers who de-escalated projects (208 
companies). This may indicate that most project managers in the present study make 
prospectively rational decisions that avoid the much talked about sunk costs fallacy 
(Klimek, 1997; Baliga and Ely, 2011). Although, the formal corporate approach 
sometimes resulted in project managers being demoted and sometimes sacked as an 
expression of prospective rationality that curtails project mismanagement, failing projects 
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have not only been a commonly recurring event in the representative sample of companies 
but a seemingly pervasive and increasing one as well, creating the intriguing (de)-
escalation of commitment phenomenon. The explanations offered by the respondents to 
the questionnaire survey as to the array of project-specific and other determinants that 
influence such commitment have justified the research design adopted for this study that 
incorporates, besides financial and technical factors, contextual and behavioural 
considerations which have so far largely been confined to the experimentation of 
laboratory-based studies. The results of the data analysis thus far also lend strong support 
to extending the study of the (de)-escalation of commitment phenomenon beyond the 
direct effect of a set of determinants to include an interaction term, in this case project 
audit, in order to unravel this phenomenon from the experience and perception of 
managers in a large sectional study in a developing economy environment.     
 
The (de)-escalation of commitment is so complex that it is impossible to comprehend it 
through laboratory experiment settings. Although the results described above are 
statistically generalizable within the Saudi corporate decision making environment, they 
clearly indicate that more of this type of study based on real management practice need to 
be undertaken in different countries to be able not only to have a better understanding of 
the (de)-escalation phenomenon but also to inform and improve practice. The data 
richness of the current study and its contributions to knowledge will become more 
apparent in the next chapter through the detailed results of the multinomial logistic 
regression used in hypothesis testing, followed by the interview-based case studies 
developed in Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Seven 
Hypotheses Testing: Analysis of the Determinants of (De)-
Escalation Decisions and the Moderating Role of Project Audit 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of inferential statistical analysis. It consists of the 
following sections: construct definitions and statistical tools (Section 7.2), assessing 
multinomial logistic regression (MLR) assumptions (Section 7.3), testing of direct effect 
hypotheses (Section 7.4), and the analysis of the intervening role of operational project 
audit (Section 7.5). A summary of the hypotheses test results is provided in Section 7.6, 
followed by the chapter‟s conclusion in Section 7.7.  
 
7.2 Variables Definitions and Statistical Tools Used for Hypothesis Testing 
This section will first summarise, in relation to the study‟s theoretical model, the 
examined variables and explains or justifies the statistical tools are used in testing the 
hypotheses. 
 
7.2.1 Construct Definitions 
As mentioned in Chapter One, this study examines the relationship between project-
specific/non-specific determinants and managers‟ (de)-escalation decisions in addition to 
the moderating role that operational audit might have on project (de)-escalation of 
commitment decisions in Saudi Arabia. As summarised in Table 7.1, the dependent 
variable is measured through managers‟ choices (likewise: Keil et al., 2000; Karlsson et 
al., 2002; Wong et al., 2006; Zhiyuan and Qing, 2008). Respondents were asked to make 
262 
 
one choice between three categories; (1) to continue adding more resources to the failing 
project, (2) to terminate the failing project, or (3) to redirect the failing project. Since the 
dependent variable consists of three categories (choices), where there is no underlying 
order to the categories, therefore, it is a categorical variable (Field, 2009; Hosmer et al., 
2013). All impendent variables including moderating levels of project auditing were 
measured on a 5-Likert Scale, which made them continuous variables (for a detailed 
definition of all independent variables see Chapter Five; Section 5.2).  
 
Table 7.1 Variables Conceptualisation and Operationalisation 
Variables Type Definition 
Failing project decision  Dependent Three decisions related to the failing project: add more 
resources/terminate project/redirect project.  
Operational project audit  Independent/
moderator 
All relevant project audit information: use of project audit, 
project audit in the evaluation stage, quality of project audit 
process, assessment of audit reports, response of project 
manager to audit reports, project audit steps. 
Project-Specific Determinants  
Financial determinants  Independent Factors related to the system of in and out cash flows: amount 
invested/amount expected of failing project.  
Strategic determinants  Independent Factors related to strategic investment decision-making issues 
where top management takes responsibility of. 
Informational 
determinants  
Independent All relevant information: digits/description of specific 
condition related to failing project.     
Non-Project-Specific Determinants  
Psychological 
determinants 
Independent Variables linked to decision maker‟s reactions/characters/ 
feelings and emotions.   
Contextual determinants Independent Factors beyond managers‟ control: political 
interference/cultural values/social traditions.  
Organisational 
determinants 
Independent Factors related to organizational culture and policy. 
 
7.2.2 Statistical Tools Used for Hypothesis Testing  
Multinomial logistic regression (MLR) is a statistical tool that is typically applied when 
the dependent variable is not continuous (or dichotomous; in this case it has three values 
as explained in Section 7.2.1), MLR shares few assumptions with the common linear or 
multiple regression tests, but differs fundamentally in the way that it deals with 
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assumptions related to linearity, independence of errors, and multicollinearity issues. 
Moreover, the assumption of normality is not required in MLR and the form of the 
equation differs (Field, 2009) as it predicts the probability of the occurrence of the 
dependent variable [p(y)] given known values of the independent variables: 
P(y)= 
                                 1 
1 + e – (b0 + b1X1i + b2X2i + ... + bnXni) 
                                     
Where P(y): probability of the occurrence of the dependent variable (y). 
            b: coefficients.  
            X: independent variable. 
 
 
In MLR the assumption of linearity can be established by examining the predictors‟ linear 
relationship with the Log of the outcome variable. Any interaction that is significant 
indicates that the main effect has violated the assumption of linearity of the Logit. 
Alternatively, any interaction that is insignificant supports the assumption of linearity 
(Field, 2009). As for the independence of errors, this assumption can be established in 
MLR by measuring the dispersion level through comparing the Chi-Square goodness of fit 
to its degrees of freedom. If this ratio is greater than one, over-dispersion will occur which 
results in violating the assumption of the independence of errors, but if the ratio is less 
than one, under-dispersion will occur, which supports the assumption of the independence 
of errors (Field, 2009). 
 
Another important assumption of MLR is to test for whether the independent variables are 
closely correlated, i.e., testing for the presence of multicollinearity which renders the 
individual coefficient estimates to become less reliable as it is not possible to accurately 
separate out the individual effects of the independent variables (Downing and Clark, 
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2009). One way to identify multicollinearity is to form a correlation table of all the 
predictors with the aim of finding out whether there is high correlation between them 
(Hair et al., 1998; Field, 2009). In addition, two common tests to measure the existence of 
multicollinearity can be used; these are the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF<10) and the 
Tolerance Statistic of not less than 0.1 (Hair et al., 1998; Field, 2009). The results of both 
the linearity and multicollinearity assumptions will be presented. 
  
7.3 Assessing Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) Assumptions 
As explained in Chapter Five, escalation/de-escalation determinants are classified into two 
types: project-specific (financial, strategic, informational) and non-project-specific 
(psychological, contextual, organisational) determinants, where each of the determinants 
consisting of several related items. Relationship analyses are carried out to examine the 
direct influence of each of these items as well as exploring which of the determinants has 
the greatest power in the interpretation of managers' escalation/de-escalation decisions.  
 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous; i.e., the decision to escalate commitment 
(add more resources), or to de-escalate the project (either to terminate or redirect), the 
most appropriate statistical tool to use in this case is Multinomial Logistic Regression 
(MLR). In order to apply MLR properly, the tests sammarised in Table 7.3 need to be 
applied (see Menard, 1995; Peng et al., 2002; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Field, 2009; 
Hosmer et al., 2013).  
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 Table 7.2: MLR Statistical Tests, Tools, and Measurements 
Tests Tools Measurements 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
• Akaike‟s 
Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
• Schwarz‟s 
Bayesian 
Information 
Criterion (BIC) 
• -2 Log 
Likelihood 
• Low difference between the baseline model and the logistic regression model 
(LRM) for the values of the AIC and BIC indicate good fit of the model. 
• -2 log likelihood, the larger the value of the log-likelihood, the more unexplained 
observations there are. 
 
In the current study, this information will be presented in the model fitting 
information table, as the baseline model is the one that only the constant is 
included while the logistic regression model is the one with all items that are 
grouped under each determinant separately are included.   
 
Likelihood 
Ratio Tests 
Chi-Square 
Distribution   
• The likelihood ratio test (LL ratio) is based on –2LL ratio, which examines the 
significance of the difference between the (–2LL ratio) for the (LRM) minus the 
(LL ratio) for the baseline model. Where at the .05 level or lower means that 
(LRM) is significantly different from the one with the constant only. The Chi-
square distribution is used to assess the significance of this ratio. 
 
In the current study the (LL ratio) will be presented in two tables: the model 
fitting information table for all items within each determinant, and in the 
Likelihood ratio test table to assess the significant influence of each item 
separately on the managers‟ (de)escalation decisions.  
 
Goodness of 
fit  
• The Pearson 
Statistic   
• The Deviance 
Statistic  
The Pearson and Deviance statistics test the same thing, which is whether the 
predicted values from the model differ significantly from the observed values. If 
these statistics are not significant then the predicted values are not significantly 
different from the observed values; in other words, the model is a good fit.  
 
In the current study, these tests will be presented in the model fitting 
information table to assess the goodness of fit of all items within each 
determinant.  
 
Pseudo R-
Square 
• Cox and Snell 
Statistic 
• Nagelkerke 
Statistic  
• McFadden 
Statistic 
 
The multiple correlation in logistic regression known as the R-statistic is the 
partial correlation between the outcome variable and each of the predictor 
variables and it can vary between –1 and 1. A positive value indicates, that as the 
predictor variable increases, so does the likelihood of the event occurring. A 
negative value implies that as the predictor variable increases, the likelihood of 
the outcome occurring decreases. If a variable has a small value of R then it 
contributes only a small amount to the model. 
 
In the current study, these tests will be presented in the model fitting 
information table to assess the goodness of fit of all items within each 
determinant.  
 
Parameter 
Estimates 
• Wald Statistic 
• Chi-Square 
distribution (χ²)  
• Exp (B) Ratio 
The Wald statistic, which is based on the Chi-Square distribution, shows whether 
the b coefficient for any predictor is significantly different from zero, if it is 
significantly different from zero then it is assumed that the predictor makes a 
significant contribution to the prediction of the outcome (dependent variable). 
While the value of the odds ratio (Exp (B) indicates the change in odds resulting 
from a unit change in the predictor.  
If the value of (Exp(B) is greater than 1, then it indicates that as the predictor 
increases, the odds of the outcome occurring increase. in opposition, a value less 
than 1 indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring 
decrease. 
In the current study, these tests will be presented in the parameter estimates 
table, to assess the significant of the influence of each item on either managers‟ 
escalation or de-escalation decisions.    
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7.3.1 Verification of MLR Linearity Assumption 
The results presented in Table 7.3 show that all six interactions have significant (Sig.) 
values that are >.05, which implies that the assumption of linearity of the Logit has been 
met for all six predictors [psychological (d.1), contextual (d.2), organisational (d.3), 
financial (d.4), strategic (d.5), and informational (d.6)]. 
Table 7.3: Results of Linearity Tests* 
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
d.1 -.008 3.052 .000 1 .998 .992 
d.2 -7.747 9.068 .730 1 .393 .000 
d.3 1.221 2.931 .174 1 .677 3.392 
d.4 14.294 14.564 .963 1 .326 1613823.757 
d.5 -15.883 9.704 2.679 1 .102 .000 
d.6 3.434 9.806 .123 1 .726 30.991 
Ln(d.1)*d.1 .143 1.282 .012 1 .911 1.154 
Ln(d.2)*d.2 3.648 4.177 .762 1 .383 38.383 
Ln(d.3)*d.3 -.594 1.396 .181 1 .670 .552 
Ln(d.4)*d.4 -6.317 6.629 .908 1 .341 .002 
Ln(d.5)*d.5 7.390 4.639 2.538 1 .111 1619.845 
Ln(d.6)*d.6 -1.736 4.570 .144 1 .704 .176 
Constant 4.252 32.296 .017 1 .895 70.274 
* Ln: the log of the independent variable, B: beta, S.E: standard error, Wald: parametric test, df: degree of 
freedom, Sig: significant, Exp(B): expected beta. 
 
7.3.2 Verification of MLR Multicollinearity Assumption 
There is no high correlation between any of the independent variables (see Table 7.4); the 
highest correlation value is .161, which is considered very low. VIF values also do not 
exceed the conventional level of 10, as the highest score is 1.051, and there are no values 
of tolerance below the recommended level of 0.1.  
 
Therefore, there is no evidence for the existence of multicollinearity between the 
independent variables. Since each independent variable consists of a number of items, 
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additional multicollinearity tests will be carried out below for these constituent items 
when testing individual hypotheses.  
         Table 7.4: Results of Multicollinearity Tests 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
 
d.1 d.2 d.3 d.4 d.5 d.6 Tolerance VIF 
d.1 1 
     
.983 1.017 
d.2 -.022 1 
    
.981 1.019 
d.3 -.016 -.017 1 
   
.997 1.003 
d.4 -.038 .008 -.002 1 
  
.972 1.029 
d.5 .069 .130 .029 -.161 1 
 
.951 1.051 
d.6 .099 -.009 .041 .026 .016 1 .987 1.013 
 
 
7.4 Testing of the Research Direct Effect Hypotheses   
The results of the MLR tests described in Section 7.3 will be presented, in agrerement 
with survey questionnaires studies that applied MLR tests in social science (i.e., Law, 
2010; Mzoughi and M‟Sallem, 2013) and as suggested by logistic regression studies (i.e., 
Menard, 1995; Peng et al., 2002), after multicollinearity results, in a series of three tables 
below for each of the predictor variables as follows: 
 The first table will present the Model Fitting Information for all items to establish 
whether the hypothesized model explains the observed relationships captured by the 
data colllected through the following: a) Model Goodness of Fit, b) Pseudo R-Square, 
c) Model Fitting Criteria, and d) Likelihood Ratio Test.  
 
 The second table will present the Likelihood Ratio Test for each of the items separately 
to determine which of the items included significantly influences managers' 
escalation/de-escalation decisions by representing both the Model Fitting Criteria, and 
the Likelihood Ratio Test. 
  
 The third table will present the Parameter Estimates for each of the items separately, 
by considering the decision to redirect the project as the reference point, to specify 
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which of those items will significantly contribute to either the decision to escalate/de-
escalate the failing project. The estimates are: the partial logistic regression coefficients 
(B), the standard errors of the partial slope coefficients, the Wald test, the significance 
level, and the exponentiated slope coefficient (ExpB). 
7.4.1 Analysis of Project-Specific Determinants  
This section presents the results of the MLR tests for the financial, strategic and 
informational determinants. For the analysis results to be comprehensible, first the code 
and value impact of each item of the project-specific determinants are listed in Table 7.5.   
Table 7.5: Code and Value of Project-Specific Determinants 
Determinants Code Value 
Financial Determinants (d.4) 
The availability of the project estimated revenues d.4.1 Positive  
The availability of the project‟s costs d.4.2 Positive  
The decision maker realized sunk costs d.4.3 Negative  
The financial information clearly reflected the success and failure of the project d.4.4 Positive    
The availability of a more financially attractive investment opportunity d.4.5 Positive  
The salvage value of the project is ignored d.4.6 Negative  
The withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher d.4.7 Positive  
The extra funds required could not be raised in time to save the project d.4.8 Negative  
The availability of a limit for extending the estimated budget d.4.9 Positive  
The limit for extending the estimated budget was publicly announced d.4.10 Positive  
Strategic Determinants (d.5) 
The efficacy of resources utilization d.5.1 Positive  
The availability of a less strategically attractive investment opportunity d.5.2 Negative  
The low degree of project completion d.5.3 Negative  
The systematic continuous monitoring of managers‟ actions d.5.4 Positive  
The low frequency of project progress reporting  d.5.5 Negative  
The flexibility to restructure the project d.5.6 Positive  
The low level of project risk d.5.7 Negative  
Informational Determinants (d.6) 
The information about the failing project is ambiguous  d.6.1 Negative  
The credibility of the information source d.6.2 Positive  
The information is biased d.6.3 Negative  
The information is publicly available d.6.4 Positive  
The timing of the information is helpful for the decision maker d.6.5 Positive  
 
1. Financial Determinants 
Financial determinants consist of ten items (Table 7.5) that are assumed to relate to 
managers' escalation'/de-escalation decisions as stated in hypothesis H1:    
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 H1: Financial determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.  
  
Table 7.6: Multiple Correlation Results for Financial Determinants 
 
d.4.1 d.4.2 d.4.3 d.4.4 d.4.5 d.4.6 d.4.7 d.4.8 d.4.9 d.4.10 
d.4.1 1 
         
d.4.2 .598 1 
        
d.4.3 -.162 -.109 1 
       
d.4.4 .019 -.016 -.134 1 
      
d.4.5 .041 .006 .070 .280 1 
     
d.4.6 -.070 -.117 .053 -.144 -.146 1 
    
d.4.7 .071 .046 -.118 .113 .033 -.192 1 
   
d.4.8 -.029 -.057 -.022 -.099 .010 .028 -.210 1 
  
d.4.9 -.144 -.019 .033 -.042 .092 -.059 .107 -.260 1 
 
d.4.10 -.181 -.037 -.003 .074 .086 -.080 .069 -.148 .250 1 
 
The preliminary analysis of the ten financial determinants rules out multicollinearity (see 
Table 7.6) and indicates a good data fit model (see the Deviance (p = .172) and the 
Pearson (p = .081) statistics in Table 7.6. Therefore, the hypothesized model explains the 
observed relationships captured by the data collected. The model fitting information 
indicates that collectively financial determinants significantly influence managers‟ 
escalation/de-escalation decisions in Saudi companies (χ² = 34.304, p = .024); therefore, 
hypothesis H1 is accepted. As is explained below, this collective impact comes from a 
subset of, (i.e. not all) the ten financial items.  
Table 7.7: Model Fitting Information for Financial Determinants 
Goodness-of-Fit Pseudo R-Square 
 Chi-Square χ
2
 df Sig. Cox and Snell .118 
Pearson 553.109 508 .081 Nagelkerke .134 
Deviance 538.014 508 .172 McFadden .059 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square χ
2
 df Sig. 
Intercept 
Only 
580.477 587.703 576.477    
Final 586.173 665.662 542.173 34.304 20 .024 
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The financial determinants that influence managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions 
are shown in Table 7.8. The first is (d.4.4) “the financial information clearly reflected the 
success and failure of the project” (χ2= 10.921, p < .05), and the second is (d.4.7) “the 
withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher” (χ2= 9.896, p < .05). Further, as the 
output does not explain the extent to which those items influence the decision whether to 
escalate or de-escalate commitment, the individual parameter estimates will demonstrate 
such information in Table 7.9.     
 
Table 7.8: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Financial Determinants 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
BIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square 
χ
2
 
df Sig. 
Intercept 585.369 657.631 545.369 3.196 2 .202 
d.4.1 583.557 655.820 543.557 1.384 2 .501 
d.4.2 582.298 654.561 542.298 .126 2 .939 
d.4.3 582.937 655.200 542.937 .764 2 .682 
d.4.4 593.094 665.356 553.094 10.921 2 .004 
d.4.5 582.576 654.839 542.576 .403 2 .817 
d.4.6 583.035 655.298 543.035 .862 2 .650 
d.4.7 592.069 664.331 552.069 9.896 2 .007 
d.4.8 584.715 656.978 544.715 2.543 2 .280 
d.4.9 582.957 655.220 542.957 .784 2 .676 
d.4.10 584.031 656.294 544.031 1.858 2 .395 
The chi-square statistic χ2 is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced 
model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is 
that all parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
The results of the individual parameter estimates for the financial determinants (see Table 
7.9) support the statistical output of the likelihood ratio test as it shows that both items 
“the financial information clearly reflected the success and failure of the project” and “the 
withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher”, and influence managers‟ escalation/de-
escalation decisions significantly as follows: 
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Table 7.9: Parameter Estimates for Financial Determinants 
Failing Project
a
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
More 
resources 
added to 
project  
Intercept -3.539 2.118 2.791 1 .095    
d.4.1 -.249 .269 .852 1 .356 .780 .460 1.322 
d.4.2 .080 .250 .103 1 .748 1.084 .664 1.770 
d.4.3 .113 .188 .363 1 .547 1.120 .775 1.619 
d.4.4 .547 .190 8.311 1 .004 1.727 1.191 2.505 
d.4.5 -.118 .193 .374 1 .541 .889 .610 1.296 
d.4.6 -.093 .170 .298 1 .585 .912 .654 1.271 
d.4.7 .537 .192 7.796 1 .005 1.711 1.174 2.495 
d.4.8 -.084 .198 .178 1 .673 .920 .624 1.356 
d.4.9 .170 .206 .684 1 .408 1.186 .792 1.775 
d.4.10 -.117 .172 .467 1 .494 .889 .635 1.245 
Project 
terminated 
Intercept -2.349 1.730 1.844 1 .174    
d.4.1 .026 .236 .012 1 .912 1.026 .646 1.630 
d.4.2 .009 .211 .002 1 .966 1.009 .667 1.526 
d.4.3 -.034 .161 .046 1 .830 .966 .705 1.323 
d.4.4 .379 .146 6.769 1 .009 1.460 1.098 1.942 
d.4.5 -.030 .161 .034 1 .853 .971 .708 1.331 
d.4.6 .047 .138 .117 1 .732 1.049 .799 1.376 
d.4.7 .372 .151 6.027 1 .014 1.450 1.078 1.951 
d.4.8 .167 .158 1.115 1 .291 1.181 .867 1.610 
d.4.9 .029 .164 .032 1 .858 1.030 .747 1.420 
d.4.10 -.193 .142 1.843 1 .175 .825 .624 1.089 
a. The reference category is: project redirected. 
 
 The first item, which is “the financial information clearly reflected the success and 
failure of the project (d.4.4)” significantly predicts (B = .547, Wald = 8.311, p = .004) 
that any one unit increase in this item leads to an (Exp(B) = 1.727) increase in the 
possibility that managers will add more resources than redirect the failing project. It 
also significantly predicts (B = .379, Wald = 6.769, p = .009) that any one unit 
increase in this item leads to an (Exp(B) = 1.460) increase in the probability that 
managers will terminate the failing project than redirect it. 
 
 The second item is “the withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher (d.4.7)” 
predicts significantly (B = .537, Wald = 7.796, p = .005) that any one unit increase in 
this item leads to an (Exp(B) = 1.711) increase in the probability that  managers will 
add more resources than redirect the failing project. It also significantly predicts (B = 
.372, Wald = 6.027, p = .014) that any one unit increase in this item leads to an 
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(Exp(B) = 1.450) increase in the probability that managers will terminate the failing 
project than redirect it.  
 
To conclude, hypothesis H1 is accepted since the results in this section confirm the 
collective influence of the financial determinants on the escalation/de-escalation decisions, 
through the following items: 
 Approach attributes: “the financial information clearly reflected the success and 
failure of the project” and “the withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher”. 
 
 Avoid attributes: “the financial information clearly reflected the success and failure of 
the project” and “the withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher”.  
 
The MLR results (approach/avoid attributes) are, to some extent, similar to a number of 
escalation/de-escalation studies (see Chapters Three and Four) that examined financial 
determinants, as when managers make escalation/de-escalation decisions they seem to be 
influenced by the fact that the information provided clearly reflected the success and 
failure of their capital projects and that withdrawal costs are too significant to be ignored 
(e.g. Ross and Staw, 1993; Winch, 2013).  
 
2. Strategic Determinants  
As shown earlier Table 7.5, strategic determinants consist of ten items that are assumed to 
relate to managers' escalation'/de-escalation decisions as stated in hypothesis H2:     
H2: Strategic determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
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Table 7.10: Multiple Correlation Results for Strategic Determinants 
 
d.5.1 d.5.2 d.5.3 d.5.4 d.5.5 d.5.6 d.5.7 
d.5.1 1 
      
d.5.2 -.301 1 
     
d.5.3 -.151 .218 1 
    
d.5.4 .204 -.143 -.201 1 
   
d.5.5 .217 -.117 .001 .068 1 
  
d.5.6 -.274 -.032 -.035 -.155 -.445 1 
 
d.5.7 .016 .103 .058 .006 -.068 -.150 1 
 
 
In addition to the absence of multicollinearity (see Table 7.10), the hypothesized model is 
formed to explain the observed relationships captured by the data collected. Table 7.11 
shows that both the Deviance (p = .107) and the Pearson (p = .253) statistics report that 
the model presented is a good fit of the data, but this is limited by the Pseudo R-Square 
results (McFadden .046 rate). Therefore, the model presented is a limited fit of the data in 
this case. 
Table 7.11: Model Fitting Information for Strategic Determinants 
Goodness-of-Fit Pseudo R-Square 
 Chi-Square χ2 df Sig. Cox and Snell .093 
Pearson 453.180 434 .253 Nagelkerke .105 
Deviance 470.965 434 .107 McFadden .046 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square χ2 df Sig. 
Intercept Only 536.298 543.525 532.298    
Final 537.653 595.463 505.653 26.645 14 .021 
 
 
Furthermore, the model fitting information (Table 7.11) shows that collectively strategic 
determinants significantly influence managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions in Saudi 
companies (χ2 = 26.645, p = .021). Therefore, hypothesis H2 is confirmed.  
              
As explained below, this collective impact does not come from all seven strategic items 
(see Table 7.12), as the likelihood ratio test indicates that there is only one item of the 
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strategic determinants that has a significant influence on managers escalation/de-
escalation decisions, which is (d.5.5) “the low frequency of project progress reporting” 
(χ2 = 9.930, p = .007).  
  
 Table 7.12: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Strategic Determinants 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
BIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square 
χ2 
df Sig. 
Intercept 537.684 588.268 509.684 4.031 2 .133 
d.5.1 535.326 585.910 507.326 1.673 2 .433 
d.5.2 534.093 584.677 506.093 .440 2 .803 
d.5.3 534.643 585.227 506.643 .990 2 .610 
d.5.4 536.414 586.998 508.414 2.761 2 .251 
d.5.5 543.584 594.168 515.584 9.930 2 .007 
d.5.6 533.794 584.378 505.794 .141 2 .932 
d.5.7 534.821 585.405 506.821 1.168 2 .558 
The chi-square χ2 statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a 
reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null 
hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
 
The individual parameter estimates for the strategic determinants (see Table 7.13) 
indicates that “the low frequency of project progress reporting (d.5.5)” significantly 
influences managers‟ decisions, as it predicts (B = -.422, Wald = 6.131, p = .013) that any 
one unit increase in this item leads to a (Exp(B) = .982) unit decrease in the probability 
that managers will add more resources than redirect the failing project. It also significantly 
predicts (B = -.404, Wald = 8.202, p = .004) that any one unit increase in this item leads to 
the (Exp(B) = .668) decrease in the probability that managers will redirect the failing 
project than terminate it. 
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Table 7.13: Parameter Estimates for Strategic Determinants 
Failing project
a
 B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
More 
resources 
added to 
project  
Intercept 3.647 1.982 3.387 1 .066    
d.5.1 -.308 .254 1.474 1 .225 .735 .447 1.208 
d.5.2 -.068 .218 .098 1 .754 .934 .609 1.433 
d.5.3 -.179 .183 .957 1 .328 .836 .585 1.196 
d.5.4 -.323 .201 2.578 1 .108 .724 .488 1.074 
d.5.5 -.422 .171 6.131 1 .013 .656 .469 .916 
d.5.6 .055 .186 .086 1 .770 1.056 .733 1.521 
d.5.7 .007 .169 .002 1 .969 1.007 .723 1.402 
Project 
terminated  
Intercept 2.779 1.717 2.620 1 .106    
d.5.1 -.082 .228 .130 1 .718 .921 .589 1.439 
d.5.2 -.123 .186 .437 1 .508 .884 .614 1.273 
d.5.3 -.061 .150 .163 1 .686 .941 .701 1.263 
d.5.4 -.217 .179 1.480 1 .224 .805 .567 1.142 
d.5.5 -.404 .141 8.202 1 .004 .668 .506 .880 
d.5.6 -.008 .154 .003 1 .957 .992 .734 1.341 
d.5.7 .130 .140 .867 1 .352 1.139 .866 1.498 
a. The reference category is: project redirected. 
 
 
Therefore, hypothesis H2 is accepted since the results in this section confirm the influence 
of the strategic determinants on the escalation/de-escalation decisions. This impact is 
driven by the effect of “the low frequency of project progress reporting”, which can be 
considered, according to the MLR results, as an approach as well as an avoid attribute for 
managers‟ decisions. Regarding approach/avoid attributes, this is reasonably consistent 
with the results of previous studies (see Chapters Three and Four) where escalation/de-
escalation decisions were influenced by the low frequency of progress reporting of the 
failing project (Keil and Robey, 1999).  
 
3. Informational Determinants 
Informational determinants consist of five items (Table 7.5) that are assumed to relate to 
managers' escalation'/de-escalation decisions as stated in hypothesis H3:     
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H3:  Informational determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
       Table 7.14: Multiple Correlation Results for Informational Determinants 
 
d.6.1 d.6.2 d.6.3 d.6.4 d.6.5 
d.6.1 1 
    
d.6.2 -.265 1 
   
d.6.3 -.122 -.065 1 
  
d.6.4 -.004 -.072 -.400 1 
 
d.6.5 -.064 .058 .148 .134 1 
 
 
The preliminary analysis of the five informational determinants rules out any 
multicollinearity (see Table 7.14). Moreover, the hypothesized model is formed to explain 
the observed relationships captured by the data collected. Table 7.15 shows that both the 
Deviance (p = .059) and the Pearson (p = .139) statistics report that the model presented is 
a good fit of the data, this result is, however, limited by the Pseudo R-Square results 
(McFadden .048 rate). Therefore, the model presented explains is a limited fit of the data 
in this case. Additionally, Table 7.15 shows that collectively informational determinants 
significantly influence managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions in Saudi companies 
(χ2 = 27.649, p = .0025). Therefore, hypothesis H3 is confirmed. As is explained below, 
this collective impact comes from a subset of, (i.e. not all) the five informational items.  
Table 7.15: Model Fitting Information for Informational Determinants  
Goodness-of-Fit Pseudo R-Square 
 
Chi-Square 
χ2 
df Sig. Cox and Snell .096 
Pearson 326.649 300 .139 Nagelkerke .109 
Deviance 339.286 300 .059 McFadden .048 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square χ2 df Sig. 
Intercept 
Only 
448.832 456.059 444.832    
Final 441.183 484.541 417.183 27.649 10 .002 
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The informational determinants with the most influence on managers‟ escalation/de-
escalation decisions are shown in Table 7.16. The first item is (d.6.1) “the information 
about the failing project is ambiguous” (χ2 = 6.531, p = .038), and the second is (d.6.3) 
“the information is biased” (χ2 = 6.439, p = .040). However, the output does not explain 
the extent to which those items influence the decision of whether to escalate or de-
escalate which the individual parameter estimates will demonstrate.   
 
   Table 7.16: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Informational Determinants 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
BIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square χ2 df Sig. 
Intercept 437.626 473.758 417.626 .443 2 .801 
d.6.1 443.714 479.846 423.714 6.531 2 .038 
d.6.2 439.555 475.686 419.555 2.372 2 .305 
d.6.3 443.623 479.754 423.623 6.439 2 .040 
d.6.4 439.745 475.877 419.745 2.562 2 .278 
d.6.5 439.808 475.939 419.808 2.625 2 .269 
The chi-square χ2 statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a 
reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The 
null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
The individual parameter estimates for the informational determinants (see Table 7.17) 
confirms the results of the likelihood ratio test (in Table 7.16) that two items significantly 
influence managers‟ escalation de-escalation decisions as follows: 
 The first item is “the information about the failing project is ambiguous (d.6.1)”, 
which seems to significantly predict (B = .518, Wald = 6.162, p = .013) that any one 
unit increase in this item leads to an (Exp(B) = 1.678) increase in the probability that 
managers will add more resources than redirect the failing project. On the other hand, 
it does not predict whether managers terminate or redirect the failing project (p>.05). 
 
 The second item “the information is biased (d.6.3)”, which seems to significantly 
predict (B = -.369, Wald = 4.845, p = .028) that any one unit increase in this item leads 
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to a (Exp(B) = .692) decrease in the probability that managers will add more resources 
than redirect the failing project. It also significantly predicts (B = -.283, Wald = 4.519, 
p = .034) that any one unit increase in this item leads to a (Exp(B) = .753) decrease in 
the probability that managers will terminate than redirect the failing project. 
   Table 7.17: Parameter Estimates for Informational Determinants 
Failing project
a
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
More 
resources 
added to 
project 
Intercept -1.011 1.528 .437 1 .508    
d.6.1 .518 .209 6.162 1 .013 1.678 1.115 2.526 
d.6.2 .299 .210 2.030 1 .154 1.348 .894 2.033 
d.6.3 -.369 .167 4.845 1 .028 .692 .498 .960 
d.6.4 .233 .171 1.863 1 .172 1.262 .903 1.764 
d.6.5 -.320 .208 2.369 1 .124 .726 .484 1.091 
Project 
terminated  
Intercept -.392 1.300 .091 1 .763    
d.6.1 .179 .188 .898 1 .343 1.196 .826 1.730 
d.6.2 .218 .176 1.531 1 .216 1.243 .881 1.755 
d.6.3 -.283 .133 4.519 1 .034 .753 .580 .978 
d.6.4 .188 .136 1.915 1 .166 1.206 .925 1.574 
d.6.5 -.072 .181 .158 1 .691 .930 .652 1.327 
a. The reference category is: project redirected. 
 
 
To conclude, hypothesis H3 is confirmed since the results in this section approve the 
influence of the informational determinants on the escalation/de-escalation decisions; this 
impact is driven from the effect of two items as follows: 
 Approach attributes: “the information about the failing project is ambiguous”, and “the 
information is biased”. 
 
 Avoid attributes: “the information is biased”. 
 
The results of this section (approach/avoid attributes) have, to an extent, similarities with a 
number of (de)-escalation studies that examined the influence of informational 
determinants (Drummond, 1995; Mähring and Keil, 2008; Chakravorty, 2009).  
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7.4.2 Analysis of Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
This section presents the results of the MLR tests for the psychological, contextual and 
organisational determinants respectively, similar to Section 7.4.1, the code and value 
impact of each item of the non-project-specific determinants are listed in Table 7.18.    
Table 7.18: Code and Value of Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
Determinants Code Value 
Psychological Determinants (d.1) 
The desire to justify a previous decision  d.1.1 Negative  
Manager was initially responsible for initiating the project d.1.2 Negative   
Manager experience of guilt and regret about the project‟s failure d.1.3 Positive   
Manager was allowed to bring to mind his high level of self esteem d.1.4 Positive    
Project initiated by a group d.1.5 Positive  
Manager given the opportunity to state his low self-esteem d.1.6 Positive  
Manager experience job insecurity d.1.7 Negative  
Manager desire for self-efficiency  d.1.8 Negative  
Manager has less tolerance for failure d.1.9 Positive  
Manager has personal gains d.1.10 Negative  
Manager has already committed to a mental budget d.1.11 Positive 
Manager believes that the project is a failure and cannot be turned around d.1.12 Positive 
Contextual Determinants (d.2) 
Project and its goals were publicly announced d.2.1 Positive  
Project is a key project in the manager‟s portfolio d.2.2 Negative  
Effort the manager has put in the project is noticeable d.2.3 Negative  
Manager is rewarded for decision process rather than decision outcome d.2.4 Positive  
Manager is saving his reputation d.2.5 Negative  
Manager is socially motivated to discontinue the project d.2.6 Positive  
Manager is politically supported to discontinue the project d.2.7 Positive 
Manager is respected for his previous history of managing projects d.2.8 Negative 
Manager educational background (i.e., management, finance, economics…) d.2.9 Positive 
Manager continuing a failing project would degrade his masculinity d.2.10 Positive 
Manager cultural background (i.e. customs, society ethics and morals…) d.2.11 Negative 
Manager is externally justifying others d.2.12 Negative 
Political interference to discontinue the project d.2.13 Positive 
Existence of norms of modeling d.2.14 Negative 
Organisational Determinants (d.3) 
The organisation de-escalated the project as it was technically irretrievable d.3.1 Positive 
Saving the organisation reputation d.3.2 Negative  
The linkage of project to organisation's strategic existence is significant d.3.3 Negative  
Low investment in other technical side-bets of project (i.e. hiring people…….) d.3.4 Positive  
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1. Psychological Determinants 
Psychological determinants consist of twelve items (Table 7.18) that are assumed to relate 
to managers' escalation'/de-escalation decisions as stated in hypothesis H4:     
H4: Psychological determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
Table 7.19: Multiple Correlation Results for Psychological Determinants 
 
d.1.1 d.1.2 d.1.3 d.1.4 d.1.5 d.1.6 d.1.7 d.1.8 d.1.9 d.1.10 d.1.11 d.1.12 
d.1.1 1 
           
d.1.2 .190 1 
          
d.1.3 -.228 -.213 1 
         
d.1.4 -.067 -.101 .123 1 
        
d.1.5 .057 -.051 -.029 .321 1 
       
d.1.6 .025 -.076 .094 .073 .244 1 
      
d.1.7 -.039 -.013 -.139 .012 -.017 -.015 1 
     
d.1.8 .143 -.008 .031 -.049 -.126 -.105 .043 1 
    
d.1.9 -.077 -.145 .089 .036 -.066 .165 .012 -.080 1 
   
d.1.10 .000 -.022 .050 -.070 -.100 -.170 -.035 -.003 -.126 1 
  
d.1.11 -.015 .033 .099 .059 .068 .045 -.191 .005 .075 .026 1 
 
d.1.12 -.082 -.103 .268 .109 -.060 .078 -.156 -.002 .168 .025 .172 1 
 
In addition to the absence of multicollinearity (see Table 7.19), the hypothesized model is 
formed to explain the observed relationships captured by the data collected. The results 
(Table 7.20) show that both the Deviance (p = .196) and the Pearson (p =  .179) statistics 
report that the model presented is a good fit of the data, however, this is limited by the 
Pseudo R-Square results (i.e., McFadden 50% rate). Therefore, the model presented is a 
limited fit of the data in this case. 
 
The results of the Likelihood Ratio tests (Table 7.20) show that collectively psychological 
determinants do not influence managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions in Saudi 
companies (χ² = 29.010, p > .05). Before rejecting hypothesis H4 and making the 
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conclusion that psychological determinants do not have an influence on Saudi managers' 
escalation/de-escalation decisions; it is worth looking at the results of the Likelihood Ratio 
test to establish whether there are any specific psychological items that influence Saudi 
managers' escalation/de-escalation decisions. 
Table 7.20: Model Fitting Information for Psychological Determinants 
Goodness-of-Fit Pseudo R-Square 
 Chi-Square χ² df Sig. Cox and Snell .100 
Pearson 549.475 522 .196 Nagelkerke .114 
Deviance 551.625 522 .179 McFadden .050 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square χ² df Sig. 
Intercept Only 584.635 591.862 580.635    
Final 603.625 697.566 551.625 29.010 24 .220 
 
 
The results of the Likelihood Ratio test (Table 7.21) show that two of the psychological 
determinants have a significant influence on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions. 
The first (d.1.1) is “the desire to justify a previous decision” (χ² = 8.508, p = .014), and the 
second item (d.1.5) is the “project is initiated by a group” (χ² = 6.759, p = .034).  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that although the results in Table 7.20 show no significant 
collective influence of the psychological determinants on the decision to escalate/de-
escalate commitment, there are two items that independently seem to have a significant 
influence on Saudi managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions. However, the statistical 
output have not explained the extent of this apparent influence on the decision whether to 
escalate or de-escalate. This aspect is dealt with through the parameter estimates 
information presented in Table 7.21.    
 
 
 
282 
 
     Table 7.21: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Psychological Determinants 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of Reduced 
Model 
BIC of Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square 
χ² 
df Sig. 
Intercept 602.246 688.961 554.246 2.621 2 .270 
d.1.1 608.133 694.848 560.133 8.508 2 .014 
d.1.2 605.410 692.125 557.410 5.785 2 .055 
d.1.3 599.835 686.550 551.835 .210 2 .901 
d.1.4 603.341 690.056 555.341 3.716 2 .156 
d.1.5 606.384 693.099 558.384 6.759 2 .034 
d.1.6 602.542 689.257 554.542 2.917 2 .233 
d.1.7 600.040 686.755 552.040 .415 2 .813 
d.1.8 599.895 686.610 551.895 .270 2 .874 
d.1.9 600.182 686.897 552.182 .557 2 .757 
d.1.10 600.422 687.137 552.422 .797 2 .671 
d.1.11 600.815 687.530 552.815 1.190 2 .552 
d.1.12 599.668 686.383 551.668 .043 2 .979 
The chi-square χ² statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced 
model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is 
that all parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
The individual parameter estimates for the psychological determinants are shown in Table 
7.22. Three items are found to have a significant influence managers‟ (de)escalation 
decision as follows: 
 The first item is “the desire to justify a previous decision (d.1.1)”. This seems to 
significantly predict (B = .623, Wald = 7.343, p = .007) in that any one unit increase in 
this item leads to an (Exp(B) = 1.864) increase in the probability that managers will 
add more resources than redirect the failing project. It also significantly predicts (B = 
.452, Wald = 4.659, p = .031) that any one unit increase in this item leads to an 
(Exp(B) = 1.572) increase in the probability that managers will terminate than redirect 
the failing project.  
 
 The second item is “manager is initially responsible for initiating the project (d.1.2)”. 
This seems to significantly predict (B = -.358, Wald = 4.954, p = .026) that any one 
unit increase in this item leads to a (Exp(B)=.699) decrease in the probability that 
managers will terminate the failing project than redirect it. On the other hand, it does 
not predict that managers would add more resources to the failing project (p>.05). 
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Table 7.22: Parameter Estimates for Psychological Determinants 
Failing project
a
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
More 
resources 
added to 
project  
Intercept -2.283 1.550 2.171 1 .141    
d.1.1 .623 .230 7.343 1 .007 1.864 1.188 2.924 
d.1.2 -.353 .185 3.637 1 .057 .702 .489 1.010 
d.1.3 .006 .156 .002 1 .968 1.006 .741 1.367 
d.1.4 -.121 .157 .592 1 .442 .886 .652 1.205 
d.1.5 .446 .179 6.220 1 .013 1.562 1.100 2.217 
d.1.6 -.227 .150 2.273 1 .132 .797 .594 1.070 
d.1.7 .028 .149 .035 1 .851 1.028 .768 1.377 
d.1.8 .029 .148 .038 1 .845 1.029 .770 1.375 
d.1.9 .100 .151 .442 1 .506 1.105 .823 1.485 
d.1.10 .106 .145 .528 1 .467 1.111 .836 1.478 
d.1.11 .068 .150 .209 1 .648 1.071 .798 1.436 
d.1.12 .007 .174 .002 1 .967 1.007 .716 1.417 
Project 
terminated 
Intercept -.374 1.324 .080 1 .778    
d.1.1 .452 .210 4.659 1 .031 1.572 1.042 2.370 
d.1.2 -.358 .161 4.954 1 .026 .699 .510 .958 
d.1.3 -.048 .132 .130 1 .718 .954 .736 1.235 
d.1.4 -.249 .133 3.517 1 .061 .780 .601 1.011 
d.1.5 .236 .142 2.757 1 .097 1.267 .958 1.674 
d.1.6 -.022 .132 .028 1 .867 .978 .755 1.267 
d.1.7 -.054 .129 .176 1 .675 .947 .735 1.220 
d.1.8 .065 .127 .259 1 .611 1.067 .832 1.368 
d.1.9 .084 .130 .415 1 .520 1.087 .843 1.402 
d.1.10 -.003 .127 .001 1 .978 .997 .777 1.279 
d.1.11 .139 .128 1.174 1 .279 1.149 .894 1.477 
d.1.12 .029 .151 .037 1 .848 1.029 .766 1.383 
a. The reference category is: project redirected. 
 
 The third item is “project is initiated by a group (d.1.5)”. This seems to significantly 
predict (B = .446, Wald = 6.220, p =.031) that any one unit increase in this item leads 
to an (Exp(B)=1.562) increase in the probability that managers will add more resources 
than redirect the failing project. On the other hand, it does not predict whether 
managers terminate or redirect the failing project (p > .05).  
 
Therefore, the results of the current study do not support the influence of the 
psychological determinants collectively on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions 
(hypothesis H4), however, within further analysis, the residual impact of three key 
psychological determinants was noticed as follows:   
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 Approach attributes: “the desire to justify a previous decision”, “manager is initially 
responsible for initiating the project”, and “project initiated by a group”. 
 
 
 Avoid attributes: “the desire to justify a previous decision” and “manager is initially 
responsible for initiating the project”. 
 
The results of the MLR test are conditionally consistent with the outcomes of existing 
literature, as stated formerly in Chapters Three and Four, where (regarding approach/avoid 
attributes) there was empirical evidence for the strong effect of self-justification, personal 
responsibility, and group decision making (Staw and Ross, 1986; Drummond, 1994; Pan 
et al., 2009) on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions.  
 
2. Contextual Determinants  
Contextual determinants consist of fourteen items (Table 7.18) that are assumed to relate 
to managers' escalation'/de-escalation decisions as stated in hypothesis H5:     
H5:  Contextual determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
Table 7.23: Multiple Correlation Results for Contextual Determinants 
 
d.2.1 d.2.2 d.2.3 d.2.4 d.2.5 d.2.6 d.2.7 d.2.8 d.2.9 d.2.10 d.2.11 d.2.12 d.2.13 d.2.14 
d.2.1 1 
             
d.2.2 -.454 1 
            
d.2.3 -.130 .235 1 
           
d.2.4 .183 -.113 -.134 1 
          
d.2.5 -.072 .114 .084 -.293 1 
         
d.2.6 .112 -.144 -.083 .134 -.285 1 
        
d.2.7 .102 -.160 -.143 .076 -.093 .294 1 
       
d.2.8 -.221 .098 .111 -.204 .047 -.147 -.284 1 
      
d.2.9 .148 .033 -.166 .040 -.071 .101 .084 -.208 1 
     
d.2.10 -.018 .057 -.182 .137 -.121 .062 .112 -.089 .308 1 
    
d.2.11 -.071 .087 .122 -.053 .156 -.079 -.187 .051 -.109 -.166 1 
   
d.2.12 -.053 .039 .100 -.058 .079 -.109 -.025 .044 -.059 -.048 .175 1 
  
d.2.13 .141 -.015 -.018 -.061 -.085 .042 .039 -.125 .239 .140 -.146 -.053 1 
 
d.2.14 .009 .003 .068 -.062 .078 -.043 -.058 .025 -.021 -.060 .039 .011 -.103 1 
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The preliminary analysis of the fourteen contextual determinants rules out 
multicollinearity (see Table 7.23) and indicates a good data fit model as indicated by the 
Deviance (p = .311) and the Pearson (p = .192) statistics in Table 7.24. Therefore, the 
hypothesized model explains the observed relationships captured by the data collected. 
The model fitting information (Table 7.24) indicate that collectively contextual 
determinants significantly influence managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions in Saudi 
companies (χ² = 47.255, p = .013), therefore, hypothesis h5 is accepted. As explained 
below, this collective impact comes from a subset of determinants, not all fourteen items.  
Table 7.24: Model Fitting Information for Contextual Determinants 
Goodness-of-Fit Pseudo R-Square 
 Chi-Square χ² df Sig. Cox and Snell .158 
Pearson 545.801 518 .192 Nagelkerke .180 
Deviance 533.381 518 .311 McFadden .081 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square χ² df Sig. 
Intercept 
Only 
584.635 591.862 580.635    
Final 593.381 701.774 533.381 47.255 28 .013 
      
The contextual determinants with the most influence on managers‟ escalation/de-
escalation decisions are shown in Table 7.25. The first (d.2.2) is that the “project is a key 
project in the manager's portfolio” (χ² = 8.737, p = .013). The second item (d.2.4) is that 
the “manager is rewarded for decision process rather than decision outcome” (χ² = 
13.646, p = .001). The third item (d.2.9) is the “manager's educational background” (χ² = 
6.038, p = .049), and the fourth item (d.2.14) is the existence of norms of modelling (χ² = 
6.478, p = .039). However, Table 7.26 will further explain the power of those significantly 
influencing items on the decision to escalate or de-escalate. 
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    Table 7.25: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Contextual Determinants 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
BIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square 
χ² 
df Sig. 
Intercept 592.829 693.997 536.829 3.449 2 .178 
d.2.1 594.879 696.047 538.879 5.499 2 .064 
d.2.2 598.118 699.285 542.118 8.737 2 .013 
d.2.3 591.222 692.390 535.222 1.842 2 .398 
d.2.4 603.027 704.194 547.027 13.646 2 .001 
d.2.5 590.086 691.253 534.086 .705 2 .703 
d.2.6 591.829 692.997 535.829 2.449 2 .294 
d.2.7 590.846 692.014 534.846 1.466 2 .481 
d.2.8 593.617 694.785 537.617 4.237 2 .120 
d.2.9 595.418 696.586 539.418 6.038 2 .049 
d.2.10 590.593 691.761 534.593 1.213 2 .545 
d.2.11 589.794 690.962 533.794 .414 2 .813 
d.2.12 589.590 690.758 533.590 .210 2 .901 
d.2.13 592.516 693.683 536.516 3.135 2 .209 
d.2.14 595.858 697.026 539.858 6.478 2 .039 
The chi-square χ²statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a 
reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null 
hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
Although the results of the likelihood ratio test shows the significant impact of only four 
contextual items, further analysis (parameter estimates in Table 7.26) shows the 
significant influence of five items on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decision as 
follows: 
 The first item is “project and its goals are publicly announced (d.2.1)”. This seems to 
significantly predict (B = -.537, Wald = 5.123, p =.024) in that any one unit increase 
in this item leads to a (Exp(B) = .584) decrease in the probability that managers will 
add more resources than redirect the failing project. On the other hand, it does not 
predict whether managers terminate or redirect the failing project (p >.05). 
 
 The second item is “project is a key project in manager’s portfolio (d.2.2)”. This 
seems to significantly predict (B = -.601, Wald = 8.005, p = .005) in that any one unit 
increase in this item leads to a (Exp(B)=.548) decrease in the probability that 
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managers will add more resources than redirect the failing project. On the other hand, 
it does not predict whether managers terminate or redirect the failing project, (p>.05). 
 
Table 7.26: Parameter Estimates for Contextual Determinants 
Failing project
a
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
More 
resources 
added to 
project   
Intercept 3.548 2.084 2.898 1 .089    
d.2.1 -.537 .237 5.123 1 .024 .584 .367 .931 
d.2.2 -.601 .212 8.005 1 .005 .548 .362 .831 
d.2.3 -.038 .158 .059 1 .808 .962 .705 1.313 
d.2.4 -.481 .163 8.743 1 .003 .618 .450 .850 
d.2.5 -.084 .155 .294 1 .588 .919 .678 1.246 
d.2.6 -.061 .164 .141 1 .707 .940 .682 1.296 
d.2.7 -.047 .160 .088 1 .767 .954 .697 1.305 
d.2.8 .004 .178 .000 1 .983 1.004 .708 1.423 
d.2.9 .135 .169 .645 1 .422 1.145 .823 1.593 
d.2.10 .092 .159 .334 1 .563 1.096 .802 1.499 
d.2.11 -.028 .163 .030 1 .864 .972 .707 1.338 
d.2.12 .063 .157 .161 1 .688 1.065 .783 1.449 
d.2.13 .255 .188 1.828 1 .176 1.290 .892 1.867 
d.2.14 .006 .181 .001 1 .974 1.006 .706 1.433 
Project 
terminated 
Intercept .778 1.793 .188 1 .664    
d.2.1 -.295 .208 2.008 1 .156 .745 .495 1.120 
d.2.2 -.266 .164 2.634 1 .105 .767 .556 1.057 
d.2.3 -.174 .138 1.585 1 .208 .840 .641 1.102 
d.2.4 .023 .143 .026 1 .872 1.023 .774 1.353 
d.2.5 -.108 .131 .682 1 .409 .898 .695 1.160 
d.2.6 -.205 .139 2.186 1 .139 .815 .621 1.069 
d.2.7 .113 .131 .741 1 .389 1.120 .865 1.449 
d.2.8 .249 .144 3.013 1 .083 1.283 .968 1.700 
d.2.9 .341 .143 5.695 1 .017 1.407 1.063 1.862 
d.2.10 -.066- .134 .243 1 .622 .936 .719 1.218 
d.2.11 .060 .133 .201 1 .654 1.062 .817 1.379 
d.2.12 .003 .137 .000 1 .984 1.003 .767 1.311 
d.2.13 -.042- .144 .083 1 .773 .959 .723 1.273 
d.2.14 .320 .149 4.599 1 .032 1.377 1.028 1.845 
a. The reference category is: project redirected. 
  
 The third item is “manager is rewarded for decision process rather than decision 
outcome (d.2.4)”. As it significantly predicts (B = -.481, Wald = 8.743, p = .003) that 
any one unit increase in this item leads to a (Exp(B) = .604) decrease in the probability 
that managers will add more resources to the failing project than terminate it. The item 
does not, however, predict whether managers redirect or terminate the failing project 
(p >.05).  
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 The fourth item “managers’ educational background (d.2.9)”, significantly predicts (B 
= .341, Wald = 5.695, p = .017) that any one unit increase in this item leads to an 
(Exp(B)=1.407) increase in the probability that managers will terminate than redirect 
the failing project. However, it does not predict whether managers add more resources 
or redirect the failing project (p>.05). 
 
 The fifth item is the “existence of norms of modelling (d.2.14)”, which significantly 
predicts (B = .320, Wald = 4.599, p = .032) that any one unit increase in this item 
leads to an (Exp(B) = 1.377) increase in the probability that managers will terminate 
the failing project than redirect it. However, it does not predict whether managers add 
more resources or redirect the failing project (p>.05). 
 
Therefore, the results of the current study confirm the influence of the contextual 
determinants collectively on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions (hypothesis 
H5). This influence determined, within further analysis, through the residual impact of 
five contextual determinants was noticed as follows:   
 Approach attributes: “project and its goals are publicly announced”, “project is a key 
project in the manager's portfolio”, and “manager is rewarded for decision process 
rather than decision outcome”. 
 
 Avoid attributes: “manager's educational background”, and, “the existence of norms 
of modelling”.  
 
The results of the MLR test are, to an extent, consistent with the outcomes of existing 
literature, as stated formerly in Chapters Three and Four, regarding approach/avoid 
attributes, such as the studies by Ross and Staw (1993) and Drummond (1994).  
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3. Organisational Determinants  
Organisational determinants consist of four items (see Table 7.17) that are assumed to 
relate to managers' escalation'/de-escalation decision as stated by hypothesis H6:     
H6:   Organisational determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action.   
 
          Table 7.27: Multiple Correlation Results for Organisational Determinants 
 
d.3.1 d.3.2 d.3.3 d.3.4 
d.3.1 1 
   
d.3.2 -.184 1 
  
d.3.3 .135 -.017 1 
 
d.3.4 -.158 .203 -.243 1 
 
In addition to the absence of multicollinearity (see Table 7.27), the hypothesized model 
explains the observed relationships captured by the collected data. Both the Deviance (p = 
.119) and the Pearson (p = .408) statistics report that the model presented is a good fit of 
the data (Table 7.28). These results are limited by the Pseudo R-Square results (McFadden 
.028 rate) therefore, the model presented explains is a good but limited fit of the data.      
Table 7.28: Model Fitting Information for Organisational Determinants 
Goodness-of-Fit Pseudo R-Square 
 Chi-Square χ² df Sig. Cox and Snell .058 
Pearson 195.921 192 .408 Nagelkerke .066 
Deviance 215.351 192 .119 McFadden .028 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square χ² df Sig. 
Intercept 
Only 
348.179 355.405 344.179    
Final 347.860 383.991 327.860 16.319 8 .038 
 
Table 7.28 shows that collectively organisational determinants significantly influence 
managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions in Saudi companies (χ² = 16.319, p = .038). 
Therefore, hypothesis H6 is accepted and organisational determinants influence Saudi 
managers' escalation/de-escalation decisions. Further analysis (the likelihood ratio test) 
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will indicate which of the organisational items significantly influence Saudi managers' 
escalation/de-escalation decisions. 
 
The results of the Likelihood ratio test (Table 7.29) show that this collective influence is 
led by (d.3.3) “the linkage of project to organisation’s strategic existence is significant” 
(χ² = 6.314, p = .043). The statistical output does not explain the extent of this apparent 
impact on the decision to escalate or de-escalate. This aspect is dealt with through the 
individual parameter estimates information presented in Table 7.30.   
 
Table 7.29: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Organisational Determinants 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
BIC of 
Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square 
χ² 
df Sig. 
Intercept 346.748 375.653 330.748 2.888 2 .236 
d.3.1 344.841 373.746 328.841 .981 2 .612 
d.3.2 343.946 372.851 327.946 .086 2 .958 
d.3.3 350.173 379.078 334.173 6.314 2 .043 
d.3.4 348.681 377.586 332.681 4.822 2 .090 
The chi-square χ²statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced 
model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is 
that all parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
 
The individual parameter estimates for the organisational determinants (Table 7.30), 
supporting results of likelihood ratio test, show that “the linkage of project to 
organisation’s strategic existence is significant (d.3.3)”, significantly predicts (B = -.450, 
Wald = 6.006, p = .014) that any one unit increase in this item leads to a (Exp(B)=.638) 
decrease in the probability that managers will add more resources than redirect the failing 
project. However, this item does not predict whether managers terminate or redirect the 
failing project (p>.05).  
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Table 7.30: Parameter Estimates for Organisational Determinants 
Failing project
a
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
More 
resources 
added to 
project  
Intercept .049 1.198 .002 1 .967    
d.3.1 -.127 .195 .429 1 .513 .880 .601 1.289 
d.3.2 .016 .186 .008 1 .930 1.016 .706 1.464 
d.3.3 -.450 .183 6.006 1 .014 .638 .445 .914 
d.3.4 .351 .183 3.702 1 .054 1.421 .993 2.033 
Project 
terminated  
Intercept 1.449 1.013 2.048 1 .152    
d.3.1 -.162 .166 .946 1 .331 .851 .614 1.178 
d.3.2 .045 .159 .079 1 .779 1.046 .766 1.427 
d.3.3 -.218 .147 2.187 1 .139 .804 .602 1.073 
d.3.4 .019 .146 .017 1 .896 1.019 .766 1.356 
a. The reference category is: project redirected. 
 
The results presented in this section indicate the influence of the organisational 
determinants on the escalation/de-escalation decisions, which supports hypothesis H6. 
This influence is in terms of “the linkage of project to organisation’s strategic existence is 
significant” on managers‟ escalation decisions. To some extent, these results are 
comparable with those of studies that looked at organisational determinants of escalation 
decisions (e.g. Ross and Staw, 1993; Kisfalvi, 2000).  
 
7.5 The Intervening Role of Operational Project Audit  
Project audit, (as already explained in Chapter Six), is an important factor that all 274 
participating companies considered as a key element of their capital investment decisions. 
In this section the aim is to examine whether applying operational project audit will 
moderate the influence of escalation/de-escalation determinants on managers‟ decisions, 
which will be tested through the following hypothesis: 
H7: Operational audit plays a moderating role with respect to the determinants involved 
in the escalation/de-escalation decisions. 
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In order to examine this hypothesis, first the MLR test for the mean of the escalation/de-
escalation determinants will be performed followed by running the MODPROBE Macro 
test as the following section will show below. 
 
7.5.1 Results of MLR Test for Escalation/De-Escalation Determinants  
All six independent variables, as mentioned earlier in Section 7.2 of this chapter, have met 
the assumption of linearity of the Logit (see Table 7.1). Additionally no multicollenearity 
was found between any of the independent variables (see Table 7.2), and that the first 
level of analysis has been completed. Therefore, the next step will be to determine the 
significant influence of any of the independent variables on the escalation/de-escalation of 
commitment decisions (by testing the likelihood ratio for the mean of the independent 
variables) in order to test for the moderator effect (Hayes and Mathes, 2009). The results 
of the likelihood ratio test (see Table 7.31) suggest the existence of a significant influence 
of each of the variables (Integer/Mean of each of the determinants) on managers‟ choices 
(p < .05). Thus, the next step will be testing for the moderation effect. 
Table 7.31: Likelihood Ratio Tests for (De)-Escalation Determinants* 
Effect Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of Reduced 
Model 
BIC of Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square 
χ2 
df Sig. 
Intercept 698.203 1485.865 262.203 .000 0  
d.1 673.911 1266.464 345.911 83.707 54 .006 
d.2 706.842 1313.847 370.842 108.638 50 .000 
d.3 697.939 1406.112 305.939 43.736 22 .004 
d.4 695.710 1346.073 335.710 73.507 38 .000 
d.5 690.458 1376.952 310.458 48.254 28 .010 
d.6 696.956 1412.355 300.956 38.753 20 .007 
*psychological (d.1), contextual (d.2), organisational (d.3), financial (d.4), strategic (d.5), 
informational (d.6) 
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Independent Variables 
[(De)-Escalation 
Determinants] 
Dependent variable 
(Managers’ Decisions) 
Moderator Influence 
(Operational Project Audit) 
7.5.2 Moderating the Results of Escalation/De-Escalation Determinants   
The moderation (see figure 7.1) is a special case of an interaction. Any moderation is 
definitely an interaction effect. However, an interaction effect is not necessarily 
moderation (Wu and Zumbo, 2008). The moderation effect suggests the range that the 
independent variable most strongly (or weakly) causes the dependent variable, whereas 
the moderator modifies the strength or direction of a causal relationship (Frazier et al., 
2004; Wu and Zumbo, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Moderation Effect of Project Audit on Managers’ Decisions 
 
Mathematically, in agreement with the nature of the statistical data presented in this 
research, the Johnson-Newman technique (J-N) is applied in order to specify the points 
that provide information about the range of values of the moderator (i.e., strong or weak) 
where the focal predictor has a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable and 
where it does not (Hayes and Mathes, 2009). The statistical technique used is the 
MODPROBE Macro, which was developed by Hayes and Mathes (2009) and will be 
applied in SPSS version 19.  
  
In order to prepare the data for the analysis, first: both the independent variables and the 
moderator were transformed to their centred mean, and second: the centered moderator 
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was multiplied by independent variables in order to create the interaction effect in the 
regression model (Dawson, 2014). It is worth stating that each of the six independent 
variables was interacted (separately and collectively) with each level of the moderating 
variables (see Table 7.1).  In the current study, the interaction of variables and the 
application of the J-N technique have resulted in two types of outcomes. These outcomes 
are reported as suggested by Hayes and Matthes (2009), who are leading authority in the 
moderation/logistic regression field, in two tables: the first indicates the significant 
interaction effect (Table 7.32) and the second shows the significant levels of moderation 
(Table 7.33). Both will be explained below. 
 
        Table 7.32: The Interaction Results 
Predictor: (De)Escalation Determinants x Moderator: Use of Project Audit 
 b se t P 
Constant .4799 1.1724 .4094 .6826 
Predictor .4264 .3219 1.3248 .1864 
Moderator .6076 .3085 1.9695 .0499 
Interaction -.1669 .0848 -1.9672 .0502 
Predictor: Psychological Determinants x Moderator: All Project Audit Items 
 b se t P 
Constant 5.3659 1.5010 3.5748 .0004 
Predictor -1.0613 .4719 -2.2491 .0253 
Moderator -.8340 .3977 -2.0974 .0369 
Interaction .2680 .1255 2.1351 .0337 
Predictor: Psychological Determinants x Moderator: Project Audit in Evaluation Stage 
 b se t P 
Constant 2.4271 .2920 8.3114 .0000 
Predictor -1.1671 .3785 -3.0934 .0023 
Moderator -.1173 .0773 -1.5176 .1303 
Interaction .3249 .0976 3.3307 .0010 
Predictor: Contextual Determinants x Moderator: Assessment of audit reports 
 b se t P 
Constant -2.0166 1.8936 -1.0650 .2878 
Predictor 3.8267 1.6734 2.2867 .0230 
Moderator 1.0689 .4782 2.2352 .0262 
Interaction -1.0024 .4223 -2.3735 .0183 
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The results presented above in Table 7.32 show the interaction effect of the “use of project 
audit”, “project audit in the evaluation stage”, “all project audit items”, and “assessment 
of project audit reports” on the influence of (de)-escalation, contextual and psychological 
determinants on managers‟ choices. Therefore, hypothesis H7 is confirmed for the 
moderator influence of operational project audit on the influence of escalation/de-
escalation determinants on managers‟ decisions. For example, “project audit in the 
evaluation stage” significantly moderates the influence of psychological determinants on 
managers‟ (de)escalation of commitment decisions (p = .0010).  
 
The data presented in Table 7.33 show the value of moderation levels of project 
operational audit on the influence of financial, strategic, psychological and (de)escalation 
determinants on managers‟ decisions.  
 
For example, the “use of project audit” as a moderator led to significant improvement in 
how strategic determinants influence managers‟ (de)escalation of commitment decisions 
(p = .0438). When the moderator level is (2.7451, 3.6838), the influence of strategic 
determinants increases positively and significantly (p = .0061, p = .0164) by (b = .5155, b 
= .3514) points respectively. On the other hand, when the level of the moderator “use of 
project audit” is (2.7451) the influence of psychological determinants decreases 
significantly (p = .0510) by (b = -.3257) points.    
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Table 7.33: Values of Moderation Levels  
Predictor 
variable 
Moderator 
Moderation 
Level 
B se t P LLCI(b) 
ULCI 
(b) 
(De)-
escalation 
determinants 
Project audit steps 3.8994 -.1697 .0862 -1.9684 .0501 -.3394 .0000 
4.2808 -.3148 .1233 -2.5536 .0112 -.5575 -.0721 
Project audit in evaluation stage 3.8943 -.1738 .0874 -1.9873 .0479 -.3459 -.0016 
4.3818 -.3328 .1228 -2.7094 .0072 -.5747 -.0910 
Manager respond to audit reports 4.0551 -.1787 .0875 -2.0419 .0421 -.3511 -.0064 
4.9060 -.2729 .1208 -2.2589 .0247 -.5108 -.0350 
Assessment of audit reports 3.9853 -.1760 .0879 -2.0026 .0462 -.3489 -.0030 
Quality of audit process 3.8529 -.1819 .0874 -2.0800 .0385 -.3541 -.0097 
The use of project audit 3.6838 -.1884 .0871 -2.1619 .0315 -.3600 -.0168 
4.6226 -.3451 .1198 -2.8793 .0043 -.5810 -.1091 
All project audit items 4.1231 -.3287 .1293 -2.5414 .0116 -.5833 -.0741 
Strategic 
determinants 
Project audit in evaluation stage 3.4068 .4045 .1780 2.2730 .0238 .0541 .7548 
3.8943 .3582 .1491 2.4030 .0169 .0647 .6517 
Manager respond to audit reports 4.0551 .3860 .1443 2.5500 .0113 .0839 .6521 
4.9060 .6093 .2011 3.0293 .0072 .2133 1.0052 
Assessment of audit reports 3.0682 .5786 .1915 3.0214 .0028 .2016 .9557 
3.9853 .3475 .1442 2.4093 .0167 .0635 .6314 
Quality of audit process 3.8529 .3602 .1487 2.4219 .0161 .0674 .6530 
The use of project audit 2.7451 .5155 .1867 2.7617 .0061 .1480 .8830 
3.6838 .3514 .1455 2.4145 .0164 .0649 .6379 
All project audit items 3.3206 .4563 .1760 2.5927 .0100 .1098 .8027 
3.7219 .3284 .1485 2.2117 .0278 .0361 .6207 
Project audit steps 3.5180 .4525 .1716 2.6367 .0089 .1146 .7904 
3.8994 .2945 .1500 1.9627 .0507 -.0009 .5898 
Financial 
determinants 
Manager respond to audit reports 3.2043 -.4037 .1918 -2.1046 .0363 -.7814 -.0260 
Project audit in evaluation stage 2.9235 -.3297 .1563 -2.1097 .0358 -.6374 -.0220 
3.8529 -.2274 .1131 -2.0118 .0452 -.4500 -.0049 
Psychological 
determinants 
The use of project audit 2.7451 -.3257 .1662 -1.9600 .0510 -.6528 .0015 
All project audit items 4.1231 .3081 .1400 2.2001 .0286 .0324 .5838 
Project audit in evaluation stage 4.7824 .3870 .1378 2.8074 .0054 .1156 .6583 
 
 
Linking back to the escalation/de-escalation literature, where the moderation effect was 
measured through laboratory settings, the current results are consistent with several 
studies in the escalation/de-escalation field (see for example, Rutledge, 1995; He and 
Mittal, 2007) only within the moderation concept, yet, the influence of operational project 
audit as a moderator, the detailed moderation process, and the levels of moderation were 
never examined or declared before in the escalation/de-escalation literature to the 
knowledge of the researcher (see Chapter Four). 
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7.6 Summary of the Hypotheses Tests Results 
The outcome of the hypotheses tests show that (see Table 7.34), within the direct effect, 
five project-specific/non-specific determinants (financial, strategic, informational, 
contextual, and organisational) have a significant collective effect on managers‟ 
escalation/de-escalation decisions, while psychological determinants do not collectively 
influence managers‟ choices, however, three psychological items significantly influence 
managers‟ decisions.  
Table 7.34: Summary of Results of Hypothesis Testing  
Variables H* Significant Items Escalation 
decisions 
De-escalation 
decisions 
Project-Specific Determinants  
Financial  H1 Financial information clearly reflected success 
and failure of project (d.4.4) 
√ √ 
The withdrawal costs at a later date are much 
higher (d.4.7) 
√ √ 
Strategic  H2 Low frequency of progress reporting (d.5.5) √ √ 
Informational  H3 Ambiguous information (d.6.1) √  
Biased information (d.6.3) √ √ 
Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
Psychological  H4 Desire to justify previous decision  (d.1.1) √ √ 
Manager initial responsibility (d.1.2)  √ 
Project initiated by a group (d.1.5) √  
Contextual  H5 Project and its goals publicly announced (d.2.1)  √  
Project is key project in manager's portfolio 
(d.2.2) 
√  
Manager rewarded for decision process rather 
than outcome (d.2.4) 
√  
Manager's educational background (d.2.9)  √ 
Existence of norms of modelling (d.2.14)  √ 
Organizational  H6 Significant linkage of project to organization‟s 
strategic existence (d.3.3) 
√  
Project audit H7  
* Accepted research hypothesis except for the collective psychological determinants 
 
With regard to the indirect relationship, the results show that project operational audit 
moderates the influence of project-specific/non-specific determinants on managers‟ 
escalation decisions. The moderation influence was noticed in the interaction effect of four 
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levels of project operational audit: 1) the “use of project audit”, b) “project audit in the 
evaluation stage”, c) “all project audit items”, and “assessment of audit reports” on the 
overall (de)-escalation, psychological, and contextual determinants. The interaction 
influence was particularised in the value of moderation levels of project operational audit 
on the influence of financial, strategic, psychological and (de)escalation determinants.  
 
7.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the aim was to investigate the significance influence of project-specific 
and non-project-specific determinants on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions. 
This was achieved for both the direct and indirect relationships. A number of conclusions 
can be drawn from the results attained above.   
 
First, the outcomes complement and confirm the results of the previous chapter 
(descriptive analysis) in terms of both the managerial specialisation and professional 
educational background of Saudi managers. The managerial specialisation was noticed 
when nine project-specific forces out of five financial, strategic and informational 
determinants significantly influence both escalation and de-escalation of commitment 
decisions compared to ten non-project specific forces out of nine psychological, 
contextual, and organisational determinants significantly influence mostly managers‟ 
escalation decisions. The professional educational background was perceived in the 
significant influence of managers‟ educational background on their de-escalation 
decisions.    
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Second, the results of the analysis were obtained from different levels of managers‟ 
experience (according to their jobs positions) types of companies, and were related to 
different types of projects that failed in different time scales. Therefore, the dual influence 
of several items on managers‟ choices is expected and can be explained within the strong 
capability of the approach-avoidance theory to rationalise managers‟ behaviour in conflict 
situations, particularly within the time element (Pan et al., 2009). Third, the socio cultural 
effects in terms of (as explained in Chapter Two) family managed companies and the 
father image of Saudi managers explain the significant influence of non-project-specific 
determinants on managers‟ escalation decisions. For example, Saudi managers continue 
adding resources to a failing project because they are justifying a previous decision.  
 
Finally, the importance of capital investment decisions in Saudi companies was supported 
by the moderation role of operational project audit, which is a part of the capital 
investment process, whereas several levels of project audit influenced the effect of (de)-
escalation determinants on managers‟ decisions of commitment, these determinants are 
mostly related to the investment project in terms of strategic and financial factors.  
 
The next chapter will present the results of the semi-structured interviews that could 
provide further explanations of the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon and to clarify the 
results reported using the questionnaire survey. 
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Chapter Eight 
Project (De)-Escalation Decisions in Practice: Three Interview-
Based Case Studies 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to extend the analysis presented in the previous two chapters, 
with interview-based information from three survey participants who have had firsthand 
experience with of the escalation/de-escalation decisions in their respective companies. A 
succinct summary of the three case studies is presented in Table 8.1 below. 
 
Table 8.1: Summary of (De)-Escalated Projects 
Project Period of 
escalation 
Type of de-escalation De-escalation determinants  
Food products 
factory 
5-6 years Quitting the project  Psychological, contextual, 
organizational, strategic, financial. 
Long distance trucks  One year Redirecting and Putting 
the project on hold 
Financial, contextual, strategic 
Constructing a new 
building 
Three years Stopping and replacing 
the contractor 
Psychological, contextual, financial, 
strategic, informational 
 
The interviews conducted at the three companies were part of the mixed-methods 
approach adopted in this study to collect sufficient primary data on the complex and multi-
faceted problem of commitment escalation in capital project decisions. In order to 
maximise the return from each interview, careful steps were followed, as explained in 
Chapter Five (Section 5.7), in its planning and conduct. In each case, the interviewee had 
full approval from his company to take part in the interview and a copy of the 
questionnaire that they had completed and returned was given to them by the researcher, 
in case they did not keep one, in order to remind them of the answers they had provided in 
the survey and help anchor the interview thereupon. 
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The style adopted in writing the three cases is that used by existing case studies‟ literature 
on the (de)-escalation of commitment, particularly (Drummond, 1995; 1997; Drummond 
and Hodgson, 1996; Pan et al., 2006; 2009). The structure of this chapter is defined 
according to this style, with each of Sections 8.2-8.4 dedicated to one case study, whereby 
the transcribed interview is presented first, followed by an analysis of its contents. 
Adopting this style facilitates comparison, with previous case-based studies that used the 
approach-avoidance theory (see Chapter Four).   
 
8.2 Case Study One 
This is one of the largest companies that took part in the questionnaire survey. The  
project escalation case described below concerns opening a new factory in another country 
of the Gulf region by a Saudi Arabian company that specialises in the manufacture and 
distribution of food products. The newly-opened factory faced financial problems and was 
shut down after an enormous fire. To put this case into context, a brief introduction is first 
given about the company and its main industry, the food products sector in Saudi Arabia. 
 
8.2.1 Company Overview 
The company was established in  the 1970s  with an initial capital of more than SAR 35 
million (approx. $11 million) and grew significantly since then to become a multinational 
company that is now valued in few SAR billion and having over 50% share of the  
country‟s food product market. The company is considered one of the most successful and 
fastest growing multinational food groups in many countries in the Arabian Gulf, Middle 
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East, North Africa and Central Asia. The company has enjoyed a steady profit growth and 
is expected to achieve a profit of around SAR 2 billion ($480 million) by the end of 2014. 
 
The food industry is a rapidly growing sector in the Saudi Arabia. For instance, according 
to the SIDF
7
 report (2012) in 1974 there were only 39 food factories with an investment of 
SAR 2,028 million ($540.8 million). By 2011 the number of food factories had risen to 
785 factories (i.e., 20.13% increase) with investments of up to SAR 42,117 million (more 
than $11,231.2 million), i.e., a 20.76% increase. Several factors were suggested by Al-
Jefri (2008) that influenced the growth of the Saudi food industry which is increasing at 
the rate of 20 factories per year, to meet the growing demand for food products, and to 
solve the local food store imported from abroad:  
1) Progressive realization of the population. 
2) The increasing proportion of pilgrims each year. 
3) The investment of the Kingdom in the oil industry, which led to a significant 
increase in the purchasing power of the local population.   
 
 
The food industry started over 50 years ago in 1953 with three factories: an ice factory in 
Makah City and two in Jeddah City, where one of them produced soft drinks. The SIDF 
report (2012) shows that the total area of existing industrial cities in Jeddah City is 45,000 
square metres, spread over 12 major activities, including the dairy industry, the 
manufacture of beverages, fruits and vegetables plants, packaging and preservation of fish, 
the manufacture of vegetable oils and animal fats,  grain grinding, baking products, sugar 
refining, animals and bird feeds, the production of animal and bird meat, and the 
                                                          
7
 SIDF: Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
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manufacture of cocoa and chocolate, sweets and candies, as well as other secondary food 
industries. 
 
In addition to the diversity of food products, the Saudi food industry leads this sector in 
the Gulf Region where the Kingdom exported SAR 12,605 million ($32, 694.67 million) 
worth of manufactured food in 2011 (SIDF, 2012). This success is, due to four main 
reasons: a) the Saudi government‟s support to the food industry in terms of attracting new 
technologies that reduce costs and increase production, b) the manufacturing and 
preserving of legitimate (Halal)
8
 food, which has found a market in many Muslim 
countries, c) the development of the packing and packaging industry that has enhanced the 
quality of the food products, and d) the development of advertisement industry to target 
customers both locally and abroad (Al-Jefri, 2008)  . 
 
8.2.2 The Interview Transcript 
The interview was conducted at the company‟s head office and lasted for two hours with 
Mr A, who was the manager of the newly-opened factory, and who now holds the position 
of Chief Financial Officer (CFO).  The interview transcript presented below is organised 
in segments with sub-headings that summarise the key points addressed during the 
meeting. 
The investment opportunity when first was presented to the management in the company‟s 
head office was a very good opportunity:  
 
“It was a successful business, we know how to sell our products, and we know how to 
make our products. We know how to run factories, we know how to source our products, 
and we know the market we were going into, we looked at it and said ok, because, 
                                                          
8
 Halal means not prohibited according to Islamic sharia law. 
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definitely when you go into an opportunity that was presented to you or a business that 
you are not in and try to expand. When you invest definitely there are some successes and 
some failures, in success everybody celebrates highlights but failure is different. We are a 
courage company.”  
  
The reason for investing in another country in the Gulf: 
 
“When we used to have only one factory in Saudi Arabia, we wanted to expand in the 
Gulf countries (GCC) so we opened a factory in one of the countries. We looked at it and 
said: if we want to expand do we go 2000 km away or we go 600 km away? Then we can 
represent issues we can manage. So we opened a factory in the Gulf. The aim of the 
factory was to supply part of the Eastern province and to cover the GCC market and 
eventually reach the portion where we wanted to expand.” 
 
“The store capacity in Saudi Arabia was 100-120 thousand tons, we always thought that in 
order to increase the capacity you have to build a new refinery, you can do some 
additional steps and additional investment and buy new machines with a faster capacity. 
We had the refinery capacity but we did not have the filling capacity.” 
 
“At that time we had limited space in Saudi Arabia; we were sort of thinking of the pocket 
rather than from the market. So we were told that Saudi requirement is this much and 
people came and tell us: you know we don‟t have the capacity, we have this issue, and we 
have that issue, so we opened a factory in the Gulf to cover for that.” 
 
 “It was a successful business, we know how to sell our product, and we know how to 
make our product. We know how to run factories, we know how to source our product, 
and we know the market we were going into, we looked at it and said ok, because, 
definitely when you go into an opportunity that was presented to you or a business that 
you are not in and try to expand. When you invest definitely there are some success and 
some failure, in success everybody celebrates highlights but failure is different. We are a 
courage company.”  
 
The company‟s strategy in relation to that investment opportunity as: 
 
“The strategy formulation of the company, this is a very flexible very dynamic way of 
formulating the strategy. We are not a one-man company, there was a complete study that 
was done, and a complete market study and financial study it was validated, initially we 
had people saying to us that you have a limited window to try otherwise you should stop, 
we prioritise.” 
 
The feasibility of the investment was built on three strategies: 
 
“This factory is serving the Eastern province, because if you ship from Jeddah to there it is 
more expensive, and to Gulf countries it is more and more expensive. With capacity 
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constraints in Saudi what is the nearest location? There was also a view of point which is 
Iran that has a huge population. This feasibility was based on 20-25% in Saudi, 30-35% 
Gulf country, and the rest to export to another neighbouring country.”   
 
Although all calculations encouraged the company to commence such investment, still the 
company knows very well that:     
 
“Not everything I invest in will turn good; we invested in another country seven years ago, 
and we know the powerful people are behind this fight, we want to close now. We can‟t 
fight powerful people; we can‟t lose the shareholders money. You fight a battle but you 
don‟t go into a war.” 
 
“We had the same issue in a different country, we had a plant and we had a competition 
that we didn‟t like, the thought in the company was why fight when we can merge? Share 
a bigger piece of the pie than fighting for a small piece. So we went for joint venture, 
because before they lost money and I lost money because of the price. It‟s a win-win 
situation; we are not playing with the shareholders money.”   
 
After opening the factory in the 1990s, several problems emerged: 
 
“It was running at 50-60% capacity but not very profitable and so we can say that 
although all the feasibility and everything were, we had no fundamental problems in the 
director. That factory had a very nice set up and a very good distribution setup. It operated 
in 1992 so I was managing it there it was struggling at that time because of the capacity 
constrains but it was fine.” 
 
“By the time the factory was set up, dealing with the other neighbour country became very 
difficult because of the political relationship, we used to have the export partners from 
them but they were not very consistent: they are here one month and four months they are 
not there. If you are doing this on a consistent basement you cannot pursue.” 
 
It is a special case because:  
 
“You can‟t produce food and store it, if you produce and store for 4 months then you put it 
on the shelf by the time it goes to the consumer the oxidisation levels increase. The food 
which we produce if you want to order today you have to wait 1-1.5 months in advance, 
so we can‟t operate a huge factory with a huge food production without this prediction.” 
 
But the biggest problem the factory faced was: 
 
“Five, six years down the road we had an arson fire there which made the factory unusable 
for quite some time. Since it was covering the Eastern province market (which is a good 
market) and covering the Gulf (which is a good market) we couldn‟t just shut up the 
suppliers and say sorry we cannot supply the Gulf. We went into the crash mode; the 
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damage to the factory in that Gulf country was very massive meaning it took us one year 
to complete to rebuild. So it was not that damage in partial section or this section, it was a 
problem for the whole factory, so we went into the crash mode.” 
 
It was a large problem that had one solution, which is closure for several reasons: 
 
“The fire triggered a thousand problems; you did things with little  tinkering, if you are 
working right but you did not achieve the target you continue, let‟s do this it will add 2% 
to profit, but the fire opened the eyes as we went to the crisis mode.” 
 
“We identify that we cannot let this market go away, otherwise we let the competition 
coming, so we took some steps and we saved a life. During those crises which we should 
have things coming out, ok look: how can we tinker a little bit this and a little bit that, we 
do some adjustments in our machinery we add few machines and we hope we can over 
produce that additional capacity which we were producing in that Gulf country, we do it 
here in the Saudi factory.” 
 
“That started at hard process, ok fine that is ok, now the factory is rebuilt, “what to do 
with it now?‟ I have the capacity here, shall we keep that factory? Or close it? It was a 
prestige issue at the company in a country with all this muscle and then after six years I 
want to close it.” 
 
“But when we looked at it we said ok, what to do with it, we went to talk the feasibility of 
it. We said ok fine maybe it had a flow, people rejecting it said we do this and we do that 
and we cover the shortfall. Then we said look from the outside the capacity in that Gulf 
country accessed because we still can produce in Saudi and cover all this so we agree on 
lets close.”  
 
In order to close the factory, several issues had to be addressed:   
 
“But again we did hire a consultant who did the financial bits what to do with this factory, 
because we have that stuck investment there in order to meet the demand in the Gulf and 
the Eastern province, I‟m spending roughly speaking SAR14 to 15 million additional in 
terms of the wages and extra fixed costs so we can issue the distribution.” 
 
“The study from the consultant came out and said come on, you can consistently supply 
this one if you do some additional investment in Saudi, and we can move some of the 
parts from that Gulf country to Saudi then we can reduce your fixed costs but still 
maintain your capacity.” 
 
“Then what we did we look at it from different thoughts then we said financially it makes 
sense. Then we brought in a technical consultant because moving a machinery is not only 
moving the machine, but you have to look at the technical special issues of the machine, 
because the electrical cycle in Saudi is different from the one in the Gulf country, how 
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much will it cost us to convert those machines, its filling line.  So it took us 3 months to 
do a technical evaluation, so teams were formed to consult, technical people from Saudi 
and technical people from the Gulf country as well, they said ok some of the machinery 
we can move but you can‟t move all of them.”  
 
“You can move the refinery but the moment you remove the refinery whatever you spend 
on the refinery your salvage value will be less, let‟s say you spend SAR10 million you 
will only get 3 million because of the piping, the wiring, and the panels. Again air-
conditioners you cannot move. It took us 8 months to start the moving and closing the 
factory.” 
 
“Again there was a big problem coming related to a key asset: what to do with the human 
element? You can‟t close the factory and say ok goodbye. We went into negotiation with 
the government of the Gulf country, we said look we have this financial study, we got that 
technical study. It is not viable for the company, the shareholders, we have certain factors, 
we are at some time contributing to the economy, we have 200-300 employees, and can 
we have substantial support from the government side? But the government said no we 
cannot do it.”         
 
“Again it took some time, so we had our execution plan; it took us 2 years to close the 
factory from the time the decision was made till the final closure.  Legally the company on 
paper is still there, there are certain legal cases we are closing, we understood the equity 
will take time, we understood the complication will take time and the teams that were 
formed were headed by fine people; one of them from the financial side (what to do with 
direct cost). A team was formed for the technical side, a team was formed from the human 
resources side, and a team was formed from the sales side (how to handle customers).” 
 
“We went to the closure event activity by activity and take it into consideration to close. 
What steps are necessary to ensure that we are not unfair with anybody including the 
shareholders and not to destroy the value? For the workers we looked who can be 
preserved and where, who needs financial support?” 
 
“Since the decision to close we didn‟t face anyone who went to court and said that the 
company was not fair to us because we kept them in the picture from day one the project 
was shaking. So we first took care of our employees.” 
 
“Then we took care of our customers and the sales side. For you as a customer there is no 
change; the company will have new supply for Saudi, additional costs whatever they are 
we will pay, it will not pass onto the price, the cost of distribution to you.”  
 
“Then the hard part came, when disassembling the factory. We were starting a factory in 
North Africa so we asked do you need this part and so on, even the left office furniture we 
went to other companies saying we have those offices do you want to take and so on.” 
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The proficiency of the company when dealing with the situation:  
 
“When I walked away from the Gulf country factory, I had only two brief cases, that were 
legal documents, but still though we left we kept our information system employees to 
keep testing the machinery. It was a very compressed process because of the situation, 
when you go into the new investment nobody is worried about the costs but when you are 
closing the factory everybody is worried about the costs.” 
 
“We spoke to our employees and said if the company wants you back do you come, they 
said yes. All reports are transferred whether it‟s our financial reporting our dealing with 
employees, our dealings with suppliers, we don‟t keep things to the last moment then 
surprise them, and people appreciated this.”        
 
With regard to the expected profit and the review of the factory‟s condition: 
 
“We review after five years and ask have you reached your goals and, if not, why? What 
went wrong? What is going on? Before doing the closing, there is one thing: this company 
was not 100%, we had problems, when we went to the feasibility study we promised 
certain returns: 10% or 15% or 6%.” 
 
 
 
It is what was described as the “panic mode”: 
 
“When we were in the panic mode, you do up thinking if the fire took place 2-3 years after 
opening the factory it‟s nothing; but it happened after 5 years, the company lost its capital 
twice, we knew that when you go to a new market it will take time.” 
 
Investment appraisal techniques applied to justify the chosen investment in setting up the 
factory.  
 
“We look at the market share then we look at the sensitivity of the cash flows then we use 
DCF. The cash flows in this investment, working capital requirement to enter this 
investment. When we do the sensitivity analysis we look at what line will break even, 
where I am cash neutral, export market in another country. We look at the shareholders 
have they invested this much of money to get only 3% or 4% or 10% revenue.” 
 
“DCF calculations are one of the parameters, we do look at the intangibles. It is again my 
understanding of the business to be in the future, what is the dynamics that affect this 
DCF. For us other factors do count, plus that the NPV is positive I look at the business 
itself, giving the challenges, where I will operate, which market, which category and with 
which customers. Business dynamics at the lower level so DCF and NPV are not the final 
factors. The NPV and DCF in that Gulf country were done by a financial consultant.” 
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“The business community differ; we normally have 40% GP margin in that Gulf country if 
I had 3% net then it is very good business. Return on dividend: what is the discount rate 
for the sugar is not the same for the plastic or oil. The risk (beta) and the dynamics of the 
investments are different, it depends, and we adjust it for the industry and the country. For 
the beta we use the cost of capital against the dynamics and risk and revenues of the 
business. It is the cash that makes it.”        
 
“What is this risk, someone says that the risk is that we shall not capture the market share 
but what is the problem with it? Is it competition? You want to buy the market share or 
you want to build the market share? What is the price? One is a long duration one is a 
short but expensive.” 
 
There were working capital considerations. 
 
“This tightens the investment‟s impact on product cost. An avoidable investment in 
working capital and its effect on operational efficiency in terms of costs and what can be 
done are these things. There is a difference between if you are a large player or a small 
player. If you are a large player, then you can go for negotiation, if you are small then you 
have to go for the rules of the supplier. There is the value buy, the supplier income, supply 
chain, you need to find a solution for the industrial business customers.” 
 
“The supply chain is very long; if I want to be competitive, I have to order and place one 
month in advance, then after those 15-20 days in the distribution. Then capacity 
constraints: you can run the same capacity with 100 tons a day or 200 tons a day through 
loading or filling line.” 
 
Reactions of the board of management at company‟s head office to the closure decision.   
 
“Initial management or initial board have been conservative, in this business you can lose 
your shirt so go and do piece maintenance small which does not affect you so badly which 
will create a problem later on. The factory was 100 thousand capacities in order to supply 
the gulf countries you can either increase capacity or build a new factory.” 
 
“But when the fire happened, it was a shock; we said thank God we did not put all of our 
eggs in one basket. You have to cover your costs to stay on your toes, you have to be big 
so you can make more money with little margin. My product is 75% of raw material over 
which I have no control.” 
 
“The resistance of the Board was because of the image of the company, not how much you 
lose. You have to be brave enough to say I made a mistake; you want to live with this 
mistake or face it and get out. What is the problem?” 
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But finally, the decision to close was not easy: 
 
“It took around 18 months before the actual closure decision of the factory took place. The 
company had so many losses that it had to recapitalize it twice.”  
 
“It was not the survival of the factory it was the survival of the whole company. You 
cannot lose your customers you cannot let competitors come in and then get out to the 
company, what shall we do? Before the fire we worried about why is it behind, but the 
crisis created a panic mode. It was not the phrase “let‟s close the factory”, it was maybe 
there is something wrong we are doing that caused this.” 
 
8.2.3 Case Analysis 
The case is an example of a decision that did not turn out well as planned. Instead of 
persisting for a long time, the company withdrew. Decisions related to the case can be 
categorized into three stages: the first is the commencement and operating of the project 
where the company continued to add resources in order to maintain the existence and 
profitability of the project; the second stage is when the fire took place and the challenges 
the company faced to rebuild the factory, and the third was the decision to close and shut 
down the project.  
 
In the first stage, when the factory was opened, the level of achievement was less than 
expected: “not very profitable......it was struggling at that time”. The main reason for the 
setback was attributed to contextual determinants “because of the political relationship.” 
However, the factory kept its production level in order to justify the company‟s 
persistence decision “if you are working right but you did not achieve the target you 
continue, let’s do this it will add 2% to profit.” This stage ended after five to six years 
from opening the food factory when the fire took place “which made the factory unusable 
for quite some time.” 
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The second stage of the escalation decision started when the fire took place, as “the fire 
opened their eyes” to see that the factory was not facing goal attainment problems 
anymore or that the achieved profit was below expectations. It would be more 
appropriately described as “we went to the crises mode.” The fire not only affected the 
existence of the factory but it extended to affect the whole company where “the company 
lost its capital twice.” The stage ended when the company decided to rebuild the factory 
“we identify that we cannot let this market go away, otherwise we let the competition keep 
coming, so we took some steps and we save a life.”   
 
The third stage, which started in the rebuilding of the factory “took us one year to 
complete to rebuild” had a major conflict “what do we do with it now? Shall we keep the 
factory? Or close it?” it is no longer a profitable opportunity but it is now a “stuck 
investment.” On the one hand, there are forces dragging the company to make the 
withdrawal decision; the most important being the ability to cover the market needs “we 
hope we can produce more in the Saudi factory than we could in that Gulf country” and 
the increasing burden of the financial cost “I’m spending roughly speaking an additional 
SAR14 to 15 million.” 
 
On the other hand, two obstacles prevented the decision to withdraw: the first is the 
number of employees “we have 200-300 employees” and the second is how flexible it is to 
transfer and operate the machinery “the technical issues of the machine, because of the 
electrical cycle in Saudi Arabia which is different from the one in the gulf country.” After 
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consulting financial, technical, and a human resource specialist the final decision was “we 
agree on closing down (the factory).”  
 
In addition to confirming both the descriptive results (see Chapter six) and those of the 
inferential analysis (see Chapter Seven), the escalation/de-escalation determinants in this 
case are similar to some of those found in a number of relevant case studies (see Chapters 
Three and  Four) (i.e., Drummond, 1997; Mähring and Keil, 2008; Pan and Pan, 2011).  
However, new variables were found that did not exist in similar cases, such as „covering 
the market needs‟. Further, in the current case non-project-specific determinants (i.e. 
psychological and contextual) are considered as approach attributes while project-specific 
(i.e. strategic and financial) determinants are considered as avoid attributes (see Table 
8.2). 
Table 8.2: Approach-Avoidance Attributes in Case Study One  
Determinants Approach Avoid 
Psychological  Justifying an earlier decision, High 
self-esteem  
 
Contextual  Political issues, Justifying external 
parties, Noticeable effort, Norms of 
modeling 
Political issues.  
Organizational  Company‟s image, No. of employees, 
The linkage of the project to strategic 
existence of company is significant, 
High investment in technical side-bets. 
Company‟s image, Saving the company‟s 
reputation. 
Strategic  Cover the market needs Efficacy of resources utilization, 
Frequency of project progress reporting, 
Consultation, Unattainable goals.  
Financial  Sunk costs, The availability of the 
project's costs and revenues 
The availability of the project's costs and 
revenues, Withdrawal costs are significant, 
Extra funds required could not be raised in 
time to save the project, Profit is less than 
expected. 
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In more detail, non-project-specific determinants (psychological, contextual, and 
organisational) have taken place first: “It was a prestige issue for this company in a 
country with all this muscle and then after six years I want to close it.” Where “initially 
the board had been conservative..... The resistance of the board was because of the image 
of the company,” and “We had the same issue in a different country.” Therefore, justifying 
a prior decision, high degree of self-esteem, protecting the company‟s image, and norms 
of modelling were approach attributes.       
 
Organizational and strategic determinants were very clear as “it was not the survival of the 
factory, it was the survival of the whole company...., we first took care of our 
employees...., we spoke to our employees and said if the company wants you back would 
you come they said yes......., you cannot lose your customers you cannot let competitors 
come in and then get out of the company....., we took care of our customers.” More 
strategic considerations were  topped the priority list in the withdrawal decision: “In this 
business you can lose your shirt...., teams that were formed were headed by fine people 
from the financial side; what do we do with direct cost, a team was formed from the 
technical side, a team was formed from the human resources side, and a team was formed 
from the sales side to handle customers......, we are not playing with the shareholders’ 
money.....we review after five years and ask if you have reached your goals and if not 
what went wrong.” Consultation, for example, was considered a strategic avoidance 
attribute, which is consistent with what Pan and Pan (2011) have reported in a UK case 
study that consultation in terms of the meetings between all project members to review 
project problems jointly and identify possible alternatives was a de-escalation tactic.  
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Financial determinants were also always evident: “The company had so many losses that it 
had to recapitalize it twice...., You have to cover your costs to stay on your toes...., you 
have to be big so you can make more money with little margin...., when you go into the 
new investment nobody is worried about the cost but when you are closing the factory 
everybody is worried about the costs....., and additional costs whatever we will pay it will 
not pass on the price.” Only two financial determinants were considered as approach 
attributes, which were sunk costs and the availability of project‟s costs and benefits.  
 
8.3 Case Study Two 
The case described below is related to expanding the current business of a transportation 
rental company to invest in big vehicles such as trucks in Saudi Arabia. To put this case 
into context, a brief introduction is first given about the company and its main industry, 
the transportation vehicle rental sector in Saudi Arabia. 
 
8.3.1 Company Overview 
The transportation rental company is one of the large transportation rental companies in 
the country. The company was founded in in the 1970s with an initial capital of around 
one million SAR ($267,000), one rental office, and few vehicles only. Currently the 
company‟s capital is almost SAR 200 million ($48 million) and it owns around 20,000 
vehicles in covering a wide geographical area throughout the country. The project under 
consideration in this case study is a new investment opportunity that the company 
embarked on but after facing an essential obstacle it decided to put the project on hold and 
redirect the investment in a way that saved the company huge losses.  
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The Saudi transportation rental market is a growing and promising one. The size of the 
industry exceeded $530 million in 2010, and was expected to continue growing in the 
foreseeable future. It is estimated that car rental market will grow to reach SAR1.1 million 
by 2017 (Euro-monitor International, 2013). There are several reasons that for the growth 
of the transportation rental industry in Saudi Arabia (Middle East, 2007): 
• Local movement of citizens and residents in the country. 
• Wide geographical area in Saudi Arabia that requires travelling between regions, which 
demands the need for travellers to rent transportation at all airports. 
• Companies‟ need to distribute their goods and consumer products as well as courier 
companies that rely mostly on rental transportations through specialized leasing 
companies. 
8.3.2 The Interview Transcript 
The interview took place at the company‟s head office and lasted for two hours with Mr. 
B who is the company‟s Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Mr. B was glad to be interviewed 
after answering the survey questionnaire as he started the meeting by expressing his 
admiration for research project and the depth and quality of the survey as they related 
directly to his company‟s experiences. Further, he stated that some of the questions had 
opened his eyes towards new elements that might be important to the decision making 
process particularly  and that thanks to the survey questionnaire he was able to tackle very 
complicated project issues in his company and share his findings with the company‟s 
Board. 
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At the beginning Mr B explained the reason for expanding the company‟s business: 
“There is no doubt that all companies are looking for an expansion or extension for their 
plans, we too are looking for the growth in our field which is purely car rental. During the 
past seven years we have been working with a 20-25% profit margin, but the piece of cake 
and market size itself changed in seven years, we got to almost 25-30% of the market 
share.” 
 
“We developed our research and started to look for other projects to launch, we thought of 
projects that are related to our business. We have a road transport using the large trucks in 
this country that we don‟t operate and we know that the size of this business is huge, and 
the size of investment is huge. For example, the smallest truck and the box behind to carry 
cars or any other wares would cost up to $200,000 to $250,000.” 
 
Further, he explained how the investment was accepted: 
 
“We started to investigate the market for such project; we are convinced that the project is 
related to our business, it is still in the transportation but in a different way. We truly 
studied the project carefully, on the one hand the project‟s feasibility is very high: great, 
the investment: we are cash rich company, we have enough money why don‟t utilize up to 
25% from the facility offered by banks, as our lending capacity is very high why don‟t 
utilize it?.” 
 
“So the first resolution is that we have the cash, the demand is very high for this type of 
service, it is required dramatically by the market. There is no large company that have a 
project like that, they are all small individuals‟ investors; this one has 10 large trucks, 
another has 5 large trucks, so we said lets open a project for the large trucks as we have 
large clients database all saying we want to work with you.” 
 
The investment was launched: 
 
“We started to buy some of the equipment as we are engaged in the project, you cannot 
imagine what the biggest drawback that made us repeal the project: , the type of truck 
drivers needed do not exist here in the Kingdom now, and if found they are a very small 
number. I was talking about a large business we want between a thousand to two thousand 
trucks. Pakistan is the number one provider for such trained drivers.” 
 
But the project faced a setback:  
 
“A major obstacle was that we need to issue visas, as we don‟t have visas for foreigner 
drivers, we have to meet requirements for Saudization. The problem is that the employee 
required is an employee who does not exist in Saudi Arabia, and if they exist, they are 
very few numbers. In order to grow in line with the demand of the business I don‟t need 
equipment, I am in need to work with a driver, as the service offered has to be a full 
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service not only the clients want the car, as we can provide them a car rental, they want 
their wares to be taken from here to there and the customer pays you. This is one of the 
reasons that made me understand why such business is run by individual investors as this 
one has ten and that one has five trucks, because he has five or six visas. But we are not 
aiming for a project that has 50 or 60 or 70 trucks, we have 18,000 cars to go and if we 
want to go for a project we have a target at least of SAR100 million returns to start.” 
 
“Drivers who drive these large trucks must be well trained, because we found that non-
well-trained drivers are a big loss for the company; these vehicles if not driven by well-
trained drivers would cause fast engine failure which costs SAR100,000. If the driver was 
driving fast and decided to stop suddenly might cause wires cutting which costs 
SAR50,000. So look how much one mistake would cost me. That is why skilled labour 
that knows how to operate properly is the foundation of work in transportation. That is 
why no one operates in this business; it is either individuals they have few trucks or 
companies that move their products alone. We started the project and felt that what we 
will not reach a high target and after we arrived to ten trucks there is a high demand we 
cannot provide the service.”  
 
After one year of initiating the project:  
 
“We took the decision after a year that we stop and hold, what did we do with those 
trucks, so we don‟t have book closes, we turned them to trucks that move our rental cars 
between cities.” 
 
Was the information regarding the availability of drivers, which is a strategically 
important piece of information, obvious by the time the project was studied?  
 
“There is no doubt that the information was obvious, sees the sensitivity that the operation 
was successful if I get a range of visas, and would fail if I don‟t get the visas. And we 
return what comes first the eggs or the chicken: you start by getting the visas and bringing 
in the drivers or you prepare the equipment of the project first. We had promises that 300 
visas for drivers would be  granted; we took the decision that it needs more than six 
months to prepare those trucks, so we start by ten trucks while we get the visas. The visas 
are the roulette ball that you throw and, if it hits, the project is achieved; all the other 
elements are all present to us. If the visas are provided I can travel and look for the 
country where such labour is available, why I said Pakistan because I can find 1,000 
trained drivers. We studied carefully, even from where to get drivers we find that Pakistan 
is the best because the country relies mainly on trucks in the transfer of goods, people and 
everything.” 
 
“The life of truck drivers is hard because they are away from their families for a month 
travelling from here to here, and it is a difficult life. The driver is available, the equipment 
is located and the financial capacity exists and everything is available. So the visas are 
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provided or not this may be the main obstacle for the failure of the project or the key 
factor in the success of the project.” 
 
“With the current circumstances and the subject of unemployment and Saudization after 
meetings with the former minister we knew that there is no possibility to get the visas. As 
Saudization is a national requirement, it is not necessary to start a business it is employing 
Saudis. We stopped the whole project and we think now to go for training Saudi truck 
drivers. We begin to study that would the Saudi labour accept to work as a truck driver 
and he has a future in it. We started thinking in a different way now, we still believe in 
this opportunity, but can we make the project succeed?” 
 
Was there any reaction from your client companies?  
 
“The lack of this service in the Kingdom has forced companies that produce products with 
expiry date such as food & dairy to set up the self-shipping service for their products. The 
feedback we got that they are very sorry we cannot continue because they will concentrate 
in the core business which is manufacturing and they don‟t want to go for the big 
headache of distribution and transportation.” 
 
“It is hard you start the business and you do not have clients, we have clients that are 
happy to give us their trucks. Another type of companies do not have a special department 
for distribution and they rely on individual drivers, someone has three trucks in Medina 
City another has five in Mecca City, the problem that it depends on the drivers when they 
deliver the service, it is supposed that the gasoline in the truck brings me the goods in 48 
hours but the driver delivers me after 5 days I subtract the difference in days. I have ready 
customers I made a survey (study) I knew that I can go for 1000 truck in one year, but the 
drawback is the lack of trained drivers.” 
 
8.3.3 Case Analysis 
The de-escalation decision in this case differs from that of the food manufacturing 
company (case study one above) in that the decision was put on hold: “we took the 
decision after a year that we stop and hold”, then the project was redirected not 
terminated: “what did we do with those trucks, so we wouldn’t have book closes? We 
turned them to trucks that move our rental cars between cities.”   
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Several determinants have influenced the company‟s de-escalation decision (see Table 
8.3), which took place after one year of initiating the investment in trucks. These 
determinants have similarities to those reported in a number of previous case-based 
studies (see Chapters three and  Four) for instance Ross and Staw (1986), Drummond 
(1995) Keil et al. (2000)  and Pan et al. (2006). In the current case, non-project-specific 
(contextual) determinants were considered as avoidance attribute, while project-specific 
(informational) determinants were considered as approach and (strategic and financial 
determinants) avoidance attributes. 
 Table 8.3: Approach-Avoidance Attributes in Case Study Two  
Determinants Approach Avoid 
Financial     Availability of funds  Availability of the project's costs; high maintenance 
costs, redirecting costs less than keeping project 
Contextual   Political interference to discontinue the project. 
Informational   Incredible information  
Strategic  High demand for market Low degree of project completion, flexibility to 
restructure the project, availability of alternative 
investments. 
 
In more detail, three project-specific approach attributes were noticed in this case study: 
financial “we are a cash rich company”, informational: “We had promises that 300 visas 
for drivers would be provided”, and strategic: “the demand is very high for this type of 
service.” These attributes made the company continue the investment even when they 
faced a main political difficulty: “we need to issue visas, as we don’t have visas for 
foreigner drivers; we have to meet requirements for Saudization.” In the escalation/de-
escalation literature, these determinants were found to influence managers‟ choices (see 
for example, Keil et al., 2000; Cuellar et al., 2006; Chakravorty, 2009).  
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Compared to approach attributes, more project-specific determinants were considered in 
this case as avoid attributes. For example, financial determinants existed in terms of “these 
trucks if not driven by well-trained drivers would cause fast engine failure which costs 
SAR100,000. If the driver was driving fast and decided to stop suddenly it might cause the 
cutting of wires which costs SAR50,000.” Further, strategic determinants influenced the 
de-escalation decision within two items: “we had ten trucks..... I can go for 1000 trucks” 
and the second item is “we turned them to trucks that move our rental cars between 
cities.” In addition to contextual (non-project-specific) determinants such as: “A 
requirement for Saudization, the problem is that the employee required is an employee 
that does not exist in Saudi Arabia.” These determinants were found to influence 
managers‟ decisions in the escalation/de-escalation literature, (see for example, Ross and 
Staw, 1986; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Kiel and Robey, 1999; Pan et al., 2006; 
2006). 
 
For example, in a case study in the UK, Pan et al. (2006) suggested three steps to redirect 
a project: a) unfreeze commitment to the failing project, b) changing previous beliefs, and 
c) refreezing new attitudes. They found that several factors have influenced managers‟ 
decisions to de-escalate commitment (through redirecting) such as the strong political 
support to redirect the failing project because of the availability of a feasible alternative 
course of action. In another case study in the UK (2006), Pan and his associates found that 
because there was a false perception that the failing project was close to completion in its 
early stages of development, managers succeeded in turning around the failing project and 
being closer to success.   
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8.4 Case Study Three  
The case described below is related to constructing a building for a public organization. 
To put this case into context, a brief introduction is first given about the company and the 
industrial context of the case which the real estate sector in Saudi Arabia. 
 
8.4.1 Company Overview 
This public organization was first established in the mid-1970s then re-structured in 2006 
to include several activities such as managing projects, and maintenance directing. The 
organization invited bids for the construction of an important new building, where a 
contractor won the project by providing the least-price. However, after three years the 
amount achieved was below the expected standards, the company withdrew the project 
from the contractor to save the company major losses.  
 
The Saudi real estate market is identified as one of the most promising and dynamic 
sectors in the Middle East Region. It is valued at more than SAR1.3 trillion (more than 
$300 billion, and expected to reach SAR1.5 trillion ($400 billion) in the coming years 
because of the high demand from investors (Arab-News, 2014).  
 
Several factors that might influence the real estate growth in Saudi Arabia were suggested 
(JLL, 2014; Arab-News, 2014) as follows: 
 The strong economic growth as the government aims to diversify the economy by 
developing non-oil based sectors (see Section 2.3) on the one hand and the oil revenues 
used to fund high public spending on infrastructure on the other hand, which both 
provide a strong incentive for the growth of the real estate sector. 
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 The rapid growth in population; from 6.2 million in 1970 to over 27 million in 2012, 
where 45% are under the age of 20. A large number of young Saudis are now setting up 
families, which increases the demand for modern retailing as well as the country‟s 
residential market.  
 
 Saudi Arabia‟s rapid rate of urbanization, as more than half a million new urban 
dwellers a year move to cities that satisfy their needs and provide better public or 
private services to them. Additionally, the government plans to build economic cities 
around the Kingdom as well as the science and advanced technology university which 
have enhanced the real estate market development.  
8.4.2 The Interview Transcript 
The interview lasted for 80 minutes at the company‟s head office with Mr C, who is the 
head of projects at the company, and is thus directly involved with project management.  
Mr C started by generally explaining the general reasons for project failure in the public 
sector: 
“Stalled projects in the Kingdom do exist, conferences are held to discuss such projects 
and their causes of failure. Some causes are related to the contractor, to the financing, or 
respect to the owner. There are two main reasons for the faltering projects at the company: 
the first is that contractors take projects more than their capacity (full loaded) so they can‟t 
pool resources and provide employment, and the second is financial where all contractors 
commencing projects are financed by banks as they operate and then, take extracts from 
the company according to the development of project so liquidity is the spirit of the 
project; no liquidity no projects.” 
 
“Other reasons related to that some contractors who won the bid of the project has the 
intention of selling it to another second-sub, in the company something like this doesn‟t 
happen because we have a strong monitoring system and an advisory that checks things 
out.” 
 
“Another important reason is that the contractor tends to burn the price, as he wins the 
project bid with the lowest price and then he realizes that his estimations were not correct. 
He knows from the beginning that he will lose in that project so he delays the project, and 
doesn‟t fulfil his obligations, he says why waste my time and my effort in a project that is 
a loss, because he placed prices less than available on the market and we at the company 
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have certain standards that we don‟t accept lower than the approved suppliers and 
materials. Anything new is required tests to make sure it is identical to the criteria set.” 
 
How projects are accepted within the public sector: 
 
“Government procurement system declares that if the price submitted by the Contractor is 
more than 35% of the original price can be ruled out but if less than 35% it has to be 
considered, for example, the original price is SAR100 million, the price of the contractor 
is 70 million, he wins the bid though I know that he will lose and cannot complete the 
project, he wins the bid, otherwise he might complain to the office of Grievances.” 
 
The case the organisation faced and the reasons that drove it to withdraw the project:  
 
“We had a project that we removed from the contractor; the project was related to 
constructing a building. The contractor won the project bid and spent a long time but his 
performance and progress were very slow, after several meetings trying to move the 
project forward, we arrived at the decision that he cannot continue the project. He won the 
project bid according to the system, he offered the lowest price and there was some 
difference between his bid and the one above him, he offered SAR121 million ($32.3 
million), and the one after offered SAR124 million ($33.1 million). The building was 
supposed to end within 36 months.” 
 
“The contractor significantly delayed the project and the entire market prices rose, his 
performance was weak, which means over 30 months his weak performance didn‟t exceed 
more than 2% of the project‟s expectations. Several meeting occurred and the government 
system declares that he must be given first and second warnings. We had a weekly report 
from our consultant about how much of the project the contractor managed to complete.” 
 
“The contractor gave us a time schedule that showed what he would accomplish each 
week and what labour he would provide, so we compared the planned schedule and the 
actual to calculate the difference between them.  If the difference was negative and 
exceeded 10% we gave him a warning; if less than 10% he was urged to intensify his 
efforts and do better to make up the difference. If the difference adds up and he cannot 
cover, we give out a second warning; if the gap is bigger we go for more serious 
procedures.” 
 
“We continued according to the governmental procedures and we gave him warnings 
according to the system, because all the contractors we give those warnings but after such 
alarm things get better. We found that it was hopeless as the gap was increasing, there is 
no hope that things would get better; and then we started looking withdrawing of the 
project.” 
 
“Of course, the project withdrawal is never in the favour of the project, because the 
withdrawing process takes a long time and then the need to put the project back for 
324 
 
bidding. You have three ways to end a contract 1) withdrawal, 2) the contractor gives in 
the project with same design to another contractor, or 3) we manage the project ourselves. 
Withdrawal of course is the worst solution and takes a long time; it took nine months in 
order to withdraw the project and take the approval of the relevant authorities. From the 
time we stopped the contractor, as he went and complained to the office of Grievances and 
other committees, we must wait till all the complaints are through to withdraw the 
project.” 
 
“The project was first initiated in 2008 (1428h) and the withdrawal procedures started at 
the beginning of 2011 (1431h) and were completed at the end of 2011”  
 
“The contractor came from Riyadh City and opened an office at the site and provided a 
project manager and a certified accountant. When we sent him a letter after the project 
was withdrawn he did not receive it for some reason, so we had to send it to the chamber 
of commerce who handed it over to him.”  
 
“He faced many technical problems as he made a contract with a consultant office for 
design, and they both disagreed, in addition to problems in the project management and 
administrative as well as financial problems. In meetings we usually meet with top 
management but in his case he did not intend to meet with us and instead he sent 
unqualified people who have no authority. We did not see any cooperation from his side 
and he was insisting to continue the project and he never thought that the company would 
withdraw the project, once we stopped the bank guarantee he knew that it is serious and 
started to meet with us.” 
 
After the project was withdrawn, the project has to be put up once again for bidding but 
with a limited number of contractors:  
 
“So withdrawal has complex procedures, we withdrew the project from this contractor 
because we found that giving in to another contractor will not work as the prices were  too 
high compared to the prices of three years before when the project initially started. The 
system requires us to look for contractors that took part in the initial bidding and try to 
make a deal with each one to check if any is willing to take over the project with the same 
original price, but they all apologized, so we ask them to present new closed prices with 
determining the minimum price. So the project went back for the bidding competition but 
confined to the contractors who initially bid for the same project.” 
 
“They were five contractors, two apologized and three submitted new prices, we 
negotiated the price and told them that the contractor who withdrew would bear the price 
difference. The initial bidding price was SAR121 million, when the contractors provided 
their new prices the minimum price quoted was SAR140 million, i.e. a difference SAR19 
million to be borne by the failed contractor. We pressed on the new contractor to lower his 
price but he said that it was impossible to go below SAR139 million, so he won the bid 
and sent the documents to the management and got the approval. As the withdrawal 
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contractor might not pay the difference in cash, the Ministry of Finance would deduct the 
amount from the revenues of his other projects.” 
 
The problems that any contractor faces when his project is withdrawn from a public 
company might lead him to declare bankruptcy: 
 
“Truly the contractor whose project is withdrawn faces difficult times. The first thing his 
bank guarantee is cancelled from all banks that deal with him. If the bank guarantee is 
cancelled it means that he will not be able to bid on any governmental project because no 
bank will finance him. He has to pay the price difference, which is SAR19 million. He 
cannot bid on any new governmental projects for at least a year. Withdrawing the project 
breaks the contractor‟s back but we reached a path where this was the only solution.” 
 
Payments made to the failed contractor  
 
“The contractor received the first payment in exchange of a bank guarantee; it is like he 
received nothing. Any contractor bidding for the project receives a 10% return in 
exchange of a bank guarantee so if he disappeared we have the bank guarantee and can 
regain it back. He took the value of the business he carried out, which was very simple up 
to 2.5%. The building was simple he doesn‟t have to provide any services or equipment 
only construct the building according to our qualifications. The time we took was nine 
months to withdraw the project from the contractor, but we don‟t have any concern with 
his labour or any problems he faced, as a public company when we have withdrawn the 
project it needs to be closed, that is the most important thing. Any equipment found in the 
construction area he has no right to remove it because it is considered the property of the 
company till a new contractor wins the project bidding we then look at the cars, 
equipment, and offices on the site according to the system.” 
 
Calculation of the cost of the project 
 
“We produce a table that details the amounts involved: what is the building to be 
constructed, how many doors and windows, how much wood to be used, we look at the 
market prices, then we calculate the cost of the building. We determine the price and cost 
of the building but it is confidential and closed, when contractors submit their bidding 
prices we look at their prices, any which is more than 35% than ours is ruled out.” 
 
Does anyone endorse or favour a particular contractor? 
 
“No one can recommend a specific contractor because the project that is put for bidding 
has to be declared in newspapers.  Applicants need to be classified according to the 
classification of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, each contractor has a 
specified category: if first class he is not limited, and a second class will have a higher 
limit for projects to enter. There is a specific time set when the bidders‟ envelopes are 
opened and the minimum price will win the bid. We cannot change the winning bid, only 
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in specific cases: if the minimum price provider is over loaded or if it has stalled projects 
or projects the company withdrew from. If there is no legal document for the exclusion of 
a contractor from the bidding process, you cannot exclude them.” 
 
“Every time a contractor completes some work he submits reports, that are reviewed and 
approved by a consultant and must conform to the pre-agreed specifications. From the 
beginning of the competition, a compact disk is given to contractors which contain the 
materials required and the criteria for such material, as he can only provide better than the 
existing, also he is given the overall and specific conditions.” 
 
“The loss that we face is the loss of time and not direct financial loss but time costs 
money. Instead of being able to utilize the building as planned it is delayed. The 
company‟s consultant and the contractor have a weekly meeting to follow up the work.” 
 
Did you have a project where you started and then you quit? 
 
“Yes we have a project like that, renovation of an old building. When the contractors 
worked and disassembled the surfaces for redoing them, it appeared later that the damage 
could not be located, the damage wasn‟t apparent in the plan for maintenance. So we quit 
the project because it became not feasible for both parties, and the contractor was 
compensated for the work done.” 
 
“We have a project to develop a building, for which the Ministry of Finance allocated a 
certain amount or money to develop but contractors‟ bids were much higher. We asked the 
Ministry of Finance to increase the allocated portion and so far the project has not gone 
ahead as we are still waiting for the extra funds to be allocated.” 
 
“We have a drawn plan arranged by project management, it includes all the projects 
needed by the  organisation, which is in agreement with the top management on priorities 
in implementation of projects and then sent to the Ministry of Finance that determine what 
projects to be implemented, I can suggest forty projects and only twenty get the approval. 
The decision to construct a building is not individual or related to a certain department, 
but it is a joint decision of more than one department. Even the control over projects is not 
done individually, but is done by team work, and so are the decisions of awarding projects 
and the withdrawing where top management as well as the Ministry participating in.” 
 
8.4.3 Case Analysis 
The de-escalation decision in this case, as one of the public sector organisations, differs 
from the previous two in many ways. The means of initiating the project: “the project that 
is put for bidding has to be declared in newspapers”; the monitoring system: “we have a 
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strong monitoring system and an advisory that checks things out..... Every time a 
contractor completes some work he submits abstracts, that are reviewed and approved by 
a consultant and must conform to the company’s conditions”; projects are further checked 
by external parties: “the office of Grievances....the Ministry of Municipal and Rural 
Affairs”, and projects are not selected only upon necessity: “the Ministry of Finance that 
determine what projects are to be implemented.”    
 
Another important feature that differs from the de-escalation decision in the company 
from the two earlier cases is the concept of withdrawal itself, as it was not about quitting 
or putting the project on hold or redirecting it “so the project went back for the bidding 
competition”, but it was stopping and replacing the current contractor “we withdraw the 
project from this contractor”, and the company continued constructing the building with 
the same qualifications but with a different contractor “the new contractor..... Won the bid 
and sent the documents to the management and got the approval.”    
 
Several determinants influenced the company‟s de-escalation decision (see Table 8.4), 
which took place after three years of initiating the project. These determinants have 
similarities with those reported in a number of case-based studies (see Chapters Three and  
Four) such as Ross and Staw (1986, 1993), Lipshitz (1995), and Newman and Sabherwal 
(1996), and Winch (2013). In the current case, contextual (non-project-specific) 
determinants are considered as approach attributes, while project-specific (financial, 
strategic and informational) determinants and non-project-specific (psychological and 
contextual) determinants are considered as avoid attributes. 
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Table 8.4: Approach-Avoidance Attributes in Case Study Three 
Determinants Approach Avoid 
Psychological  Project is a failure and cannot be turned around. 
Contextual Political (government 
procedures) 
Project and its goals were publicly announced, project 
is a key project in the manager‟s portfolio, Political 
(government procedures). 
Financial  Availability of the project's costs. 
Strategic  Systematic continuous monitoring, efficacy of 
resources utilization 
Informational   Information is publicly available, credibility of the 
information source 
 
In more detail, non-project-specific in terms of contextual determinants were considered 
as an approach force, that made the company continue the project for three years: “we 
continued according to the governmental procedures and we gave him warnings 
according to the system”, while other contextual determinants were considered as avoid 
attributes in terms of: “the project that is put for bidding has to be declared in 
newspapers......the contractor whose project is withdrawn faces difficult times.....He went 
and complained to the office of Grievances and other committees.” Political support was 
considered in previous studies as an influence for both escalation/de-escalation decisions 
(e.g., Ross and Staw, 1993; Winch, 2013).  
    
More non-project-specific determinants were considered as avoid attributes such as the 
psychological influence: “we found that....there is no hope that things will get better....he 
did not intend to meet with us and instead he sent unqualified people who have no 
authority.....We did not see any cooperation from his side.....he was insisting to continue 
the project and he never thought that the company would withdraw the project.” In 
addition to project-specific determinants in terms of financial effects: “the loss of time and 
not direct financial loss but time costs money....Instead of utilizing the building at a 
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certain time it is delayed.... the entire market prices rose...it took nine months in order to 
withdraw the project and take the approval of the competent authorities.....the difference 
is 19 million borne by the contractor.” Strategic and informational pressures such as: “his 
performance and progress were very slow…….. Over 30 months his weak performance 
didn’t exceed 2% of the project........The contractor gave us a time schedule.....We had a 
weekly report from our consultant which says how much the contractor completed.”  
  
In the literature (see Chapter Four), there is some evidence for the influence of these 
determinants on managers‟ choices. For example, Pan et al. (2009) in a UK-based case 
study found that a project being closer to completion was an approach for escalation while 
the detection of serious deficiency within the project was an avoidance of escalation of 
commitment.  Therefore, it can be said that the current study‟s results are consistent with 
the proximity to the goal and the deficiency results, whereas when the project is far from 
completion (2% in the current case) and has critical deficiencies (weak performance), 
managers would consider de-escalation of commitment. 
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8.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter has extended the analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 through valuable information 
gleaned from interviews conducted with senior managers in three large organisations in 
the manufacturing, services and construction industrial sectors in Saudi Arabia. The three 
cases not only substantiated the questionnaire survey findings but also highlighted new 
avenues for the study of the (de)-escalation phenomenon.  
 
The three cases seemingly started as successful investment opportunities that eventually 
became problem cases that typify (de)-escalation of commitment. Most of the literature 
limits the concept of de-escalation to either redirecting or withdrawing an investment 
opportunity. In this research it was found that de-escalation includes more than that. For 
example in the case two, the project was redirected but still the investment opportunity has 
been put on hold until the company is capable of carrying out such a project, while in case 
three the project was completed using a different contractor. Consistent with the survey 
results, it is also evident from each case that de-escalation decisions in Saudi companies 
are influenced by a multitude of project specific and non-project specific factors. Finally, 
the interviews also showed that all cases depended on project audit either through 
continuous monitoring or reports that reflected the project‟s performance to achieve its 
goals.   
 
The next chapter draws together all of the study findings, stating its main contributions, 
limitations and opportunities for future research. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
The current study has presented a detailed and comprehensive account of managers‟ 
project escalation/de-escalation decisions in Saudi Arabia, an economy in which limited 
prior management accounting research has occurred.  This study has applied the approach-
avoidance theory to investigate both the resistance as well as forces (items) that endorse 
and influence managers‟ decisions to continue or withdraw a failing course of action. 
Without a doubt, in the light of an extensive review of relevant literature, this study can be 
considered a pioneer in conducting a large questionnaire survey in Saudi Arabian 
companies, that investigated a detailed set of 52 pertinent study variable), grouped under 
two sets of determinants (project-specific and non-project specific), in order to capture all 
the relevant and critical aspects of this complex, sensitive and data-deficient field of study. 
As stated in Chapter One, the main aim of this research was to provide, through the lens of 
the approach-avoidance theory, a better understanding of managers‟ escalation/de-
escalation decisions in the Saudi corporate culture and the determinants influencing their 
decisions. Accordingly, this study was set four specific objectives: 
 
1) Examine the impact of project-specific determinants on managers' decisions to 
escalate/de-escalate commitment. 
 
2) Examine the psychological dimension in capital project (de)escalation of commitment 
decisions. 
 
332 
 
3) Examine the extent to which contextual and organizational factors influence capital 
project (de)escalation of commitment decisions. 
 
4) Examine the moderating role that operational audit might have on project 
(de)escalation of commitment decisions. 
 
In an attempt to meet the above objectives, the socio-cultural-economic features of the 
Saudi Arabian business environment were presented first in Chapter Two to put the study 
within a well-defined context. As with any study of this magnitude and importance, an 
extensive search, filtering and review of literature on capital project and escalation of 
commitment decisions (Chapters Three and Four) took place throughout the course of the 
study, particularly in its early stages to pave the way for variable identification and 
theoretical model specification and research design, as well as comparative analysis and 
discussion of results in the later stages. In particular, the theoretical literature helped in the 
initial identification and definition of the determinants that influence the occurrence as 
well as the continuing of the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon. This was followed by   
a thorough review of empirical studies available, whether laboratory-based or those that 
reported real company experience, to give more (practical) insights into the escalation of 
commitment phenomenon.  
 
As was shown in Chapter Five,  in the design of the research  two-level theoretical model, 
the determinants have been divided into six categories (financial, strategic, informational, 
psychological, contextual, and organizational), with each category consisting of several 
items. The theoretical model accounted for the possible role of a third variable, namely 
operational project audit, on the first level relationship between the determinants and (de)-
escalation decision. To examine these two levels of relationship as defined by the study‟s 
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objectives, questions and hypotheses, an elaborate questionnaire survey was painstakingly 
developed and administered to collect the main study‟s primary data from a large sample 
of companies based in the port city of Jeddah. The relatively high survey response rate 
achieved attests to the success of this study‟s design and execution not only on a difficult 
to research and data-starved topic but also by being able to achieve this in a largely 
untapped corporate environment that is usually perceived as very sheltered and 
inaccessible. This initial and very significant success was augmented by securing more 
primary data through interviews.  In addition to the wealth of quantitative data obtained 
from the questionnaire survey, interviews were granted by three of the survey participants, 
making it possible to get more insights into the escalation of commitment decisions 
through the analysis of qualitative data. All the data collected were analysed using 
appropriate techniques whether at the descriptive or inferential stages and the results of the 
extensive analyses, discussions and interpretation in the light of relevant literature were 
presented in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, a summary and discussion of the major findings that have 
emerged from the descriptive statistics, multinomial logistic regression analysis, analysis 
of moderator effect, and the interviews conducted are given. This is followed by the major 
implications of this research for both academic knowledge and project management 
practice. The final section outlines the limitations of this research, and offers 
recommendations for future research. 
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9.2 Summary and Discussion of Research Findings 
This section highlights the outcomes of this research that have emerged from the data 
analyses and discussions in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. These outcomes are discussed 
in the context of relevant literature that was reviewed in Chapters Three and Four and how 
they relate to the study‟s research objectives. 
 
9.2.1 Findings of Descriptive Statistics 
The aim of applying descriptive statistics was to examine the survey data that was 
collected from 274 Saudi companies in Jeddah City. The results of the descriptive 
statistics are summarised here in terms of the research objectives as well as the approach-
avoidance theory. 
 
9.2.1.1. Project-Specific Determinants   
Regarding the first objective of this research, which is to examine the impact of financial, 
strategic and informational (project-specific) determinants on managers' decisions to 
escalate/de-escalate commitment, the results of the descriptive analysis have shown that 
all project-specific determinants received high levels of approval on the 5-point Likert 
scales, as most of the respondents agreed/totally agreed that the listed items had an impact 
on their escalation/de-escalation decisions.  
 
1. Financial Determinants 
When Saudi managers were provided with 10 financial items, the majority indicated that 
most of those items would act as an avoidance of escalation of commitment, and  only 
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three items were considered as an approach for escalation of commitment, i.e., an 
approach for escalation (see Table 9.1).  
         Table 9.1: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Financial Determinants 
Financial Determinants M Approach  Avoidance 
The withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher 4.003  √ 
The availability of a more financially attractive investment 
opportunity  
3.970  √ 
The financial information clearly reflected the success and failure of 
the project  
3.901  √ 
The availability of the project's costs  3.806  √ 
The availability of the project estimated revenues  3.799  √ 
The availability of a limit for extending the estimated budget  3.784  √ 
The limit for extending the estimated budget was publicly 
announced 
3.113  √ 
The salvage value of the project is ignored 2.127 √  
The extra funds required could not be raised in time to save the 
project 
2.083 √  
The decision maker realized sunk costs 2.025 √  
 
2. Strategic Determinants 
From a strategic point of view according to the respondents, out of seven items, three were 
valued as an avoidance of escalation, while four were considered as an approach for 
escalation of commitment decisions (see Table 9.2). 
  Table 9.2: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Strategic Determinants  
Strategic Determinants M Approach  Avoidance 
The efficacy of resources utilization 4.094  √ 
The systematic continuous monitoring of managers' actions 3.974  √ 
The flexibility to restructure the project  3.715  √ 
The low frequency of project progress reporting  2.343 √  
The low level of project risk  2.211 √  
The low degree of project completion 2.102 √  
The availability of a less strategically attractive investment 
opportunity 
1.952 √  
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3. Informational Determinants 
Regarding informational determinants, out of five items, three were considered as an 
avoidance of Saudi managers‟ escalation decisions, while two items were considered as an 
approach for their decision to escalate commitment (see Table 9.3). 
  Table 9.3: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Informational Determinants 
Informational Determinants M Approach  Avoidance 
The credibility of the information source 4.069  √ 
The timing of the information is helpful for the decision maker 4.065  √ 
The information is publicly available 3.693  √ 
The information is biased 2.405 √  
The information about the failing project is ambiguous 1.773 √  
  
9.2.1.2 Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
The influence of non-project-specific (psychological, contextual, organizational) 
determinants coincides with the second and third objectives of this research. The results of 
the descriptive analysis have shown that all non-project-specific determinants received 
high approval views, whereas most respondents agreed/totally agreed that the listed items 
had an impact on their escalation/de-escalation decisions as follows.  
 
1. Psychological Determinants 
The psychological determinants‟ influence was led with the second objective of this 
research, which examines the psychological dimension on capital project (de)escalation of 
commitment decisions. The results of the descriptive analysis have shown that seven out 
of twelve items were considered as de-escalation attributes (see Table 9.4) while the 
remaining five items were considered as escalation forces.  
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          Table 9.4: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Psychological Determinants 
Psychological Determinants M Approach  Avoidance 
Project initiated by a group 3.733  √ 
Manager has less tolerance for failure 3.722  √ 
Manager given the opportunity to state his low self esteem 3.715  √ 
Manager was already committed to a mental budget 3.627  √ 
Manager believes that project is a failure and cannot be turned around 3.580  √ 
Manager was allowed to bring to mind his high level of self esteem 3.503  √ 
Manager experience of guilt and regret about the project‟s failure 3.302  √ 
Manager has personal gains 2.613 √  
Manager was initially responsible for initiating the project 2.609 √  
The desire to justify a previous decision 2.485 √  
Manager desire for self-efficiency 2.335 √  
Manager experience job insecurity 2.292 √  
 
2. Contextual Determinants 
With regard to the third objective, which aimed to examine contextual determinants‟ 
influence on capital project (de)escalation of commitment decisions, the results of the 
descriptive analysis have shown that most contextual determinants have an impact on 
Saudi managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions (see Table 9.5).  
       Table 9.5: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Contextual Determinants  
Contextual Determinants M Approach  Avoidance 
Political interference to discontinue the project 3.813  √ 
Manager educational background 3.806  √ 
Manager continuing a failing project would degrade his masculinity 3.733  √ 
Manager is politically supported to discontinue the project 3.700  √ 
Project and its goals were publicly announced 3.678  √ 
Manager is socially motivated to discontinue the project 3.656  √ 
Manager is rewarded for decision process rather than decision outcome 3.540  √ 
Effort the manager has put in the project is noticeable 2.540 √  
Existence norms of modeling 2.423 √  
Manager is externally justifying others 2.405 √  
Manager is saving his reputation 2.361 √  
Project is a key project in the manager‟s portfolio 2.357 √  
Manager cultural background 2.277 √  
Manager is respected for his previous history of managing projects 2.208 √  
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    Seven out of fourteen contextual items were considered as avoidance attributes for 
escalation, while the other seven were considered as approach attributes for escalation.  
 
3. Organisational Determinants 
Organisational determinants‟ influence was covered in the third objective as well, which 
aimed to examine the effect of organisational determinants on capital project 
(de)escalation of commitment decisions. The results of the descriptive analysis have 
shown that half of the organisational determinants were approach attributes (see Table 
9.6), while the other half were avoidance attributes of Saudi managers‟ escalation 
decisions.  
   Table 9.6: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Organisational Determinants 
Organisational Determinants M Approach  Avoidance 
The project was technically irretrievable   3.598  √ 
Low investment in other technical side-bets of project   3.507  √ 
The linkage of project to organisation‟s strategic existence is significant  2.438 √  
Saving the organisation reputation   1.835 √  
 
9.2.1.3 Project Auditing Role  
The fourth objective of this research aimed to examine the moderating role that 
operational audit might have on project (de)escalation of commitment decisions. The 
descriptive results, show that operational project audit has moderated this influence in two 
contradictory trends (see Table 9.7), where on the one hand it minimized the influence of 
psychological determinants and contextual determinants (except for political items), while 
on the other hand it maximized the influence of the organisational, financial, strategic and 
informational determinants.  
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        Table 9.7: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Project Audit Influence 
De-escalation Determinants M Approach  Avoidance 
Financial determinants 4.580  √ 
Informational determinants 4.434  √ 
Organisational determinants 4.098  √ 
Strategic determinants 4.094  √ 
Contextual determinants in terms of political effects 3.054  √ 
Psychological determinants 2.788 √  
Contextual determinants in terms of social effects 2.678 √  
Contextual determinants in terms of cultural effects 2.562 √  
 
9.2.2 Results of Hypotheses Testing  
In agreement with achieving the stated objectives of this research, and to further confirm 
results of descriptive statistics, more sophisticated statistical techniques were applied in 
order to measure the significance of descriptive outcomes as well as to confirm suggested 
hypotheses with regard to approach-avoidance propositions. The results will be reviewed 
by grouping them into two subsections: the first describes the direct relationship between 
each of the selected determinants and Saudi managers‟ escalation/de-escalation decisions, 
and the second subsection presents the moderating role of operational project audit in the 
relationship between escalation/de-escalation determinants and managers‟ decisions in 
Saudi companies.  
 
9.2.2.1 Results of Direct Interactions 
Results of the direct interactions refer to the influence of escalation/de-escalation 
determinants on managers‟ decisions in Saudi Arabia that were indicated through 
suggested hypotheses. To examine the significant of this relationship, taking into 
consideration the type of the data to be analysed as the dependent variable is not 
continuous (dichotomous), Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) test is applied. The 
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results that are summarized in Table 9.8 show that project-specific/non-specific 
determinants (financial, strategic, informational, contextual, and organizational) have a 
collective significant influence on Saudi managers‟ choices, where the p value is less than 
.05, except for psychological determinants, which did not have a significant effect (p > 
.05).  
 
Therefore, all five hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, H5, and H6) were accepted regarding the 
influence of related determinants, which is in agreement with the results of the previously 
stated descriptive statistics. Hypothesis (H4) regarding the total psychological 
determinants was however rejected.                          
Table 9.8: Results of Hypothesis Testing   
Hypothesis Sig. Comment 
Project-Specific Determinants 
H1: Financial determinants influence managers‟ decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action 
.024 Accepted 
H2: Strategic determinants influence managers‟ decisions to escalate/de-escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action 
.021 Accepted 
H3: Informational determinants influence managers' decisions to escalate/de-
escalate commitment to a failing course of action.   
.002 Accepted 
Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
H4: Psychological determinants influence managers‟ decisions to escalate/de-
escalate commitment to a failing course of action 
.220 Rejected⃰ 
H5: Contextual determinants influence managers‟ decisions to escalate/de-
escalate commitment to a failing course of action 
.013 Accepted 
H6: Organisational determinants influence managers‟ decisions to escalate/de-
escalate commitment to a failing course of action 
.038 Accepted 
*Rejected for the absence of a statistically significant collective impact, but individually three psychological 
items had a significant influence. 
 
The MLR test is based on several statistical assessments and tools, as stated in Chapter 
Seven, the valuation of the credibility of hypotheses extends to examining the significance 
of each item of the determinants (Likelihood Ratio Test) and testing the extent to which it 
will significantly contribute (Parameter Estimates) to the escalation/de-escalation 
decisions
 
in Saudi companies. Thus, when applying these tests, several results occurred 
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that not only narrowed and condensed the descriptive analysis outcome, but gave more 
detail to the significant and type of influence (whether to escalate or de-escalate 
commitment) of each item on managers‟ choices.  
               
Regarding project-specific determinants, five out of twenty-two items had a strong 
significant influence on managers‟ decisions (see Table 9.9). Both managers‟ escalation 
and de-escalation decisions were influenced by four items, yet the item “information 
ambiguity” influenced managers‟ escalation decisions only. While regarding non-project-
specific determinants, nine out of thirty items have significantly influenced managers‟ 
decisions. Only one item “desire to justify previous decision” had an impact on managers‟ 
escalation and de-escalation decisions, while the additional eight items have either 
influenced managers‟ escalation or de-escalation decisions (see Table 9.9). 
Table 9.9: Approach-Avoidance Attributes for Significant Items 
Significant Items Approach Avoidance 
Project-Specific Determinants 
Financial determinants 
Financial information clearly reflected success and failure of project  √ √ 
The withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher √ √ 
Strategic determinants 
Low frequency of progress reporting √ √ 
Informational determinants 
Ambiguous information  √  
Biased information √ √ 
Non-Project-Specific Determinants 
Psychological determinants 
Desire to justify previous decision √ √ 
Manager initial responsibility  √ 
Project initiated by a group √  
Contextual determinants 
Project and its goals publicly announced  √  
Project is key project in manager's portfolio √  
Manager rewarded for decision process rather than outcome √  
Manager's educational background  √ 
Existence of norms of modeling  √ 
Organisational determinants 
Significant linkage of project to organisation‟s strategic existence √  
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This dual effect of four project-specific and one non-project-specific items on managers‟ 
decisions could be explained through the different respondents‟ work experience 
according to the years of work they spent in their jobs, different range of decision making 
authority, and their companies‟ sectors and sub-sectors (as explained in Chapter Six), in 
addition to the time proposition of the approach-avoidance theory and the type of the 
current study (comprehensive that included a large set of variables in the questionnaires 
survey).     
 
The time element, as explained in Chapter Three, is one of the important propositions of 
the approach-avoidance theory. According to the time element, any variable could be seen 
as an approach or an avoid tendency (Brockner and Rubin, 1975). This was confirmed in 
studies that examined the escalation/de-escalation phenomenon within the approach-
avoidance theory (i.e., Keil et al., 2000; Pan et al., 2009) and in other studies that found 
that managers‟ decisions varied within the time influence on managers‟ decisions (i.e., 
Keil, 1995; Ryan, 1995). In the current study, the time element was obvious through the 
results of the descriptive analysis, which indicated that respondents faced a failing project 
(see Table 6.15): one year ago (40.1%), two years ago (28.8%), three years ago (21.5%), 
and more than four years (9.4%).  
 
In the existing literature, the two financial items “the financial information clearly 
reflected the success and failure of the project” and “withdrawal costs are at a later date 
are much higher” were considered as escalation forces when variables such as the political 
influence to continue the project (Drummond, 1994; Sabherwal et al., 2003; Winch, 
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2013), or the effect of sunk costs (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Kisfalvi, 2000), high 
withdrawal costs (Ross and Staw, 1993) existed. Alternatively they are considered as de-
escalation attributes (Drummond, 1995; Boulding et al., 1997; Gosh, 1997; Zikmund-
Fisher, 2004) when the financial information revealed high returns (Zikmund-Fisher, 
2004), low withdrawal costs and high salvage value (Drummond, 1995) or low salvage 
value and low closing costs (Newman et al., 1996) existed. 
 
The strategic item “low frequency of progress reporting” was considered as an escalation 
force (Gosh, 1997; Keil and Robey, 1999; McNamara et al., 2002) but when associated 
with the degree of project completion (Moon et al., 2003; Pan et al., 2006; Ting, 2011; 
Lee et al., 2012) or the availability of an alternative investment (Pan et al., 2006; Harvey 
and Victoravich, 2009; Fox et al., 2009) it was considered as a de-escalation attribute.  
 
Finally, the informational item “the information is biased” was considered as a de-
escalation force when manipulated with variables such as managers‟ selective perception, 
where managers make the decision that favour his\her egocentric position in terms of 
his\her performance appraisal (Chakravorty, 2009), or with the culture effect (Harrison et 
al., 1999; Greer and Stephens, 2001; Salter et al., 2004; Gomez and Sanchez, 2013). 
Alternatively, “the information is biased” was considered an escalation force when 
variables such as personal responsibility (Staw, 1976; Caldwell and O‟Reilly, 1981), high 
product innovativeness (Schmidt and Calantone, 2002), managers‟ formed favourable 
opinions (Biyalogorsky et al., 2006), and high self-esteem (Sivanathan et al., 2007; Pan et 
al., 2009) were considered. 
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Regarding the single influence of each of the remaining eight items, it is found in the 
current study that three non-project-specific items “manager initial responsibility”, 
“manager's educational background”, and “existence of norms of modelling” influenced 
managers‟ de-escalation decisions. The majority of existing empirical literature that 
examined initial responsibility found it an escalation force (i.e., Staw, 1976; Barton et al., 
1989; Jeffery, 1992; Schultz and Cheng, 2002; Biyalogorsky et al., 2006; Slaughter and 
Greguras, 2008). Yet it was a de-escalation attribute when manipulated with variables 
such as the availability of an alternative investment (McCain, 1986; Keil et al., 1995; 
Schulz-Hardt et al., 2009), the frame or content of information provided (Barton et al., 
1989; Brown and Solomon, 1993; Harrison and Harrell, 1995), or individuals given the 
opportunity to affirm their wounded ego (Sivanathan et al., 2007). The item “manager's 
educational background” was a de-escalation force in Conlon and Garlands‟ (1998) study, 
as they reported that when the degree of the failing project completion was 90%, a 
percentage of 88.24 Chinese undergraduate students compared to 59.67% MBA students 
agreed to allocate an additional $1 million. The “existence of norms of modelling” was 
according to Newman and Sabherwal (1996) an escalation force if models represented 
successful projects, otherwise it could be a de-escalation attribute.  
 
It is found, in the current study, that the remaining six items have significantly influenced 
managers‟ escalation decisions. The first is “ambiguous information”, which is an 
informational item that Mähring and Keil (2008) reorganised as an escalation force when 
manipulated with the absence of information clarity, which made managers focus on 
positive information and interpret negative information in a positive way which made 
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them committed to the project longer (Boulding et al., 1997), or when information framing 
existed (Gosh, 1997). The second is “project initiated by a group” a psychological item 
that was considered to significantly influence managers‟ escalation decisions since there is 
no difference between group and individual decision making (Bazerman et al., 1984), or 
because the group of managers were provided with high ambiguous information (Brecher 
and Hantula, 2005).  
 
The third, fourth, and fifth items were “project and its goals are publicly announced”, 
“project is key project in manager's portfolio”, and “manager is rewarded for decision 
process rather than outcome” contextual determinants that were considered to be 
escalation attributes (e.g., Newman et al., 1996; Pan et al., 2006; 2009). When managers 
were identified with the project they become more committed to it (Ross and Staw, 1993), 
and even if managers were rewarded for their behaviour, the existing of political factors 
influenced their escalation decisions (Drummond, 1995). The final item “significant 
linkage of project to organisation’s strategic existence”, which is organisational, has 
induced managers‟ escalation decisions, because large percentage of the company‟s assets 
were tied to the project (Ross and Staw, 1993) or since the company‟s future potential as a 
business was tied up with this project (Kisfalvi, 2000). 
  
9.2.2.2 Results of the Moderating Role of Project Operational Audit  
Results of the intervening influence refer to examining hypothesis (H7), which indicated 
that “operational auditing plays a moderating role with respect to the determinants 
involved in the escalation/de-escalation decisions”. Because of the nature of the data, as 
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mentioned in Chapter Seven, the moderation assumption was examined through first 
applying the MLR test for the mean of the escalation/de-escalation determinants followed 
by running the MODPROBE Macro test. 
 
Results of examining the mean of the escalation/de-escalation determinants suggested the 
existence of a significant influence of each of the project-specific/non-specific 
determinants on managers‟ escalation/de-escalation of commitment decisions, which 
paved the way for examining the moderation effect. For the moderation interaction, seven 
items of operational project audit were interacted (use of project audit, project audit in the 
evaluation stage, quality of project audit process, assessment of audit reports, response of 
project manager to audit reports, project audit steps, and all project audit items) with each 
of the six independent variables (separately and collectively). 
 
The interaction results showed two levels of moderation influence, which confirms 
hypothesis H7. The first is the interaction effect of the “use of project audit”, “project 
audit in the evaluation stage”, “all project audit items”, and “assessment of project audit 
reports” on the influence of (de)-escalation, contextual and psychological determinants on 
managers‟ choices. The second is the value of moderation levels of project operational 
audit on the influence of financial, strategic, psychological and (de)escalation 
determinants on managers‟ decisions.  
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9.2.3 Findings of Interviews 
The aim of carrying out interviews was to follow-up the questionnaires‟ survey results and 
to get an in-depth understanding of the escalation/de-escalation determinants that 
influence Saudi mangers‟ decisions in particular case studies. Three cases were presented 
that could be thought of as real life de-escalation prototype in manufacturing (food 
manufacturing company), services (car rental company), and constructing sub-businesses, 
where one case represented the public sector (constructing) and the other two were a part 
of the private sector companies in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The three cases started as successful investment opportunities, managers escalated 
commitment for a period of time, and finally the commitment was de-escalated. In the 
food manufacturing case it took the company a period of 5-6 years of escalating resources 
to realize that the project should be stopped, in the car rental case the management 
escalated resources for one year only, and when constructing a building it took the 
management 3 years of time escalation before withdrawing the project from the 
constructing contractor.    
 
An important result of conducting the interviews was that the concept of de-escalation in 
the three cases extended what the existing literature have limited either to redirecting or 
withdrawing an investment opportunity (see for example, Rubin and Brockner, 1975; Ross 
and Staw, 1986; Harrison and Harrell, 1993; Schmidt and Calantone, 2002; Pan et al., 
2009). In the current research it was found that the de-escalation of commitment concept 
includes in addition to quitting the failing project (food manufacturing case), redirecting 
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the failing project while putting the investment opportunity on hold until the company is 
capable of carrying out such project (car rental case), or completing the failing project but 
through a different constructing company (constructing a building case). 
Table 9.10: Approach-Avoidance Attributes in Case Studies 
Approach 
Attitudes 
Cases studied* 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Psychological 
determinants 
Justifying an earlier decision, High self-
esteem. 
  
Contextual 
determinants 
Political issues, Justifying external 
parties, Noticeable effort, Norms of 
modeling. 
 Political (government 
procedures). 
Organisational 
determinants 
Company‟s image, No. of employees, 
The linkage of the project to strategic 
existence of company is significant, 
High investment in technical side-bets. 
  
Financial 
determinants 
Sunk costs, The availability of the 
project's costs and revenues.  
Availability of funds.  
Strategic 
determinants 
Cover the market needs. High demand for market.  
Informational 
determinants 
 Incredible information.  
Avoidance 
Attitudes 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Psychological 
determinants 
  Project is a failure and cannot 
be turned around. 
Contextual 
determinants 
Political issues. Political interference to 
discontinue the project. 
Project and its goals were 
publicly announced, Project 
is a key project in the 
manager‟s portfolio, Political 
(government procedures). 
Organisational 
determinants 
Company‟s image, Saving the 
company‟s reputation. 
  
Financial 
determinants 
The availability of the project's costs and 
revenues, Withdrawal costs are 
significant, Extra funds required could 
not be raised in time to save the project, 
Profit is less than expected. 
Availability of the project's 
costs, High maintenance 
costs, Redirecting costs less 
than keeping project. 
Availability of the project's 
costs. 
Strategic 
determinants  
Efficacy of resources utilization, 
Frequency of project progress reporting, 
Consultation, Unattainable goals. 
Low degree of project 
completion, Flexibility to 
restructure the project, 
Availability of alternative 
investments. 
Systematic continuous 
monitoring, Efficacy of 
resources utilization. 
Informational 
determinants 
  Information is publicly 
available, Credibility of the 
information source. 
*Case 1: food manufacturing, Case 2: vehicle rental, Case 3: constructor 
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Another important outcome of the interviews, which is in line with the results of the 
questionnaires survey, is that the decision to approach/avoid escalation was influenced by 
several determinants. Generally, all suggested groups of determinants were considered as 
approach/avoidance attitudes for the de-escalation decision in each of the three cases. 
There are however, differences with regard to the influence of individual items within 
each group of determinants as shown in Table 9.10 above.       
 
9.3 Contributions to Knowledge and Implications for Practice 
In a modern business world characterised by globalised competitive markets and value 
chains, the size and complexity of capital projects are growing and, consequently, expose 
managers to more uncertainties that often drive them to make ill-informed decisions that 
become a strategic, financial and emotional burden. The burden is bigger if the investment 
is more of the irreversible type, for example a purpose-built factory. Faced with the 
inescapable and dilemmatic reality of a failing project, managers (or teams of them) often 
engage in what is perceived, in finance parlance at least, as irrational and suboptimal 
behaviour as they commit themselves, emotionally or otherwise, to investing more in 
failing projects instead of cutting their losses and terminating them early. In trying to 
study this phenomenon, this research has been able, through an extensive critical review of 
the literature and a rigorous study of current practice in a developing country, to make 
several significant contributions to the knowledge related to the (de)-escalation of 
commitment in capital project decisions as well as implications for capital project 
practitioners and academic researchers. These are summarised below. 
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9.3.1 Contributions to Knowledge 
 Since Staw‟s (1976) ground-breaking “knee-deep in the muddy” article on escalation 
of commitment, various theories put forward to try to understand and explain this 
phenomenon have been subject to empirical experimentation. However, the 
knowledge value of most of the previous attempts has been severely limited by the 
dual impact of overly simplistic theoretical frameworks and reliance on either little 
real data or just laboratory generated data. Therefore by adopting a more inclusive 
research design, the current study has, to some extent, been able to overcome the  
conceptualisation and operationalisation deficiencies inherent in previous studies with 
regard to applying the approach-avoidance theory (Eder et al., 2013), and contributes 
to knowledge by  
 
o enabling a more informative use of the approach-avoidance theory, to try to 
understand the complex phenomenon that the escalation of commitment really is; 
 
o examining the effect on (de)-escalation decisions of a large range of drivers that 
underlie project-specific aspects (financial, strategic, informational) and non-
project-specific aspects (psychological, contextual, organizational) and by 
demonstrating that the various (de)-escalation determinants have different impacts 
when viewed in isolation but are much more intertwined than previously depicted 
in the literature. 
 
 Previous non laboratory-based studies have relied on limited evidence and only from 
companies in developed countries. The current study contributes to the literature not 
only by providing a richer picture of the (de)-escalation phenomenon but by also 
offering a fresh and different perspective from the emerging economy of Saudi Arabia 
and its hitherto untapped socio-economic characteristics in relation to how they shape 
managerial behaviour and the capital project decision process, particularly when faced 
with failing investment projects. 
 
351 
 
 Another notable contribution to knowledge made by this study comes from how it has 
been able to contextualise the escalation of commitment in terms of the (strategic) 
manner in which a capital investment project has been initiated (e.g. formal/informal) 
and demonstrate the role that intervening variables, in this case operational project 
audit, have in the escalation process and its many interwoven first-level determinants. 
In other words, knowing when a project started to become problematic (e.g. from the 
initiating phase) and identifying multi-level determinants is essential to understand 
and deal with escalation of commitment issues in capital project decisions. 
 
 Another contribution that has transpired from this study‟s findings and which 
previous studies have not addressed is that, although traditional capital appraisal 
techniques, particularly NPV and IRR, play a deciding role in capital project 
selection, they fail to prevent neither the initial investment in what eventually 
becomes a failing project nor the additional investment through escalation of 
commitment. Therefore, as currently designed and taught in accounting and finance 
courses, these traditional textbook techniques maybe creating upfront knowledge 
boundaries that imperceptibly impact the level of decision rationality throughout the 
duration of a failed project. A contribution corollary therefore is that more dynamic 
and multi-attribute decision models that, for example, draw on the project escalation 
determinants modelled in the current study, are required to comprehend all critical 
dimensions of modern capital investment decisions.   
 
 Contrary to the traditional belief held in a vast array of literature that setbacks in 
projects drive managers to exhibit what Klimerk (1997) called retrospective 
rationality for example, by attempting to recoup sunk costs, an important contribution 
of this study is to rethink how sunk costs are perceived in capital investment 
(escalation) decisions. In most cases in the current study (i.e. 208 companies), Saudi 
managers exhibit prospective rationality by opting to de-escalate or redirect failed 
projects, and sunk costs seem to be the least of their concerns. The prospective 
rationality is further evidenced for example with replacing managers of failed projects 
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and looking for feasible alternative investments. On the other hand, the retrospective 
rationality associated with sunk costs is only found in the cases (i.e. 66 companies) 
where managers decided to escalate commitment and, even in those cases, sunk costs 
are not the only deciding factor to justify increased investment in a prior decision. In 
other words, there is little evidence in this study that Saudi project managers misuse 
the „sunk cost‟ principle to rationalize previous ill-informed decisions, and 
consequently the alternative view (e.g. Baliga and Elly, 2011) that escalation is not 
necessarily an expression of the sunk cost fallacy merits further empirical verification. 
 
 Finally, from a methodological perspective, this study contributes to the literature in 
the sense that it should encourage researchers interested in the escalation of project 
commitment to overcome the perennial inhibitors of topic complexity, sensitivity and 
data deficiency and venture out research projects that are both theoretically robust and 
solidly embedded in company practice. By overcoming the research inhibitors, this 
study has demonstrated that this risk-taking approach that tries to narrow the gap 
between theory and practice appeals to and finds resonance with practising managers 
even in traditionally conservative socio-cultural environments as evidenced by the 
large number of Saudi participants in this study‟s comprehensive survey. In other 
words, adopting a simplistic approach that excludes critical aspects of a problem such 
as the escalation of project commitment to make the research more amenable achieves 
neither significant knowledge value nor practical relevance as it would likely trivialise 
the research and bring low (quality) response.  
 
9.3.2 Implications for Capital Project Practitioners 
 Through its comprehensive coverage of what drives commitment escalation, this 
study‟s practical relevance is reflected primarily by the wide corporate interest it has 
generated. The 274 Saudi managers who fervently took part in this study, including 
the three who offered deeper insights through unfettered interviews, undeterred by the 
complexity and sensitivity of the research topic and the socio-cultural constraints, did 
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so because the study addressed topical and pertinent issues they easily identified with, 
they wanted to learn more and share information about. In general, in itself the wide 
participation in the survey would have given pointers to managers, as was apparent 
during the interviews, towards effective capital budgeting and escalation 
countermeasures in their companies. 
 
 The educational value of the study to capital project managers should not however 
stop at their participation in the study. They should build on this valuable experience 
and engage more with knowledge through further collaboration with state-of-the-art 
academic research and generating their own in-house research initiatives to help 
bridge the gap between theoretical prescriptions and practical needs in the vast and 
specialist field of capital investment and management. A starting point could be to 
have a closer look at the suitability of the capital appraisal techniques, particularly the 
DCF techniques of NPV and IRR that most companies currently use but do not seem 
to have helped prevent failure of projects they justified investing in nor the escalation 
of investment in the face of perceived failure. The unquestioned reliance on such 
techniques may be harbouring knowledge barriers that could be forcing project 
managers to act apparently irrationally by escalating failing projects they ought to 
terminate. The search for and use of alternative techniques, for example multi-
attribute models that transcend cash flow estimates and time value of money to 
include non-financial aspects mapped onto the current study‟s model, may be the 
answer to the escalation riddle. 
 
 The large number of reported cases of project managers having been demoted or 
sacked because of failed projects testifies to deeply seated and repetitive ill-fated 
project decisions that need a more methodical approach than just a change of 
personnel. Changing the personnel without challenging the systems and procedures 
within their organisational and cultural contexts may only result in an endless cycle of 
failures and personnel change, particularly as investments become bigger and more 
uncertain. Educational programmes about escalation of commitment and its 
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implications for companies and contingency plans to assist managers with failing 
projects are examples of more proactive steps that avoid the stigma of demotion and 
job loss and nurture entrepreneurship and creativity particularly when capital projects 
are strategically paramount. In this respect, companies might adapt this study‟s model 
to their own training needs by utilizing the suggested determinants in simulation 
exercises as well as when evaluating real problematic projects. 
 
9.4 Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
This research has achieved its aim and objectives and is, to the author‟s best knowledge, 
the most comprehensive primary data-based study of the escalation/de-escalation 
phenomenon in general and the first of its kind on Saudi companies.  Nevertheless, like 
any other study of this type, it has limitations that need highlighting to benefit further 
research in this area. 
 
This study‟s theoretical model is based on the approach-avoidance theory, which, 
although was chosen after a careful review of the literature and weighing up the pros and 
cons of the various theories available, it still has limitations and, therefore, cannot be 
expected to fully explain all aspects of the escalation of commitment phenomenon. Future 
research may consider combining this theory with other theories provided that such 
theoretical triangulation is properly supported methodologically for instance by using a 
mixed methods approach or a multi case studies approach.   
 
The second limitation is related to the nature of the background literature on the study‟s 
research topic. Most of the existing empirical studies of the escalation of commitment 
drew conclusions from simulated decisions in laboratory settings and very few studies 
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have been based on real events in operating companies. This has limited the ability to 
compare the results of the current study like-for-like, especially the detailed findings from 
the survey questionnaire. Therefore, to overcome this limitation it is suggested that more 
field work of the type undertaken in the present study needs to be carried out provided 
researchers are prepared to take similar risks and bear the costs of such undertaking to 
secure sufficient input from target respondents. 
 
The third limitation is that most of the respondents did not answer questions on some 
general and financial aspects such as the educational level of the project managers, job 
related information, company market share, profit levels, and monetary amount involved 
in the failing project. Had this information been provided by the respondents it would 
have enriched the descriptive analysis and the results therein. The reason for respondents 
not supplying this information, despite being guaranteed total confidentiality is the 
sensitivity involved given the socio-cultural environment. Therefore, future researchers 
may need to bear this in mind when designing data collection instruments.  
 
The fourth limitation is, despite the significant participation in the questionnaire survey, 
only three companies allowed access for conducting in-depth interviews. Given the 
complex nature of the research topic and the fact that generalisation from cross-sectional 
data is only because of statistical significance, more creative effort is required at the 
research design stage to convince companies to collaborate more with this type of research 
project by facilitating detailed case analysis. A possible way for researchers to achieve this 
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is through action research, which may appeal to companies as a form of free consultancy 
service that would benefit their management of projects. 
 
Finally, this study has relied on a selection of appropriate statistical tools particularly the 
multinomial logistic regression to analyse the data collected and the study findings are 
obviously dependent on how the data were analysed. The study has tried to uncover 
second level relationships by looking at the role of a moderator variable. It is possible that 
higher levels of analysis could have been achieved through further statistical exploration 
of the data analysis, for example, by introducing mediator variables and using more 
sophisticated techniques such as structural equations modelling. 
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Appendix (A): Survey Questionnaire (English Version) 
 
 
Dear Respected Company/ Project Manager:                                
I am a faculty member in the Accounting department at King Abdul Aziz University, 
Jeddah, where my teaching and research interests are mainly in management accounting. I 
am currently enrolled on a doctoral program which is jointly supervised from the 
University of Huddersfield, UK.  
  
My Ph.D. research project, as indicated by its title above, deals with topical issues in 
project management, particularly how managers make project de-escalation decisions. By 
de-escalation is meant stopping or withdrawing from a project that is perceived to be 
failing. 
 
To my knowledge this is the first research project of its kind that will address these 
theoretically and practically important issues within the Saudi corporate context. As you 
may have valuable relevant experience that can greatly benefit this research project, I 
would therefore like to take this opportunity to seek your assistance in making this 
research project a success by completing the enclosed survey questionnaire. This should 
take no more than 20 minutes of your time and all the information you provide will be 
treated with total confidentially. 
 
Given the importance of this research project, I would like to be able to conduct 
interviews with some of the companies participating in this survey. The purpose of the 
interviews is to elaborate on issues that emerge from the survey that are of common 
interest for both research and practice. If you are willing to take part in such interviews, 
please provide contact details. 
 
If you have any queries about this study, please do not hesitate to contact me either by 
email: u0772042@hud.ac.uk or Tel: ……. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Mrs. Rawia Obaid  Director of studies                                
Dr. Messaoud Mehafdi 
Department of Accountancy & Finance 
Business School 
University of Huddersfield, UK 
Tel: DD: (0044) 1484-473071 
An Approach-Avoidance Examination of Corporate Project De-escalation 
Decisions in Saudi Companies 
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Section One: General Information: 
 
1) Please indicate the number of years you have been                           
 with the current company                          ………………….years 
 a project manager                          ………………….years 
 
2) From the list below, please choose one item that best describes your current and previous position in your 
company indicating the number of years you have been in this position  
Job title Current job  Previous job  
 Company general manager                   ………….years                   ………….years 
 Finance manager                   ………….years                   ………….years 
 Divisional manager                   ………….years                   ………….years 
 Project manager                   ………….years                   ………….years 
 Other (please specify) ………….……………………………………..….                   ………….years                   ………….years 
 
3) In relation to project management, please tick (√) all relevant items to indicate the scope of your job authority: 
 Authorize new projects  
 Conduct audits on active projects   
 Make decisions about failing projects  
 Other (please specify) ………………………………………………………………….……………………………….………….…………………… 
 
4) Please tick (√) only one item below to indicate your company's ownership type: 
 Corporation   Limited partnership  
 General partnership   Holding company  
 Sole proprietorship   Semi government  
 Other (please specify) ……………………………………………..………………………………………………………….……. 
 
 
5) Please tick (√) only one item below to indicate approximately how old  your company is: 
 Less than 5 years   5 - 10 years  
 11- 15 years   16-20 years  
 20-25 years    More than 25 years  
 
6) Please tick (√) all items below to indicate the approximate size of your company in terms of:      
 Total capital amount:                          ……………………S.R. 
 Current market value:                          ……………………S.R. 
 Annual sales turnover:                          ……………………S.R. 
 Total number of employees:                      ……………Employees 
 
7) Please tick (√) only one item below that best describes your company's main business 
 Industrial    Commercial   Services  
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8) Please choose all relevant items below to indicate approximately how much each contributes, in percentage 
terms, to your company's annual sales turnover  
Sub Sector(according to the Tadawul classification) % Contribution to Turnover 
 Agriculture & Food Industries              …….……% 
 Banks & Financial Services …….……% 
 Building & Construction                                            …….……% 
 Cement                                                                       …….……% 
 Energy & Utilities                                                  …….……% 
 Hotel & Tourism         …….……% 
 Industrial Investment …….……% 
 Insurance …….……% 
 Media & Publishing …….……% 
 Multi Investment                                                        …….……% 
 Petrochemical Industries …….……% 
 Real Estate Development …….……% 
 Retail …….……% 
 Telecommunication & Information Technology       …….……% 
 Transport …….……% 
 Other (please specify) …………………………………………………..………… …….……% 
Total            100% 
 
9) Please tick (√) only one item below to indicate how long  your company has been operating in the highest 
contributing sub-sector to sales turnover you have identified in question 8 above: 
 Less than 5 years   5 - 10 years  
 11- 15 years   16-20 years  
 More than 20 years    
 
Section Two: Description of the Capital Investment Process 
 
10) Please tick (√) one of the two items below to indicate how capital investment decisions are made in your 
company? 
 By following a mostly formal capital investment decision process                       (now please answer questions 11-16) 
 By following a mostly informal capital investment process   (now please answer questions 17-21)                         
 
If the capital investment process in your company is mostly formal please answer questions 11-16 below 
then go to question 22. 
 
11) Using the 5-point scale below, please rank the following items in terms of their importance to a project's  
      identification stage in your company (1 = not important at all, 5 = very important) 
 
Project identification stage: 
Not important                                  Very  
at all                                                   important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Source of Idea Origination      
 Reasons for Idea Origination      
 Process and Submission of Origination       
 Time Pattern of Origination      
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
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12) Using the 5-point scale below, please rank the following items in terms of their importance to a project's  
      development stage in your company (1 = not important at all, 5 = very important) 
 
Project development stage: 
Not important                                  Very  
at all                                                   important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Extent of Project screening       
 Screening process      
 Forecasting and estimates      
 Personal responsibility for the project       
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
 
13) Using the 5-point scale below, please rank the following items in terms of their importance to a project's  
      selection and implementation stage in your company (1 = not important at all, 5 = very important) 
 
Project selection and implementation stage: 
Not important                                  Very  
at all                                                   important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Strategic importance of the project      
 Size of the project      
 Personal responsibility for analysis      
 Determining project appraisal techniques      
 Risk assessment      
 Capital rationing process      
 Knowledge of the appropriate cost of capital      
 Project approval      
 Project implementation      
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
 
14) Please tick(√) all relevant items to indicate which of the following capital investment appraisal techniques are 
used in your company 
 NPV (net present value)   ROI (return on investment)  
 IRR (internal rate of return)   ARR (accounting rate of return)  
 Payback method   Other (please specify)…………………………..  
 Non-financial techniques (please specify) ………………………….………………………………………………….…… 
 
 
 
15) Using the 5-point scale below, please rank the following items in terms of their importance to a project's  
      evaluation stage in your company (1 = not important at all, 5 = very important) 
 
Project evaluation stage: 
Not important                                  Very  
at all                                                   important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 The clarity of roles in project evaluation      
 The use of project audit      
 The quality of the project audit process      
 The assessment of audit reports      
 The response of the project manager to audit report      
 The effective use of team-based performance measures      
 The effective use of performance incentives      
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
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16) Using the 5-point scale below, please rank the following steps in terms of their importance to a project's  
auditing process in your company (1 = not important at all, 5 = very important) 
 
Project auditing: 
Not important                                  Very  
at all                                                   important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Step 1: agree to start the audit       
 Step 2: prepare an audit plan      
 Step 3: collect basic information      
 Step 4: emphasize essential factors      
 Step 5: consider risks involved of conducting audit      
 Step 6: outline audit profile      
 Step 7: gather more detailed information      
 Step 8: interpret information      
 Step 9: evaluate information      
 Step 10: record findings and recommendations      
 Step 11: write up and submit the audit report      
 
If the capital investment process in your company is mostly informal please answer questions 17-21 below 
then go to question 22. 
 
17) In the absence of a formal project investment process, the main reason for approving a capital investment 
project in your company is (please tick (√) one item only): 
 The strategic importance of the investment opportunity  
 The annual capital budgeting round  
 Other (please specify) ………………………………………………………………………...…  
 
18) Please tick (√) one item below to indicate who normally takes personal responsibility for the capital investment 
decision: 
 Company general manager   Finance manager  
 Divisional manager   Project manager  
 Other (please specify) …………………………………..……………………………………… 
 
 
 
19) Please tick (√) all relevant items below to indicate if there is a follow-up to the capital investment project once it 
has been implemented: 
 Continuous monitoring of the project   
 Evaluation of project teams  
 Post completion evaluation   
 Other (please specify) ………………………………………………………………………...…  
 
20) Does project auditing play a role in the informal capital investment decision? 
 Yes   No   
 
21) If yes, please tick (√) all relevant items below to indicate whether such items are considered when applying 
project auditing in your company 
 Monitor  profitability  
 Monitor revenue  
 Other (please specify) ………………………………………………………………………...…  
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Section Three: Project Evaluation and the De-escalation Decision 
 
22) If the project was completed successfully (i.e., there was no perceived failure and no need to de-escalate it) how 
close was the final cost to the budget? (please tick (√) one item only) 
 Final cost did not significantly differ from the set budget   
 Final cost did differ from the set budget  
 Final cost significantly exceeded the set budget  
 
23) When evaluating existing projects in your company, what criteria do you normally apply to establish failure? 
(please tick (√) all relevant items) 
 Project exceeded anticipated completion time   
 Project exceeded budget   
 Project did not meet initial strategic objectives   
 Project should not have been accepted in the first place   
 New regulations   
 Other (please specify) ………………………………..…………………………  
 
24) Which of the following represents the most recent failing project you have been involved with?(please tick (√) one 
item only) 
 Opening a new company branch  
 Renewing old capital assets  
 Buying new capital assets  
 Expanding capacity (for example: production, marketing or administration)   
 Other (please specify) ………………………………..…………………………  
  
25) Please tick (√) one item below to indicate when was the most recent failing project? 
 Last year   Two years ago  
 Three years ago   Four years ago  
 Five years ago   Other (please specify) …..…….  
 
26) Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate what initially motivated the investment into this project (1= not 
important at all, 5= very important):  
 
Investment motivation factors: 
Not important                                  Very  
at all                                                   important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Company's strategic goals      
 Capital expenditure budget      
 Its social impact      
 Other (please specify) ………………………………………………...      
 
27) What happened to the failing project? (please tick (√) one item only) 
 More resources were added to it (i.e. project was escalated)        
 The project was terminated (i.e. project was de-escalated)   
 The project was redirected (i.e. project was de-escalated)   
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28) Please indicate approximately: 
 How much did the project cost by the time it irretrievably failed .........................................S.R. 
 How much does this represent from the original budget in percentage terms …………………………...% 
 
29) What additional costs did the de-escalation of the failing project incur? (please tick (√) all relevant items):                    
 Contractual penalties with suppliers .........................................S.R. 
 Contractual penalties with customers    .........................................S.R. 
 Redundancy payments                                                                                               .........................................S.R. 
 Governmental penalties .........................................S.R. 
 Insurance costs .........................................S.R. 
 Joint-venture costs .........................................S.R. 
 Other (please specify) …………………………………………………………………….. .........................................S.R. 
 
30) What impact, if any, did the failure and de-escalation of the project have on the person directly responsible for 
the project management? (please tick(√) the most applicable item): 
 No impact at all  
 Person is no longer involved with project management  
 Person lost his job and left the company  
 Other (please specify) ……………………………………………………………………..  
Section Four: Determinants of the De-Escalation Decision 
31) From your experience dealing with failing projects, please indicate using the 5-point scale below, to what extent 
you agree or disagree that each of the following psychological items impacts the decision to de-escalate 
commitment to a failing project in your company (1= totally disagree, 3= unsure, 5=totally agree):  
 
Psychological determinants 
Totally                                                Totally 
Disagree                    Unsure                     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 The desire to justify a previous decision       
 Manager was initially responsible for initiating the project      
 Manager experience of guilt and regret about the project‟s failure      
 Manager was allowed to bring to mind his high level of self esteem      
 Project initiated by a group      
 Manager given the opportunity to state his low self-esteem      
 Manager experience job insecurity      
 Manager desire for self-efficiency       
 Manager has less tolerance for failure       
 Manager has personal gains       
 Manager has already committed to a mental budget       
 Manager believes that the project is a failure and cannot be turned around      
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
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32) From your experience dealing with failing projects, please indicate using the 5-point scale below, to what extent 
you agree or disagree that each of the following contextual items impacts the decision to de-escalate 
commitment to a failing project in your company (1= totally disagree, 3= unsure, 5=totally agree):  
 
Contextual determinants 
Totally                                                Totally 
Disagree                    Unsure                     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Project and its goals were publicly announced      
 Project is a key project in the manager‟s portfolio      
 Effort the manager has put in the project is noticeable       
 Manager is rewarded for decision process rather than decision outcome      
 Manager is saving his reputation      
 Manager is socially motivated to discontinue the project      
 Manager is politically supported to discontinue the project      
 Manager is respected for his previous history of managing projects      
 Manager educational background (i.e. studied management, finance, economics…)      
 Manager continuing a failing project would degrade his masculinity       
 Manager cultural background (i.e. customs, society ethics and morals…..)      
 Manager is externally justifying others       
 Political interference to discontinue the project       
 Existence of norms of modeling       
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
 
 
33) From your experience dealing with failing projects, please indicate using the 5-point scale below, to what extent 
you agree or disagree that each of the following organizational items impacts the decision to de-escalate 
commitment to a failing project in your company (1= totally disagree, 3= unsure, 5=totally agree):  
 
Organizational determinants 
Totally                                                Totally 
Disagree                    Unsure                     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 The organization de-escalated the project as it was technically irretrievable       
 Saving the organization reputation       
 The linkage of project to organization's strategic existence is significant       
 Low investment in other technical side-bets of project (i.e. hiring people…….)       
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
 
 
34) From your experience dealing with failing projects, please indicate using the 5-point scale below, to what extent 
you agree or disagree that each of the following financial items impacts the decision to de-escalate commitment 
to a failing project in your company (1= totally disagree, 3= unsure, 5=totally agree):  
 
Financial determinants 
Totally                                                Totally 
Disagree                    Unsure                     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 The availability of the project estimated revenues       
 The availability of the project's costs       
 The decision maker realized sunk costs       
 The financial information clearly reflected the success and failure of the project      
 The availability of a more financially attractive investment opportunity       
 The salvage value of the project is ignored       
 The withdrawal costs at a later date are much higher       
 The extra funds required could not be raised in time to save the project       
 The availability of a limit for extending the estimated budget       
 The limit for extending the estimated budget was publicly announced       
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
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35) From your experience dealing with failing projects, please indicate using the 5-point scale below, to what 
extent you agree or disagree that each of the following strategic items impacts the decision to de-escalate 
commitment to a failing project in your company (1= totally disagree, 3= unsure, 5=totally agree):  
 
Strategic determinants 
Totally                                                Totally 
Disagree                    Unsure                     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 The efficacy of resources utilization      
 The availability of a less strategically attractive investment opportunity      
 The low degree of project completion      
 The systematic continuous monitoring of managers' actions      
 The low frequency of project progress reporting       
 The flexibility to restructure the project       
 The low level of project risk       
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
 
 
36) From your experience dealing with failing project, please indicate using the 5-point scale below, to what extent 
you agree or disagree that each of the following informational items impacts the decision to de-escalate 
commitment to a failing project in your company (1= totally disagree, 3= unsure, 5=totally agree):   
 
Informational determinants 
Totally                                                Totally 
Disagree                    Unsure                     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 The information about the failing project is ambiguous       
 The credibility of the information source       
 The information is biased       
 The information is publicly available      
 The timing of the information is helpful for the decision maker      
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
 
 
37) Using the 5-point scale below, please rank the following determinants to indicate the degree to which 
applying ongoing audit in your company has limited their effect on the project's de-escalation decision in 
your company (1= not important at all, 5= very important):  
 
Determinants  
Not important                                  Very  
at all                                                   important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Psychological determinants       
 Contextual determinants in terms of cultural effects         
 Contextual determinants in terms of social effects           
 Contextual determinants in terms of political effects          
 Financial determinants      
 Organizational determinants      
 Strategic determinants      
 Informational determinants      
 Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………………………………….      
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Section Five (optional): 
 
Company's name: ………………………………………………………………………………..………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Your name: ……………………………………………….………………………………………………………… 
Your age:   
                                                    ……….………….years     
Your gender: 
                Male                                                              Female  
Highest qualification: 
Less than high school level  High school level  
Bachelor degree  Post graduate (e.g., MSC, MBA, PhD…)  
Professional qualification (please specify) ………………………………………………………….  
 
Please indicate  
 If you would like a copy of the summary report of this study’s findings: 
 
                    Yes                 No  
 If you would like to take part in a post-survey interview 
 
                    Yes                 No  
 
If you have answered yes, to either or both questions above please give contact details below:  
 
Address:…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Telephone number:  
 
Fax number: 
 
Email-address: 
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 اٌس١ذ اٌّؾزشَ ِذ٠ش اٌششوخ/ اٌّشبس٠غ
 
أف١ذوُ إٟٔٔ ِؾبضشح فٟ لسُ اٌّؾبسجخ فٟ عبِؼخ اٌٍّه ػجذ اٌؼض٠ض ثغذح، ؽ١ش أْ ا٘زّبِبرٟ اٌزذس٠س١خ ٚ اٌجؾض١خ 
رزشوض أسبسب فٟ اٌّؾبسجخ الإداس٠خ. ٚؽبٌ١ب ألَٛ ثاوّبي دساسزٟ اٌؼٍ١ب ٚرٌه ضّٓ ثشٔبِظ الإششاف اٌّشزشن ِغ عبِؼخ 
ئ١سٟ د. ِسؼٛد ِؾبفظٟ                                                  لسُ ٘ذسصف١ٍذ فٟ ثش٠طبٔ١ب، ٚرٌه ثاششاف اٌّششف اٌش
ٚ اٌّششف اٌّؾٍٟ أ.د. 170374-4841 )4400(. اٌّؾبسجخ، وٍ١خ اٌزغبسح، عبِؼخ ٘ذسصف١ٍذ، اٌٍّّىخ اٌّزؾذح، ٘برف: 
 :liameلسُ اٌّؾبسجخ، عبِؼخ اٌٍّه ػجذ اٌؼض٠ض، عذح،  سػجذ اٌؼبي ثٓ ٘بشُ أثٛ خشجخ، سئ١
  ………، ٘برف: moc.liamtoh@laaludba
 
وّب ٠زضؼ ِٓ اٌؼٕٛاْ اٌشئ١سٟ فٟ أػٍٝ اٌظفؾخ، فبْ ِٛضٛع اٌجؾش ٠زّشوض ؽٛي و١ف١خ ارخبر ِذساء اٌششوبد أٚ 
ٔسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ اٌّشبس٠غ الاسزضّبس٠خ لشاسارُٙ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثخفض أٚ سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الا
 ؽبٌخ ػذَ رأو١ذ ٔزبئظ اٌغذٜٚ الالزظبد٠خ ضشٚسح الأسؾبة ِٕٗ. 
 
٘زا ثؾش ٔظشٞ ٚ ِ١ذأٟ ٠زُ رطج١مٗ فٟ اٌٍّّىخ اٌؼشث١خ اٌسؼٛد٠خ، ٚ ؽ١ش أٗ ٠ٛعذ ٌذ٠ىُ خجشح ل١ّخ ٚراد ػلالخ 
ػ ٘زا اٌجؾش ثبلإعبثخ ػٍٝ أسئٍخ الاسزج١بْ ٚط١ذح ثّٛضٛع اٌجؾش، فبٔب أزٙض اٌفشطخ ٌطٍت ِشبسوزىُ فٟ ئٔغب
 اٌّشفك، ػٍّب أْ ئعبثبرىُ سزؾبط ثبٌسش٠خ اٌىبٍِخ.
 
ٔظشا لأّ٘١خ ِٛضٛع اٌجؾش، فبٔب أرطٍغ أ٠ضب لأْ ألَٛ ثذساسخ رفظ١ٍ١خ ػٓ طش٠ك ئعشاء ِمبثلاد ِغ ثؼض اٌششوبد 
ش اٌؼّ١ك ٌجؼض إٌمبط ٚ اٌّٛاض١غ اٌزٟ رٕجغ اٌزٟ سزشبسن فٟ ٘زا الاسزج١بْ ؽ١ش أْ اٌٙذف ِٓ اٌّمبثلاد ٘ٛ اٌزفس١
ِٓ ٘زا الاسزج١بْ راد الأّ٘١خ ٌٍجبؽض١ٓ أٚ ِزخزٞ اٌمشاساد فٟ اٌششوبد اٌسؼٛد٠خ ئرا ٌُ ٠ىٓ ٌذ٠ىُ ِبٔغ ِٓ اٌّشبسوخ 
 فٟ اٌّمبثلاد اٌشعبء اٌزىشَ ثافبدرٟ ثزٌه.  
 
ٚ ػٓ اٌجؾش اٌشعبء ػذَ اٌزشدد فٟ الارظبي ػٓ ئرا وبْ ٕ٘بن أٞ اسزفسبساد ٌذ٠ىُ ثخظٛص الأسئٍخ فٟ الاسزج١بْ أ
  ku.ca.duh@2402770uطش٠ك الا٠ّ١ً اٌزبٌٟ: 
   
 
 شبوشح ٌىُ زغٓ رؼبٚٔىُ
 
                                             
 
 اٌجبزثخ
 ساٚ٠خ سػب ػج١ذ . أ
 ..……٘برف )ِجبشش(: 
 
 
اٌّزؼٍك ارخبر ِذساء اٌششوبد أٚ اٌّشبس٠غ الاسزضّبس٠خ ٌٍمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ اٌظؾ١ؼ  دساسخ ٔظش٠خ
 ثٕزبئظ اٌغذٜٚ الالزظبد٠خ ٚرطج١ك رٌه ػٍٝ اٌششوبد اٌسؼٛد٠خ
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 اٌغضء الأٚي: ِؼٍِٛبد ػبِخ
 
 ػٍّىُاٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ ػذد سٕٛاد  )1
  ِغ اٌششوخ اٌسبٌ١خ 
  وّذ٠ش ِششٚػبد 
 
 فمظ ٚاٌزٞ ٠ؼجش ػٓ سٕٛاد شغٍىُ ٌٛظ١فزىُ اٌؾبٌ١خ أٚ ٚظ١فزىُ اٌسبثمخ اٚاؽذ اشػٕظ اخز١بسِٓ اٌمبئّخ اٌزبٌ١خ، اٌشعبء  )2
 ِسّٝ اٌٛظ١فخ سٕٛاد شغٍىُ ٌٍٛظ١فخ اٌؾبٌ١خ سٕٛاد شغٍىُ ٌٍٛظ١فخ اٌسبثمخ
 اٌّذ٠ش اٌؼبَ ٌٍششوخ  عٕخ                                   عٕخ
 اٌّذ٠ش اٌّبٌٟ  عٕخ عٕخ
 ِذ٠ش اٌمغُ  عٕخ عٕخ
 ِذ٠ش اٌّشبس٠غ  عٕخ عٕخ
  .………………………………………………………(اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر)أخشٜ   عٕخ عٕخ
 
 ِذٜ اٌظلاؽ١بد اٌّشرجطخ ثٛظ١فزىُ ثبٌٕسجخ لإداسح اٌّشبس٠غ فٟ ششوزىُ: ٛضؼراٌزٟ  اٌؼٕبطش اٌشعبء اخز١بس  )3
  ِششٚػبد خذ٠ذح ثبٌجذء فٟارخبر لشاساد رزؼٍك  
  ارخبر لشاساد رزؼٍك ثاخؼبع اٌّششٚػبد اٌمبئّخ ٌٍّشاخؼخ ٚ اٌفسض 
  ارخبر لشاساد رزؼٍك ثزسذ٠ذ ِظ١ش ِششٚػبد رٛاخٗ اٌفشً 
  ………………………………..……………………………………………………………)اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
  :فمظ ٌزؾذ٠ذ ٔٛع ٍِى١خ ششوزىُ اٚاؽذ اػٕظش  اٌشعبء اخز١بس )4
  ششوخ رٛط١خ ثغ١طخ   ششوخ ِغبّ٘خ 
  ششوخ لبثؼخ   ششوخ رؼبِٓ 
  ششوخ شجٗ زىِٛ١خ   ِإعغخ فشد٠خ 
  .…………………………………………………………………………….……………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
                                            فمظ ٌزؾذ٠ذ ػّش ششوزىُ فٟ اٌسٛق اٌسؼٛدٞ رمش٠جب اٚاؽذ اػٕظشاٌشعبء اخز١بس  )5
  عٕٛاد 10-5   عٕٛاد  5الً ِٓ  
  عٕخ 10-10  عٕخ                                                    50-00 
  عٕخ 50أوثش ِٓ    عٕخ   52-02 
 
 اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ اٌؾغُ اٌزمش٠جٟ ٌششوزىُ ِٓ ؽ١ش: )6
 ريال عؼٛدٞ                                            ساط اٌّبي اٌّظشذ ثٗ 
 ريال عؼٛدٞ                                            ساط اٌّبي اٌّزذاٚي )ل١ّخ أعُٙ اٌششوخ فٟ اٌغٛق(  
 ريال عؼٛدٞ                                            زدُ اٌؼبئذ ػٍٝ اٌّج١ؼبد اٌغٕٛٞ 
 ِٛظف                              ػذد اٌّٛظف١ٓئخّبٌٟ  
 
 :فمظ ٚاٌزٞ ٠ؼجش ػٓ اٌمطبع اٌشئ١سٟ اٌزٞ رٕزّٟ ئٌ١ٗ ششوزىُ اٚاؽذ اػٕظشاٌشعبء اخز١بس  )7
  خذِٟ   ردبسٞ   طٕبػٟ   
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اٌؼٕبطش اٌزٟ رؼجش ػٓ لطبػبد الاسزضّبس اٌغضئ١خ اٌزٟ رٕزّٟ ئٌ١ٙب ششوزىُ ِغ رٛض١ؼ ٔسجخ ِسبّ٘خ وً لطبع ِٓ ٘زٖ  وًاٌشعبء اخز١بس  )8
 الأٔشطخ فٟ رؾم١ك اٌؼبئذ ػٍٝ اٌّج١ؼبد اٌسٕٛٞ رمش٠جب
 ٔسجخ ِسبّ٘خ وً لطبع  لطبػبد الاسزضّبس  (ؽست رظٕ١ف رذاٚي)
 %................                                         اٌضساػخ ٚ اٌظٕبػبد اٌغزائ١خ  
  %................ اٌّظبسف ٚ اٌخذِبد اٌّبٌ١خ  
  %................ اٌزش١١ذ ٚ اٌجٕبء  
  %................ الاعّٕذ  
  %................ اٌطبلخ ٚ اٌّشافك اٌخذِ١خ 
  %................ اٌفٕبدق ٚ اٌغ١بزخ 
  %................ الاعزثّبس اٌظٕبػٟ  
  %................ اٌزبِ١ٓ 
  %................ الإػلاَ ٚ إٌشش  
  %................ ششوبد الاعزثّبس اٌّزؼذد 
  %................ اٌظٕبػبد اٌجزشٚو١ّ١بٚ٠خ  
  %................ اٌزطٛ٠ش اٌؼمبسٞ  
  %................ اٌزدضئخ 
  %................ الارظبلاد ٚ رمٕ١خ اٌّؼٍِٛبد 
  %................ إٌمً 
  %................ .………………………………………………………….………………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
 
اٌغضئٟ الأػٍٝ ِسبّ٘خ فٟ رؾم١ك اٌؼبئذ ٔشبطٙب الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ اٌمطبع ششوزىُ ػذد اٌسٕٛاد اٌزٟ ِبسسذ فمظ ٌزؾذ٠ذ  اٚاؽذ اػٕظشاٌشعبء اخز١بس  )9
                                            ػٍٝ اٌّج١ؼبد اٌسٕٛٞ ٚ اٌزٞ سجك اخز١بسٖ فٟ اٌسإاي اٌسبثك
  عٕٛاد 10-5   عٕٛاد  5الً ِٓ  
  عٕخ 10-10  عٕخ                                                    50-00 
  عٕخ 50أوثش ِٓ    عٕخ   02-52 
 
 اٌغضء اٌضبٟٔ: ٚطف ئعشاءاد ارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ (اٌشأسّبٌٟ)
 
 فمظ ٌزؾذ٠ذ ٔٛػ١خ الإعشاءاد اٌّزجؼخ لارخبر اٌمشاساد الاسزضّبس٠خ فٟ ششوزىُ ػٕظشا ٚاؽذااٌشعبء اخز١بس  )01
 ثارجبع ئخشاءاد سعّ١خ ػٍٝ الأغٍت   10-00ِٓ  خاٌشخبء الإخبثخ ػٍٝ الأعئٍ 
 ثارجبع ئخشاءاد غ١ش سعّ١خ ػٍٝ الأغٍت   00-10ِٓ  خاٌشخبء الإخبثخ ػٍٝ الأعئٍ 
    
ئرا وبٔذ الإعشاءاد اٌّزجؼخ لارخبر لشاس الاسزضّبس اٌشأسّبٌٟ فٟ ششوزىُ ٟ٘ ئعشاءاد سسّ١خ ػٍٝ الأغٍت اٌشعبء الإعبثخ ػٍٝ 
 ِٚب ٠ٍ١ٗ 22صُ ِزبثؼخ الإعبثخ ػٍٝ سإاي  61-11الأسئٍخ ِٓ 
 
 شوزىُاٌشعبء رشر١ت اٌؼٕبطش اٌزبٌ١خ ؽست أّ٘١زٙب ثبٌٕسجخ ٌّشؽٍخ اٌزؼش٠ف ثبٌفىشح (اٌفشطخ) الاسزضّبس٠خ ػٕذ ارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ش )11
 = ُِٙ عذا)5= غ١ش ُِٙ ػٍٝ الإطلاق، 1(
 
 ِشؽٍخ اٌزؼش٠ف ثبٌفىشح (اٌفشطخ) الاسزضّبس٠خ
 ُِٙ           غ١ش ُِٙ 
 عذا                          ػٍٝ الإطلاق          
 5 4 3 2 1
      اٌزسمك ِٓ ِظذس اٌفىشح الاعزثّبس٠خ 
      اٌزسمك ِٓ أعجبة اٌفىشح الاعزثّبس٠خ 
      اٌزسمك ِٓ ئخشاءاد رمذ٠ُ اٌفىشح الاعزثّبس٠خ 
      اٌزسمك ِٓ اٌٛلذ اٌّسذد ٌٍفىشح الاعزثّبس٠خ 
       .……………………………………………….………………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
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= غ١ش ُِٙ 1( اٌشعبء رشر١ت اٌؼٕبطش اٌزبٌ١خ ؽست أّ٘١زٙب ثبٌٕسجخ ٌّشؽٍخ رطٛ٠ش اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ ػٕذ ارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ )21
 = ُِٙ عذا)5ػٍٝ الإطلاق، 
 
 ِشؽٍخ رطٛ٠ش اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ
 ُِٙ           غ١ش ُِٙ 
 ػٍٝ الإطلاق                                عذا    
 5 4 3 2 1
      رسذ٠ذ ِذٜ فسض اٌّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ ِٕٙح فسض اٌّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ اٌزٕجإاد ٚ اٌزٛلؼبد ِٓ اٌّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ اٌّغإٌٚ١خ اٌشخظ١خ ػٓ اٌّششٚع 
       .……………………………………………….………………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
= 1( ىُاٌشعبء رشر١ت اٌؼٕبطش اٌزبٌ١خ ؽست أّ٘١زٙب ثبٌٕسجخ ٌّشؽٍخ اخز١بس ٚ رطج١ك اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ ػٕذ ارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوز )31
 = ُِٙ عذا)5غ١ش ُِٙ ػٍٝ الإطلاق، 
 
 ِشؽٍخ اخز١بس ٚ رطج١ك اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ
 ُِٙ           غ١ش ُِٙ 
 ػٍٝ الإطلاق                                عذا    
 5 4 3 2 1
      رسذ٠ذ الأّ٘١خ الإعزشار١د١خ ٌٍّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ زدُ اٌّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ اٌّغإٌٚ١خ اٌشخظ١خ ػٓ رسٍ١ً اٌّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ أعبٌ١ت رثّ١ٓ اٌّششٚع 
      رم١١ُ زدُ اٌّخبؽشح 
      رسذ٠ذ ِظبدس رّٛ٠ً اٌّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ أوثش اٌٛعبئً ِٕبعجخ ٌزّٛ٠ً اٌّششٚع 
      اٌّٛافمخ ػٍٝ اٌّششٚع 
      رطج١ك اٌّششٚع 
       .……………………………………………….………………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
 اٌؼٕبطش راد اٌؼلالخ ثزضّ١ٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ وً  اٌشعبء اخز١بس  )41
  اٌؼبئذ ػٍٝ الاعزثّبس  طبفٟ اٌم١ّخ اٌّطٍمخ
  ِؼذي اٌؼبئذ اٌّسبعجٟ  ِؼذي اٌؼبئذ اٌذاخٍٟ 
  .…………...........................................................……)اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ   فزشح الاعزشداد
  …….......................................…………………………………………………….…………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر( أعبٌ١ت غ١ش وّ١خ
 
= غ١ش ُِٙ 1( اٌشعبء رشر١ت اٌؼٕبطش اٌزبٌ١خ ؽست أّ٘١زٙب ثبٌٕسجخ ٌّشؽٍخ رم١١ُ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ ػٕذ ارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ )51
 = ُِٙ عذا)5 ػٍٝ الإطلاق،
 
 ِشؽٍخ رم١١ُ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ
 ُِٙ           غ١ش ُِٙ 
 ػٍٝ الإطلاق                                عذا    
 5 4 3 2 1
      رٛػ١ر الأدٚاس اٌّخزٍفخ ٌٍّغبّ٘خ فٟ رم١١ُ اٌّششٚع 
      اعزخذاَ أعٍٛة ِشاخؼخ اٌّششٚع 
      رسذ٠ذ ٔٛػ١خ ئخشاءاد اٌّشاخؼخ ٌٍّششٚع  
      رم١١ُ رمبس٠ش اٌّشاخؼخ اٌّمذِخ 
      رسذ٠ذ سد فؼً الإداسح ٌزمبس٠ش اٌّشاخؼخ 
      رم١١ُ فؼبٌ١خ اعزخذاَ ِإششاد ل١بط الأداء ػٍٝ الأشخبص اٌؼبٍِ١ٓ فٟ اٌّششٚع 
      اٌؼبٍِ١ٓ فٟ اٌّششٚعرم١١ُ فؼبٌ١خ اعزخذاَ ِسفضاد الأداء ػٍٝ الأشخبص  
       .……………………………………………….………………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
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= غ١ش ُِٙ ػٍٝ 1( اٌشعبء رشر١ت اٌؼٕبطش اٌزبٌ١خ ؽست أّ٘١زٙب ثبٌٕسجخ ٌٍخطٛاد اٌّزجؼخ فٟ ِشؽٍخ ِشاعؼخ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ )61
 = ُِٙ عذا)5الإطلاق، 
 
 اٌّششٚعخطٛاد ِشاعؼخ 
 ُِٙ           غ١ش ُِٙ 
 ػٍٝ الإطلاق                                عذا    
 5 4 3 2 1
      اٌخطٛح الأٌٚٝ: اٌّٛافمخ ػٍٝ ثذء ػٍّ١خ اٌّشاخؼخ 
      اٌخطٛح اٌثبٔ١خ: رسؼ١ش خطخ ٌؼٍّ١خ اٌّشاخؼخ 
      اٌخطٛح اٌثبٌثخ: ردّ١غ ِؼٍِٛبد أعبع١خ ػٓ اٌّششٚع 
      اٌخطٛح اٌشاثؼخ: اٌزشو١ض ػٍٝ اٌؼٛاًِ اٌٙبِخ  
      اٌخطٛح اٌخبِغخ: الأخز فٟ الاػزجبس اٌّخبؽشح اٌّشرجطخ ثاخشاء اٌّشاخؼخ  
      اٌخطٛح اٌغبدعخ: رٛػ١ر اٌخطٛؽ اٌؼش٠ؼخ ٌٍّشاخؼخ 
      اٌخطٛح اٌغبثؼخ: ردّ١غ ِؼٍِٛبد أوثش دلخ ػٓ اٌّششٚع 
      اٌّؼٍِٛبداٌخطٛح اٌثبِٕخ: رفغ١ش  
      اٌخطٛح اٌزبعؼخ: رم١١ُ اٌّؼٍِٛبد 
      اٌخطٛح اٌؼبششح: رغد١ً إٌزبئح ٚ الالزشازبد 
       اٌخطٛح اٌسبد٠خ ػشش: وزبثخ ٚ رمذ٠ُ رمش٠ش اٌّشاخؼخ 
 
اٌشعبء الإعبثخ ػٍٝ ئرا وبٔذ الإعشاءاد اٌّزجؼخ لارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ ٟ٘ ئعشاءاد غ١ش سسّ١خ ػٍٝ الأغٍت 
 ِٚب ٠ٍ١ٗ 22صُ ِزبثؼخ الإعبثخ ػٍٝ سإاي  12-71الأسئٍخ ِٓ 
 
(اٌشعبء فٟ ظً غ١بة الإعشاءاد اٌشسّ١خ لارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ، فبْ اٌسجت اٌشئ١سٟ ٌٍّٛافمخ ػٍٝ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ ٘ٛ  )71
 فمظ) ػٕظشا ٚاؽذااخز١بس 
 الأّ٘١خ الإعزشار١د١خ ٌٍفشطخ الاعزثّبس٠خ ٌٍششوخ    
 رٛفش الأِٛاي اٌلاصِخ ٌٍّششٚع الاعزثّبسٞ   
 .…………………………………………….………………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ   
 
 فمظ ٌزؾذ٠ذ ِٓ اٌزٞ ٠زؾًّ اٌّسإٌٚ١خ اٌشخظ١خ ٌٍمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ   ػٕظشا ٚاؽذااٌشعبء اخز١بس  )81
  ِذ٠ش اٌمغُ   اٌّذ٠ش اٌؼبَ ٌٍششوخ 
  ِذ٠ش اٌّشبس٠غ   اٌّذ٠ش اٌّبٌٟ 
  …….......................................……………………………….……………………………….………………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ 
 
 اٌؼٕبطش اٌزٟ رؼجش ػٓ ٚعٛد ِزبثؼخ ٌٍّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ ػٕذ رطج١مٗ وًاٌشعبء اخز١بس  )91
 ِزبثؼخ ِغزّشح لأداء اٌّششٚع  
 اٌؼبٍِ١ٓ فٟ اٌّششٚع  صرم١١ُ ِغزّش ٌلأشخب  
 رم١١ُ أداء اٌّششٚع ثؼذ الأزٙبء ِٕٗ  
 .……………………………………………….…………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ   
 
 ارخبر اٌمشاس الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىًُ٘ رٍؼت ِشاعؼخ اٌّششٚع أٞ دٚس فٟ  )02
  لا   ٔؼُ 
 
 اٌؼٕبطش راد اٌؼلالخ ٌزؾذ٠ذ أٞ ِٕٙب رإخز فٟ الاػزجبس ػٕذ رطج١ك ِشاعؼخ اٌّششٚع فٟ ششوزىُ وًئرا وبٔذ الإعبثخ ثٕؼُ، اٌشعبء اخز١بس  )12
 ِشالجخ سثس١خ اٌّششٚع  
 ِشالجخ اٌؼبئذ ِٓ اٌّششٚع   
 .……………………………………………….…………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ   
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 رم١١ُ اٌّششٚع ٚ لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞاٌغضء اٌضبٌش: 
 
فؼٍ١خ إٌٙبئ١خ ِطبثمخ ، ئٌٝ أٞ ؽذ وبٔذ اٌزىٍفخ اٌ(ٌُ ٠لاؽع أٞ فشً ٚ ٌُ ٠ىٓ ٕ٘بن لشاس ٌلأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع)ئرا رُ الأزٙبء ِٓ اٌّششٚع ثٕغبػ  )22
 ٌٍزىٍفخ اٌّزٛلؼخ ٌٍّششٚع؟
 إٌٙبئ١خ ٌُ رخزٍف ػٓ اٌزىٍفخ اٌّزٛلؼخ ٌٍّششٚعاٌزىٍفخ   
 اٌزىٍفخ إٌٙبئ١خ اخزٍفذ ػٓ اٌزىٍفخ اٌّزٛلؼخ ٌٍّششٚع  
 اٌزىٍفخ إٌٙبئ١خ اخزٍفذ ػٓ اٌزىٍفخ اٌّزٛلؼخ ٌٍّششٚع ثشىً وج١ش  
 
   اٌؼٕبطش راد اٌؼلالخ) وً (اٌشعبء اخز١بس ػٕذ رم١١ُ اٌّششٚػبد اٌؾبٌ١خ فٟ ششوزىُ، ِب ٘ٛ ِؼ١بس اٌفشً اٌزٞ رؼزّذٚٔٗ ٌٍؾىُ ػٍٝ اٌّششٚع؟  )32
 رٕف١ز اٌّششٚع ردبٚص اٌٛلذ اٌّزٛلغ ٌلأزٙبء ِٕٗ   
 رٕف١ز اٌّششٚع ردبٚص اٌزىٍفخ اٌّزٛلؼخ ٌلأزٙبء ِٕٗ  
 اٌّششٚع ٌُ ٠ؼذ ٠سمك الأ٘ذاف الإعزشار١د١خ اٌّزٛلؼخ  
 اٌّششٚع ٌُ ٠ىٓ ِٓ اٌّفزشع اٌمجٛي ثٗ ِٓ الأعبط  
 ظٙٛس لٛأ١ٓ خذ٠ذح لا ٠زٕبعت ِؼٙب الاعزّشاس فٟ اٌّششٚع   
 .……………………………………………….……………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ   
 
   فمظ) ػٕظش ٚاؽذ(اٌشعبء  اخز١بس أٞ ِٓ اٌّشبس٠غ اٌزبٌ١خ رّضً أؽذس ِششٚع شبسوزُ ف١ٗ ٚ لاؽظزُ فشٍٗ؟  )42
 رش١١ذ ٚ افززبذ فشع خذ٠ذ ٌٍششوخ   
 أطٛي لذ٠ّخ ردذ٠ذ  
 ششاء أطٛي زذ٠ثخ  
 ٌٍششوخ )ِثلا: الإٔزبخ١خ أٚ اٌزغٛ٠م١خ أٚ الإداس٠خ(اٌزٛعغ فٟ اٌطبلخ   
 .……………………………………………….…………………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ   
 
 فمظ ٌزؾذ٠ذ ِزٝ وبْ أؽذس ِششٚع لاؽظزُ فشٍٗ: ػٕظش ٚاؽذاٌشعبء اخز١بس  )52
  ِٕز عٕز١ٓ   اٌغٕخ اٌّبػ١خ 
  ِٕز أسثغ عٕٛاد   ِٕز ثلاس عٕٛاد 
  …............................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ    ِٕز خّظ عٕٛاد 
 
 = ُِٙ عذا)5= غ١ش ُِٙ ػٍٝ الإطلاق، 1(اٌشعبء رٛض١ؼ ِب اٌزٞ دفؼىُ ٌلاسزضّبس فٟ رٌه اٌّششٚع  )62
 
 دٚافغ الاسزضّبس
 ُِٙ           غ١ش ُِٙ 
 ػٍٝ الإطلاق                                عذا    
 5 4 3 2 1
      اٌّششٚع ٠سمك أ٘ذاف ئعزشار١د١خ ٌٍششوخ 
      رٛفش اٌّٛاسد اٌّبٌ١خ 
      الأثش الا٠دبثٟ ٌٍّششٚع ػٍٝ اٌّدزّغ 
       ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
 ِبرا ؽذس ٌٍّششٚع ػٕذِب لاؽظزُ فشٍٗ؟     )72
  )ارخز لشاس خفغ دسخخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأغسبة(رُ ػخ ِٛاسد ئػبف١خ ٌٍّششٚع   
  الأغسبة ( )ارخز لشاس  سفغ دسخخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاسرُ الأغسبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع ٚ ئٌغبؤٖ   
  )ارخز لشاس  سفغ دسخخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأغسبة (رُ رسٛ٠ً ٚ رغ١١ش اٌّششٚع   
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 اٌشعبء رٛض١ؼ ِب ٠ٍٟ ثشىً رمش٠جٟ: )82
 اٌزىٍفخ إٌٙبئ١خ ٌٍّششٚع اٌزٞ لازظزُ فشٍٗ ػٕذ ئٌغبؤٖ  ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................             
 ٔغجخ ص٠بدح اٌزىٍفخ إٌٙبئ١خ ػٓ اٌزىٍفخ اٌّؼزّذح ٌٍّششٚع  % ........................................                             
 
    اٌؼٕبطش راد اٌؼلالخ) وً (اٌشعبء اخز١بس ِبٟ٘ اٌزىٍفخ الإضبف١خ اٌزٟ رسجت ف١ٙب ئٌغبء اٌّششٚع اٌزٞ لاؽظزُ فشٍٗ؟  )92
 غشاِخ فغخ اٌؼمذ ِغ اٌّٛسد٠ٓ    ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................
 غشاِخ فغخ اٌؼمذ ِغ اٌؼّلاء   ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................
 اٌمذسح ػٍٝ اٌغذاد(غشاِخ فغخ اٌؼمذ ِغ اٌدٙخ اٌٌّّٛخ )ػذَ    ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................
 غشاِخ زىِٛ١خ   ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................
 رىٍفٗ ئػبف١خ ٌٍزأِ١ٓ   ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................
 رىٍفخ ئٔٙبء اٌششاوخ فٟ اٌششوخ   ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................
 ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ    ريال عؼٛدٞ ........................................
 
    اٌؼٕبطش اٌمبثٍخ ٌٍزطج١ك)أوضش  (اٌشعبء اخز١بس ِب٘ٛ رأص١ش، ئْ ٚعذ، فشً اٌّششٚع ٚ ئٌغبؤٖ ػٍٝ اٌشخض اٌّسئٛي ِجبششح ػٓ ئداسح اٌّششٚع؟  )03
 ٌُ ٠ىٓ ٕ٘بن أٞ رأث١ش   
 ٌُ ٠ؼذ ٘زا اٌشخض ٠شبسن فٟ ئداسح أٞ ِششٚع  
 خغش ٘زا اٌشخض ػٍّٗ ٚ رشن اٌششوخ  
 ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ   
 
 اٌغضء اٌشاثغ: ِؾذداد لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ 
 
اٌزبٌ١خ ِٓ خجشرىُ فٟ اٌزؼبًِ ِغ اٌّششٚػبد اٌزٟ لاؽظزُ فشٍٙب، اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ ئٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفمْٛ أٚ رخزٍفْٛ ػٍٝ رأص١ش اٌؼٛاًِ اٌس١ىٌٛٛع١خ  )13
 = ارفك رّبِب)5= غ١ش ِزأوذ، 3= اخزٍف رّبِب،1(ػٍٝ لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ 
 
 اٌؼٛاًِ اٌس١ىٌٛٛع١خ
 اخزٍف              غ١ش                    ارفك 
 رّبِب                ِزأوذ                  رّبِب
 5 4 3 2 1
      اٌشغجخ فٟ رجش٠ش لشاس اعزثّبسٞ عبثك 
      ِزخز اٌمشاس ِغئٛي ػٓ ثذء اٌّششٚع 
      ئزغبط ِزخز اٌمشاس ثبٌزٔت ٚ إٌذَ ػٍٝ فشً اٌّششٚع  
      أر١ر ٌّزخز اٌمشاس اٌفشطخ فٟ اٌزؼج١ش ػٓ ػؼف ثمزٗ ثٕفغٗ 
      رّذ اٌّٛافمخ ػٍٝ اٌّششٚع ثمشاس خّبػٟ 
      أر١ر ٌّزخز اٌمشاس اٌفشطخ فٟ اٌزؼج١ش ػٓ ص٠بدح ثمزٗ ثٕفغٗ 
      شؼٛس ِزخز اٌمشاس ثبلأِبْ اٌٛظ١فٟ 
      سغجخ ِزخز اٌمشاس فٟ اٌٛطٛي ئٌٝ اٌىفبءح اٌزار١خ 
      لا ٠ٛخذ ٌذٜ ِزخز اٌمشاس طجش ػٍٝ ئداسح ِششٚع فبشً 
      ٌذٜ ِزخز اٌمشاس أ٘ذاف خبطخ 
      أعظ ِزخز اٌمشاس فٟ رٕ٘ٗ ِ١ضأ١خ ِسذدح ٌٍّششٚع 
      اػزمبد ِزخز اٌمشاس ثبْ اٌّششٚع فبشً ٚلا ٠ّىٓ رغ١١ش رٌه 
       ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
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 ِٓ خجشرىُ فٟ اٌزؼبًِ ِغ اٌّششٚػبد اٌزٟ لاؽظزُ فشٍٙب، اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ ئٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفمْٛ أٚ رخزٍفْٛ ػٍٝ رأص١ش اٌؼٛاًِ الاعزّبػ١خ ٚ )23
= 5، = غ١ش ِزأوذ3= اخزٍف رّبِب،1(اٌضمبف١خ ٚ اٌس١بس١خ اٌزبٌ١خ ػٍٝ لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ 
 ارفك رّبِب)
 
 اٌؼٛاًِ الاعزّبػ١خ ٚ اٌضمبف١خ ٚ اٌس١بس١خ
 اخزٍف              غ١ش                    ارفك 
 رّبِب                ِزأوذ                  رّبِب
 5 4 3 2 1
      رُ الإػلاْ ػٓ اٌّششٚع ٚ أ٘ذافٗ  
      اٌّششٚع ٠ّثً ٔمطخ أعبع١خ فٟ ِٕظت ِزخز اٌمشاس 
      اٌدٙٛد اٌزٟ ثزٌٙب ِذ٠ش اٌّششٚع رُ ِلازظزٙب   
      ٠زُ ِىبفأح ِزخز اٌمشاس ػٍٝ ئخشاءاد اٌمشاس ٚ ٌ١ظ ػٍٝ ٔز١دخ اٌمشاس 
      ِسبفظخ ِزخز اٌمشاس ػٍٝ عّؼزٗ 
      ٕ٘بن ػغؾ ِٓ اٌّدزّغ ػٍٝ ِزخز اٌمشاس لإٌغبء اٌّششٚع 
      اٌّششٚعٕ٘بن رٛخ١ٗ زىِٟٛ ٌّزخز اٌمشاس ثاٌغبء  
      ِذ٠ش اٌّششٚع ٌٗ ربس٠خ ِششف فٟ ئداسح ِشبس٠غ ِّبثٍخ 
       )ِثلا: دسط ئداسح، ِسبعجخ ِبٌ١خ، الزظبد...........اٌخ( اٌخٍف١خ اٌزؼٍ١ّ١خ ٌّزخز اٌمشاس 
      الاعزّشاس فٟ ِششٚع فبشً ٠ٕمض ِٓ سخٌٛخ ِزخز اٌمشاس 
      ) اٌؼبداد، اٌزمبٌ١ذ ٚ أخلال١بد اٌّدزّغ ....................اٌخ( اٌخٍف١خ اٌثمبف١خ ٌّزخز اٌمشاس  
      ِزخز اٌمشاس ٠غؼٝ لإسػبء اٌغ١ش 
      اٌزٛخ١ٗ اٌشعّٟ ثا٠مبف اٌّششٚع 
      ٚخٛد ّٔبرج عبثمخ ٠مزذٞ ثٙب ِزخز اٌمشاس 
       ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
ثبٌششوخ ِٓ خجشرىُ فٟ اٌزؼبًِ ِغ اٌّششٚػبد اٌزٟ لاؽظزُ فشٍٙب، اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ ئٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفمْٛ أٚ رخزٍفْٛ ػٍٝ رأص١ش اٌؼٛاًِ راد اٌؼلالخ  )33
 ِب)= ارفك رّب5= غ١ش ِزأوذ، 3= اخزٍف رّبِب،1(اٌزبٌ١خ ػٍٝ لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ 
 
 اٌؼٛاًِ راد اٌؼلالخ ثبٌششوخ
 اخزٍف              غ١ش                    ارفك 
 رّبِب                ِزأوذ                  رّبِب
 5 4 3 2 1
      اٌزظؼ١ذ لاْ اٌّششٚع لا ٠ّىٓ الاعزّشاس ف١ٗ-اٌششوخ رإ٠ذ لشاس ػذَ 
      اٌّسبفظخ ػٍٝ عّؼخ اٌششوخ 
      ز١ٛٞ ٘بَ ث١ٓ اعزّشاس اٌّششٚع ٚ اٌزٛاخذ الاعزشار١دٟ ٌٍششوخ٠ٛخذ سثؾ  
      ) رؼ١١ٓ أشخبص ، الاعزؼبٔخ ثخجشاء...............اٌخ( اعزثّبس اٌششوخ اٌؼئ١ً فٟ خٙبد أخشٜ  
       ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
ٌ١خ ػٍٝ ِٓ خجشرىُ فٟ اٌزؼبًِ ِغ اٌّششٚػبد اٌزٟ لاؽظزُ فشٍٙب، اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ ئٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفمْٛ أٚ رخزٍفْٛ ػٍٝ رأص١ش اٌؼٛاًِ اٌّبٌ١خ اٌزب )43
 ِب)= ارفك رّب5= غ١ش ِزأوذ، 3= اخزٍف رّبِب،1(اٌزظؼ١ذ فٟ ششوزىُ -لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ ػذَ
 
 اٌؼٛاًِ اٌّبٌ١خ
 اخزٍف              غ١ش                    ارفك 
 رّبِب                ِزأوذ                  رّبِب
 5 4 3 2 1
      رٛفش رمذ٠شاد ٌٍؼبئذ ػٍٝ اٌّششٚع  
      رٛفش رمذ٠شاد ػٓ رىٍفخ اٌّششٚع 
      أخز ِزخز اٌمشاس اٌزىٍفخ اٌغبسلخ فٟ الاػزجبس 
      اٌّؼٍِٛبد اٌّبٌ١خ ػىغذ ثذلخ ٔدبذ ٚ فشً اٌّششٚع  
      رٛفش فشطخ اعزثّبس٠خ أخشٜ أوثش خبرث١خ ِبٌ١ب 
      ردبً٘ رىٍفخ ئٔمبر اٌّششٚع  
      رىٍفخ الأغسبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع رشرفغ فٟ ٚلذ لازك 
      اٌّٛاسد اٌّبٌ١خ الإػبف١خ ٚ اٌؼشٚس٠خ لإٔمبر اٌّششٚع ٌُ رزٛفش 
      ٚخٛد زذ ألظٝ ٌىّ١خ الأِٛاي الإػبف١خ 
      رُ الإػلاْ ػٓ اٌسذ الألظٝ ٌىّ١خ الأِٛاي الإػبف١خ  
       ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
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اٌزبٌ١خ  ِٓ خجشرىُ فٟ اٌزؼبًِ ِغ اٌّششٚػبد اٌزٟ لاؽظزُ فشٍٙب، اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ ئٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفمْٛ أٚ رخزٍفْٛ ػٍٝ رأص١ش اٌؼٛاًِ الإسزشار١غ١خ )53
 ك رّبِب)= ارف5= غ١ش ِزأوذ، 3= اخزٍف رّبِب،1(اٌزظؼ١ذ فٟ ششوزىُ -ػٍٝ لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ ػذَ
 
 اٌؼٛاًِ الإسزشار١غ١خ
 اخزٍف              غ١ش                    ارفك 
 رّبِب                ِزأوذ                  رّبِب
 5 4 3 2 1
      الاعزغلاي الأِثً ٌٍّٛاسد اٌّزبزخ  
      رٛفش فشطخ اعزثّبس٠خ أخشٜ أوثش خبرث١خ اعزشار١د١ب 
      ِشازٍٗ اٌّجذئ١خ ِٓ اٌزٕف١زاٌّششٚع لاصاي فٟ  
      اٌّشالجخ اٌّغزّشح ٌزظشفبد ِذ٠شٞ اٌّششٚع  
      أخفبع دسخخ رٛفش رمبس٠ش ِشاخؼخ اٌّششٚع 
      ِذٜ اٌّشٚٔخ فٟ ئػبدح ٘١ىٍخ اٌّششٚع 
      دسخخ اٌّخبؽشح فٟ اٌّششٚع ِٕخفؼخ 
       ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
  
اٌزبٌ١خ ِٓ خجشرىُ فٟ اٌزؼبًِ ِغ اٌّششٚػبد اٌزٟ لاؽظزُ فشٍٙب، اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ ئٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رزفمْٛ أٚ رخزٍفْٛ ػٍٝ رأص١ش اٌؼٛاًِ اٌّؼٍِٛبر١خ  )63
 = ارفك رّبِب)5= غ١ش ِزأوذ، 3= اخزٍف رّبِب،1(ػٍٝ لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ 
 
 ٛاًِ اٌّؼٍِٛبر١خاٌؼ
 اخزٍف              غ١ش                    ارفك 
 رّبِب                ِزأوذ                  رّبِب
 5 4 3 2 1
      رٛفش ِؼٍِٛبد غ١ش ٚاػسخ ػٓ فشً اٌّششٚع  
      ِذٜ ِظذال١خ ِظذس اٌّؼٍِٛبد  
      ٚخٛد رس١ض فٟ اٌّؼٍِٛبد 
      ٌٍدّٙٛسئربزخ اٌّؼٍِٛبد  
      ٌّزخز اٌمشاس حاٌزٛل١ذ إٌّبعت ٌٍّؼٍِٛبد اٌّغبػذ 
       ..............................................................…………….…………………………… )اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١ر(أخشٜ  
 
اٌشعبء رشر١ت اٌؼٛاًِ اٌزبٌ١خ ٌزٛض١ؼ ئٌٝ أٞ دسعخ ل١ذ رطج١ك ِشاعؼخ ِسزّشح ٌٍّششٚع ػٍٝ رأص١ش٘ب فٟ لشاس سفغ دسعخ الاٌزضاَ ثمشاس  )73
 = ُِٙ عذا)5= غ١ش ُِٙ ػٍٝ الإطلاق، 1(الأسؾبة ِٓ اٌّششٚع الاسزضّبسٞ فٟ ششوزىُ 
 
 اٌؼٛاًِ
 ُِٙ           غ١ش ُِٙ 
 عذا                         ػٍٝ الإطلاق           
 5 4 3 2 1
      اٌؼٛاًِ اٌغ١ىٌٛٛخ١خ   
      اٌؼٛاًِ اٌثمبف١خ 
      اٌؼٛاًِ الاخزّبػ١خ 
      اٌؼٛاًِ اٌغ١بع١خ  
      اٌؼٛاًِ اٌّبٌ١خ 
      اٌؼٛاًِ راد اٌؼلالخ ثبٌششوخ 
      اٌؼٛاًِ الإعزشار١د١خ 
       اٌؼٛاًِ اٌّؼٍِٛبر١خ 
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 :)اخز١بسٞ(اٌغضء اٌخبِس 
 
 ..................................................................................................................................................................................اسُ اٌششوخ: 
 ............................................................................................................................................................................................................
 ..............................................................................................................................................................................................الاسُ:  
 اٌسٓ: 
 اٌغٕس: 
 روش                           
 
  أٔضٝ
 اٌّسزٜٛ اٌزؼٍ١ّٟ:
 ألً ِٓ اٌضبٔٛ٠خ اٌؼبِخ
 
 اٌضبٔٛ٠خ اٌؼبِخ دسعخ
 
 عبِؼٟ
 
 دساسبد ػٍ١ب
 
 ..............................................................………… ))اٌشخبء اٌزٛػ١رشٙبداد رخظظ١خ  
 
 اٌشعبء رؾذ٠ذ:
 ئرا وٕذ رشغت فٟ ٔسخخ ِٓ ٔزبئظ ٘زٖ اٌذساسخ:
 ٔؼُ اسغت                   
 
  لا اسغت
 رشؽت ثبٌّشبسوخ فٟ اٌّمبثلاد اٌشخظ١خ:ئرا وٕذ 
 ٔؼُ أسؽت                   
 
  لا أسؽت
 ئرا وبٔذ الإعبثخ ٔؼُ لأؽذ أٚ ولا اٌسإاٌ١ٓ الأخ١ش٠ٓ اٌشعبء ئدساط اٌّؼٍِٛبد اٌزبٌ١خ: 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................اٌؼٕٛاْ: 
 .........................................................................................................................................................................................................
 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................
 .....................................................سلُ اٌٙبرف:  
 ....................................اٌفبوس: 
 ...........................................................................اٌجش٠ذ الاٌىزشٟٚٔ: 
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Appendix (C): A Summary of Escalation/De-Escalation Empirical Research  
Table 1: A Summary of Studies that Examined Controlled Variables Separately and Directly 
No. Author(s), Year, & 
Country 
Theoretical Model Examined Variables Data Collection 
Method 
Sample Characteristics 
1 Rubin & Brockner 
(1975) USA 
Approach-
Avoidance   
Decrement (high/low rate of decrease), Salience (high vs. low), 
Queue positions (first/third in the line). 
Laboratory 72 (M & F) undergraduates  
2 Staw (1976) USA Self-Justification Personal responsibility (high/low), Decision consequences 
(positive/negative). 
Laboratory 240 business school undergraduates 
3 Staw & Fox (1977) 
USA 
Self-Justification Initial responsibility (high/low), Efficacy of resources (high/low), 
Time (three periods). 
Laboratory  96 business school undergraduates 
(48 M & 48 F) 
4 Staw & Ross (1978) 
USA 
Self-Justification Prior experience (success/failure), Type of setback (exogenous/ 
endogenous). 
Laboratory 120 psychology undergraduates 
5 Brockner et al., 
(1979) USA 
Self-Justification Prior limit setting (public/private/none), Process of resource 
allocation (self-sustaining/self-terminating) 
Laboratory 86 undergraduates (46 M & 40 F) 
6 Fox & Staw (1979) 
USA 
Self, & External- 
Justification 
Degree of resistance (high/low), Job insecurity (high/low). Laboratory 160 business school undergraduates 
(80 M & 80 F) 
7 Brockner et al. (1981) 
USA  
External- 
Justification 
Social anxiety (high/low), Gender, Decision type (risky/cautious), 
Importance of rewards (high/low). 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
 92 undergraduates [56 F & 36 M], 
86 people [42 F & 44 M] 
8 Caldwell & O'Reilly 
(1982) USA 
Self-Justification 
 
Personal responsibility (high/low), Choice (high/low). Laboratory 72 business undergraduates [41 F & 
31 M] 
9 Leatherwood & 
Conlon (1983) USA 
Self-Justification  A third party to blame (present/absent), Foreseeability (present/ 
absent), Persistence of the setback (present/absent). 
Laboratory 68 MBA & executive MBA 
students.  
10 Bazerman et al. 
(1984) USA. 
Self-Justification Decision (group/individuals), Initial responsibility (high/low) Laboratory 183  undergraduates 
[male] 
11 Brockner et al. (1984) 
USA. 
Modeling effects An escalation model (present/competitive/none). Laboratory (4 
experiments) 
195 undergraduates from both 
genders.  
12 Arkes & Blumer 
(1985) USA 
Sunk Costs Sunk costs (high/low). Laboratory (10 
experiments) 
900 undergraduates 
13 McCain (1986) USA Attribution theory Choice (high/low), Alternative investment (present/absent). Laboratory 100 undergraduates [50 F & 50 M] 
14 Bateman (1986) USA  Reactance theory 
Attribution theory. 
Financial information (success/failure), Probability of future 
success (chosen division/another division), Attribution of decision 
performance to (internal/external causes), Gender.  
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
179 undergraduates [120 F & 95 
M]. 
 
15 Singer & Singer 
(1986) New Zealand 
Self- Justification Initial responsibility (high/low), Locus of control (internal/ 
external). 
Laboratory 93 undergraduates 
16 Brockner et al. (1986) 
USA 
Self-Identity Task performance (diagnostic/none), Performance (increase/ 
decrease fortune), Identification with outcome (high/low). 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
97 introductory psychology 
students [61 f & 36 m] 
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Sample Characteristics 
17 Leatherwood & 
Conlon (1987) USA 
Self-Justification Initial responsibility (high/ low), Diffusion of blame (present/ 
absent), Cause of setback (foreseeable/unforeseeable).  
Laboratory 24 MBA students & 43 business 
undergraduates.  
18 Hollenbeck et al.  
(1989) USA 
Goal Attainment Goal public-ness (present/absent) Goal origin (self-set/assigned). Laboratory 190 business school undergraduates 
19 Barton et al.  (1989) 
USA 
Self-Justification Initial responsibility (present/absent), Feedback framing 
(positive/positive). 
Laboratory 123 employees in a high technology 
firm 
20 Garland  (1990) USA Sunk Costs Sunk costs (five levels: high to low). Laboratory 407 business school undergraduates 
21 Garland et al. (1990) 
USA 
Sunk Costs  Sunk costs (high/low), Feedback (ambiguous/unambiguous) Laboratory, and 
laboratory field 
survey 
Lab: 77 business school 
undergraduates, 235 independent 
petroleum geologists  
22 Garland & Newport 
(1991) USA 
Prospect theory Sunk costs (high/low amount vs. high/low proportion) Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
88 management course 
undergraduates, 36 MBA students 
23 Whyte (1991) Canada Self-Justification Initial responsibility (groups/individuals/none).  Laboratory 173 graduates [67 F & 106 M] with 
work experience. 
24 Goltz (1992) USA Partial-
Reinforcement  
Recommitment over time (18 periods). Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
164 psychology undergraduates, 
102 management undergraduates. 
25 Simonson & Staw 
(1992) USA 
Self-Justification 
 
Responsibility, Threat reduction, Through decision-making, Goal 
setting, Outcome and decision process accountability. 
Laboratory 193 business school 
undergraduates. 
26 Jeffrey (1992) USA Self-Justification Personal responsibility (high/low), Experience (present/ absent). Laboratory 41 independent auditors from a 
single big 6 accounting firm 
27 Brown & Solomon 
(1993) USA 
Self-Justification Relationship between subject, advisor, and division committee 
funding decision (agree/disagree), Project outcome (ex post best/not 
vs. no outcome). 
Laboratory 92 senior business school 
undergraduates  
28 Beauvois et al. (1993) 
France 
Cognitive 
Dissonance  
External justification (present/absent), Information (positive/ 
negative/none) 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
115 natural science students 
806 customers of a supermarket. 
29 Conlon & Garland 
(1993) USA  
Project Completion Initial responsibility (high/low), Sunk costs (different levels), 
Project completion (several degrees), Information about the budget 
(known/unknown) 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
808 business school undergraduates 
30 Whyte (1993) Canada  Prospect theory Decision making (groups/individuals), Decision frame (no sunk 
costs/sunk costs/initial responsibility for sunk costs). 
Laboratory 325 subjects [133 F & 192 M] [200 
graduates & 125 undergraduates] 
31 Bobocel & Meyer 
(1994) Canada 
Self-Justification Justification (public/private/choice only vs. none). Laboratory 137 undergraduates enrolled in a 
psychology class 
32 Harrell & Harrison 
(1994) USA 
Agency theory Managers incentive to shirk (present/absent), Private information 
(present/absent) 
Laboratory 122 MBA students [ 42 F & 80 M] 
33 Schaubroeck & Davis 
(1994) USA 
Prospect theory Personal responsibility (high/low), Riskiness of alternatives 
(high/low), Relative risk of reinvestments (more/less risky). 
Laboratory (2 
experiments). 
365 undergraduates  [ 175 F & 190 
M] 
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34 Keil et al. (1995) 
USA & Finland. 
Self-Justification  
Prospect theory 
Prior commitment (high/low), Nationality (Americans/ Finnish), 
Sunk costs (high/low), Alternative investment (present/ absent)  
Laboratory (5 
experiments) 
170 MBA students who have work 
experience, 254 IT master students 
[107 M & 147 F] 
569 business undergraduates 
35 Devine & O'Clock 
(1995) USA 
Prospect theory Sunk costs (present/absent), Opportunity costs (implicit/ explicit), 
Information framing (negative/positive). 
Laboratory 282 business undergraduates [161 
M & 121 F] 
36 Harrison & Harrell 
(1995) USA 
Self-Justification Initial responsibility (present/absent), Internal Rate of Return 
(prospective/overall IRR), Net Present Value (prospective/ 
retrospective).  
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
Study 1: 78 PMBA students who 
have work experience. 
Study 2: 89 PMBA students who 
have managing experience 
37 Heath (1995) USA Mental Budgeting Mental budget (set/not), Sunk costs (high/low), expected benefits 
(present/absent), Sunk costs (time/monetary). 
Laboratory (5 
experiments) 
537 undergraduates. 
38 Tan & Yates (1995) 
Singapore 
Sunk Costs Accounting backgrounds (present/absent), Sunk costs (high/ low), 
Explicit estimates of future returns, Prior investment 
(present/absent) 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
287 undergraduates     (137 
accounting & business 150 science, 
art, engineering)]    
39 Kite et al. (1997) 
USA.  
Self-Image Frequency of performance appraisal (long/short term). Laboratory 109 subjects. 
40 Boulding et al. (1997) 
USA. 
Sunk Costs  
Self-Justification. 
Pre-commitment to a self-specified stopping rule, Poor outcomes, 
Future opportunity costs, Sequential decision decoupling, 
Ambiguous environment 
Laboratory 209 executive students with work 
experience  
20 capital budgeting experts. 
41 Chow et al. (1997)  
USA & Taiwan 
Culture Values Initial responsibility (present/absent), Nationality (Americans/ 
Chinese), Framing of information (positive/negative). 
Laboratory 
 
192 undergraduates [109 
Americans: 51 F & 58 M, 83 
Chinese: 56 F & 27 M].  
42 Gosh (1997) USA Capital Budgeting  Future benefits of additional expenditures (available/not), Progress 
report (available/not), Feedback (ambiguous/not). 
Laboratory 96 subjects [29 undergraduates & 
67 MBA students] 
43 Sharp & Salter 
(1997) Asia, North 
America.  
Agency theory 
Prospect theory 
Adverse selection (present/absent), Nationality (Asia/North 
America), Framing (neutral/sunk costs effect). 
Laboratory Executive MBA from Canada, 
USA, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
44 Whyte et al. (1997)  
Canada 
Self-Efficacy Self-efficacy (high/low/none).  Laboratory 132 [62 F & 70 M; 59 graduates 
with work experience & 73 
undergraduates] 
45 Garland & Conlon 
(1998) USA 
Goal-Substitution  Nationality (American/Chinese), Sunk costs (high/low), 
Opportunity cost (present/absent), Degree of project completion 
(high/low). 
Laboratory (3 
experiments)  
111 mid-senior bank managers, 68 
Chinese graduate students, 32 MBA 
students 
46 Kirby & Davis 
(1998) USA 
Agency theory Initial responsibility (present/absent), Monitored managers 
(present/absent), Accountability. 
Laboratory 102 management  undergraduates 
[50 F & 52 M] 
406 
 
No. Author(s), Year, & 
Country 
Theoretical Model Examined Variables Data Collection 
Method 
Sample Characteristics 
47 Goltz (1999) USA Behavioral 
Momentum 
Magnitude (large/medium/low levels of training), Rate of 
increasing in quarters (1/2 vs. 1/3 vs. 1/4 vs. 1/6).  
Laboratory 313 introductory management 
course undergraduates, 44 MBA 
students.  
48 Harrison et al. (1999) 
China, USA 
Agency theory The potential for personal gain (present/absent), Nationality 
(Chinese/Americans), Private information (public/private) 
Laboratory 230 MBA students [ 119 Chinese 
(68 M & 51 F), 111 Americans (71 
M & 40 F)] 
49 Rao & Monk (1999) 
Canada 
Self & External- 
Justification 
Motivation (inner/other), Anonymity (anonymous/ non) Laboratory 26 business graduates &  
undergraduates [13 M & 13 F] 
50 Hantula & Bragger 
(1999) USA 
Decision Dilemma 
theory 
Equivocality (more/less predictable feedback),  
A standard against which feedback may be judged (present/absent).   
Laboratory 112 undergraduates enrolled in a 
psychology course 
51 Ruchala (1999) USA Prospect theory Budget goals (achieved/not achieved), Incentives (profit 
sharing/bonus-plan),  
Laboratory  60 undergraduates enrolled in 
management course  
52 Rutledge & Karim 
(1999) USA 
Agency theory Moral reasoning (high/low), Adverse selection (present/ absent). Laboratory 67 MBA, MS-accounting [29 F & 
38 M] with work experience 
53 Citera et al. (2000) 
USA 
Group Decision 
Making 
Personal responsibility (high/low), Decision context (individuals 
/groups/groups with shared information) 
Laboratory 226 undergraduates recruited from 
psychology and business courses. 
54 Boehne & Paese 
(2000) USA  
Goal Completion  Sunk costs (high/low), Sales price (high/low), Degree of project 
completion (high/low). 
Laboratory 199 business and psychology  
undergraduates 
55 Greer & Stephens 
(2001) USA and 
Mexico 
Self-Justification Nationality (Americans/Mexicans), confidence (high/low), Personal 
responsibility (direct/indirect) 
Information source (junior/peer engineer)  
Laboratory   159Mexicans [31 decision makers 
in a plant, 128 MBA students (106 
M & 53 F) & 153 Americans [13 
managers, 11 IS managers, 18 
students, 111 MBA students (104 
M & 47 F)        
56 Seibert & Goltz 
(2001) USA 
Self-Justification Decision unit (group/individuals), Magnitude (moderate/large) Laboratory 302 undergraduates enrolled in an 
introductory management course 
[178 M & 124 F] 
57 Schmidt & Calantone 
(2002) USA 
Escalation of 
Commitment 
theory. 
Personal responsibility (high/low), Product innovativeness 
(high/less), information source credibility (high/low) Stage of new 
product development (3 stages). 
Laboratory 285 managers drawn from 
executive programs [114 F & 171 
M].  
58 Schulz & Cheng 
(2002) Australia 
Self-Justification Initial responsibility (high/low), Information asymmetry 
(present/absent). 
Laboratory  113 management accounting 
undergraduates. 
59 Tan & Yates (2002) 
Singapore 
Escalation theory Prospective additional investment (exceed/not exceed initial 
budget), Prospective multi stage budget (exceed/not exceed in a 
stage of initial budget), Sunk costs, Opportunity costs (present/ 
absent). 
Laboratory (5 
experiments) 
185 undergraduates, 211 MBA 
students with work experience.  
21 master of construction 
management with work experience. 
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60 Cheng et al. (2003) 
Australia 
Cognitive 
Dissonance  
Hurdle rates (no hurdle rate/self-set/organization-set) Laboratory 205 undergraduates enrolled in a 
second-year managerial accounting 
course 
61 Salter et al. (2004) 
USA, Mexico  
Agency theory 
Prospect theory 
Incentive to shirk (available/absent), Nationality (Americans/ 
Mexicans), Information framing (positive/negative) 
Laboratory 286 managers (MBA, Executive 
MBA, executive development 
programs in the business school 
[201 Americans, 85 Mexican]).  
62 Brecher & Hantula 
(2005) USA 
Equivocality theory Equivocal (high/low ambiguous). Laboratory 43 undergraduates enrolled in an 
introductory psychological course 
63 Biyalogorsky et al. 
(2006) USA 
Escalation Bias Personal involvement (high/low), Initial information (positive/ very 
positive), New information (negative/very negative) 
Laboratory 142 participants [ 95 MBA 
students, 47 midlevel managers 
enrolled in Executive MBA]  
64 Wong et al. (2006) 
Hong Kong 
Cognitive 
Dissonance 
Personal responsibility (available/non), Unpleasant emotions 
(high/low), Momentary negative effect (strong/weak) 
Field and laboratory 
(3 experiments) 
462 undergraduates enrolled in 
organizational behavior classes 
[187 M & 275 F] 
65 Keil et al. (2007) 
USA 
Cognitive Bias Problem recognition (more/less), Illusion if control (high/low), 
Selective perception (high/low). 
Laboratory 178 undergraduates enrolled: 96 in 
marketing course & 82 in CIS 
course  
66 Sivanathan et al. 
(2007) USA 
Self-Justification Self-affirm (present/absent), Self-esteem (high/low). Laboratory (3 
experiments). 
231 undergraduates 
67 Sivanathan et al. 
(2008) USA 
Self-Affirming Self-esteem (high/low), Self-values (present/absent) 
Task relevance affirmation (high/low). 
Laboratory (3 
experiments) 
220 undergraduates [136 F & 84 M] 
were paid $10 
68 Ku (2008) UK Learning  Post regret (escalators/non)  
 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
122 undergraduates [84 F & 38 M]  
were paid $10  
69 Jani (2008) USA Self-Efficacy Initial task-specific self-efficacy (high/low), Project risk factors 
(exogenous/endogenous). 
Laboratory 20 undergraduates, 16 graduates, 35 
practicing managers. 
70 Zhiyuan & Qing 
(2008) China  
Prospect theory Sunk costs (high/low), Framing (positive/negative), Decision 
making process (individuals/groups with prior decisions/groups 
without). 
Laboratory  211 business school undergraduates 
[116 F & 95 M] 
71 Slaughter & Greguras 
(2008) USA 
Self-Justification Personal responsibility (present/absent/third candidate).   
 
Laboratory 204 undergraduates students 
enrolled in psychology course [159 
F & 45 M].  
72 Berg et al. (2009) 
USA 
External- 
Justification 
Decision settings (single personal/public information social/ 
information asymmetry social). 
Laboratory  80 undergraduates  
73 Fox et al. (2009) 
USA 
Status Quo Bias Availability of alternative (two/three equal attractiveness) 
Difficulty of decision (negative/positive features and attributes). 
Laboratory 340 students [190 F & 150 M] 
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74 Greitemeyer et al. 
(2009) UK 
Group Decision 
theory 
Group composition (homogenous/heterogeneous), Decision making 
procedure (devil‟s advocacy/no procedure), Time of measurement 
(one/two). 
Laboratory 138 high school students, in the 
business and economics curriculum 
(99F, 39 M) 
75 Chong & suryawati 
(2010) Australia 
Agency theory Monitoring control (present/absent) Information (public/ private). Laboratory 74 undergraduates commerce 
program 
77 Hatfield et al. (2011) 
USA 
Prior involvement Auditor involvement (present/absent), Client pressure (present/ 
absent) 
Field laboratory 
(email) 
149 practicing audit professional 
78 Karami & Farasani 
(2011) Iran 
Real Options Real option (present/absent), NPV (present /absent) Laboratory  80 financial managers 
79 Molden & Hui (2011) 
USA 
Self-regulation Personal responsibility (present/absent), Activated motivations 
(prevention/promotion/none) 
Laboratory (2 
experiments)  
238 different ethnics, education 
levels (168 F & 70 M)  
80 Yen & Lin (2012) 
Taiwan  
Terror Management Mortality salience (present/not) Laboratory  76 military officers (70 M, 6 F). 
81 Moser et al. (2013) 
Germany  
De-escalation Accountability (present/absent), Choice (present/absent) Laboratory 60 psychology and business 
students 
82 Salter et al. (2013) 
Canada, China, Hong 
Kong, India, USA, 
Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Singapore. 
Culture Agency condition (present/absent), Long term orientation 
(high/low), Uncertainty avoidance (high/low), Individualism 
(high/low).  
Laboratory 1208 MBA and executive education 
students for 17 years 
83 Gomez & Sanchez 
(2013) USA, 
Mexico  
Self-Justification 
Prospect theory 
Culture (nationality), Decision context (high/low), Framing 
(negative/positive) 
 
Laboratory 146 working MBA students 
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Table 2: A Summary of Studies that Examined Controlled Variables Separately and Indirectly 
No. Author(s), Year, 
& Country 
Theoretical Model Moderator/Mediator Examined Variables Data Collection 
Method 
Sample Characteristics 
1 Conlon & Wolf 
(1980) USA 
Self and External 
Justification 
Moderator: Strategy 
(calculators vs. non)  
Involvement (high/low), Visibility (high/ 
low), Cause of setback (foreseeable/none). 
Laboratory 96 undergraduates studying an 
organizational theory  course 
2 Rutledge (1995) 
USA 
Prospect theory Moderator: Information 
framing (negative vs. 
positive). 
Group initial responsibility (present/absent). Laboratory 213 employers in professional 
business position [143 M & 70 F] 
3 Brody & Kaplan 
(1996) USA 
Personal 
Involvement 
Moderator: Level of 
internal audit experience 
Personal responsibility (high/low). Laboratory 39 internal auditors attending a 
regularly scheduled meeting [24 M & 
15 F]  
4 Keil et al., (2000) 
Finland, Nether-
lands, Singapore 
Risk-Taking theory Mediator: Risk perception 
(high vs. low) 
Nationality (Finland/Netherlands/ 
Singapore), Sunk costs (high/low), Risk 
propensity (high/low).  
Laboratory 536 undergraduates & masters 
enrolled in an introductory IS course 
[185 from Finland, 121 from 
Netherlands, 230 from Singapore] 
5 Heng et al. (2003) 
USA 
Self and External 
Justification 
Moderator: Sunk costs 
(high vs. low). 
Approach (shoulder blame/provide 
assurance/do nothing), Individual 
(superiors/peers). 
Laboratory 360 senior IS undergraduates [53% 
M & 47%F], subjects received 
monetary payment upon completion. 
6 Moon et al. 
(2003) USA 
Group Decision 
Making 
Mediator: Decision 
confidence 
Previous performance (high/low), Sunk cost 
(low/high), Project completion (low/ high), 
Decision process (individual/group with 
prior decision/group with no prior decision). 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
982 undergraduates enrolled in a 
capstone management course. 
7 Kadous & Sedor 
(2004) USA 
Mental 
Representation 
Mediator: Knowledge 
score (high vs. low) 
Assigned purpose (relevant/irrelevant/ 
general) self-monitoring (high/low), 
Justification (present/absent), Consultation 
of a third-party (auditors), Assigned purpose 
of consultation. 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
82 senior level undergraduates 
enrolled in a managerial accounting 
course, 71 senior level undergraduate 
accounting majors.  
8 Wong (2005) 
Hong Kong 
Sitkin-Pablo model 
of risk taking 
(1992) 
Mediator: Risk perception 
(high vs. low) 
Personal responsibility (available/non), Risk 
propensity (high/low), Outcome expectancy 
(high/low). 
 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
234 Chinese- English secondary 
school teachers [ 82 M & 152 F] 
9 Cuellar et al. 
(2006) USA 
Heuristic-Analytic 
theory 
Mediator: Relevance of 
message 
Auditor credibility (positive/negative), 
Gender, Age. 
Laboratory 60 students [26 M & 34 F] 
10 He & Mittal 
(2007) USA 
Project Completion Moderator: Project risk 
(high vs. low) 
Project completion (10% vs. 50% vs. 90%), 
Need for information (important/ none). 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
969 business school  undergraduates  
 
11 Wong et al. 
(2008) China 
Cognitive 
Dissonance theory 
Mediator: Strength of prior 
beliefs (high vs. low)  
Rational thinking style (high/low), Personal 
responsibility (present/absent). 
Laboratory (3 
experiments) 
547 undergraduates (265 F & 282 M) 
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12 Denison (2009) 
USA 
Real Options Mediator: Cognitive 
possibility of project 
abandonment possibility 
Capital budgeting (NPV/real options),  
Time (first/second period). 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
74 MBA & MA students [30 F & 44 
M] 
13 O'Neill (2009) 
USA 
Social Information 
processing theory. 
Appraisal theories 
of Emotion.  
Mediator: Psychological 
safety 
Anger and Quilt feeling 
Measured on a five-scale ranged from 
almost never to several times a day. 
Personal responsibility (individual/ 
collective).  
Field experiment 
Laboratory 
197 employees of major metropolitan 
areas randomly selected [103 F & 93 
M] 
60 undergraduates enrolled in a 
management course 
14 Harvey & 
Victoravich 
(2009) USA 
Self-Justification, 
Cognitive 
Dissonance theory 
Mediator: Anticipatory 
emotions  
An alternative project (present/absent), The 
level of progress toward completion (low 
10% vs. high 90%). 
Laboratory 307 undergraduate business students 
[143 F & 164 M] 
15 Schulz-Hardt et 
al. (2009) 
Germany 
Prospect theory Mediator: Responsible 
participants' preferences 
Personal responsibility (given/not), 
Assessment of preferences (initial/ 
retrospective). 
Laboratory 293 graduates and undergraduates 
[158 F & 135 M] 
16 Gunia et al. 
(2009) USA 
Self-Justification Mediator: Vicarious self-
justification 
Decision evaluation (perspective-taking/ 
objective/none), Attributes (shared/ 
different), Participation (interdependence/ 
dependent). 
Laboratory (3 
experiments) 
191 undergraduates [110 F & 81 M] 
17 Tsai & Young 
(2010) USA 
Risk Perception Mediator: Risk perception Fear (present/absent), Anger (present/ 
absent). 
2 Field laboratory 
(email) 
98 adults interested in in completing 
behavioural studies (72 F & 26 M) 
18 Ting (2011) USA Goal Completion Mediator: Goal proximity   Free draws (5/0), Sunk costs (high/low). Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
277 undergraduates  
19 Contractor et al. 
(2012) USA 
New Product 
Development 
Moderator: Reward for 
success 
Personal responsibility (self-initiated/ 
organizationally). 
Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
335 MBA & MBA executives 
20 Lee et al. (2012) 
USA & India 
Goal Setting theory Moderator: Commitment 
to a budget and schedule 
goal  
Goal difficulty (high/low), Goal specificity 
(very specific/less specific), 
Project completion (high/low). 
Field laboratory 
(email) 
349 experienced workers from 
companies 
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Table 3: A Summary of Studies that Examined Uncontrolled Variables Separately 
No. Author(s), Year, & 
Country 
Theoretical Model Examined Variables Data Collection 
Method 
Sample Characteristics 
1 Bondt & Makhija 
(1988) USA 
Prospect theory Sunk costs, Average return, Project completion, negative 
information 
Case study 
(single) 
A Nuclear power program ($50 
million)  
2 Keil (1995) USA Multi theoretical 
approach 
Personal responsibility, Lack of goal congruency, Negative 
framing, Information asymmetry 
Case study 
(single) 
An IT project to help a company's 
sales representative produce error-
free configurations prior to price 
quoting. 
3 Lipshitz (1995) USA Single-option 
paradigm 
Anger, frustration feelings, Face saving, Non-achievable goal, Risk 
involved. 
Case study 
(single) 
The Desert Storm decision 
4 Staw & Hoang 
(1995) USA 
Sunk costs effect Justification, Face saving, Sunk costs,  Case study 
(single) 
National Basketball Association 
draft 
5 Ryan (1995) 
Australia  
Prospect theory Investors' beliefs about the course of action, Investors not to be 
embarrassed. 
Case study 
(5 cases) 
Investors that invested in five 
portfolio companies  
6 Drummond (1997) 
UK 
Decision dilemma 
theory.  
Desire for self-justification, Expectations are not met, Paucity of 
information. 
Case study 
(single)  
A salon owner that wants to dismiss 
an employee. 
7 Drummond (1998) 
UK 
Escalation theory Justify previous decision, Socially motivated, Sunk costs, Technical 
difficulties 
Case study 
(single) 
An IT project (Taurus) 
8 Keil & Robey (1999) 
USA 
The mum and deaf 
effect 
Less tolerance for failure, Awareness of problems, Publicly stated 
limits, and Clear success and failure criteria, Outcome oriented 
evaluations, Regular evaluations of projects, Separation of 
responsibility for approving and evaluating projects. 
Telephone 
interviews 
75 IS auditors: population. 
42 interviewees  
9 Montealegre & Keil 
(2000) USA 
Theory-building 
approach 
Problem recognition, Re-examining prior course of action, 
Alternatives, Implement an exit strategy 
Case study  
(single) 
An IT project at Denver 
International Airport. 
10 Keil et al. (2000) 
USA 
Multi theoretical 
model. 
Psychological self-justification, Social self-justification, Sunk 
costs, Goal incongruence, Completion effect, Information 
asymmetry. 
Cross- sectional 
(mailed) survey 
2231 internal & external auditors' 
members of ISACA [information 
systems audit and control 
association, (Response rate 26%) 
11 Kisfalvi (2000) 
Canada 
Self- External- 
justification. 
Managers being successful, achieving, clever, Being respected, 
Sunk costs. 
Case study 
(single) 
A small entrepreneurial firm 
12 Bourgie (2001) USA Sunk costs Age, Salary, Individual, club performance, Managing style. 
 
Case study 
(single) 
736 Major league Baseball players   
13 McNamara et al. 
(2002) USA 
Intervention- 
Avoidance 
Monitoring, Change in decision responsibility, Control variables 
(Borrower relationship characteristics, Prior size of loan, Previous 
performance of a branch, and Branch size).  
 
Observed data  Total 787 observations of loan and 
financial data.  
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14 McElhinney & 
Proctor (2005) UK 
Justification theory Internal resistance, Powerful product champions, Limited 
knowledge of capital costs or ongoing revenue costs, Lack of 
knowledge of the level of risk, No stated project objectives. 
Case study 
(single) 
Establishing call/contact centres in 
local government in the UK. 
15 Pan et al. (2006) UK Lewin's (1951) 
Change theory 
Worry of punishment, Sunk costs, Managers loss of control, 
Availability of an alternative, Monitoring, Restructuring 
Case study 
(single) 
An electronic project at a UK 
public organization. 
16 Pan et al. (2006) UK Approach-
Avoidance theory 
Reward for success, Cost of withdrawal, Cost of persistence, 
Proximity to goal, Ambiguity. 
Case study 
(single) 
An electronic project at a UK 
public organization that serves the 
local population. 
17 Mähring et al. (2008) 
Denmark 
Montealegre & 
Keil's (2000) De-
Escalation Model 
Noticeable role for communicators during the project. Case study 
(single) 
An IT large Danish project for 
higher education institutions.  
18 Mährang & Keil 
(2008) Europe  
Narrative theory 
Visual mapping 
Project charter ambiguity, Goal conflict, Management incapable to 
determine problems, Availability of unfeasible alternatives. 
Case study 
(single) 
NDS (new deposit system) a large 
IT project undertaken by a mid-
sized bank in 1990 
19 Pan et al. (2009) UK Approach-
Avoidance Theory 
Psychological self-justification,  Social self-justification, Cost of 
withdrawal/ resistance, Reward for success, Sunk costs, Proximity 
to goal, Ambiguous, Asymmetry  
 
Case study 
(single) 
An IS large utility provider project 
based in the U.K. 
20 Korzaan & Morris 
(2009) USA 
Psychological 
factors 
Implementation mind-set, Locus of control, Preference for 
consistency, Time urgency. 
Online survey 232 survey responses of IS project 
stakeholders: developers, leaders 
and end users [93 F & 139 M]   
21 Pan & Pan (2011) 
UK 
Theories of 
Leadership, Politics 
and Interpersonal 
Provision of psychological safety, Personal appeal Consultation 
Agile mobilization, Re-establish legitimacy and stakeholder 
commitment, Continues empowerment. 
Case study E-procurement project in the British 
metropolitan borough council 
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Table 4: A Summary of Studies that Examined Variables within Groups  
No. Author(s), Year, & 
Country 
Theoretical Model Examined Variables Data Collection 
Method 
Sample Characteristics 
1 Ross & Staw (1986) 
Canada 
Ross & Staw model 
(1986) of escalation 
Project, Psychological, Social, and Structural determinants. Single case study Expo 86: $1.5 Billion 
2 Ross & Staw (1993) 
USA 
Organization theory Psychological, Project, Social, Organisational, Contextual 
determinants. 
Single case study Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant 
3 Drummond  (1994) 
UK 
Ross & Staw model 
(1986) of escalation 
Project, Psychological, Social, and Structural determinants. Single case study A technical services department of 
the city council that worth £35 
millions 
4 Drummond (1995) 
UK 
Bowen's (1987) two 
factor model 
Psychological, Social, Information effects. Single case study Partnership between four solicitors 
5 Newman & 
Sabherwal (1996) 
USA 
Ross & Staw model 
(1986) of escalation 
Project, Psychological, Social, and Structural determinants. Single case study A large regulated utility in the 
telecommunications industry. 
6 Drummond & 
Hodgson (1996) UK 
Escalation theory Psychological, Social, Political, Organisational effects. Single case study A technical services department of 
the city council. 
7 Sabherwal et al. 
(2003) USA 
Self-justification. 
Prospect theory 
Project, Psychological, Social, and Structural factors. Laboratory (2 
experiments) 
208 MIS students [56 graduates & 
152 undergraduates] 101 M & 107 
F 
8 Chakravorty (2009) 
USA 
Escalation theory Project, Psychological, and Organisational determinants. Single case study Six-sigma program in an electrical 
company 
9 Alvarez et al.(2011) 
Mount Everest 
Escalation theory Project, Psychological, Social, and Organisational determinants Single case study Disaster of climbing MT Everest in 
1996 
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Table 5: Detailed Examined Variables within Groups 
No. Author(s)& Year Determinants and forces of escalation/de-escalation 
Project  Psychological  Social  Structural  
1. Ross & Staw (1986) Objectively beneficial project, 
Doubtful costs and benefits, and 
Clear-cut financial losing project. 
Information processing errors 
and Personal responsibility.  
Need for external justification, 
Political importance, Pressures 
for behavioural consistency, 
and Modelling. 
Project side-bets, Inner and 
outside relationships, and Fear 
of international 
embarrassment. 
2. Ross & Staw (1993) Ambiguity of economic data, 
Sequencing of project's costs and 
benefits, Project categorization as 
a long investment, Salvage value, 
Closing costs, and Overall size of 
project. 
Personal reinforcement history 
and Erors in information 
processing. 
External justification, 
Management identified with 
project, Norms of consistency 
and modelling. 
Organisational: technical side-
bets, Political support, and 
Institutionalization. 
Contextual: Project became 
larger than the company, and 
External political parties. 
3. Drummond  (1994) Paucity of alternatives.  Committee embarrassment, 
Political pressures, and Desire 
to maintain appearance. 
The committee was tied to 
their inheritance.  
4.  Drummond (1995) Costs of withdrawal and Salvage 
value.  
 Fear of confrontation. Timing of information. 
5. Newman & Sabherwal 
(1996)  
Project payoff, payoff structure, 
Infeasibility of alternatives, 
Salvage value, and Closing costs.   
Reinforcement traps, 
Information processing errors, 
Value attached to turnarounds, 
Sunk costs, and Framing. 
Public identification with 
project, Responsibility for 
failure, Modelling, and Political 
rivalry.  
Political support and resource 
constrains. 
6. Drummond & 
Hodgson (1996)  
  Director became a scapegoat, 
Political pressures, and 
Preserving the image. 
Committee was tied to its 
inheritance.  
 
7.  Sabherwal et al. (2003)  Project payoff, Cost of payoff. Initial commitment, Decision 
frame. 
Competitor experience, Job 
security. 
CEO support, Side bets 
8.  Chakravorty (2009)  Unclear definition and incorrect 
sequence of program, Illusion of 
control, Lack of long-term 
improvement objectives, 
Unavailability of accurate and 
unbiased data. 
Selective perception   
 
9. Alvarez et al. (2011)  Low salvage value, Expedition 
goal had a large payoff, 
Mismanaged information. 
Prior history of success, 
Reinforcement traps, , Personal 
responsibility, Ego implications 
Competitive rivalry, Revelation 
of errors and failure. 
Organisational 
(institutionalization, Pursuit 
of enterprise growth) 
 
